



**Citation:** Guerra, N. (2026). Ecofascism's Dual Legacy: Local Revolts and Imperial Dreams in Italy. *Società Mutamento Politica* 17(33): 183-199. doi: 10.36253/smp-17050

© 2026 Author(s). This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (<https://www.fupress.com>) and distributed, except where otherwise noted, under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 License for content and CC0 1.0 Universal for metadata.

**Data Availability Statement:** All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.

**Competing Interests:** The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.

**ORCID:**  
NG: 0000-0003-2519-7041

## Ecofascism's Dual Legacy: Local Revolts and Imperial Dreams in Italy

NICOLA GUERRA

*University of Turku, Turku, Finland*  
E-mail: nicola.guerra@utu.fi

**Abstract.** This study analyzes the ideological and political frameworks of three Italian radical ecofascist movements: the National Anarchists (N-As), the Alliance of Italian Anarchist Nationalists (ANAI), and National Resistance - National Autonomists (NR-NA). Employing a multi-methodological approach, with a particular emphasis on inductive qualitative thematic analysis, the research reconstructs the ideological foundations of these movements, focusing on the pivotal role of nature within their doctrines. These groups are identified not merely as far-right environmentalists, but as genuine ecofascists, who elevate natural laws above human legislation, drawing on an organicist worldview rooted in nature. The study reveals their rejection of nationalism and the nation-state, which they perceive as tools of capitalism, and underscores their distinctly anti-liberal political eclecticism, which is explored in its various dimensions.

**Keywords:** ecofascism, far-right environmentalism, Italian far right, environmentalism.

---

### 1. ECOFASCISM IN FOCUS: UNTANGLING A COMPLEX IDEOLOGY AMID RISING ATTENTION

Scholarly engagement with ecofascism has intensified in recent years, largely as a reactive response to episodes of politically motivated violence (Campion 2021; Darwish 2024; Hughes et al. 2022; Macklin 2022; Tarin 2023), rather than as the outcome of a sustained, coherent, and long-standing theoretical tradition. Earlier academic contributions, spanning the late 1980s through the 1990s, remained sporadic and were primarily concerned with tracing the historical, cultural, and ideological roots of ecofascist thought, rather than examining it as a contemporary political phenomenon (Bramwell 1985; 1989; Staudenmaier 1999a; 1999b; Olsen 1999).

It was only in the 2000s, and particularly from the second decade of the century onwards, that scholarly interest began to expand, with research progressively shifting towards a range of interconnected analytical domains, including the circulation of ecofascist discourses across digital environments and print media, the structural and motivational dynamics underpinning their development, and the interpretative frameworks through which ecofas-

cist movements articulate their identities and worldviews (Forchtner 2020; Hughes et al. 2022; Moore and Roberts 2022; Darwish 2024; Loadenthal 2022; Lubarda 2020; 2024; Malm and The Zetkin Collective 2021; Forchtner and Gruber 2024).

The developments observed and documented throughout the 2020s have been instrumental in directing scholarly attention towards the contemporary intersections between far-right and/or neo-fascist ideologies and ecological concerns. Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of this burgeoning body of literature, a fundamental conceptual ambiguity persists: no stable or universally endorsed definition has yet emerged to delineate what constitutes an ecofascist movement or political organisation, thereby rendering the term analytically contested within the academic field (Guerra 2025).

Precisely for this reason, recent scholarship has increasingly interrogated whether ecofascism constitutes a sufficiently robust analytical category capable of capturing the complex and heterogeneous interactions between environmental concerns and far-right political projects. This issue of conceptual framing must therefore be clarified prior to articulating the research questions and establishing the significance of the selected case studies examined in this article.

Some authors, regarding the classification of ecofascism as unduly restrictive, have advanced the concept of Far-Right Ecologism (FRE) as a broader and more flexible analytical framework, designed to account for the plurality of normative orientations that arise at the intersection of far-right ideology and ecological thought. These include, *inter alia*, organicist worldviews, spiritual and naturalist belief systems, authoritarian imaginaries, projects of economic autarky, nostalgic narratives, and forms of dualistic moral reasoning (Lubarda 2020).

Within this interpretative reconfiguration, ecofascism is no longer treated as an autonomous ideological formation; rather, it is subsumed within a wider analytical inquiry into the ways in which environmental discourses are appropriated, rearticulated, and mobilised across the far-right spectrum (Hughes et al. 2022). Proponents of this approach further contend that far-right ecologism affords greater conceptual precision than the category of ecofascism, insofar as it frames these dynamics as a mode of political practice that sustains hierarchical social orders and capitalist relations, while simultaneously drawing upon ethnonationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, and, in certain instances, the legitimisation of violence (Moore and Roberts 2022, 13).

While the FRE framework has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in opening a previously neglected field of inquiry, it concurrently perpetuates the assumption that

environmentally oriented actors on the far right remain analytically indistinguishable from the broader far-right milieu. In this regard, the FRE perspective would benefit from a more systematic and sustained engagement with the expanding corpus of scholarship on far-right climate scepticism and environmental denial, which foregrounds the internal contradictions and ideological tensions inherent within these movements (Forchtner and Lubarda 2022; Vowles and Hultman 2021; Barla and Bjork-James 2021). Moreover, such undifferentiated approaches risk generating reductive and stereotypical interpretations, for instance by collapsing ecofascism into a mere rhetorical façade for racism or reductively branding it as ‘racial capitalism’ (Iosifidis 2026), thereby obscuring its more complex ideological configurations and variegated articulations.

The FRE approach is further constrained in its capacity to capture processes of intra-far-right differentiation and fragmentation, particularly with regard to distinguishing between fully fledged ecofascist formations and actors who merely appropriate ecofascist or environmentalist motifs in a selective manner. The former are typically structured around an organicist cult of nature and characterised by anti-systemic, anti-statist, extra-parliamentary, and markedly anti-modern orientations, frequently advancing insurrectionary strategies or envisaging the gradual erosion of the nation-state, which they regard as an obsolete political form. By contrast, far-right militants who incorporate ecofascist elements tend to remain firmly anchored in nationalism and statism, promoting a hyper-nationalist vision of a strong and sovereign state, conceived in organicist terms as the ‘brain’ governing the social body. Within this framework, ecological discourse is subordinated to broader projects of authoritarian governance and national consolidation (Guerra 2025; Forchtner and Kølvrå 2017).

Accordingly, the present article adopts the perspective of those scholars who conceptualise ecofascism as an autonomous ideological formation, and it is therefore instructive to revisit and refine existing definitional accounts. Champion (2021, 926), for instance, characterises ecofascism as a synthesis of revolutionary aspiration and reactionary politics. Within this framework, ecofascist thought is oriented towards the symbolic renewal of a collectively imagined community, the cohesion of which is presumed to have been eroded. This perceived decline is attributed, albeit indirectly, to the rupture of an allegedly primordial bond with nature – a dislocation ascribed to the advance of modernity in its various manifestations, including industrialisation, urbanisation, cultural pluralism, consumerism, and the ascendancy of individualism. From this standpoint, the restoration of an idealised natural order is envisaged as the principal

mechanism through which authenticity, hierarchy, and collective strength may be reconstituted (Campion 2021; Benoist, Turner and Bailey 2026).

Within ecofascist thought there resides a distinctly palingenetic vision, oriented towards restoring society to a communitarian form (Griffin 1991, 33). This imagined community is not equated with the nation-state – regarded instead as a product of modern decadence, shaped by Masonic, capitalist, and individualist forces (Guerra 2025) – but rather with an organic social order believed to have once existed. Ecofascism thus seeks to reclaim the purported benefits once conferred upon its members by recreating a lost society, whose decline is attributed to the intrusion of “impurities” that have weakened it and rendered it vulnerable to its enemies (Campion 2021).

It is further important to note that ecofascism is not articulated as a fixed or systematically codified doctrine; rather, it is more appropriately understood as a political-theoretical orientation grounded in the primacy of an “organic” conception of society. This conception not only diverges from the nation-state but is explicitly opposed to and posited as an alternative to it, being instead anchored in the idealisation of micro-communities modelled upon those deemed “traditional.” Within these reimagined communities – constructed in deliberate opposition to the national framework – the subordination of individual interests to the integrity of nature, conceived as a coherent and hierarchically ordered whole, constitutes the central tenet of ecofascist thought (Guerra 2025).

