Sociology and the Life-World

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Sociology and the Life-World
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Introduzione

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Il Life-World non è un semplice tema della sociologia fenomenologicamente orientata. È *il* tema. Il tema intorno al quale ruotano vari problemi interconnessi. Il nucleo verso il quale convergono teorie relative a temi specifici e insieme interrelati. L'idea di *Lebenswelt* è presente sin dal momento in cui viene proposta un'alternativa alla lettura positivista del mondo sociale. Dobbiamo a Dilthey una prima formulazione embrionale dell'idea di *Lebenswelt.* Idea che nell'autore è connessa alla ricerca di un fondamento epistemologico delle *Geisteswissenschaften.* Fondamento che si presenterà, infine, nella forma di una *critica della ragione storica.* Critica che implica una ricostruzione della genesi e della struttura del mondo umano (è evidente la simmetria con *La critica della ragion pura* e il fondamento delle scienze della natura).

Le scienze dello spirito "riposeranno", nella terza fase della riflessione dell'autore (1905-1911) (cfr. Magnano San Lio 1998), sulla relazione triadica tra esperienza vissuta, espressione e comprensione. Concetti non semplicemente nati dalle astrazioni dell'osservatore, ma tratti da elementi radicati nel concreto mondo vissuto intersoggettivamente dagli attori. Più ancora: le categorie delle scienze dello spirito "sono forme strutturali del mondo umano tradotte concettualmente" (Rossi 1971: 78).

Non sarebbe corretto dichiarare di scarso interesse le fasi precedenti. L'idea di una psicologia descrittiva era presente già nella prima fase del suo percorso teorico. E questo è uno dei punti di interesse che Dilthey condividerà con Husserl[1].

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[1] "Together, Dilthey and Husserl, were involved in the struggle against logicism on the one hand, and the naturalism on the other. Their positive common alternative was descriptive psychology. For both men there was always the scientific ideal, the firm objective grounding of truth upon the solid basis of *leibhaftig* evidence; the return of the things themselves, to lived experience and the *Lebenswelt*" (Tillman 1976: 123). Mary K. Tillman nell'articolo ricorda i rapporti tra Dilthey e Husserl nel periodo dal 1900 al 1911, anno della morte di Dilthey.

Semplificando molto il pensiero di Dilthey possiamo riassumere la sua analisi, riguardo il nucleo essenziale del mondo della vita (nucleo che riguarda la co-costituzione di soggetto e sociale), indicando le due dimensioni in cui è articolata: dimensione verticale e dimensione orizzontale[2].

Nella prima dimensione viene ricostruita più direttamente la costituzione del senso nel tempo, viene seguito il paradigma della biografia individuale, della formazione del soggetto. In questa abbiamo così concetti come *relazione vitale (Lebensbezug)* e di *insieme vitale (Lebenszusammenhang)*. Sono *relazioni vitali* le relazioni primarie, le relazioni più elementari tra il singolo soggetto e il suo ambiente (persone e cose). L'insieme vitale è la risultante del processo.

Nell'ottica orizzontale l'autore si concentra principalmente sulla genesi del mondo storico-sociale, sulla sua costruzione e ricostruzione. Due le categorie principali richiamate in quest'ottica: l'*oggettivazione della vita* e la *connessione dinamica (Wirkungszusammenhang)*. L'oggettivazione rappresenta il dominio esterno delle scienze della spirito. La connessione dinamica indica una struttura interagente autocentrata e teleologicamente guidata. "Tanto il mondo umano preso nella sua totalità, quanto ognuno dei suoi settori costituisce una connessione attiva e produttiva, fornito della propria struttura e avente in se stessa il proprio centro" (Rossi 1971: 84). Il mondo storico-sociale è quindi una connessione dinamica composta da insiemi di connessioni dinamiche avente ciascuna un carattere attivo e teleologico. Il che riguarda un qualsiasi rapporto interumano, come un qualsiasi sistema culturale, una qualsiasi forma di associazione.

La separazione tra dimensione verticale e orizzontale è analitica. Non si ha un prima e un dopo. Individuazione e socializzazione sono co-originarie.

L'insieme vitale, la totalità significativa della vita esperienziale del singolo, è necessariamente e intrinsecamente legata alla dimensione della socialità. La presenza di una comunità è la premessa della comprensione. "Tutto ciò che viene inteso, -sostiene Dilthey- porta con sé, per così dire, il marchio della sua conoscibilità sulla base di […] [una] comunanza" (Dilthey 1982). Vi è così una doppia dipendenza reciproca. Le esperienze singole, per essere rese comunicabili e condivisibili, hanno bisogno essere selezionate e raggruppate in forme o contenuti generali socialmente costruiti. Così la scelta dei caratteri singoli presuppone i caratteri generali; e questi ultimi, a loro volta, implicano la presenza necessaria degli ele-

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[2] Seguiremo in particolare il percorso indicato da Zaccaï-Reyners nei due volumi seguenti: Zaccaï-Reyners 1995; Zaccaï-Reyners 1996.

menti singoli. È questa una delle modalità attraverso la quale si manifesta il circolo ermeneutico. Circolo che nelle analisi di Dilthey opera a vari livelli come rapporto tra "le tout et les parties, entre le général et le particulier, entre l'individuel et l'universel, entre le systématique et l'historique" (Zaccaï-Reyners 1995: 69).

Nel rapporto individuo-società Dilthey intende evitare, da un lato, di cadere in una forma di individualismo atomistico: l'individuo è, infatti, sempre parte di un insieme interattivo, senza tuttavia annullarsi in esso. Dall'altro lato l'autore deve evitare di cadere nella reificazione del mondo sociale. L'insieme interattivo non costituisce mai una realtà ontologica. Questo insieme rappresenta sempre "des créations du sujet réfléchissant cette expérience: l'ensemble interactif 'est seulement une construction de la pensée'". Non si ha così nessun dualismo. Ma l'integrazione tra un individualismo non atomistico e un "holisme méthodologique" (Mesure 1990: 192).

Occorre inoltre ricordare che in Dilthey la dimensione storica è onnipervasiva: sono soggetti storici gli individui singoli, i sistemi sociali, i sistemi culturali e le loro connessioni. Questa modalità di lettura rifluisce sullo stesso pensiero delle scienze storico-sociali. Dato che i concetti delle scienze delle spirito rappresentano forme della struttura sociale concettualizzate, da ciò deriva che anche le concettualizzazioni sono storicamente condizionate.

Come è evidente, il contenuto di ciò che si intende per mondo della vita al suo primo apparire è molto più spoglio del modello costruito in seguito da Schutz[3]. E ciò anche se vi sono, oltre all'importantissima rivendicazione della non assimilabilità epistemologica delle scienze dello spirito alle scienze della natura, convergenze di indubbio interesse tra le analisi dei due autori, per quanto le analisi di Dilthey siano allo stato embrionale.

Tra le similitudini ricordo il modo in cui è inteso il rapporto tra scienze dello spirito e mondo vissuto dagli attori. Dilthey tende a considerare i concetti dell'osservatore come concetti di secondo grado, rispetto a quelli dell'attore, prefigurando in tal modo una posizione più vicina a quella di Schutz, che a quella di Weber[4]. Un altro punto di convergenza riguar-

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[3] Alfred Schütz, nato a Vienna (1899), si trasferisce negli Stati Uniti (1939) in seguito all'avvento del nazismo. Negli Stati Uniti il suo cognome perde l'Umlaut, viene trasformato in Schutz. Nondimeno questa trasformazione non viene assunta universalmente. Molti autori, in particolare europei, mantengono l'originale Schütz. Noi riporteremo la versione usata da ciascun autore in libertà.

[4] Possiamo intendere quella di Dilthey una prefigurazione del fondamento degli ideal-tipi dell'osservatore nelle tipizzazioni di senso comune. Noschis e de Caprona ritengono che

da la natura sociale della conoscenza: la conoscenza, dice Dilthey, porta impresso il marchio della conoscibilità, sulla base di una comunanza. Schutz dà una base fortemente strutturale a questa intuizione sostenendo che non esiste una tipizzazione che non abbia in sé l'impronta del sociale[5].

Certo in Schutz si coglie il salto che vari fattori hanno contribuito a determinare: il passaggio dal neokantismo alla fenomenologia, l'approdo a un costruttivismo metodologico che rende molto più fluido il rapporto di co-determinazione[6]. Così come un'idea di soggettività, che tra i punti costitutivi vede la teoria del flusso di coscienza, colta principalmente attraverso Bergson e Husserl, unita alla visione del sé di Mead. Fondamentale è inoltre la categoria dell'intersoggettività mondana che, come categoria di intermediazione, porta a un salto decisivo l'analisi soggetto-sociale a partire dalla We-relation che Natanson considera la "radice sistemica del mondo condiviso". Si tratta, come è evidente, solo di pochi esempi, ma forse sufficienti per indicare il senso del percorso.

Esula necessariamente dagli obiettivi di questa rapida introduzione ripercorrere gli sviluppi teorici che vengono compiuti, dopo Dilthey, da autori come Simmel, Weber, Bergson, Husserl, James, Mead, ecc.

Richiamare Dilthey ha solo lo scopo di richiamare un progetto complessivo che riguarda le scienze sociali a partire dal problema della loro fondazione, quindi dei loro caratteri costitutivi, della loro legittimità epistemica[7].

È innegabile che la posizione teorica di Schutz rappresenti un vero e proprio passaggio di fase per le scienze sociali. La sua architettura teorica, per quanto complessa, è costituita da un modello unitario che contiene al suo interno un ampio sviluppo di temi classici e meno classici (senso, soggetto, sociale, teoria dell'azione, rilevanze, segni simboli, ecc.) organicamente collegati all'interno della teoria delle province finite di significato[8]. L'approdo alla fenomenologia dell'atteggiamento naturale consente a Schutz di compiere un decisivo passo in avanti. È l'assumere "the life-world […] [as] the alpha and the omega for any kind of activity"; è

Schutz, nell'esplorare le basi fenomenologiche dell'ideal-tipo, faccia riferimento sia a Dilthey sia a Weber (Noschis et de Caprona 1987).

