Vol. 16 No. 32 (2025): Communities and possible worlds. Community experiences and practices of resistance in neoliberal rationality
Articles

Counter-Resistant Digital Communities: The Impact of Truth Social in a Fragmented Society

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  • Daniele Battista,
  • Marta Gallina
Daniele Battista
Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali, Management & Innovation Systems (DISA-MIS) Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy
Marta Gallina
European School of Political and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Lille, France
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36253/smp-16188

Published 2025-12-30

Keywords

  • truth social,
  • polarization,
  • digital communities,
  • political communication,
  • ideological identity

How to Cite

Battista, D., & Gallina , M. (2025). Counter-Resistant Digital Communities: The Impact of Truth Social in a Fragmented Society. SocietàMutamentoPolitica, 16(32), 37–47. https://doi.org/10.36253/smp-16188

Copyright (c) 2025 Daniele Battista, Marta Gallina

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In today’s digital landscape, social media platforms serve as central spaces for political communication and community building. However, the growing fragmentation of information has fostered ideological polarization and the emergence of closed environments, such as Truth Social, launched by Donald Trump following his exclusion from traditional channels. Focusing on the U.S. case, this study examines how Truth Social functions as a refuge for groups perceived as isolated from mainstream discourse, offering a context of cultural and political “resistance” that often conveys identitarian and exclusionary visions. The article explores communicative dynamics and the construction of political identity within this alternative digital space, where the algorithm rewards engagement regardless of the reliability of the content. The result is a progressive radicalization, fuelled by echo chambers and filter bubbles that strengthen internal cohesion and limit democratic dialogue. Through an illustrative comparative reading of significant posts published by Trump on Truth Social, X, Instagram, and TikTok during the 2024 presidential campaign, the study highlights differences in tone, political purpose, and rhetorical strategies. While Truth Social fosters a direct, intimate, and polarizing communication with Trump’s electoral base, the other platforms reveal a more strategic and performative use of language. The text technically emphasizes how Truth Social is not merely a distribution tool but rather a true space of ideological belonging, contributing to the formation of closed communities and the radicalization of public opinion. The article thus offers a critical reflection on the role of alternative platforms in reshaping the public sphere and the democratic implications of growing digital segmentation.

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