Vol. 14 No. 2 (2021): Finalism in judgment, finalism of judging
Monographica

Husserl’s Teleologie der «tiefen» Assoziationen as Foundation of the Theory of Judgment in comparison with Millikan’s Teleosemantic Theory

Andrea Lanza
University of Florence
Published January 24, 2022
Keywords
  • Absolute cognition,
  • Passive syntheses,
  • Regulative function,
  • Teleosemantics,
  • Evolutionary conditions
How to Cite
Lanza, A. (2022). Husserl’s Teleologie der «tiefen» Assoziationen as Foundation of the Theory of Judgment in comparison with Millikan’s Teleosemantic Theory. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi dell’estetico, 14(2), 65-78. https://doi.org/10.36253/Aisthesis-13152

Abstract

The paper inquires Husserl’s immanent teleology of conscious life, conceived as a Teleologie der «tiefen» Assoziationen. The associative genesis entails synthetical processes in the primordial-associative field, driven by the general concept of interest. The resulting syntheses ground the various forms of judgments, both judgments on experience and predicative ones in general. Since the theory’s foundation relies on pre-predicative experience, then it must encompass its teleological dimension and, in this sense, the concept of evidence – pivotal in the theory – mirrors the result of the synthesis of fulfilment. This latter, in turn, is driven in an asymptotic path towards a teleological idea of adequacy. This account expresses the complementary mirroring that characterizes the relationship between judging and teleology, without the need to separate teleology from reason. In order to highlight the significance of this framing, the paper is closed by a brief comparison with R. Millikan’s teleosemantic theory, whose concept of teleology is shown as flawed by the general concerns proper to naturalism.

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