[5] E ciò perché, come sottolinea Barber, in Schutz il sociale è presente nelle tipizzazioni come carattere eidetico (Barber 1987: 111-120).

[6] Sui caratteri del costruttivismo di Schutz vedi Muzzetto 1997: 119-197.

[7] Sul senso di questo percorso vedi Bakker 1995: 187-212.

[8] Questa organicità rende più significativo il tutto. Per esempio: la teoria dei segni e dei simboli ha rilevanza e capacità esplicativa autonoma. Ma, nel momento in cui Schutz collega segni e simboli intesi come strutture appresentative ai livelli di trascendenza (piccoli, medi, grandi), rende maggiormente coerente e significativa la struttura globale, il progetto complessivo.

l'ancorare "the mundane certainty to "the natural attitude which bestows the Schutzian conception of the life-world with unparalleled originality" (Belvedere 2013: 79).

Ma soprattutto è innegabile che Schutz rappresenti l'autore che ha dato la maggiore enfasi al tema del fondamento, cogliendone la grande rilevanza non solo per il piano epistemologico, ma per l'intero impianto delle scienze sociali.

Sostiene Gurwitsch: "I [...] venture the opinion that Dilthey's expectations may find fulfillment in the original development that Schutz gave to Husserl's phenomenology". E dopo aver ricordato la centralità del problema della storia in Dilthey e il carattere meno enfatizzato che ha questo tema in Schutz, dal momento che la sociologia di quest'ultimo ha come riferimento principale i contemporanei, nondimeno Gurwitsch conclude sostenendo che la "clarification of the foundations of the social sciences (in a more restricted sense of the terme) prepares for and contributes to the clarification of the foundations of the historical sciences. For this reason I suggest as a desirable and promising enterprise a study of Schutz's concepts and theories from the point of view of their significance for the work inaugurated by Dilthey and continued by some of his successors" (Gurwitsch 1975: XXX-XXXI).

Non è difficile quindi assumere le parole di Endress come sintesi del significato di questa prefazione: "the main concept Schutz introduced to the social sciences is the concept of the life-world ("Lebenswelt"). Schutz's analyses of the structures of the life-world have to be viewed as one of the most important contributions to general sociological theory" (Endress 2005: 1-2).

Questo spiega perché le analisi sul mondo della vita sono molto numerose nel panorama internazionale. Come sono molto numerosi i temi che sono stati affrontati richiamando il mondo della vita. Mi riferisco sia a temi che costituiscono sottotematizzazioni del mondo della vita sia a temi che comportano estensioni del paradigma schutziano. Estensioni sia verso numerosi problemi sociologici emergenti, sia verso problemi che riguardano l'intero fronte delle scienze sociali. Così il paradigma schutziano (o più latamente fenomenologico-sociologico) ha mostrato, in modo crescente dall'inizio del nuovo secolo, la sua straordinaria capacità di rendere conto di tratti essenziali di discipline come economia, diritto, politologia, psicoterapia, ecc. che non appartengono direttamente al *main stream* della sociologia.

Ritengo opportuno aggiungere che la costituzione dello *Schutz's Circle* ha notevolmente contribuito a un deciso innalzamento della qualità del

dibattito. Nel senso che, mentre non era difficile trovare ancora alla fine del secolo scorso volumi e articoli su Schutz e la fenomenologia che travisavano platealmente le analisi e le teorie di quest'ultimo, ora letture di questo genere sono diventate meno frequenti.

Ringrazio molto i colleghi che hanno accettato di partecipare a questo numero monografico dedicato al pensiero di Alfred Schutz. Da molti anni mi occupo del pensiero dell'autore. E da molti anni costato che in Italia vi è un interesse assolutamente inadeguato verso questo approccio, verso le sue potenzialità analitiche, critiche, teoretiche. E ciò malgrado siano evidenti i grandi contributi dati al rinnovamento delle scienze sociali. Ritengo sia necessario non arrendersi. Anche per questo i contributi dei colleghi sono preziosi. Ritengo che questa chiave di lettura del mondo sociale sia un patrimonio che nessuno studioso può trascurare.

Come auspicio di un futuro atteggiamento di maggiore attenzione verso la fenomenologia e come messaggio ai colleghi italiani intendo lasciare l'introduzione del numero della rivista in lingua italiana e realizzare dello stesso numero, in tempi brevi, una versione in lingua italiana.

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Husserl on Lifeworld and Experiential World

Chung-Chi Yu

Husserl brings up the lifeworld notion in his discourse on overcoming the crisis of European sciences that results from the objectivism or naturalism of scientific research. He puts forward the concept of experiential world as he works on the foundation for socio-cultural sciences. Both concepts depict how the subject is not enclosed in itself, it is instead the subject in the world. Yet the distinction of lifeworld and experiential world reveals that Husserl thematizes this problem in two distinguished ways, the one has the transcendental phenomenology as background, the other the phenomenological psychology. My paper aims at an explication of these two different ways of how Husserl deals with the relationship between subject and the world and explores the possibility of an lifeworld discourse that looses itself from the transcendental bond.

I. Husserl on Lifeworld

In the modern age the natural science developed in a way that no science can compare with. Its methodology is widely recognized and imitated. The pursuit of knowledge in natural science is based on the belief that its object of inquiry is the nature in objective reality. The objectivity of the nature signifies that it is free from the impact of human being. As long as it has nothing to do with the human experiences, the human perception of nature plays herein no substantial role. It is even taken to be irrelevant in the research for objective knowledge. Subjectivity is entangled with relativity, which for the sake of objectivity just needs to be dispensed with. In general, in the division of scientific researches, the objectivity of nature belongs to the subject matter of natural sciences, whereas the aspect of subjectivity is ascribed to psychology, which deals with the psychic phenomenon based on the physical nature. Since Galileo and Newton, natural science has made tremendous development and set up the model for all scientific researches. Even the old tradition of philosophy cannot but recognize this fact. Yet is the viewpoint that the subjectivity can only be seen to be relative and unworthy of being the subject matter of scientific re-

search also justifiable? To be sure, how objective is the nature at all in view of its being as the object of scientific research? How is the nature to be disclosed, anyway? With all these questions in mind, Husserl asks more questions about the status of subjectivity. He wonders how to legitimate the claim that subjectivity has only to do with the relativity? Is there no invariant structure in the human experiences of nature in spite of all varieties and differences? It is from here that Husserl begins his lifeworld discourse. He asks about the possibility of a science of lifeworld and explores the relationship between human experiences in lifeworld and the objective natural sciences. In the end he brings up his transcendental phenomenology to help clarify all these questions.

Husserl delineates the lifeworld as "universal field of establishable facts"(Hua VI 141/Carr, 138).These facts are related to the individual persons, such that the lifeworld is in the realm of the subjective (*Reich der Subjektiven*)(Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). Husserl mentions that the facts recognized by the Congos in Africa, the Chinese farmers will not have the same validity for the Europeans (Hua VI 141/ Carr, 139). In such a case asks Husserl, can there be a core that is commonly valid to all people, no matter which culture or tradition they belong to? Both the traditional philosophy and the natural sciences in the modern age can be said to have overlooked this question. It is actually uneasy to thematize the lifeworld in a scientific way as long as it has since long been questioned whether such a science about lifeworld is possible. Even the legitimacy of such a questioning is bracketed. Is the experience in lifeworld not just subjective and therefore relative? Is it not what we need to dispense with in our pursuit of objective knowledge? The lifeworldly experience is shadowed by its untrustworthy subjectivity, which is undesirable in our demand of rigid objectivity. In pursuit of objectivity one should jump over the subjectivity that is inherent in the lifeworldly experience. As a result, the lifeworldly experience is regarded as valueless for scientific research and one seems to have sufficient reason to suspend it. Either traditional philosophy or modern science has dismissed it as a whole. However, the more it is dismissed, the more Husserl sees the urgency to take it up as a problem. How then does he approach this problem? Wherein lies the appropriate way of access to it? Suppose that the lifeworldly experience cannot be merely regarded as relative, through which way we can claim its universality? Are there indeed universal aspects to be worked out? In order to deal with these questions, Husserl suggests to introduce the epoché of objective sciences as its method (Hua VI 138/ Carr, 135). He holds that we need to get free from the impact of natural science, which aims to work on the objectivity of nature. The purpose of practicing epoché is not to do away with scientific thinking. In Husserl's eyes the science is not restricted to natural, objective science. Working on lifeworld without objective science does not mean that we give up scientific thinking

at all. In Husserl's view in order to make clear the meaning of lifeworld, one needs a science that can handle the problematic of lifeworld correspondingly.

As mentioned above, lifeworld is the "universal field of establishable facts".

The question arises as regards the facts in lifeworld: do they remain the same after the epoché? Husserl gives a positive answer to this question because for him the aim of epoché is not to dismiss these facts, rather, it aims to facilitate our recognition of these facts. But does it mean that the study of the lifeworld lies in the collection of all kinds of facts spread all over the planet? Obviously not, Husserl holds that despite the differences on the surface there is universal structure to dig out. He deems these universal structures a priories. And it is the task of his phenomenology to depict all these a priories. Now, what are the universal a priories to understand substantially? First of all, Husserl points out that as persons, people are living in the world, he is existent in the lifeworld. As such he has all kinds of lifeworldly experiences. The practical actions in everyday life show that people experience the world and the objects in the world incessantly. Though people never cease their experiences in lifeworld, they seldom notice their own involvement in such kinds of experiences. So long as their attentions focus more on things that are relevant to their basic needs, vocational activities or enjoyments, they fail to thematize the world as a whole. Such awareness remains concealed unless special occasion occurs, for example, when they start philosophizing. Philosophy, as Husserl conceives of it, has paid attention to such a thematization from beginning on. He claims that in the seventh century before Christ the philosophy was born in Greece. This counts as unique event in the whole development of human history. The philosophers thematize the world rather than just living in the world like the ordinary people through theoretical attitude. They are highly motivated in this attitude to know what the world is rather than just being involved with it. In this way, the philosophy made great contributions to the human culture as a whole. It constitutes a breakthrough in the human history. From then on, not only the philosophy was born, so was the science in the narrower sense, that is, the discipline that is separate from philosophy. This special event has evolved to become one of the essential characteristics of European or Western culture (Hua VI 325/Carr, 279).

