Vol. 6 No. 1 (2013): Wittgenstein on Aesthetics / Aesthetics on Wittgenstein
Articles

The Content of a Seeing-As Experience

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  • Alberto Voltolini
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Aisthesis-12848

Published 2013-05-15

Keywords

  • Seeing-as,
  • intentionalism,
  • seeing-in,
  • cognitive penetrability

How to Cite

Voltolini, A. (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi dell’estetico, 6(1), 215–237. https://doi.org/10.13128/Aisthesis-12848
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Abstract

In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational seeing-as (its configurational fold) and by an experience of knowingly illusory seeing-as (its recognitional fold). To my mind, Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing-as have anticipated these claims.
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