From the first to the third Critique. Judgment sensible position and Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigkeit

Abstract

Starting from Lyotard’s definition of Kantian reflection as “judgment repercussion”, my contribution aims to describe the logical side of this repercussion. To do this, I will focus on Kant’s concept of “judgment”, explaining it as the logical act of constitution of experience. I will then point out how judgment involves sensibility for its self-affection and restriction to sensibility. Finally, I’ll give a nominal explication of Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigkeit, returning to Lyotard’s interpretation. The purpose, in so doing, is to offer to Lyotard’s key concept a logical validation, finding its foundation in the Critique of pure Reason itself. And thus to gain an aesthetical definition of Judgment principle, to read the third Critique.