Even though the philosophy in ancient Greece was interested in the question about what the world is, he sees that the main trend of traditional philosophy, particularly the traditional metaphysics became more and more objectivistic with the culmination in the modern age as the natural sciences emerged[1]. The objectivistic tendency leads to the consequence that the question regard-

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[1] Husserl calls the natural science as the residuum of the metaphysics (Hua VI 232/ Carr, 229).

ing the relationship between human experience and the world as experienced remains concealed first by the traditional metaphysics and then the natural science in the modern age. In view of this, Husserl regrets quite a lot about the unthematization of the realm of the subjective in scientific research (Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). The subjective experience is commonly relegated to merely relative and becomes valueless in the eyes of natural scientists who claim to pursue the objective truth in nature. For this reason Husserl aims to work out a science of lifeworld and suggests to practice the epoché of objective sciences as first step. On such a basis Husserl develops what he names "ontology of the lifeworld"*(Ontologie der Lebenswelt)*[2] in order to work out the aprioric, universal structures (Hua VI 145/Carr, 142). To make clear such a universal structure is to depict how the world is experienced by subjects in a flow of experiences.

The life in the lifeworld is a "life within a universal unthematic horizon"(Hua VI 148/Carr, 145). That means, in the lifeworld, the subjective manifold (*das mannigfaltige Subjektive*) has been in function, though in a concealed manner (Hua VI 149/Carr, 146). Thus, to make clear how the subject and world are correlated to each other would become the task of the ontology of lifeworld. Such a correlation is aprioric and universal. According to such a conception, the manner in which an object is revealed is also the manner how a subject is revealed. In a word, the world is correlated to the subjective consciousness. Though the world and objects can be displayed in a variety of ways, yet the correlation between the world/objects and the subjective consciousness is universal and aprioric. Husserl acknowledges such an essential fact and takes it to be the task for the ontology of lifeworld.

In this context another question arises as regards the ontology of lifeworld:

How is the ontology of lifeworld related to the transcendental phenomenology? The answer to this question will concern how Husserl conceives of subject. The subject that is correlated to the world is a subject in the world. Despite its status as subject, it can be just objectified. It has double aspects of subject and object, which seems to be paradoxical (Hua VI §53). Suppose that the human being is nothing but an object, then we may explain how the worldly experience proceeds, how the aprioric structures of lifeworld functions without having to think of how the thematization of lifeworld is made possible. It is exactly in consideration of such a problematic that Husserl introduces his transcendental phenomenology following the ontology of lifeworld.

Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology works on the ultimate foundation of philosophy. In this way he intends to provide philosophy with

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[2] David Carr translates it as "life-world ontology"(Carr, 142).

a way to overcome the antitheses of all kinds—subjectivism vs. objectivism, empiricism vs. rationalism, absolutism vs. relativism, ontologism vs. transcendentalism, positivism vs. metaphysics etc. (Hua IX, 300/McCormick eds., 34). In Husserl's conception phenomenology in its complete form is no other than universal philosophy, which is a rigorous science that results from radical self-reflection. Only transcendental phenomenology is legitimate to fulfill this requirement. And it is in this sense that Husserl regards the "ultimate and highest" problems as phenomenological problems. So explains he:

> In its universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its particular function within a possible life of mankind at the transcendental level (Hua IX, 299/McCormick eds., 33).

With this in mind, Husserl holds that the ontology of lifeworld has to be transformed into transcendental phenomenology if one wants to work out a science about lifeworld in the full sense. And Husserl makes it very clear that the motivation behind his thematization of lifeworld is for the sake of introducing transcendental phenomenology. However, it is exactly here that we need to ask the following questions:

1. Has Husserl only make use of lifeworld for another purpose instead of taking seriously the theme of lifeworld? As a result, one might wonder how his treatment of lifeworld is corresponding to the thematization of lifeworld in the full sense?
2. Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?
3. If it is reasonable to distinguish two sorts of the ontology of lifeworld and argue for the independence of the ontology of lifeworld successfully, then what impact does it have on Husserl's discourse on Europe, which he displays over and over again in his late philosophy, particularly in his Vienna Lecture in 1935?

In what follows, I would like to focus on the second question by invoking the "*Lecture Summer Semester 1925: Phenomenological Psychology*"[3].

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[3] Together with "Article for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1927)", "*Amsterdam Lectures* (1929)" this lecture is included in the *Husserliana* Band IX.

2. Phenomenological Psychology

Husserl's phenomenological psychology touches on the natural world-concept (*natürliche Weltbegriff*) (Hua IX, 93/Scanlon, 70), the universal science of the world (*universale Weltwissenschaft*) (Hua IX, 92/Scanlon, 69) and the correlation of our experiences and the world. In phenomenological psychology Husserl lays foundation to the factual sciences with help of the concept of experiential world.

Husserl uses the term psychological phenomenology or phenomenological psychology alternatively, I myself prefer the former term than the latter, because the empirical psychologists have taken it for granted that the phenomenological psychology is a qualitative methodology for the empirical study in psychology as a specific science, yet Husserl makes it very clear, that phenomenological psychology is more embracing than psychology, that is, it is related to all socio-cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), even all sorts of sciences. Husserl points out that as long as all the socio-cultural sciences are related to the mental (*das Geistige*), they all can be seen to belong to psychology (Hua IX, 221/Scanlon, 169). In this sense, psychology is treated as the universal science of the mental (*universale Wissenschaft vom Geistigen*) (Hua IX, 91/Scanlon, 68).

Husserl on the one hand determines the psychological phenomenology or phenomenological psychology as pre-stage or propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology, yet on the other hand he also underlines that the former is parallel to the latter. Because the transcendental phenomenology is extremely alien to the people of common sense, Husserl regards the phenomenological psychology as helpful device to ascend to transcendental phenomenology. With help of phenomenological psychology one might get familiar with phenomenology step by step and then becomes well-prepared to go upwards to transcendental phenomenology (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 31-32). The final step requires a "mere reversal of its doctrinal content" (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 32), which concerns the change in attitude. To which Husserl explains:

> While the psychologist, operating within what for him is naturally accepted world, reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but still within the world), the transcendental phenomenologist, through his absolutely all-embracing epoché, reduces this psychologically pure element to transcendental pure subjectivity (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).

Concretely speaking, it concerns the apperception of the world (*Weltapperzeption*) and its transformation. The psychologists, be they empirical psychologists or phenomenological psychologists, never stop their reliance on such apperceptions, so are the pure psychic subjectivities (Hua IX, 340-341/Sheehan

eds. 246).The apperception of the world includes not only the apperception of objects, but also that of themselves, through which the personal ego (*Mensch-Ich*) is constituted. This kind of ego is that which is objectified in the world. All this requires a Copernican turn in order to get to the transcendental level (Hua IX, 341/Sheehan eds. 248). The transcendental pure subjectivity posits within itself the validity of such apperception. The process of such a transforming process delineates Husserl as follows:

> They are transmuted into my transcendental mental process if through a radical epoché I posit as mere phenomena of the world, including my own human existence, and now follow up the intentional life-process wherein the entire apperception 'of' the world, and in particular the apperception of my mind, my psychologically real perception-process, and so forth, are formed (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).

The contents of these processes are preserved. That is, all that is included in the mental process of pure psychic subjectivity are preserved in the transcendental pure subjectivity; and all these contents become "transcendentally inner experience". As a result, this new kind of transcendental field of being is parallel to the purely psychic one.

Husserl contends that there are not two separate egos (i.e. the personal ego and the transcendental ego), but the same ego functioning in different attitudes. In view of contents they are parallel to each other, only in regard to attitude, the one is mundane and the other transcendental. Because of this parallel «the field of transcendental self-experience…can, through mere alteration of attitude, be changed into psychological self-experience » (Hua IX, 294/McCormick eds., 31).

What this signifies is that, conversely, whatever is the result of research in the transcendental field, there is the possibility to apply such a result to the mundane level. And whenever one is well acquainted with the practice of phenomenological psychological reduction and consequently knows the psychic subjectivity well enough, one is ready for the transcendental reduction and get to know the transcendental pure subjectivity.

Here we notice that Husserl distinguishes two different kinds of reduction: the phenomenological psychological and the transcendental. This distinction is first introduced in *First Philosophy* (1923/24), yet not made completely clear until in the articles concerning the phenomenological psychology such as *Encyclopedia Britannica* Article in 1927, *Amsterdam Lectures* in 1929 and finally Part Three of *Crisis* in 1936.

Generally speaking, Husserl localizes phenomenological psychology between the empirical psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Yet as

mentioned above, he also renders it as the central science to all socio-cultural sciences. In addition, it is also universal science for all empirical studies on human phenomenon because of its aprioristic characters (Hua IX, 127, 128/ Scanlon, 96, 97). It is very close to transcendental phenomenology, but it remains positive science because it is confined to the natural attitude. In view of all these characteristics of this discipline, one may see its role as bridge between the transcendental phenomenology and empirical researches, but it also involves the seeming contradictions as well. It is eidetic as well as positive science, it practices epoché to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity, but it also retains the presupposition of the world. If we follow Husserl to see how he talks about the duplicity of human being – he is at the same time the person living in the world and the transcendental ego for the validity of the world (Hua IX, 294/McCormick ed., 31; see also Hua VI, §53), then the psychological phenomenology can be seen to best reflect such duplicity in regard to the status of the world. Husserl on the one hand dispenses with the presupposition of the world through reduction and on the other hand insists that the world has never been completely dispensed with due to its connection to natural attitude, which is opposed to transcendental attitude evidently.

In Husserl's conception, psychology should not be only restricted to the empirical psychology. Psychology can be also understood as that which aims at the study of the essential part of psychic phenomenon—the intentionality. In this sense, phenomenological psychology is an aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, and purely descriptive field of investigation. The objects of such a psychology are the consciousness-life (*Bewußtseinsleben*) of the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects in the world (Hua XXVII, 213-214; Hua IX, 335; Hua XV, 142).