Although the term itself exhibits a considerable degree of conceptual fluidity and remains subject to ongoing processes of rearticulation, a measure of internal coherence is nonetheless sustained through the recurrent emphasis on organicism. In accordance with this logic, nature is envisaged as an indivisible and overarching organism, a supreme totality within which all constituent elements participate in a state of functional equilibrium. Ecofascist imaginaries subsequently transpose this organicist vision onto society itself, which is similarly construed as a living entity governed by principles of hierarchy and functional differentiation. Within such a framework, individuals are assigned specific roles or “missions” in accordance with these principles, thereby contributing not merely to the welfare, but more precisely to the presumed “health” of the collective body (Guerra 2025).

## 2. MAPPING ECOFASCISM: OBJECTIVES AND ANALYTICAL METHODS

Having thus clarified the profound divergence in the respective orientations towards the nation-state and

nationalism between far-right movements exhibiting ecological sensitivities and explicitly ecofascist formations, the present article turns to the Italian context. More specifically, the analysis concentrates on three extra-parliamentary groups that can be clearly identified as distinctly ecofascist: the National Anarchists (N-As), the Alliance of Italian Anarchist Nationalists (ANAI), and National Resistance – National Autonomists (NR-NA) (Guerra, 2025). The object of analysis is deliberately circumscribed to groups that have already been examined and classified in the literature as explicitly ecofascist (Guerra 2025), operating – within the scope of this study – primarily in Italy, and more specifically in Northern Italy. The decision to focus on overtly ecofascist formations necessarily entails a degree of geographical delimitation; however, this should not be regarded as restrictive. On the contrary, such delimitation enables the level of analytical precision required to distinguish systematically between genuinely ecofascist formations and instances of ecological sensibility within the broader far-right milieu.

Furthermore, these groups are characterised by documented patterns of transnational collaboration, thereby offering a potentially fruitful avenue for future research on ecofascist transnationalism. Finally, Italy itself – having for decades constituted a central locus for far-right activism, ecofascist currents, and hybrid anti-hegemonic ideologies such as Red-Brownism (Ferraresi 2012; Marano and De Feudis 2021; Guerra 2024; 2025) – may be considered a particularly privileged observational setting for the purposes of this inquiry.

Within this analytical framework, the research questions seek to arrive at a precise conceptualisation of the specific form of ecofascism adopted by the three movements under examination, with particular attention to how they position themselves in relation to the nation-state and nationalism as ecofascist actors. Do they articulate an intensified form of hyper-nationalism, or rather a communitarian, anti-statist, and anti-nationalist orientation?

Furthermore, the study interrogates their stance vis-à-vis liberal-capitalist modernity. Can these formations be interpreted, as some scholars have suggested, through the lens of “racial capitalism” (Iossifidis 2026), or do they instead advance explicitly anti-capitalist critiques? Finally, the research seeks to determine the organisational and aggregative characteristics of the ecofascist communities envisaged by these groups, with particular emphasis on their internal structure, modes of cohesion, and socio-political logics of formation.

From an analytical standpoint, this study builds upon recently published research on the three movements under examination (Guerra 2025) and extends it

through a more sustained interrogation of their relationship to the state, nationalism, and the idealised community conceived in organicist terms. This constitutes a form of analytical deepening that does not rely exclusively on secondary literature, but instead adopts a practice-oriented methodological approach, engaging directly with textual materials produced and disseminated via the movements' official websites and social media platforms. Collected throughout 2024, these sources allow for a more fine-grained empirical elaboration and critical refinement of the findings established in previous scholarship, while also enabling a more rigorous assessment of the extent to which the empirical evidence speaks to, and fulfils, the research objectives formulated in this study.

Building on existing knowledge of the three groups and recognising the inherently complex and multilayered nature of radical discourse, this study adopts a multimethod analytical framework designed to capture both the surface-level textual structures and the latent conceptual foundations of ecofascist thought. Such an approach is particularly necessary given the propensity of radical movements to mobilise heterogeneous cultural, social, and political repertoires while simultaneously deploying sophisticated rhetorical strategies.

These forms of communication seldom operate through transparent or uniform linguistic mechanisms; rather, they are characterised by shifting rhetorical registers, symbolic encoding, and contextual ambiguity. As Fairclough (1992) has argued, language does not merely reflect social structures but actively participates in their constitution and reproduction, particularly in relation to power and domination.

The principal methodological approach adopted is thematic analysis, which functions as a key interpretative instrument by enabling the systematic identification of semantic regularities and discursive focal points across extensive textual corpora. Through the detection of recurring motifs and conceptual configurations, this method provides insight into the normative orientations and strategic concerns underpinning a movement's communicative practices (Braun and Clarke 2006). In this sense, thematic analysis facilitates a shift from surface-level content description towards a more critical interrogation of how themes are constructed, hierarchised, and discursively legitimised.

It is therefore necessary to engage simultaneously with explicit argumentative structures and implicit processes of meaning-making. This requirement is particularly salient in the study of radical movements, whose communicative strategies frequently rely on indirect reference, metaphorical framing, and semiotic signalling, thereby necessitating both textual and contextual forms

of interpretation. In this regard, Wodak and Meyer (2009) emphasise that methodological pluralism, which is a constitutive feature of thematic analysis, enhances analytical robustness by enabling findings to be triangulated across multiple interpretative lenses, thereby yielding a more nuanced and comprehensive account of politically saturated discourse. On this basis, the present analysis adopts a composite thematic framework, integrating political discourse analysis, thematic categorisation, and linguistic register analysis in relation to the collected communicative materials produced by the groups under examination.

As articulated by Braun and Clarke (2006, 79), thematic analysis provides a systematic means of identifying, examining, and presenting recurrent patterns of meaning, while remaining sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide range of epistemological and theoretical positions. Such methodological openness is of particular relevance when engaging with radical discourses, which frequently resist stable ideological typologies and may simultaneously articulate contradictory, overlapping, or internally tensioned positions.

The thematic analysis employed in this study is explicitly non-deductive. As Gibbs (2007, 48) cautions, deductive strategies may constrain analytical sensitivity by foregrounding pre-established categories that risk obscuring salient dimensions of the data that do not readily conform to predetermined thematic structures. By contrast, an inductive approach, as adopted here, foregrounds attentiveness to emergent meanings and sustains a close engagement with the ways in which actors within radical movements construct, negotiate, and reconfigure their belief systems.

This approach is particularly valuable for capturing processes of ideological transformation, insofar as radical narratives often evolve dynamically in response to shifting political, social, and cultural contexts. In this regard, Clarke et al. (2015, 89) emphasise that inductive analysis facilitates a grounded reconstruction of meaning-making processes, rendering it especially well suited to tracing discourses whose content, emphasis, and internal coherence may change over time.

Moreover, inductive thematic analysis facilitates a more differentiated representation of ideological diversity within radical movements. By allowing themes to emerge organically from the corpus, this approach avoids treating such movements as ideologically monolithic and instead brings into relief the plurality of voices, internal tensions, and situated experiential standpoints that constitute their discursive landscapes. As noted by Lune and Berg (2017, 167), inductive procedures are particularly well suited to illuminating the het-

erogeneity inherent in radical milieus, thereby enabling a richer and more fine-grained account of their ideological configurations.

For these reasons, an inductive thematic approach offers distinct analytical advantages over deductive alternatives, insofar as it enables a more nuanced understanding of the narratives, motivations, and symbolic repertoires underpinning radical ideologies. As O'Brien (2006, 45) observes, classificatory clarity derived from inductive thematic analysis facilitates a structured comprehension of ideological formations and the socio-political environments within which they operate.

For clarity and transparency, it is appropriate to specify the textual corpora collected and examined. In the case of N-As, their communications were observed and compiled from a fragmented online presence, disseminated across various far-right and environmentalist networks through comments, as well as via the movement's official international Facebook page. By contrast, the communications of ANAI were sourced from the official Facebook page of the Italian branch, which also articulates a clearly defined political programme. Regarding NR-NA, the texts collected and analysed were retrieved from the movement's official online platform entitled National Resistance.

From both a methodological and analytical standpoint, it is also worth noting that this study pertains to what may be defined as the phase of ideological development and social-media-based communication of the three movements. This phase is, however, explicitly interrupted over the period 2013–2020, as the groups transition towards a communicative regime increasingly reliant on encrypted channels and thereby less exposed to public visibility and collective scrutiny. Where relevant within the analytical framework of the study, verbatim quotations from the groups' writings are reproduced in quotation marks. These, however, do not constitute the primary object of inquiry; rather, as previously clarified, such texts function as the empirical textual corpus for thematic analysis aimed at reconstructing the underlying ideological architectures.