In order for the investigations to be made possible, the phenomenological psychologists need to practice reduction such that they may become "the non-participating onlooker" (*der unbeteiligte Zuschauer*) (Hua IX, 313/Sheehan eds., 222) and become aware of the consciousness-life of the research objects. They need to give up all that they hold on in the natural attitude and do their best to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity and describe the essence of it (Hua IX, 312/Sheehan eds., 222). They also need to dispense with the world and what remains is all kind of being conscious of, for example, perception of, remembering of, judging of etc. (Hua IX, 282/McCormick, 24). With all these practices they become different from the objects they investigate. The purity of the psychic phenomenon, secured by "psychological-phenomenological reduction", means mainly liberation from the psycho-physical aspects of psychic phenomenon (Hua IX, 308/Sheehan eds., 218). The reduction demands that whatever irrelevant to the essential part of the psychic needs to be bracketed. The investigators concentrate solely on the correlation between the psychic activities and their intentional objects.

As indicated above, the objects that the psychological phenomenology aims to study are the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects in the world. The subjects of these sorts are deeply involved in the world, so deeply that without the correlative part of the world, the psychic phenomenon of the subject(s) can be hardly explained. In this sense, the investigation has to presuppose the world. And this results in contradiction regarding the status of the world, i.e. on the one hand the world is bracketed through the practice of reduction, it is on the other hand retained for the sake of research so long as the objects they investigate are deeply involved in the world. In transcendental phenomenology such a contradiction is overcome because the world as a whole has turned into phenomena. Consequently the reduction practiced by the psychologists is so to speak incomplete compared to philosophers and consequently the purity attained therein has also only relative purity (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172).

3. Phenomenological Psychology and the Experiential World

Nevertheless one should never denounce the value of phenomenological psychology in view of such contradiction. As long as this discipline works on the liberation from the "transcendent factors," that is, the psycho-physical aspects of the psychic phenomenon, it gets hold of the basis to work out the essence of psychic phenomenon. And this leads to the study of the "unitary experiential world" (*einheitliche Erfahrungswelt*), which is "all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences" (Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178).

All the socio-cultural sciences need to deal with what proceed in the mental (*das Geistige*) of the people, what they think and how they think. But as long as the human beings are living in the world, the worldly aspect just requires to be taken into consideration. Traditionally, the relation between material nature and the mental has concerned the philosophers and scientists since Descartes in the early 17th century. Though Husserl poses similar question, yet he declines to see either "nature" or "mind" as indubitable notions from which we can start dealing with this question. As a matter of fact, these two concepts result from our theoretical thinking instead of our original experience. As long as the concepts of "nature" and "mind" are results of theoretical interests, they should not be taken for granted in such a context.

The world revealed through pre-theoretical experiences is never the world-in-itself, i.e. the pure material nature, it is instead related to the subject. Husserl delineates such a world as surrounding world (*Umwelt*). This is a pre-scientific, pre-theoretic world of experience that involves the subjective aspect. Even though every subjective experience has its particular, concrete content,

it nevertheless contains the stable sense (*fester Sinn*), that is, the invariant (*das Invariante*) in the world (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172). The phenomenological psychology of Husserl aims at exactly the clarification of such invariants in the world. So long as it is related to the subjective moments, it is not devoid of the mental or mind. Besides, one has to add that the subject is closely connected to the world. It is "subject in the world". How, then, is such a subject to understand?

The subject is a being with the mental, with mind, yet it is not purely mental, it is also a being with bodily existence. The subject is involved in space, closely related to the physical phenomenon and material nature. How then is such a connection to be explained? Husserl takes up this old question with a new orientation.

Basically, Husserl holds the view that the mental is more essential than the body in the definition of human being. However, to the extent that the mental cannot exist on its own, the mind is not irrelevant to the space. The mind is involved with space through the body, with such involvement the mind can be said to localize in space, though mediately. Husserl regards this as the way how the mind is originally given in space. When we determine that the mental cannot exist without the physical subsistence, the latter can be said to constitute the presupposition for the former. As a result, when the body is annihilated, so is the mental or mind. This is how Husserl thinks of death as a real event in the world (Hua IX, 109/Scanlon, 82). Accordingly Husserl does not support the idea that the soul may survive the decay of the body. He insists on the necessary precondition of the bodily existence for the mental. However, he is not in accordance with the naturalistic view that the mental or mind can be treated as no more than the by-product of the physical body, either. It is unacceptable to him to study the mental or mind with the devices borrowed from natural sciences. For him this sort of approach makes up the biggest obstacle to understand the mental or mind. He explains:

> In a completely one-sided fashion, one attempted always to continue proceeding exclusively in the mode of natural science and to reduce all research concerning reality to inductive research. Inductive science and empirical science fact stood and still now stand for many as equivalent expressions. Connected with that is the unclear transfer, one which is as a rule even false in principle, of the idea of a science of nature to the science of mental essences and of the psyche itself (Hua IX, 142/Scanlon, 108).

In the eyes of the natural scientists the mental or mind is nothing but the phenomenon that is based on the physical occurrences. The mental is thus interpreted as objectified phenomenon in the natural world. The human be-

ing is normally conceptualized as such, and the ego is basically regarded as spatial existence. But Husserl rejects such a conception of the ego. In his eyes, the pure ego is far beyond what the bodily phenomenon reveals[4].

Husserl reinterprets the traditional philosophical question of mind/body by inquiring: how the mind comes to be involved in the spatial world? The answer to this question lies in animation (*Beseelung*), which can be made clear against the background of what Husserl calls the personalistic attitude.

As the subject in the world the human being deals with the things in the surrounding world with a attitude that Husserl calls the personalistic attitude. This attitude signifies the interest in the meaning and value of the things. And in this attitude, «my body is … given for me in the surrounding world as the center of the rest of the surrounding world, as a spatial thing of the surrounding world with somatic properties, in which I hold sway, and even as that by which I exercise an influence upon the rest of the surrounding world, etc.» (Hua IX, 228/Scanlon, 175). This attitude is definitely different from the naturalistic attitude, which has exclusively interest in the pure nature that is deprived of value and meaning. For Husserl the surrounding world is related to the personalistic attitude and the pure nature results from the privation of personalistic attitude.

Originally, the world is never independent of our experiences, the items we encounter are never just natural material, but always involving some senses beyond pure nature, not to mention the persons we encounter. As personal I (*Mensch-Ich)* I am living in the world with all these things and other persons. And it is the socio-cultural science that deals with the personal subject living in his surrounding, cultural world (Hua XXVII, 211). In such a situation, the things around him are significant (*bedeutsam*) (Hua IX, 111; Scanlon, 84). Husserl even notifies that between the personal subject and his objects there is intertwining relationship (Hua IX, 226; Scanlon, 173). In brief, cultural objects are produced for the sake of some uses or purposes that constitute their meaning and value.

The knowledge about the pure nature is not at all equal to the understanding of the world. The things in the surrounding world are things full of meaning and value, they are cultural objects. Although the cultural objects have the components of natural material, they are not merely natural objects. Husserl holds that « (t)he purpose and sense of the work which accrued to the object in its original production is something permanently appropriated to that material object » (Hua IX, 115/Scanlon, 87). The value and meaning are adherent

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[4] As long as the pure ego is the origin of constitution, the body can even be said to be constituted by the pure ego (208).

to the cultural objects as their inseparable parts. Taking up arrow as example, Husserl explicates:

> physically the arrow is sensually seen and is at the same time, as we say, understood in its final sense as an arrow. It shows itself to be that in possible and actual experience whenever it is shown and demonstrated as having been produced for the sake of this sense and as corresponding to it (Hua IX, 115/ Scanlon, 87).

Seen as such, the eidetic description of the personalistic attitude can provide us with an appropriate approach to understand the world. A study of this world calls Husserl also as «the eidetic study of the world of natural experience» (*die Eidetik der natürlichen Erfahrungswelt*). As long as this science aims at describing the a priori of the experiential world, it is close to the aforementioned phenomenological psychology and universal science of the world (*universale Weltwissenschaft*).

Phenomenological psychology, the universal science of the world, or «the eidetic study of the world of natural experience», all of them are to be characterized as aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, descriptive and intentional. Beyond that it remains in the natural attitude instead of transcendental attitude. A priori implies that between subject and the world there is a universal structure, which is revealed through constant styles and types. Such aprioric, universal structures are presuppositions of the daily life. Yet these presuppositions are not being aware of. Even the subject that is involved is not being aware of, either. In daily life people have their preoccupations with all kinds of object that concern their living. One needs to step back in order to get in touch with these presuppositions as well as the subject that has been constantly in function. It is what Husserl means by reduction. First is the stage of psychological-phenomenological reduction, and then the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In this context, the first one will suffice.

Through the reduction we become aware of the presupposition of daily life and come in touch with the experiential world, which Husserl explains:

> By the title 'experiential world' we mean clearly what makes up the unity of concordant total actuality which is continually reestablished in the course of our experiences (Hua IX, 59/Scanlon, 44).

The world is a world that is related to the subject, not just the world-in-itself, as already mentioned before. And such experiential world has a universal structure that is revealed in stable types and styles. The structure is on the one

hand related to the subject, it is on the other related to the world. The subject and the world are just correlated to each other.

Husserl points out further that the experiential world with its eidetic structure is the «all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences»(Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). It contains the world-truth (*Weltwahrheit*) (Hua IX, 63/ Scanlon 47) that constitutes the basis for all the truths in factual sciences, be it natural or socio-cultural. The truth revealed in the world of original experiences signifies that such a world of truth is not a world without contents. Only because of its fruitful contents can it become the foundation of all sciences. Based on the truth of such a world we can be sure of truth in scientific knowledge. The world is a domain of pre-scientific experience, the structures of which will be reflected in other sciences (Hua IX, 64, 46, 232/Scanlon, 33, 47, 178).

Thus, the experiential world is the foundation of all the scientific researches. The experience has it that, as human beings living in the natural attitude, we hold lots of unshakable believes which concern the reality and totality of the world. It is accepted by us as firmly as possible. But that which is revealed in the original experiences is for Husserl much too contaminated by the scientific culture that we may find it extremely hard to return to the world in original experiences and recognize it. For this reason Husserl suggests to overcome such difficulties by phenomenological reduction, here once again the psychological-phenomenological reduction.

Conclusion

In the first part of my paper, I delineate the Husserlian notion of lifeworld ending with the question: Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?

In the second and third part of my paper I explore the meaning of phenomenological psychology by indicating the position of this discipline as between transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. In addition, I also indicate the parallel between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Husserl himself handles the relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology quite a lot when he deals with phenomenological psychology. However, in the lecture held in 1925, we hardly find Husserl articulate much about the relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, rather, it concentrates on the relationship between phenomenological psychology and the factual sciences, in particular that of socio-cultural sciences in the context of which the experiential world plays a pivotal role.

As long as phenomenological psychology works on the correlation of our experiences and the world, and as long as it deals with the natural world-concept, the phenomenological psychology corresponds to the universal science of the world. If, as the mind's self-knowledge (193/Scanlon, 148), the phenomenological psychology focuses on the side of subject, then it is the universal science of the world that focuses on the side of the world. Like two sides of the same coin, these two sciences belong to each other and both of them correspond to « the eidetic study of the world of natural experience» as long as they are eidetic sciences. In such a case, a phenomenology without the subsoil of transcendental phenomenology seems sustainable. Looking back to the question raised above, why not also grant the ontology of lifeworld an independent status?

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Phenomenology and Sociological Research: The Constitution of "Friendship"

Jochen Dreher

This analysis combines phenomenological and sociological research for an investigation of the social relationship of "friendship". From a phenomenological perspective, it focuses on the epistemological basis, on the subjective constitution of the phenomenon of "friendship". The social construction of friendship however, is described from a sociological research perspective with reference to concrete empirical expressions of this specific social relationship. The key for the reflections on friendship is the adaptation of Edmund Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction for the analysis of social phenomena, based on the argumentations of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch. This leads to the assumption that friendship is symbolically constituted with reference to everyday transcendent ideas which substantially define the specific expression of this social relationship.

Introduction

The aim of this investigation is to describe a possibility of how phenomenological reflections can have a purpose for questions focused by the social sciences. I will demonstrate how analogous to the application of phenomenological reduction – the basic methodical procedure of phenomenology – there can be a specific reduction, oriented towards the analysis of the constitution of social phenomena. I will focus on the analysis of the constitution of "friendship" as a specific form of human relationship to be described as example for applied phenomenology on the interface of sociological and phenomenological research. The essential intention of these phenomenological reflections is to discover the subjective preconditions of the social relationship of friendship.

Phenomenological reduction, on the one hand, can have a specific purpose for an epistemological reflection of the methodology of the social sciences, which will be of less relevance for these reflections. Essentially, I will show how analogous to the application of phenomenological reduction, this methodological procedure can be used to analyze specific social phenomena. (1) First of all, I will briefly describe the fundamental procedures of phe-

nomenological reduction, relying on Edmund Husserl's respective writings. (2) Secondly, I will follow the ideas of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch who work out the "epoché of the natural attitude," adapting Husserl's method to confront social scientific problems. (3) In the third part of my paper, I will demonstrate how a modified reduction method can be used to analyze a specific social phenomenon; my "applied theoretical" reflections will concentrate on the constitution of a specific form of human encounters, in analyzing the constitution of "friendship."

The Phenomenological Reduction

The basic methodical procedure within phenomenological philosophy is the "phenomenological reduction" as it was essentially developed by Edmund Husserl in his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Husserl 1982 [1913]) and *Cartesian Meditations* (Husserl 1960 [1931]). The phenomenological reduction is characterized by the fundamental inhibition of any statement about the *world* or *existence* with the aim of describing the mechanisms and potentialities of the intentionality of the subjective consciousness. Husserl's reflections on the meaning of "existence" are searching for an answer to the question of how the world "exists," i.e. how our ideas, perceptions, and judgments can be considered "objective." All of our statements on meaning and existence have to be identified as well-founded. According to the tradition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy, not the objects are being focused; it must be analyzed how they appear to our consciousness. It is precisely the phenomenological reduction which aims at revealing the constitutive principles of the subjective consciousness. Husserl mainly differentiates between (1) the *eidetic reduction*, (2) the *transcendental reduction* and (3) the *phenomenological reduction* (also called *phenomenological* or *transcendental epoché*). I will now briefly describe these three reduction procedures, and I will also point out their relevance for the analysis of social scientific problems.

(1) The *eidetic reduction* leads to a description of the intuition, of what presents itself as the eidos of the constituted object being in the focus of consciousness. As Husserl argues, it serves to uncover noetic-noematic correlations, the noetic-noematic structures that are present within the constituting process of objects. The "eidetic variation" reveals the eidetical structure in abstracting from the coincidences and individual particularities of factual acts of thinking.

(2) The *transcendental reduction* serves to describe "pure phenomena" in a sense that these are liberated from anything that is part of reality. From such a perspective, phenomenology is supposed to be not only the theory of the eidos of *real* phenomena but also of transcendentally reduced phenomena.

(3) What Husserl denotes as *phenomenological reduction* is also called "phenomenological" or "transcendental epoché." What is being achieved with this methodological procedure is the "bracketing" or "inhibition" of the world; assumptions and previously constituted knowledge are bracketed with the help of phenomenological reduction. With the bracketing of the unquestionable validity of the being of the world, this world is being focused as constituting world of a constituting consciousness. The world which is being constituted in the natural attitude, which is discovered as real in experience, has to be put into brackets, has to be inhibited.

What significance do these phenomenological procedures have for the social sciences? Why should this highly subjectivist position be relevant for the analysis of social phenomena? Of course, as Schutz and Gurwitsch have demonstrated, the phenomenological method can be used to epistemologically challenge the methodology of the social sciences. Alfred Schutz in his basic work *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (Schütz 2004 [1932]) phenomenologically revises Max Weber's notion of social action in the heart of his interpretive sociology. Using phenomenological reflections, Schutz shows that Weber's perception of the individual actor who confers meaning to his actions, needs to be formulated more precisely, taking into consideration the perspective of the constituting subjective consciousness. Finally, in revising Weber's basic sociological concepts, Schutz establishes the phenomenological foundations for the social sciences.

In analogy to the different reduction procedures as described by Husserl, Schutz challenges the issue of "subjective meaning" being conferred to social actions by the acting subject. He does not explicitly refer to the reduction method, while challenging Weber's notion of subjective meaning. What becomes obvious is the fact that Schutz is using the phenomenological position to epistemologically found Weber's sociology.

The aim of this argumentation is to apply the phenomenological reduction method to analyze concrete social phenomena. The question for me is whether insights on the constitution of social phenomena can be reached through the application of phenomenological reduction, or, to be more precise, through an analogous procedure to phenomenological reduction. In my opinion, neither Schutz nor Gurwitsch explicitly applied this methodological procedure to analyze concrete social phenomena. One could argue that for example Alfred Schutz, in his studies on the stranger and the homecomer, is using reduction procedures, which still remain on the level of a sociology of knowledge. Anyhow, he does not evidently relate to the reduction method when conducting these studies in applied theory.

I will elaborate on this interface between phenomenology and the social sciences by referring to what Schutz and Gurwitsch developed following Hus-

serl's position on phenomenological reduction. They further develop Husserl's perspective – I would not say they distance themselves from Husserl, in establishing the *epoché of the natural attitude*.

The Significance of Phenomenological Reduction for the Social Sciences

In his reception of Husserl's earlier phenomenology and coming from the social sciences, Alfred Schutz focuses on a "phenomenology of the natural attitude" rather than transcendental phenomenology. Although he acknowledged "the importance of the phenomenological and the eidetic reductions for the foundations of a presuppositionless philosophy", Schutz analyzes social reality on the account of time-consciousness, discovered by Husserl within the transcendental sphere but still valid within the natural attitude (cf. Michael D. Barber 2004). According to his theory of the life-world, Schutz emphasizes the life-world as science's substrate, unquestioned unless there were some motivations for questioning it, and admits that his idea of the "epoché of the natural attitude" surpassed Husserl's work without being incompatible with it. The way I argue, Schutz's reflections "sociologize" Husserl's subjectivist position in concentrating on the we-relationship as the fundamental social relationship from which subjectivity needs to be explained.

In his essay on multiple realities, Schutz describes the "natural attitude" as an epistemological position that takes the world and its objects for granted, until counterproof imposes itself. "As long as the once established scheme of reference, the system of our and other people's experiences, works, and as long as the actions and operations performed under its guidance yield the desired results, we trust these experiences. We are not interested in finding out whether this world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system of consistent appearances" (Schutz 1962 [1945]: 228). This attitude, which is part of our everyday life experience, can only be interrupted if a "strange," not expected experience appears. Comparing the "natural attitude" to a phenomenological attitude, Schutz discovers the relatedness of the phenomenological epoché and the natural attitude. He describes phenomenological epoché as the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt. Schutz suggests that human beings within the natural attitude also use a specific epoché which is of course rather different to the one used by a phenomenologist. Human beings within the natural attitude do not suspend their belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, they suspend doubt that the world and its objects might not be how they appear to them. Schutz calls this epoché the *epoché of the natural attitude* (ibid.: 229).

While the phenomenological attitude, reached through phenomenological reduction, is so to speak artificially assumed by the scientist, the epoché of the natural attitude is a position taken by human beings in their everyday life.

When describing different reality spheres, such as the world of dreams, of imageries and phantasms, the world of art, the world of religious experience, the world of scientific contemplation, the play world of the child, etc., Schutz argues that a peculiar cognitive style belongs to each of these different provinces of meaning. A specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific epoché, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective belong to these provinces of meaning as well. It is crucial that the world of working in daily life is the archetype of our experience of reality. All other provinces of meaning may be considered to be its modifications.