### 3. DECENTRALIZING POWER: N-AS' VISION FOR A FEDERATION OF DIRECTLY DEMOCRATIC ECO-COMMUNITIES

In the Italian context, the National Anarchists (N-As) emerged in the late 1980s within milieus closely associated with the intellectual currents of the *Nouvelle Droite* (ND) (Guerra 2025), to which the group's discourse makes both implicit and explicit reference. This

is evidenced by citations and conceptual borrowings from Alain de Benoist, which situate the group within a discernible ideological lineage and genealogy of influence stemming from the ND. It should nevertheless be noted that, rather than constituting a coherent or unified doctrine, the ND is more accurately understood as a heterogeneous ideological formation whose contours resist conventional political classification. Numerous scholars have characterised it as an assemblage or constellation of interrelated ideas, encompassing positions ranging from ethnonationalist and far-right orientations to discursive elements more commonly associated with anarchist thought (Griffin 1991; Taguieff 1994; François 2014). Consequently, the existence of a stable ideological relationship does not, in itself, provide a sufficient basis for automatically clarifying or determining the group's political positions.

A defining characteristic of the ND is, moreover, the absence of a fixed programmatic text or authoritative manifesto. Instead, as Kaplan (1997) observes, it operates through a network of mutually reinforcing discourses that intersect with multiple strands of contemporary right-wing ideology. This discursive openness contributes to its capacity to mobilise supporters from diverse backgrounds, united less by a shared blueprint for political action than by a convergent rejection of liberal universalism and the cultural foundations of modernity. Within this framework, themes such as ethnocultural identity, critiques of globalisation, and selective engagements with environmentalism occupy a central place, drawing on a wide array of philosophical and political influences (de Benoist 2012). It is within this sense – and within this complex and internally heterogeneous constellation – that the N-As are most appropriately situated.

What should be emphasised in examining the relationship between the N-As and the ND is that, within the latter's intellectual universe, Alain de Benoist accords a foundational status to ecological thought, treating it not as a peripheral concern but as a structuring principle of his broader worldview. His engagement with environmentalism functions primarily as a critique of modern civilisation, understood as driven by industrialisation, technological rationality, and mass consumption, which together produce both a rupture between human communities and the natural world and the erosion of traditional social and cultural forms. For de Benoist, ecological thought is not reducible to technical or policy-oriented solutions, but rather constitutes a fundamental critique of modernity itself (de Benoist 2012). Environmental degradation is thus interpreted as a symptom of a deeper civilisational crisis, rooted in instrumental and anthropocentric conceptions of nature, whereby eco-

logical crises reveal profound existential ruptures rather than merely failures of governance or technology.

Having delineated, so to speak, the political family to which the N-As may be ascribed, it is important to note that even a preliminary examination of the group's digital output reveals a marked absence of formal manifestos or systematically articulated doctrinal statements. Rather than advancing a coherent programme, the movement communicates its positions through fragmented and often implicit discursive interventions.

Nonetheless, a preliminary assessment of the N-As' materials indicates that the ideological core of the movement is organised around a clearly identifiable thematic nexus, namely the overarching sacralisation of the natural world, which is treated as the ultimate source of normative authority. A qualitative thematic analysis of N-As communications reveals three analytically distinct yet mutually reinforcing domains that structure the movement's worldview: the symbolic and normative status of nature, conceptions of economic organisation, and imaginaries of political authority and statehood. These three thematic clusters are internally configured in such a way that the understanding of nature – elevated to a transcendent normative reference point – occupies a foundational position, permeating and shaping the remaining dimensions of the ideology (Guerra 2025).

With regard to the thematic cluster concerning the symbolic and normative status of nature, the N-As conceive the natural order as governed by immutable principles that lie beyond the reach of human will or legislative intervention. Human attempts to override these principles – particularly those driven by anthropocentric hubris and technological domination – are portrayed as violations of an eternal natural order. Accordingly, social organisation is envisaged as a form of collective life that must be modelled in accordance with natural laws. This orientation gives rise to an organicist conception of society, in which human communities are understood as inseparable components of a wider ecological and normative totality. Within this framework, recurring formulations assert that “human society can neither act nor regulate itself according to normative principles that contravene those established by Nature,” and that “to violate the sacred principles of Nature entails the death of the social organism, as when the roots of a tree are severed or a source is dried up.”

With regard to the second thematic cluster, contemporary economic systems are subjected to a sharp critique, particularly insofar as they are associated with capitalist rationality and productivist imperatives that are seen to “erode natural equilibria”. Such practices are interpreted as symptomatic of a broader civilisa-

tional rupture between humanity and the natural world. Importantly, this position extends beyond conventional environmentalist discourse by asserting that “the legitimacy of human legal and political arrangements should ultimately derive from their conformity to natural principles”, rather than from abstract, anthropocentric notions of progress or utility.

Within this framework, economic organisation, according to the N-As, cannot contravene an organicist conception of social life, whereby human communities are expected to mirror the structural logic of the natural world, operating as cohesive and self-regulating wholes rather than as aggregates of autonomous individuals. Society – and its economic system – is thus envisaged as a “living system in which each component – whether individual, group, or institution – derives its meaning from its contribution to the continuity and equilibrium of the collective body.”

Organicism, as a broader intellectual tradition, conceptualises social order – of which the economic sphere is merely a component – through biological metaphors, portraying societies as organisms composed of interdependent elements whose cooperation ensures survival and stability (Sermonti 1966; 1992; Guerra 2025). Within N-As discourse, the perceived breakdown of the reciprocal relationship between humanity and nature is attributed to the ascendancy of capitalist and productivist logics, which are depicted as having dismantled inherited social bonds and replaced them with atomised forms of existence driven by material self-interest. The resulting condition is described as one of “existential disorientation”, characterised by individualism, economic competition, and the erosion of collective meaning.

The second domain, concerning economic organisation, is characterised by a radical rejection of capitalism. Capitalism is depicted in highly moralised and confrontational terms as a “destructive force responsible for social disintegration and environmental degradation”. This oppositional rhetoric is designed both to challenge liberal-economic assumptions and to mobilise political engagement by framing capitalism as a pervasive source of systemic harm affecting both society and nature.

It is within this thematic framework that the N-As propose an alternative centred on the collectivisation of productive enterprises, envisaged as institutions to be administered directly by workers through participatory mechanisms such as factory councils. This model reflects a historical lineage that draws on the ideological experiments of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), the final phase of fascist rule, during which efforts were made to reframe fascism as a socially radical and anti-capitalist project (Osti Guerrazzi 2012; Rocca 2009; Tosi 2008). A

symbolic reference point for this synthesis is the figure of Nicola Bombacci, whose political trajectory – from co-founder of the Italian Communist Party to advocate of fascist socialisation – embodies the convergence of radical left and fascist economic imaginaries. His execution alongside Benito Mussolini in Piazzale Loreto has rendered him a potent emblem within narratives that seek to legitimise anti-capitalist positions rooted in fascist historical experience (Niccolai and Vincenti 2022; Guerra 2026a).

The N-As argue that, once what is represented as “capitalist domination” has been overcome, economic activity may be reconfigured as unfolding within a competitive environment, provided that no single actor is able to acquire monopolistic control. In this configuration, market exchange is not rejected outright, but rather redefined as acceptable only insofar as enterprises are liberated from private ownership and reorganised along collective lines.

Such a position closely parallels the intellectual legacy of revolutionary syndicalism, a tradition that sought to reconcile anti-capitalist struggle with the selective retention of market dynamics (Sorel 1908; Labriola 1906; Olivetti 1914a; 1914b). Revolutionary syndicalism advanced the principle that productive units should be transferred into the hands of workers themselves, thereby enabling direct participation in management and decision-making while preserving inter-enterprise competition. As Guérin (1965) famously argued, market mechanisms need not disappear under conditions of socialisation, provided that production is governed by workers rather than by capital. From this perspective, competition is stripped of its exploitative character and subordinated to democratic control, ensuring that economic activity is no longer dictated exclusively by profit maximisation.

This rearticulated understanding of the market also illuminates the specific variant of organicism endorsed by the movement, which departs significantly from authoritarian interpretations of the organic metaphor. In contrast to models that attribute a privileged or commanding role to a single institutional centre, this conception rejects the notion that any single component of the social or economic order should exercise dominance over the others. The movement explicitly refuses to equate the state with a directing “brain” responsible for the regulation of the entire social body. Classical political theory distinguishes between authoritarian organicism – where the state exercises hierarchical control over subordinate elements (Schmitt 2001; Müller 2025) – and non-authoritarian organicism, which emphasises functional plurality and reciprocal interdependence (Dur-

kheim 1984; Spencer 1860). Freund (1968) associates the former with rigid social ordering and the subordination of individual autonomy to an overarching authority. By contrast, non-authoritarian organicism conceives of society as a network of interacting parts, each retaining a degree of autonomy while contributing to overall systemic stability. As Agamben (1998) suggests, an authentically organic conception must accommodate plurality and continuous interaction rather than impose uniformity from above. The movement’s adherence to this latter interpretation is reinforced by its explicit repudiation of the nation-state, which it associates with coercive “centralisation” and “chauvinistic nationalism”.