Schutz proposes a systematical grouping of these provinces of meaning, according to their constitutive principle. This analysis would prove, he says, that the more the mind turns away from life, the larger the slabs of the everyday world of working which are put in doubt; the epoché of the natural attitude which suspends doubt in the existence of the world is replaced by other epochés which suspend belief in more and more layers of the reality of daily life, putting them in brackets (Schutz 1962 [1945]: 232f.). Like this, a typology of the different provinces of meaning could be established, and each one – this is highly important for my argumentation – could be described with a particular epoché. Dreaming, reading a poem or novel, playing with children requires some kind of suspension of what is pre-given by the everyday lifeworld. Following Schutz, this is in each case achieved through a specific kind of epoché.

A slightly different argumentation is presented by Aron Gurwitsch who describes the interface between phenomenology and the social sciences. The central notion for him would be the concept of the life-world which, the way I argue, is the key concept to connect the two disciplines. Gurwitsch argues with the following words: «Whether we concern ourselves with the life-world along the lines of Husserl's orientation or, following the direction of existentialism and philosophical anthropology, we deal with human existence within the life-world, in raising the problem of access, we are led to consider consciousness and its acts. These include the acts through which the life-world presents to us and is interpreted in the sense it has for the sociohistorical group to which we belong […] and the acts through which we conceive of ourselves as mundane existents, as human beings in a sense which is congruous in that we interpret our life-world. Acts of consciousness are in play in all our conduct – in all our doings, involvements, commitments, hopes, fears, actions, and projects» (Gurwitsch 1974 [1970]: 12).

When, the way Gurwitsch argues, consciousness in this context is considered to be «the universal and sole medium of access», a special methodological device is required «by means of which consciousness is stripped of the sense of mundanity or, as it may also be put, one which permits us to consider consciousness exclusively under the aspect of its presentational or presentifying function, that is opening up access to objects and entities of every kind, including those which pertain to the life-world. The device is the phenomenological or transcendental reduction» (Gurwitsch 1974 [1970]: 13).

What the phenomenological reduction does, according to Gurwitsch, is putting the existential character of the world and the objects out of play, out of action, so that it is no longer in use. «*The belief in question is suspended and correlatively the existential character is placed between parentheses*; it is *inhibited*, but inhibition is not suppression» (Gurwitsch 1974: 185). Therefore, according to the phenomenological attitude, an object which continues to offer itself to consciousness as existing is considered not simply as existing, not as such and such a reality, but as presenting itself *as* existing, as laying claim on existence. Comparing these reflections to what is achieved in the natural attitude, Gurwitsch argues that in the natural attitude the subject is convinced that he or she is in the midst of a real world, confronted by levels of being whose objects also comport themselves as existing in one form or another. Phenomenological reduction is less concerned with the objects themselves, or with the convictions the subject has about them, than with the way in which these objects and convictions enter into phenomenology.

Strictly following Husserl's reflections on phenomenological reduction, Gurwitsch does not see any possibility to connect phenomenology with philosophical anthropology and the biological and psychological sciences. These disciplines refer to consciousness in its relation to mundane realities, as pertaining to the concrete human self, and therefore are impregnated with human reality. Above all, consciousness can be described as a pure field of experienced acts which are related to objects, acts by which the real concrete self is itself grasped and in which it is constituted. This is, as Gurwitsch argues, why consciousness possesses the absolute character assigned to it by Descartes and reaffirmed by phenomenological reduction. «Therefore no anthropological element may be allowed to enter into phenomenological considerations. One of the fundamental reasons for the phenomenological reduction is that it carves an impassable gulf between phenomenology and every species of philosophical anthropology» (Gurwitsch 1974: 187f.). When phenomenological reduction is being practiced as a methodical procedure, what is retained is the reduced consciousness, that is, consciousness viewed solely in terms of the appearing and constituting of objects before it. Reduced consciousness, above all, is defined as a field of experienced acts which refers to objects.

If we follow Gurwitsch in this argumentation, the social sciences as well as philosophical anthropology remain separated from phenomenology, especially if the specific aim of phenomenological reduction was to be taken into consideration. Reduced consciousness is free of any kind of social category and predominantly consists of noetic-noematic structures. Still, I would say, that there is the possibility to analogically apply the reduction procedure to analyze the constitution of social phenomena. Basically, Alfred Schutz is proposing a similar procedure when identifying a specific kind of epoché which belongs to each of the experienced multiple realities. As far as I can see, concrete descriptions of reductions by phenomenologically oriented social scientists are missing. That is the reason why I would like to propose a possible social scientific equivalent to phenomenological reduction.

Focusing on the social phenomenon of "friendship," first of all, I will define it from a sociological perspective. To describe the sociological relevance of phenomenological reflections, after all, I will paraphrase three different reduction levels that can be established in analyzing this phenomenon.

The Phenomenon of "Friendship": Transcending the Intersubjective Life-World

Although "friendship" is a common term in modern cultures, surprisingly it has rarely been the focus of investigation by social scientists. There are differing cultural conceptualizations in relation to the quality of the phenomenon of "friendship" as a social relationship. The golden age of friendship in Europe was clearly the period of romanticism when Schiller and Goethe celebrated "friendship" as specific form of human relations. The idea of "friendship" was most probably invented in antiquity, as is brilliantly demonstrated in Homeric legends. In all these contexts, friendship is not defined as a kin term; however, it does imply some type of reciprocity and obligation between otherwise unrelated individuals. Friendships can range from the relatively casual, dependent on shared activity or setting (such as a sports club), to deep and enduring relationships of mutual support.

Within highly differentiated societies, given social relations – such as family and kinship relations – as well as roles are not sufficient to provide complete orientation to human action (Simmel 1999: 383ff.), hence personal relations and especially friendship, consisting of two partners that were chosen voluntarily among themselves, become more and more important. The crucial characteristic of friendship is that understanding and involvement are shared within a mutual spiritual and emotional relationship encompassing typified convictions and ideals agreed upon by the friends (Kracauer 1971: 45f.). One of the founders of the Western tradition of thought, Aristotle, disclosed the

core issue in the concept of friendship when he described a friend as one's "other self." Sociological interpretations of friendship share this view, arguing that the human being in the socially heterogeneous world does not find a second ego in addition to a previously existent ego, instead he or she encounters his or her own ego in discovering an ego within a friend (Tenbruck 1964: 440).

From a *phenomenological perspective*, "friendship" as an *idea* and as a specific form of *human encounter* transcends the everyday life-world of the individual and establishes a certain bond between human beings, thus constituting a unique form of social relation (Schutz 1962 [1955]: 316-318; Dreher 2003: 147f.). The systematic phenomenological – one can also say proto-sociological – analysis of "friendship" as an element of the intersubjective life-world is the focus of this presentation. I will describe the basic constitutive activities of consciousness in establishing a "friendship" within the social world.

From a subjectivist perspective, the I as experiencing subject is confronted with the transcendences of space, time, the intersubjective (social) world and multiple reality spheres (worlds of dreams, imagination, play, religion, science etc.). Social phenomena such as "friendship" or "love" develop within face-to-face-relationships (according to their original idea) – they require the face-to-face-relationship as a basis, while simultaneously transcending this form of human encounter because they are *symbolized* at a higher level – and this is of crucial importance. In this way, these social phenomena endure independent of *time* and *space*. The fact that the person I love or a friend is on another continent does not necessarily affect the social relationship; no matter what temporal or spatial distance exits between lovers and friends, this social relationship in its specificity establishes a strong bond between human beings. The phenomenon of "friendship" in its symbolically super-elevated form usually develops – within a face-to-face-relationship, so that for the *two* persons (the constitution within which the basic form of this social phenomenon most often occurs), a high level of *individuality* (cf. Simmel 1999) is involved in this form of human encounter. It is a highly personal and individual decision who is chosen to be one's friend.

According to Alfred Schutz's theory of the life-world, "friendship" must be symbolized by an idea originating in another reality – a reality transcending the everyday life-world and which is shared by the persons involved in a friendship. This idea of a unique "friendship" can be the result of common experiences of an existential character which form part of the unique biography of each person involved in the friendship (Schutz 1989 [1956]: 255-257). For example, the shared experiences of adventures, catastrophes, journeys, coping with a crisis etc. often form the basis of a friendship. What these experiences all have in common is that they transcend everyday reality – they are experienced by friends in a common reality sphere that lies beyond the

experiences of the everyday life and, because of their symbolic meaningfulness, they represent something crucial within one's biography.

Construction and Constitution of "Friendship"

Starting from Husserl's, Schutz's and Gurwitsch's assumptions on the phenomenological reduction, I will analyze the social phenomenon of "friendship," taking into consideration different reduction levels. My reflections part from the general differentiation between *construction* and *constitution* that is proposed by Thomas Luckmann (1999) (cf. also (Berger/Luckmann 1987 [1966]). On the one hand it can be argued that historical worlds are socially *constructed* in concrete experiences; on the other hand, reality is *constituted* on the basis of general structures of experience within consciousness activities. Therefore, social phenomena like "social relationships", in this case "friendship", can only be constructed within concrete historical worlds. As substantial phenomena they are constructed in each of these social worlds in a specific way. However, the construction of "friendship" occurs on the basis of general constitutive principles of the subjective consciousness. Typical mechanisms within the process of the construction of "friendship" are briefly mentioned to inspire the phenomenological reductions that I will develop. Friendship, as I argued, first and foremost, is *symbolically* constructed, that is to say it is established with reference to a collectively shared symbolism which includes the cultural categories used within construction processes.

With phenomenological reductions the researcher describes the "formal" structures without which human experience would not be possible. The most obvious structures are the categories of the subjective orientation in space, like above/below, in front of me/behind me or categories of time. Life-world structures of social relationships with different levels of immediateness, familiarity/strangeness and anonymity are in contrast considerably more complex (Luckmann 1999: 20) and therefore more difficult to describe. I will now propose the three reduction levels of the analysis of the phenomenon of friendship; of course, more of them could be described.

The Reduction Levels

(1) The first reduction I propose is called the *mundane phenomenological reduction* which serves to discover the typically ongoing construction mechanisms of "friendship." From the perspective of a sociology of knowledge, it will be shown how friendship is constructed on the basis of knowledge structures that are part of the intersubjective life-world. On this level   substantial categories

related to friendship are to be found. What can be found on this first reduction level are "first order constructs" (Schutz 1962 [1953]); we find the "natural concepts" being used by individuals in concrete situations of interaction and everyday communication. On this level of reflection, one discovers substantial constructs that the experiencing individual is using for the construction of friendship.

I argue that in order to be communicated by friends and to serve as a means of establishing a friendship, these "existential" experiences must be symbolized within the Here and Now with the help of symbols that belong to our everyday life. *Symbols* in this sense are *objects*, *facts* or *events* from our everyday reality which refer to the reality of the unique "friendship" which transcends the everyday life-world. These symbols, on a further level, can then be used repeatedly in communication between friends and in this way establish the friendship again and again. Narratives of common experiences of the friends that are told *ritually*, are examples that demonstrate how symbolic appresentation of the social relationship of friendship is being constructed. If we concentrate on the sphere of the intersubjective life-world, these phenomenological reflections on the symbol show us how the social relationship "friendship" is established through common experience and communication by means of symbols. Interaction and communication between human beings establish "friendship" as well as other forms of social relations. For this reason, they serve to constitute the social world as an intersubjective life-world – in a specific way, the symbols of friendship enable the individual to overcome the transcendences of the intersubjective life-world.

Alfred Schutz explains the social relationship of "friendship" from an egological perspective as a life-worldly phenomenon, that is to say as a phenomenon based on the experience and perception of the ego, of the subject. On the basis of the *we-relation* – as the basic element of the social world or intersubjective life-world – human beings are able to constitute their subjectivity within the process of socialization. In terms of the phenomenon "friendship", we have demonstrated that a great part of *individuality* resulting from a certain subjectivity of a human being with a distinct biography is involved in this kind of social relationship; the friend is individually chosen and reflects one's own typical characteristics, for example by repeatedly telling the crucial narratives about oneself from the past or just by memorizing the mutual "idea of the friendship" – this is constitutive for the phenomenon of friendship.

As I mentioned before, there must be an *implied agreement* between the two friends about typified ideals and convictions. In other words, from their individual perspectives they supposedly share basic elements of their world views. When their biographies crossed, in the situation when they first met each other face-to-face, when their "inner times" were synchronized in mutually

shared experiences (Schutz 1962 [1955]: 317), then and only then a specific, unique "friendship" could be established through the process of symbolization. The crucial aspect of the mutual experience is the condition that the experience in itself has an "existential" character for both of the potential friends and that, in retrospect, they are able to connect the experience with an everyday transcendent idea which is identified as "friendship".

In comparison to the love relationship, which is especially based on a sensual and sexual union of the lovers, "friendship" is symbolized and "lives" exclusively through the everyday transcendent idea. No physical attraction is required for the establishing of a friendship, friendships are possible between older and younger people, gender first and foremost is not decisive for friendship relations (although friendship frequently occurs in same gender constellations), and also, one can imagine without any problems friendships between individuals with a completely divergent cultural background. The relationship between Robinson Crusoe and Friday gives an excellent example of how extreme differences and contradictions can be overcome through the constitution of a bond called "friendship".

From a phenomenological perspective the conviction that the social relationship of "friendship" is established through symbolization is relevant. The crucial mechanism within the structure of these symbols is their ability to harmonize contradictions or even paradoxes, and in that way, they serve to overcome borders between individuals (Soeffner 2000: 198-203). The two individuals who become friends may differentiate from each other tremendously – like Robinson and Friday –, the activity of consciousness called "symbolization", a specific category of appresentation, enables them to establish a mutual social relationship with each other. The relation with the friend becomes part of the intersubjective life-world of the individual. Through symbolization the friend becomes part of one's individual existence. Without the friend as the "alter ego", the individual would not be the same anymore; the "unique friendship", as symbolized social relationship, forms part of the totality of the life-world of the experiencing subject. Other social relations – the family, kinship, the nation or a certain culture – are also experienced as elements of the life-world of the individual; they are constituents of the individual's self-identity.

With the help of the *mundane phenomenological reduction* I described the typicality of the specific social bond of friendship. Culturally and historically, this concept varies tremendously, however, common features of friendship can still be identified.

(2) The second reduction reaches *the structural level of symbolic constitution* of "friendship". To get to this level, the substantial contents of cultural symbolizations of friendship are bracketed within the reduction. Relational structures

defining the Otherness or the familiarity of the interaction partner are used to constitute specific bonds among human beings. The individual, who experiences and interacts in everyday life, structurally relates to an everyday transcendent realm of "friendship" in encounters with the Other. The individual relates on an everyday transcendent reality which contains constructions of this specific relationship relevant to interacting individuals. At this point of the argumentation, Alfred Schutz's theory of the life-world is helpful (Schutz 1962 [1945], 1962 [1955], 1989 [1956]; cf. also Dreher 2003). The specific cultural symbolism which is used by the individual actors and which is present within the stock of knowledge of the interacting persons is used for the interpretation of the Otherness and familiarity of the opposed person. Everyday transcending ideas of friendship are exchanged in intersubjective relationships by communicating them in the everyday reality with the help of symbols. The crucial aspect about this second reduction level is the fact that on the basis of the structuring of the life-world of the experiencing subject – everyday life and multiple realities – the specific relationship of friendship is symbolically constructed. Because of the structurally prevalent potentiality to transcend the world of everyday life, these forms of social relationships are constituted by the experiencing and interacting subject.

The second reduction level that I am describing – the *structural level of symbolic constitution* – allows identifying subjective preconditions of this kind of social relationship, of friendship. Of course, at this point of realizing the reduction procedures, the concept of "friendship" has already been bracketed, which is why we are referring to the specific form of social relationship. As far as the subjective preconditions are concerned, we now know that this form of social relationship is highly dependent on the potentiality of human beings to use symbols. Experiencing and interacting subjects are able to establish common everyday transcending realities which include a common idea of the specific, unique social relationship.

(3) The third reduction I would like to discuss is the *reduction of the sensual sensation of the Otherness and familiarity of the encountering human being*. With this reduction level, "corporality" or "bodilyness" are in the center of the reflections. This reduction leads to a formal level of the encountering of the Other. The intentionality of the subjective consciousness on this level is directed towards the Other as another human being. Experiences of "strangeness" and "familiarity" or "anonymity" and "intimacy" determine the subjective perception of the Other whose appearance is perceived in relation to our analysis of "friendship" as familiar or acquainted. On this basic level of the encounter of human beings, language and also semiotic symbolic relations are bracketed and in reflection, they are not taken into consideration. What is reached is a pre-theoretical, pre-linguistic level of bodily human encounter in which

vague experiences of Otherness are constituted within the intentionality of the experiencing consciousness. On this proto-sociological or phenomenological reduction level, the general foundations can be discovered which serve the experiencing subject as a basis for the constitution of the specific social bond as the basis for "friendship." On this level we can especially determine the difference to the love relationship. Physical or sexual attraction as pre-theoretical conditions are important for the constitution of the "love relationship", for "friendship", as we have seen, they are usually not of any relevance.

Of course, as I have shown before, "friendship" is structurally and substantially established on the other two reduction levels. On this level of sensual sensation of the Otherness and familiarity, it can be phenomenologically described how social bonds are being constituted. It gives an insight intohow these social relationships are formally and substantially conferred with meaning and the way they are culturally coded becomes obvious form the first two reductions I described.

This was an attempt to demonstrate how analogously phenomenological reduction is used to analyze the constitution and construction of social phenomena. Instead of applying the epoché of the natural attitude, which is not the position of the scientist, I follow Husserl and Schutz and methodically use the reduction procedures for the reflection of social interrelations. This is achieved by focusing on the perspective of the experiencing subject with its life-world, but within situations of interaction of human beings. Therefore, the reductions have to stop on a level, on which the Other can still be perceived, that is to say the bodily level. Transcendental reductions would not make any sense in relation to the analysis of the social phenomenon of "friendship." This analysis was meant to demonstrate how, with a focus on the constitution analysis of concrete social phenomena, phenomenology can be made fruitful for sociological research.

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Making humor together:
phenomenology and interracial humor

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This paper explains humor through phenomenological concepts and methods. The three major theories of humor: Superiority, Relief, and Incongruity depend on the thwarting of intentional expectations. Since one experiences an incongruity between what is intended and what is actually experienced, the incongruity theory affords the best explanation, but intentionality remains fundamental for all theories. Theorists of humor rightly insist that the enjoyment of humorous incongruity completes the definition of humor, but such enjoyment also depends on a special epoché, usually elicited by the cues of an interlocutor who invites the listener to leap together into the humorous finite province of meaning. In this province, actions and statements, hurtful in everyday life, such as a pie thrown at someone who ducks as the pie hits another, produce laughter. This comic epoché resembles the phenomenological epoché in its distancing from everyday life, and, like the phenomenological epoché, it opens everyday experience to reflection. Although one often experiences and enjoys humor alone, humor is thoroughly intersubjective and more frequently occurs when two persons participate in the humorous epoché together. The opportunities for making humor together are enhanced to the extent the partners differ in their expectations and responses to situations. Those differences, including bodily differences, often result from the complex intersubjective networks, including culture. As in the case of a seemingly solitary activity like reflection, which one learns from others and exercises on one's own autonomously, one internalizes others' styles of humor and discovers such internalization through reflection on one's «because motives».
On the basis of these features − intentionality, epoché, and intersubjectivity, the paper concludes by briefly examining an example of interracial humor. Despite the racist character of much interracial humor, the example shows that interracial humor can produce a respectful bonding between representatives of different races who make humor together.