Indeed, the dissolution of the nation-state constitutes a central political objective of N-As. The movement aligns itself with autonomist initiatives in Italy and abroad that contest the legitimacy of state sovereignty, conceiving the state as an institutional apparatus fundamentally oriented toward the protection and reproduction of capitalist interests rather than the pursuit of social justice. In accordance with classical Marxist critiques, the state is represented as a structural facilitator of capital accumulation, inherently predisposed to privileging economic elites over the broader populace. This perspective closely resonates with Harvey’s (2005) conceptualisation of the nation-state as an instrument that sustains the requisite conditions for capitalist expansion. Consequently, state policies are interpreted as mechanisms through which socio-economic inequalities are reproduced and entrenched, thereby consolidating wealth and power within a narrow and structurally advantaged minority.

This critique extends to the very concept of the nation, which is understood as historically constituted through processes of capitalist development, particularly during the Industrial Revolution. The consolidation of national identities is thereby interpreted as being closely intertwined with the functional imperatives of industrial capitalism, insofar as processes of economic integration and intensifying competition generated novel forms of political organisation. Such assessments resonate strongly with Hobsbawm (1992), who famously observed that the nation-state emerged as a central actor within the global capitalist system, binding national identity to imperatives of economic performance and productivity.

Within this interpretative framework, the ideological hybrid often labelled “anarcho-fascism” – from which the movement’s nomenclature appears in part to derive – assumes a significant symbolic role. This fusion of anarchist and fascist elements, notwithstanding its internal contradictions, operates as a populist critique of contemporary political arrangements and appeals to

constituencies disillusioned with liberal-democratic governance (Kinna 2019; Nilsson 2017; Donovan 2013). In the Italian context, such ideological crosscurrents are not novel, but rather traceable from the fascist period through to post-war far-right formations, including the *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari* (NAR), whose praxis has been characterised by what has been described as ‘armed spontaneity’ (Guerra 2024).

In this respect, N-As does not merely identify an adversary, but also articulates and projects a normative vision of the future. In the envisaged post-statist order, political life would be reorganised around self-governing communities interconnected through “voluntary federative arrangements”. Governance within this putative “federation of communities” would be grounded in principles of direct democracy, whereby decision-making authority is vested directly in the demos rather than being mediated through elected representatives. Instruments such as referenda and popular initiatives are thereby valorised as mechanisms capable of ensuring immediacy of participation and democratic accountability. Representative democracy, by contrast, is dismissed as a merely formal construct, ostensibly “concealing oligarchic domination by economic and financial elites” beneath the “normative façade of liberal constitutionalism”.

This communitarian and federalist vision resonates strongly with de Benoist’s theorisation of ‘small homelands,’ which privileges regional belonging and cultural particularity over homogenising national or global identities. For de Benoist (1999), political communities ought to be understood as historically sedimented constellations of shared destiny, embedded within specific cultural and territorial contexts. The emphasis on local identities is thereby advanced as a corrective to the perceived cultural erosion associated with globalisation, fostering forms of solidarity and continuity which, it is argued, large-scale political units tend systematically to undermine (de Benoist 2006). This outlook aligns closely with ethnopluralist thought, which advocates the preservation of cultural diversity through the maintenance of distinct, territorially bounded communities. In de Benoist’s formulation, ethnopluralism rejects both assimilationist universalism and integrative multiculturalism, instead positing that coexistence is best secured through separation and reciprocal recognition (Held 2018; Sen 2007).

The movement’s endorsement of this model is inseparable from its broader denunciation of global capitalism, depicted as a homogenising force driven by multinational corporations that reduce populations to interchangeable consumers. Globalisation is interpreted as an extension of Western capitalist dominance, perpetuating structural inequalities at the expense of Africa and

the Global South. In response, the movement gestures towards alternative imaginaries of resistance, including forms of pan-African nationalism symbolised by figures such as Thomas Sankara, whose legacy is invoked as an example of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist defiance.

#### 4. GREEN INSURRECTION: ANAI’S VISION FOR ORGANIC MICRO-COMMUNITIES BEYOND THE STATE

The second organisation examined in this study, ANAI, appears to be deliberately withdrawing from mainstream social media platforms while signalling its intended convergence with National-Anarchist networks (N-As). This strategic repositioning is explicitly conveyed through a statement published on its Facebook page<sup>1</sup>: “By now, the project has become somewhat restrictive on Facebook. In the meantime, we are joining en masse the National-Anarchist Movement group.” This shift is further reinforced by a celebratory post welcoming the presence within the group of Troy Southgate, described in the following terms: “It is a great honour for us to have in our group the father of National Anarchism, Troy Southgate. Together, for the Third Way.” Southgate is a British political activist and theorist, initially associated with the European far-right milieu, from which he subsequently distanced himself. In the 1990s, he founded the International Third Position (ITP), a movement characterised by a synthesis of nationalism, spiritual traditionalism, and anti-capitalism. He is most prominently recognised for elaborating the ideological current of National-Anarchism, a doctrine that endeavours to synthesise elements of anarchism with ethnically and culturally delimited identities, while simultaneously rejecting both global capitalism and the centralised state, and advocating for the establishment of autonomous, self-governing communities grounded in distinct ethno-cultural formations.

The ANAI Facebook group, which at its last recorded update prior to the shift towards encrypted channels comprised 156 followers, is characterised by the circulation of both programmatic and organisational content. Within this online space, discussions took place regarding possible strategic developments, including the establishment of an official web presence, the creation of a territorial section, and the launch of a membership recruitment campaign; the latter proposal was ultimately rejected by users. From the outset, the group demon-

<sup>1</sup> The page of the movement, although it has now been stripped of many posts, can be accessed at the following address: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068855184254>.

strates a clear effort to distance itself from the nationalist far-right milieu. In this regard, the protest formation associated with the so-called 'Forconi' movement – an Italian grassroots protest wave that emerged in 2013, initially involving farmers, lorry drivers, and small business owners mobilised against austerity measures, taxation, and perceived political and economic elites – is explicitly repudiated due to its perceived proximity to Forza Nuova, which ANAI militants dismissively and polemically rebrand as "Fogna Nuova" ["New Sewer"]. Furthermore, although the movement appears to be structured through informal and decentralised networks – consisting of localised cells or groups lacking stable coordination, and defined more by ideological and theoretical coherence than by formalised organisational structures with territorial continuity – it nevertheless appears to have been active primarily, if not exclusively, in Northern Italy.

ANAI, as a movement, is notable for two defining characteristics. First, it articulates a codified six-point programme, publicly accessible online; second, its rhetoric is explicitly revolutionary in tone, advancing insurrection as both a legitimate and immediate instrument of political action. These six points, which constitute the foundation for the present thematic analysis, may be conceptually organised into three principal domains: conceptions of political authority, economic principles, and the ideological elevation of nature.

Within the first of these domains – namely, conceptions of political authority – three key points articulate a categorical rejection of the nation-state (Guerra 2025). In their shared aversion to the national state, a further divergence emerges between ANAI and the N-As. Whereas the latter emphasise the gradual erosion of state power through support for autonomist initiatives, ANAI instead advocates an abrupt and forceful overthrow, framing "revolution" as an urgent imperative. The ANAI programme insists that the dismantling of the state must occur "without delay". In one post, it is stated: "We are slowly but inexorably expanding. LONG LIVE THE ITALIAN PEOPLE, DEATH TO THE TYRANNICAL STATE!"

In the aftermath of this rupture, the movement proposes the establishment of autonomous micro-communities, each comprising only a few thousand members. These units are conceived as self-governing entities, forming the basis of a broader federated structure intended to replace the abolished nation-state. This conception foregrounds decentralisation and the localisation of political organisation, reflecting a stronger affinity with anarcho-fascist thought and a pronounced scepticism towards hierarchical authority.

Still within the shared aversion to the nation-state as the principal enemy, it is important to note that,

unlike the approach adopted by the N-As, ANAI does not provide guidelines regarding internal governance mechanisms for collective decision-making. There is no explicit commitment to the form of "direct democracy" envisaged by the N-As; instead, the emphasis is placed on what is regarded as the overriding priority, namely immediate action and the operationalisation of revolutionary objectives. In line with this prioritisation of revolutionary necessity, the language deployed throughout the programme and its accompanying texts is highly charged, characterised by exhortations to "rebellion", imperatives for mobilisation, and a rhetoric designed to instil urgency and militancy among adherents. This discursive strategy seeks to translate core ideological principles into concrete action, framing insurrection as both a moral and strategic necessity (Guerra 2025).

Through this combination of anti-statist ambition, advocacy for small self-governing communities, and radical rhetorical style, ANAI constructs a vision of political transformation that is both immediate in execution and decentralised in organisation. Its programme, therefore, presents a coherent, if uncompromising, model in which revolutionary upheaval precedes the establishment of federated, locally autonomous communities, underlining the movement's rejection of conventional structures of authority and representative governance.

Within the corpus of ANAI's political programme, a distinct conceptual axis emerges concerning the organisation of the economy. This axis, articulated primarily in the fourth and fifth points of the movement's manifesto, advances a radical critique of prevailing capitalist structures. The fourth point envisions the total dissolution of capitalism, framing it as a structural condition that inhibits genuine social and economic emancipation. Complementing this, the fifth point proposes an alternative configuration: a systemic reorganisation in which economic enterprises are both socially appropriated and democratically administered by workers' councils, yet remain capable of engaging in competitive market dynamics. In this respect, ANAI's economic thought intersects with that of the N-As, reflecting a hybrid model in which socialisation and worker control coexist with market mechanisms. The movement's theoretical orientation draws upon the syndicalist legacies of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), while simultaneously resonating with the ethnopluralist and "small-homeland" paradigms articulated by de Benoist (1993; 2006). In its programmatic text, it is stated: "Economic Revolution for the creation of a free market composed exclusively of FaSinPat (Fábricas Sin Patrón), factories in which the owners are the workers themselves, who discuss and decide production strategies through factory assemblies."

The final point of ANAI's programme extends this critique to the natural environment, positioning ecology as a foundational parameter within which human action must be circumscribed. The establishment of a federal fund for environmental stewardship exemplifies the movement's assertion that nature constitutes a non-negotiable framework, threatened by what it identifies as "protracted capitalist exploitation" and the imperatives of extractive productivism. While traces of organicist thought are discernible, they remain subordinate and less systematically elaborated than in N-As doctrine. ANAI's orientation is resolutely forward-looking: it conceives the contemporary state system as inherently disintegrative and advocates its deconstruction in favour of forms of collective organisation more closely aligned with human and ecological interdependence – a vision that bears conceptual affinities with Franco Freda's critique of modernity (Freda 2000), as well as with de Benoist's ethnopluralist critique of liberal universalism and his concomitant emphasis on culturally and territorially embedded plural communities, and, more broadly, with "small-homeland" imaginaries of decentralised, identity-bound political organisation.

Freda's political theory elucidates the mechanisms of societal disintegration under liberal modernity, diagnosing a pervasive erosion of cultural cohesion and social solidarity. Modern institutions, characterised by bureaucratic centralisation and the promotion of individualism, are seen as alienating, severing the individual from the historical and communal matrix in which identity and purpose are grounded. Freda proposes a return to organically constituted communities, in which localism, historical consciousness, and the reaffirmation of shared values constitute the foundations of societal regeneration. While his intervention does not explicitly call for the abolition of the nation-state, it implicitly valorises decentralised forms of political and social organisation that counteract fragmentation and restore collective coherence (Freda 2000).

In synthesising these themes, ANAI articulates a framework that is both radical and theoretically nuanced. Its programme envisages the socialisation of production, the decentralisation of political authority, and the primacy of ecological stewardship, all within a critique of capitalist and statist paradigms. At the intersection of historical syndicalism, ethnopluralist philosophy, and critiques of liberal modernity, ANAI formulates a conceptual architecture in which economic, ecological, and social dimensions are inseparably interwoven, reflecting a coherent, if uncompromising, theoretical vision.

## 5. BEYOND CAPITALISM: NR-NA'S QUEST FOR A GREEN, ORGANIC, AND INDEPENDENT EUROPE

The National Resistance–National Autonomists (NR-NA), which for several years communicated online through dedicated pages – at least until 2021<sup>2</sup>, when its communicative activity shifted towards encrypted channels – exemplify a political formation whose communication strategy and ideological architecture are notably intricate, diverging significantly from the movements previously examined. The group is active in Northern Italy, with a particular concentration in Piedmont, and includes a subsidiary organisation known as *Resistenza Femminile* [Female Resistance], which operates under the slogan "Pink revolution against capitalism." Within its public political communication, four conceptual domains emerge as foundational to its discourse: institutional organisation, ideological orientation, economic conception, and the positioning of nature within its broader worldview.

The movement's economic perspective constitutes a central axis of its political reasoning. Capitalism is framed as an "instrument of global homogenisation" and as the engine of a so-called New World Order, whereby "human societies are reduced to networks of consumers" rather than autonomous communities. In response, NR-NA advocates robust state intervention in economic processes, rejecting free-market paradigms in favour of centralized control intended to protect local autonomy and counteract transnational economic domination. This economic critique resonates with a broader Third Positionist orientation, which seeks a synthesis of nationalist principles with selective socialist interventions, positioning itself against both liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism, while often aligning rhetorically with anti-imperialist struggles beyond Europe (Guerra 2025).

Ideology, however, remains a defining feature of NR-NA's programme. Unlike other contemporary far-right currents, the movement explicitly frames its positions within a coherent theoretical structure. Its nomenclature – National Autonomists – signals the primacy of autonomy as a guiding principle, merging commitments to national identity with advocacy for localized governance and cultural self-determination. In doing so, the group differentiates itself from conventional authoritarian nationalisms, which prioritize centralised power and the maintenance of ethnic or cultural homogeneity. The ideological scaffolding of NR-NA reflects affinities with Third Positionism and the neo-fascist tradition, incor-

<sup>2</sup> The two primary websites used for communication are the following: <https://resistenza-nazionale.blogspot.com/> and <https://autonominazionalisti.blogspot.com/>.

porating critiques of liberal democracy and globalization while emphasizing decentralisation, self-governance, and a reconfiguration of power to mirror the collective will (Bale 2002; Shaffer 2018; Guerra 2024).

Institutionally and geopolitically, the group advances the vision of a European or Eurasian empire. This aspiration draws upon the intellectual legacies of Jean Thiriart and the *Jeune Europe* movement of the 1960s, which envisaged a continental unification capable of counterbalancing American geopolitical influence. Thiriart's advocacy for a continental-nationalist synthesis – a Euro-Soviet or proto-Eurasianist framework – underpins NR-NA's rejection of traditional nation-state chauvinisms in favour of a supranational structure capable of harmonizing the interests of constituent polities (Thiriart 1984; Sauveur 1978; Guerra 2024). Here, the conception of empire is both normative and strategic: it functions as a unifying principle for Europe, conceived as a geopolitical entity under external constraint, and as a corrective to the fragmenting effects of globalization.

NR-NA's environmental discourse constitutes the fourth thematic axis, intimately connected to its organicist philosophy. Nature is conceived as a normative matrix, whose “eternal laws” ought to “guide human legislation and societal organisation”. The movement frames ecological degradation as a direct consequence of capitalist expansion and unrestrained productivism, advocating the protection of natural systems as a civilizational imperative. This organicist vision extends from the individual to the collective, implying that just as humans must align with ecological laws, nations and continental entities must embody internal cohesion and harmony. In this sense, the European/Eurasian empire functions as a macrocosmic expression of organicism, promoting balance among nations and safeguarding cultural and political integrity against external domination (Guerra 2024).

Finally, NR-NA's programmatic communication illustrates a complex interplay between autonomy, empire-building, economic critique, and ecological concern. By synthesizing nationalist principles with Third Positionist economic strategies, and by situating environmental stewardship within a broader organicist framework, the movement articulates a coherent theoretical architecture. Its vision juxtaposes the imperatives of local self-determination with supranational harmonization, presenting an ideological and practical alternative to the nation-state-centric and market-driven logics dominant in contemporary Europe. In doing so, NR-NA situates itself at the intersection of neo-fascist revivalism, national autonomist theory, and organicist political philosophy, while retaining a distinctive critique of globalization, liberalism, and transnational hegemony.

## 6. ECOFASCIST AGENDAS: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SHARED VISIONS AND DIVERGENT PATHS

Following a comprehensive analysis of the ideological frameworks of the three groups under examination, it has become evident that the first two – by virtue of their substantial ideological convergence and their present *de facto* amalgamation – may appropriately be treated as a single analytical category, hereafter designated as National Anarchism (NAn). By contrast, the third group, identified as NR-NA, shall hereafter be designated as National Autonomism (NAut) for the purposes of this political analysis. Both strands are generally subsumed within the broader analytical category of national-revolutionary movements (Macklin 2005), and have at times been, albeit somewhat reductively and in explicitly polemical terms, characterised as a form of fascist rebranding (Sunshine 2008).

However, the present analysis has facilitated the identification of two eco-fascist axes within the Italian radical landscape, thereby necessitating a systematic examination of both convergences and divergences, including the respective models of mobilisation associated with these ideological profiles and the broader cultural and political contexts within which they are embedded.

The key distinction between National Anarchism and National Autonomism lies in their respective positions on state authority. For the National Anarchists (NAn), the state is viewed as an oppressor that enforces multiculturalism and imposes artificial boundaries, thereby hindering the natural development of communities. As such, the movement vehemently rejects the nation-state, which it perceives as the driving force behind a “capitalist dictatorship” (Guerra 2025). NAn advocates for a dual approach to resisting the state. The first approach, aimed at long-term objectives, supports autonomist movements in order to weaken the state. The second, rooted in the desire for immediate revolution, promotes insurrection against the state. Both approaches operate within a framework of ethnopluralism (de Benoist 1993; 1999; 2006; Taguieff 1994), which envisions the establishment of homogeneous communities that collaborate federatively. Once the state is overthrown, NAn envisions a federation of communities or small homelands governed by direct democracy, rejecting the ‘deception of liberal representative democracy’.

In contrast, National Autonomism (NAut), while critical of the centralization and authoritarianism of the state, does not advocate for its destruction. Instead, it proposes autonomist reforms to better accommodate local specificities and autonomy, envisioning a federation of these autonomies within the state (Guerra 2025).

However, NAut also perceives the nation-state as a fundamental reality and as complicit in the processes of capitalist globalization, which it views as detrimental. Drawing on the ideas of Jean Thiriart and his 1960s movement *Jeune Europe* (Thiriart 1984; Sauveur 1978; Guerra 2024, 116-133), NAut idealizes a European and/or Eurasian empire as the preferred model. The objective is therefore not to reconfigure the nation-state along autonomist lines, but rather to establish an imperial structure in which distinct national identities are harmonised under a central authority, grounded in mutual respect and reciprocal recognition.

The economic perspectives of the two strands of eco-fascism – National Anarchist (NAn) and National Autonomist (NAut) – originate from a largely similar analysis but propose solutions that are only partially aligned. Both NAn and NAut are resolutely opposed to capitalism, which they regard as an unequivocal evil, with NAn advocating for its “absolute abolition”. Additionally, both movements critique globalization, viewing it as a capitalist tool designed to “create a homogenized world of consumers, upon whom customs, governments, and consumption patterns can be imposed”. The solution they propose involves the socialization of enterprises, drawing inspiration from the experience of the final phase of Italian republican fascism, which sought to reclaim the revolutionary and social roots of the movement (Legnani 1998; Martone 2008; Burgwyn 2018). For both NAn and NAut, companies should be owned by the workers and managed by workers’ councils (Guerra 2025). However, the two movements diverge in their views on the role of the market. According to NAn, once companies are socialized and liberated from capitalist influences, they should operate freely within a competitive market. In contrast, NAut views the free market as inherently problematic and argues that the market should be regulated by designated institutions to ensure control over economic practices.

Ideologically, as suggested by their respective names, significant differences exist between the two movements. The National Anarchists (NAn) align themselves with anarchism, which informs their staunch commitment to the overthrow of the nation-state. In contrast, the National Autonomists (NAut) have their roots in Marxist autonomism (Wright 2017; Cuninghame 2002), maintaining that the state functions as an instrument of the ruling class that oppresses workers and undermines collective self-management, thus requiring reform rather than abolition. In the Italian context, as reconstructed in this analysis, NAut identifies with Third Positionism, expressing affinity for National Bolshevism and left-wing fascism (Brandenberger 2002; Parlato 2000),

particularly in regard to the socialization of companies. Despite these ideological differences, both movements share a complex and eclectic identity, characterized by strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Furthermore, both NAn and NAut express solidarity with nationalist movements in Africa and the Global South, advocating for the liberation of these regions from what they perceive as American and capitalist domination (Guerra 2025).

Both the National Anarchists (NAn) and National Autonomists (NAut) adhere to ethnopluralist principles, though these are more pronounced in the case of NAn, which envisions homogeneous, federated micro-communities. NAn’s version of ethnopluralism is pushed to its extreme and correlates with its anarchist foundations: the more homogeneous and circumscribed a community, the less oppressive it is perceived to be for the individual. While NAut also embraces ethnopluralism, it does so within a broader framework that advocates for the reform of the nation-state along autonomist lines, recognizing local specificities. Both movements reject supremacist ideologies and racial discrimination (Guerra 2025); rather, their ethnopluralism is rooted in the preservation of cultural particularities within communities. In both cases, there is a notable admiration for heroic models, even from African nationalism, as exemplified by figures like Thomas Sankara (Lanzano 2022). Their rejection of multicultural society is not driven by ethnic discrimination, but by opposition to capitalism, globalization, and the creation of a homogenized world, where ‘from Paris to Bangkok or from Brest to Beijing, individuals are reduced to undifferentiated consumers’.

The positions of the National Anarchists (NAn) and National Autonomists (NAut) regarding nature are largely aligned, with both movements recognizing nature as embodying the “supreme organicist principle”. They assert that no human law or custom should contradict the laws of nature, which they regard as the ultimate regulator. Human organization and laws, according to both movements, must reflect the principles of nature, and humans should abandon their arrogance of considering themselves “in the likeness of God”. This anthropocentric view is seen as the root cause of humanity’s violation of natural laws and exploitation of nature for productivist and profit-driven purposes. Both NAn and NAut identify “exploitative capitalism” as nature’s greatest adversary, arguing that it not only plunders and degrades the environment but also distorts the organic relationship between humanity and nature, turning it into one of supremacy that humans arrogate to themselves (Guerra 2025). NAut proposes the creation of a Federal Fund for the construction of a European empire,

which would allocate resources to environmental preservation and the restoration of a healthy, organic bond between humanity and nature.

In terms of mobilization, the initiatives of the two groups differ in scope, consistent with their respective ideological frameworks. NAn's actions are predominantly local, reflecting its goal of forming self-sufficient micro-communities that would federate through organic collaboration. In contrast, NAut engages in broader initiatives, including national-level actions. These divergent forms of mobilization reflect the movements' differing approaches to activism. Linguistically, both groups employ the rhetoric typical of political radicalism, characterized by assertive language, confrontational tones, and invectives against perceived enemies. However, NAn's discourse is more heavily infused with calls for immediate insurrectionary action.

For both movements, the organicist principle, derived from the laws of nature, forms the core of their entire ideological framework. The federal structure they propose – whether it involves micro-communities or states reformed along autonomist lines – is modeled on the collaboration observed between the organs of the human body or living beings in nature. The federated entities must function according to these natural principles. Capitalism, and by extension the United States, which is viewed as its primary exponent and exporter, is perceived as a fundamental adversary, as it violates the organicism rooted in the laws of nature. According to the movements, capitalism not only destroys nature but is also grounded in a 'predatory logic' and individualistic selfishness that disregards the community, 'because capitalism has no community,' and undermines collective long-term well-being. The movements argue that capitalism's focus on short-term profit maximization is inherently at odds with the principles of nature, which prioritize balance and sustainability over time. This divergence from natural law forms the basis for categorizing both the National Anarchists (NAn) and National Autonomists (NAut) as eco-fascist movements.

From an ideological and cultural standpoint, both movements exhibit significant complexity and eclecticism. NAn, which blends elements of anarchism and nationalism, has diverse and heterogeneous roots, drawing on both anarchist and nationalist traditions. Traditionally, anarchism has been linked to anti-nationalist sentiments due to its opposition to hierarchical structures, including the state. However, in specific contexts, such as national liberation struggles, anarchism has intersected with nationalist movements. For instance, anarchist groups in Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) demonstrated a form of anarcho-

nationalism, prioritizing regional autonomy and cultural identity while rejecting centralized authority (Ealham, 2010). The synthesis of anarchism with national identity often emerges in situations where national oppression is seen as a form of domination, thus aligning anarchism with national liberation movements (Hobsbawm, 1992). However, the nationalism embraced by NAn should not be equated with conventional chauvinism, which the movement refers to as "old, incapacitating chauvinism". Instead, it embodies an identity-based, ethnopluralist form that defines small communities or homelands, which do not seek dominance over others but aim to establish federative relations based on mutual respect. This ideological framework reveals a form of eclecticism that draws from both anarchist culture and revolutionary or leftist fascism (Buttignon 2010; Rimbotti 2018; Dell'Orco 2013).

In the case of NAut, the movement combines elements of nationalism with leftist autonomist thought. Autonomism itself emerged from the radical leftist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in Europe, as a critique of both capitalist state systems and traditional Marxist structures, emphasizing direct action, self-management, and workers' autonomy (Wright 2017; Quadrelli 2020). NAut, however, diverges from traditional autonomist ideology by integrating nationalist elements in opposition to globalization and the 'predatory New World Order'. It advocates for a form of nationalism that calls for the autonomist reform of states, urging them to recognize their internal specificities, which would then be federated into a broader European empire.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS ON ECOFASCISM: EXAMINING TWO MOVEMENTS IN PROGRESS

The first conclusion is that the two movements, the National Anarchists and the National Autonomists, should indeed be classified as ecofascist based on a definitional framework which identifies ecofascist movements as those that centralize organicism, inspired by a nature-based cult, within their ideological structure (Campion 2021; Guerra 2025). However, these movements cannot be categorized as Far-Right Ecologism (FRE). While they are deeply ecological in orientation, their ideology is characterized by eclecticism and syncretism, incorporating elements from revolutionary and left-wing fascism, revolutionary syndicalism, a revised form of Marxism, as well as anarchism and autonomism (Guerra 2025). Additionally, defining them merely as ecological would be reductive, as the core ideological focus of these movements is not merely the preservation

of nature, but its elevation as a model and normative standard for human society.

The syncretism and ideological eclecticism of the two movements, however, may initially seem inconsistent with the definition of fascism, even when considering the concept of ecological fascism. Yet, when viewed through Sternhell's definition of early fascist ideology (Sternhell 1985; Sternhell et al. 2010), the classification of the two movements within the framework of ecofascism becomes more certain. Conversely, if one adopts the more recent definitional approach to fascism and neo-fascism – where various movements are grouped under a singular 'black phenomenon' based on shared traits such as extreme nationalism and anti-immigration stances – the attribution of ecofascist ideology to these movements loses significance. This is attributable to the fact that both movements reject conventional conceptions of nationalism, which they critique as inherently chauvinistic and structurally complicit with capitalism, while likewise opposing the principle of an authoritarian nation-state. In conclusion, although both Autonomist Nationalists and Anarcho-Nationalists may be classified under the rubric of ecofascism, such a designation is tenable primarily within Sternhell's definitional framework of fascist ideology, which foregrounds organicism as a central criterion distinguishing ecofascism from other forms of right-wing or far-right environmental thought.

A further conclusion can be drawn by observing how the ideological structure of these two movements, along with their positions on geopolitical issues – such as their radical anti-Americanism, their rejection of capitalism (which they consider abolished), and the Autonomist proposal for a Eurasian empire modeled on the ideas of Thiriart and Jeune Europe (Thiriart 1984; Sauveur 1978; Guerra 2024, 116-133) – aligns ecofascism with the phenomenon of Red-Brownism. Red-Brownism is characterized by a political hybridization in which anti-liberal, neo-fascist, and radical Marxist elements converge in opposition to a shared enemy, identified as liberal democratic values, the capitalist system, the unipolar world order led by the United States and the West, and the very concept of the West itself (Guerra 2026a; 2026b). The ideological eclecticism of both the National Anarchists and the National Autonomists fits squarely within the still-evolving development of so-called Red-Brown politics, understood as a syncretic, antiliberal, anti-capitalist, and anti-Atlanticist ideological formation whose contours remain in flux.

Moreover, the two ecofascist movements, despite their strong orientation towards ideological production, have participated in ecological, anti-speciesist, and animal rights demonstrations within the framework of the

Offensiva Animalista [Animalist Offensive] movement in Italy. The presence of these two ideological strands has generated tensions within segments of the contemporary radical left, oscillating between a degree of acceptance within broader dissident milieus and outright rejection of their participation. The latter position is primarily justified by the labelling of National Anarchists and National Autonomists as "fascists". In a document produced by the network of movements known as 'Anti-speciesism is anti-fascism', in addition to confirming the activism of National Anarchists and National Autonomists in northern Italy and in cities such as Turin, Ivrea, Bergamo, Verona, and Rimini, it is stated that: "For us it is inconceivable to give space not only to the fascists and racists of the third millennium, but also to those who mingle with them and share their analyses, trajectories, and struggles" (Antispesfa undated). This reflects an explicit opposition not only to the National Anarchists and National Autonomists themselves, but also to those elements within the radical left that advocate dialogue or thematic cooperation with them. These dynamics constitute internal tensions that are, moreover, not uncommon within both the far right and the far left, and are closely linked to the broader ideological consolidation of so-called Red-Brownism (Guerra 2026a; 2026b).

Although the Red-Brownism milieu in Italy exhibits a high degree of ideological production and geopolitical theorisation, both within extra-parliamentary and parliamentary spheres (Guerra 2026a; 2026b), it is characterised predominantly by convergences of thought rather than by a genuine cohabitation of public and protest spaces. Instances of spatial co-presence during environmental protests and demonstrations nonetheless highlight one of the central uncertainties surrounding Red-Brownism, namely whether such convergences – articulated in explicitly anti-liberal, anti-capitalist, anti-American, and anti-Western registers – may, in the future, extend beyond the realm of discursive exchange and social media communication into embodied forms of political practice.

An analysis of the ideological structure of Italian ecofascism suggests that it may potentially constitute both a possibility and an opportunity for the convergence of new forms of radicalism. Movements such as ecofascism, Red-Brownism, and radical anti-liberal Eurasianism (Guerra 2024) could, under certain conditions, coalesce into a unified front of dissent against the liberal-democratic world order, which they collectively subject to sustained critique, contingent upon the resolution of any potential divergences in historical interpretation along the traditional political cleavage between the right and the left.

This critique, as articulated within anarcho-nationalist discourse, characterises the liberal-democratic system as “falsely democratic,” grounded in the perceived farce of representative governance, which, by obstructing direct democracy, is seen as serving the interests of lobbies, multinational corporations, the financial elite, and the ultimate beneficiaries of capitalism. Within this interpretative framework, such actors are accused of violating nature and alienating humanity, while manipulating state structures and governing populations as though they were a herd directed toward consumerism and socio-political alienation.

Future research will be essential both for further theoretical and empirical elaboration of ecofascism as a distinct ideological formation, and for a more systematic examination of its possible intersections with other radical movements that challenge the liberal-democratic and Western international order.

#### REFERENCES

- Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Antispefa. Undated. *Conoscerli per isolarli: Resistenza Nazionale e Autonomi Nazionalisti Italia*. Italy: Antispefa.
- Bale, J. M. 2002. “National revolutionary” groupuscules and the resurgence of “left-wing” fascism: the case of France’s Nouvelle Résistance. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 36(3), 24–49.
- Barla, J., and Bjork-James, S. 2021. Introduction: Entanglements of Anti-Feminism and Anti-Environmentalism in the Far-Right. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 36(110), 377–387.
- Benoist, L., Turner, J., and Bailey, D. 2026. Ecofascism in the shadow of ‘patriotic ecology’: Nativism, economic greenwashing, and the evolution of far-right political ecology in France. *Politics*, 46(1), 173–192.
- Bramwell, A. 1985. *Blood and Soil: Walther Darré and Hitler’s Green Party*. London: Kensal Press.
- Bramwell, A. 1989. *Ecology in the 20th Century: A History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Brandenberger, D. 2002. *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Braun, V., and Clarke, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2): 77–101.
- Burgwyn, H.J. 2018. Socialization Projects. In H. J. Burgwyn and A. Osti Guerrazzi, *Mussolini and the Salò Republic, 1943–1945. Italian and Italian American Studies* (pp. 127–139). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buttignon, I. 2010. *Compagno Duce: fatti, personaggi, idee e contraddizioni del fascismo di sinistra*. Bresso: Hobby & Work.
- Campion, K. 2021. Defining Ecofascism: Historical Foundations and Contemporary Interpretations in the Extreme Right. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 35(4), 926–944.
- Clarke, J. N., Braun, V., and Hayfield, N. 2015. Thematic analysis. In *Handbook of Research Methods in Health Social Sciences* (pp. 1–18). Singapore: Springer.
- Cuningham, P. G. 2002. *Autonomia: a movement of refusal: social movements and social conflict in Italy in the 1970’s*. London: Middlesex University.
- Darwish, M. 2024. Fascism, nature and communication: a Discursive-affective analysis of cuteness in ecofascist propaganda. *Feminist Media Studies*, (2024), 1–21.
- de Benoist, A. 1993. Democracy Revisited. *Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary*, 95, 65–75.
- de Benoist, A. 1999. *The New Right: A European Perspective*. New York: Arktos Media.
- de Benoist, A. 2006. L’identité et la différence: Une réflexion sur la politique et la culture. *Revue d’Études Autrichiennes*, 34(2), 45–67.
- de Benoist, A. 2012. *On Being a Pagan*. New York: Arktos Media.
- Dell’Orco, D. 2013. *Nicola Bombacci, tra Lenin e Mussolini*. Cesena: Historica.
- Donovan, J. 2013. Anarcho-Fascism. *Counter-Currents*, March 4.
- Durkheim, É. 1984. *The Division of Labour in Society*. London: Macmillan.
- Ealham, C. 2010. *Anarchism and the City: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Barcelona, 1898–1937*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Fairclough, N. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Ferraresi, F. 2012. *Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Forchtner, B. 2020. *The Far Right and the Environment: Politics, Discourse and Communication*. London: Routledge.
- Forchtner, B., and Gruber, M. 2024. Far-Right World Ordering from the Margins: Ethno-Ecological Degrowth and the Nation in the Swiss Democrats’ Discourse About the Natural Environment. *Global Studies Quarterly*, 4(3), 1–13.
- Forchtner, B., and Kølvrå, C. 2017. Extreme right images of radical authenticity: multimodal aesthetics of his-

- tory, nature and gender in social media. *University of Leicester. Journal contribution*, 1-31.
- Forchtner, B., and Lubarda, B. 2022. Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament. *Environmental Politics*, 32(1), 43-68.
- François, S. 2014. The Nouvelle Droite and 'Tradition'. *Journal for the Study of Radicalism*, 8(1), 87-106.
- Freda, F. G. (2000). *La disintegrazione del sistema*. Padova: Edizioni di Ar.
- Freund, J. 1968. *L'État et la société*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit
- Gibbs, G. R. 2007. *Analyzing Qualitative Data*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- Griffin, R. 1991. *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: Routledge.
- Guérin, D. 1965. *Anarchismo e socialismo: un'antologia*. Roma: Edizioni Avanguardia.
- Guerra, N. 2024. *The Italian Far Right from 1945 to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict*. London: Routledge.
- Guerra, N. 2025. The dark green agenda: tracing ecofascist ideologies and identities in Italy. *Identities*, 1-21.
- Guerra N. 2026a. Red meets brown: investigating the antiliberal political convergence of Italy's extremes. *Modern Italy*, 31(1), 119-135.
- Guerra, N. 2026b. Red-Brownism: from its post-Soviet foundations to present-day political faultlines. *European Politics and Society*, 27(1), 165-193.
- Harvey, D. 2005. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Held, D. 2018. *Models of democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hughes, B., Jones, D., and Amarasingam, A. 2022. Eco-fascism: An Examination of the Far-Right/Ecology Nexus in the Online Space. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 34(5), 997-1023.
- Iossifidis, M. M. J. 2026. Ecofascism, far-right ecology, and neo-Malthusianism. In: Vaughan, A., Braune, J., Tinsley, M. and Mondon, A., eds. *The Ethics of Researching the Far Right: Critical Approaches and Reflections*. Manchester University Press; 57-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, J. 1997. *The New Right: A Critique*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Kinna, R. 2019. *Anarchism: A Beginner's Guide*. London: One world Publications.
- Labriola, A. 1906. *Riforme e rivoluzione sociale. II edizione*. Roma: E. Cagnoni & C. Soc. ed. Avanguardia.
- Lanzano, C. 2022. Italian fascists quoting Samora Machel and Thomas Sankara. *ZAM*, October 4.
- Legnani, M. 1998. Potere, società ed economia nel territorio della Rsi. *Italia contemporanea*, 213, 781-800.
- Loadenthal, M. 2022. Feral fascists and deep green guerrillas: infrastructural attack and accelerationist terror. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 15(1), 169-208.
- Lubarda, B. 2020. Beyond Ecofascism? Far-Right Ecology (FRE) as a Framework for Future Inquiries. *Environmental Values*, 29(6), 713-732.
- Lubarda, B. 2024. *Far-Right Ecologism. Environmental Politics and the Far Right in Hungary and Poland*. London: Routledge.
- Lune, H., and Berg, B. L. 2017. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. London: Pearson.
- Malm, A., and The Zetkin Collective. 2021. *White Skin, Black Fuel: On the Danger of Fossil Fascism*. London: Verso.
- Marano, S., and De Feudis, M. 2021. *Fare Verde. La terra e la rugiada. Storia di un'associazione eretica, idee per un'ecologia profonda*. Massa: Eclettica.
- Martone, L. 2008. *Guerra civile e diritto: una costituzione per la Repubblica di Mussolini*. Macerata: Edizioni Università di Macerata.
- Macklin, G. D. 2005. Co-opting the counter culture: Troy Southgate and the National Revolutionary Faction. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 39(3), 301-326.
- Macklin, G. 2022. The Extreme Right, Climate Change and Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 34(5), 979-996.
- Moore, S. and Roberts, A. 2022. *The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Müller, A. 2025. *The Elements of Statecraft*. London: Imperium Press.
- Niccolai, G. and Vincenti, F. 2022. *Nicola Bombacci. Passione e rivoluzione*. Massa: Eclettica.
- Nilsson, J. 2017. *Anarcho-Fascism: Nature Reborn*. Stockholm: Logik förlag.
- O'Brien, C. 2006. Classification of radical ideologies: Towards a typology. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(1), 43-61.
- Olivetti, A. O. 1914a. *Azione diretta e mediazione*. Napoli: Società Editrice Partenopea.
- Olivetti, A. O. 1914b. *Cinque anni di sindacalismo e di lotta proletaria in Italia*. Napoli: Società Editrice Partenopea.
- Osti Guerrazzi, A. 2012. *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana*. Roma: Carocci.
- Parlato, G. 2000. *La sinistra fascista: storia di un progetto mancato*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

- Quadrelli, E. 2020. *Autonomia operaia. Scienza della politica e arte della guerra dal '68 ai movimenti globali*. Rimini: Interno4.
- Rimbotti, L. L. 2018. *Fascismo rivoluzionario: il fascismo di sinistra dal sansepolcristo alla Repubblica Sociale*. Firenze: Passaggio al bosco.
- Rocca, R. 2009. *Fascismo e socialismo: il caso della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*. Rome: Istituto di Studi Politici.
- Schmitt, K. 2001. *State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity, 1933: The Question of Legality, 1950*. Corvallis: Plutarch Press.
- Sen, A. 2007. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. London: Penguin Books.
- Sermonti, R. 1966. *Stato Organico. Unica Democrazia Seria*. Roma: Settimo Sigillo.
- Sermonti, R. 1992. *L'uomo, l'ambiente e se stesso*. Roma: Settimo Sigillo.
- Shaffer, R. 2018. Pan-European thought in British fascism: the International Third Position and the Alliance for Peace and Freedom. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 52(1), 78–99.
- Sauveur, Y. 1978. *Jean Thiriart and the European National Communitarianism*. Brussels: Edition Machiavel.
- Sorel, G. 1908. *Réflexions sur la violence*. Paris: Marcel Rivière.
- Spencer, H. 1860. The social organism. *Westminster review*, lxxiii, 90–121.
- Staudenmaier, P. 1999a. *Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience*. Chico: AK Press.
- Staudenmaier, P. 1999b. *Fascist Ecology: The 'Green Wing' of the Nazi Party and its Roots in Romantic Environmentalism*. Milwaukee: Marquette University.
- Sternhell, Z. 1985. *Nè destra nè sinistra: la nascita dell'ideologia fascista*. Napoli: Akropolis.
- Sternhell, Z., Sznajder, M., and Ashéri, M. 2010. *Naissance de l'idéologie fasciste*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sunshine, S. 2008. Rebranding fascism: National-anarchists. *The public eye magazine*, 23(4), 18–24.
- Taguieff, P-A. 1994. *Sur la Nouvelle Droite: jalons d'une analyse critique*. Paris: Descartes et Cie.
- Tarin, C. A. 2023. Healing the Open Wound of Ecofascism: Notes on Care in/from the Borderlands. *Environmental Communication*, 18(1-2), 167–172.
- Thiriart, J. 1984. *L'empire Euro-Sovietique de Vladivostok a Dublin l'après-Yalta: la mutation du communisme: essai sur le totalitarisme éclairé*. Brussels: Edition Machiavel.
- Tosi, G. 2008. *L'industria e il lavoro nella Repubblica Sociale Italiana*. Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso.
- Vowles, K., and Hultman, M. 2021. Dead White men vs. Greta Thunberg: Nationalism, Misogyny, and Climate Change Denial in Swedish far-right Digital Media. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 36(110), 414–431.
- Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. 2009. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- Wright, S. 2017. *Class Storming Heaven Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Pluto Press.