Introduction

This essay will outline of a conception of humor that will draw on phenomenological concepts and methods. I will show that all three of the major theories of humor: the Superiority Theory, the Relief Theory, and the Incongruity Theory can be explained by intentionality that explodes, or, as Kant opined, expectations are suddenly transformed into nothing (Kant 1790: 200; Morreall 1987: 48). Whereas perception for Husserl proceeds, for the most part, with a continuous fulfillment of intentions, humor depends essentially

on intentional expectations that are thwarted. Insofar as one experiences an incongruity between what is intended and what is actually experienced, the incongruity theory affords the best explanation of humor, though intentionality is fundamental for all the theories. Nevertheless, we frequently experience intentional aiming that is thwarted, but humor does not necessarily result, as for example, when I believe that my wallet is on my writing table in the other room but discover that it is not or when we travel to meet a friend at the train station and they do not appear. While other theorists rightly insist that the incongruity must be enjoyed and that this enjoyment constitutes an additional element that completes the definition of humor, I will argue that such enjoyment is also generated within a special kind of *epoché* that is usually elicited by the tips and cues of the humorous interlocutor who invites the listener to leap together into the humorous finite province of meaning. This comic *epoché* distances one from the everyday life experience that, as lived, might have an entirely different tone. Thus, actions and statements that would be hurtful in everyday life, such as a pie thrown at someone who ducks with the result that the pie hits someone else, produce laughter in the realm of humor. The comic *epoché* resembles the phenomenological *epoché* in its distancing from everyday life, and, like the phenomenological *epoché*, this comic distancing opens up to reflection the everyday lived experience that by its lived intensity hinders such reflection.

Although one often experiences and enjoys humor alone, humor is a thoroughly intersubjective activity, since more frequently it occurs when two persons participate in the humorous *epoch*é together, as when children leap together into the sphere of make-believe play. The opportunities for making humor together are enhanced to the extent the partners differ in their expectations and responses to situations. Further those differences, including bodily differences—the stuff of humor—often result from the complex intersubjective networks that constitute the cultures from which we emerge. As in the case of a seemingly solitary activity like reflection, which one learns from others and goes on to exercise on one's own autonomously, one is able to internalize others' styles of humor discoverable through a reflection on what Schutz calls one's «because motives» (Schutz 1962: 69-72; Schutz 1967: 91-96, Schutz 2004: 202-209).

On the basis of these constituents of humor, namely, intentionality, *epoch*é, and intersubjectivity, I will briefly examine as an example interracial humor. I will suggest that interracial humor, which has often been racist in character, actually affords the possibility of a respectful bonding between representatives of different races as they make humor together.

1. Intentionality and the Three Theories of Humor

According to the Incongruity Theory, our normal intentional mental patterns and expectations are upset, or, as Schopenhauer points out, there is a discrepancy between concepts and the way the things that instance those concepts appear (Schopenhauer 1988:70, Morreall 2009:10-11). The pie thrown at one person who ducks with the result that the pie hits an unintended person or the winding down of the jack-in-the-box music when suddenly the lid bursts open and a comical clown pops out are paradigmatic examples of humor, the thwarting of intentional expectations experienced as incongruous. Of course, as opposed to situations of upset intentions which are not humorous (as in tragedy, when Oedipus pursues the murderer of his father only to find out it is himself), in humor, the incongruity evokes laughter and/or a sentiment of bemusement and delight. For a fuller explanation of what is involved in humor, more phenomenological analysis is needed because several intentional syntheses take place insofar as there is a «quarrel» between an intention and the intuition that fails to fulfill it. For this quarrel to appear, both the act of intending and experience of an intuition that fails to fulfill that intending must be synthetically held together in consciousness (Husserl, 1984b: 575-576; Husserl 2001: 211-212). Of course, such syntheses of conscious activity occur rapidly with such a little lapse in time that it takes subsequent, careful reflection to elucidate the several different consciousness experiences that have taken place.

It is necessary to demonstrate the idea that the other theories of humor are based on the thwarting of intentionality, experienced as incongruity. Hobbes expresses the quintessence of the Superiority Theory of humor, when he states, «I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly» (Hobbes 1649: 104). Historically, the ancients, Plato and Aristotle, also thought that the superiority theory accurately accounted for all humor, which, for them, involved an element of scorn (Morreall 1987:3, 1). Of course, one can conceive of many possibilities of humor in which no scorn for others or sense of our own eminency is involved, but rather simply incongruity, for example, humorous misunderstandings or puns. For instance, when a colleague named Voiss retired and left his Department, another colleague punned, «The Department has lost its Voiss», leading one to think that it was not allowed in some way to express itself («lost its voice»), when it had only lost a colleague named «Voiss». Similarly, Alfred Schutz's secretary, intending to refer to his classic *sinnhafte* (meaningful) *Aufbau der sozialen Welt* spoke of it as the *sühnhafte* (atoning) *Aufbau* of the social world (Schutz, 1943). Though this

misstatement might have led one to anticipate that Schutz would correct the error or even possibly be offended at it, Schutz, upsetting such expectations and producing humor, directed his humor at his own *opus magnum* by affirming that she may have spoken more truly than she thought. In such cases, it is the incongruity that underpins the humor, with Schutz defying expectations that he might have responded angrily to a misunderstanding of the title of his work, mocking his own work instead, and converting what appeared to be a mistake into a possible insightful comment. No scornful comparison with someone else is involved, unless one wants to stretch Schutz's own self-effacing comment as involving some kind of scorn against himself. But this of course, would be to subvert the «Superiority Theory» which seems based in scorn adopted toward others and to broaden the meaning of «scorn» to include any dismantling expectations that something was of positive worth. In fact, though, the source of the humor in Schutz's self-effacing response lies in its unexpectedness, its incongruity with reference to the kind of response one would have expected.

Not only are there many examples of humor that the Superiority Theory does not seem to explain, but also incongruity seems to underlie precisely the examples of humor to which the superiority theorists appeal in justifying their theoretical stance, as the previous cases suggest. Hence, when Hobbes speaks of the «sudden glory» arising from «some sudden conception» of eminency in ourselves by comparison with another's infirmity, he is suggesting that we are focused on a world in which we are all pretty much equal or the same or in which the other is «greater» than me, until something «sudden,» something upsetting, interrupts our usual ways of approaching others, thrusting into our attentional focus our «eminency» by comparison with that other. John Morreall provides the example of someone who had been hating for a while a next door neighbor, who flaunted his wealth, and then that neighbor, in a new $500 suit, falls accidentally into a swimming pool (Morreall 1987:136). Indeed that the wealth-flaunting individual with his brand new suit should fall into a swimming pool is humorous because of the incongruity of what one would expect. But this incongruity forms a base on which a higher layer of meaning, the sudden sense of eminency of the one who hates his neighbor, builds. That this wealthy individual who continually flaunted himself and treated others as if they were inferior, should fall into a swimming pool reverses all the expectations of one thought to be inferior, who suddenly finds himself thrust into eminency over the wealthy neighbor, floundering in the pool, with his new suit destroyed. Hobbes's repeated mention of «suddenness» highlights the incongruity between what was in place and the intentional expectancies that things would continue this way and the reversal and undoing of what was in place through the disappointment of those expectancies.

The Relief Theory originally was based on a physiological model according to which laughter involves the relief of pent up nervous energy, like a sigh of relief. For example, the energy used to repress feelings of hostility or sexual desire, is suddenly released when a joke expressing hostility toward another group or a sexual joke overrides our inner censor, and this released energy is expressed in laughter (Morreall 2009:15-18). Along this line, Freud argued that it is not the energy of the repressed feelings that is released, but the energy used to repress them. Freud develops other versions of this source of humor in which the energy I would exert (e.g. to understand a clown's erratic movements) is not even allowed to be spent (when I compare the clown's action with my own and see that the clown's movements are unnecessary), and then that unspent energy is then released in laughter. Or there are distressing situations in which we become ready to express affect as part of our distress, at least until the situation is defused, as when an explosion throws someone into the sky only to have her land in a hay cart, uninjured, to our relief. The energy that would have been spent in concern over the person thrown by the explosion is released in laughter (Morreall 2009:18-19).

These examples exemplifying the Relief Theory seem to rely on a kind of mechanistic psychology that envisions sums of bound energy being freed to seep out elsewhere, and, of course, the strength of phenomenological analysis is that it escapes mechanistic and physiological reductionism, and discloses the foundation of conscious intentionality, which can be correlated with physiological accompaniments that do not, however, explain it. One can see the intentionality at play when someone's expectation that hostility or sexual feelings are to be repressed is exploded when someone tells a joke hostile to another group or a sexual joke. Or when one draws a comparison between the clown's movements and one's own, the incongruity is highlighted and the out-of-the-ordinary gyrations of the clown, incongruous with what normal movements would lead one to expect, appear ridiculous and evoke laughter. Similarly, when someone is blown up high in the sky, one expects a severe injury to result, but the pleasant experience of seeing the blown-up person landing in a hay cart—an outcome incongruous with what one would have expected—incites laughter. Freud, in effect, offers a causal account of the physiological origins of laughter insofar as pent-up energy denied one outlet flows into another channel like an unruly and mindless river might—and all of this taking place beneath the threshold of consciousness. This account, though, presupposes the intentional experience of the incongruous in which humor is experienced, and on the basis of this conscious experience, Freud builds a mechanistic causal account of laughter to supplement the intentional experience of humor. For phenomenology, of course, intentionality provides the fundament which scientific explanation presuppose.

In fact, the Relief Theory further depends on a kind of bodily intentionality akin to that which pervades the writings of Merleau-Ponty. One can illustrate bodily intentionality by considering an example offered by Herbert Spencer to support the Relief Theory. Spencer suggests a theatrical scene in which a hero and heroine, after a long misunderstanding, are on the point of reconciliation, only to have a tame kid deer walk toward the lovers across the stage and sniff at them. Spencer, having presented the intentional experience, adds the mechanistic account:

> A large mass of emotion had been produced; or, to speak in physiological language, a large portion of the nervous system was in a state of tension. There was also great expectation with respect to the further evolution of the scene—a quantity of vague, nascent thought and emotion, into which the existing quantity of thought and emotion was about to pass. Had there been no interruption, the body of new ideas and feeling next excited, would have sufficed to absorb the whole of the liberated nervous energy. But now, this large amount of nervous energy, instead of being allowed to expend itself in producing an equivalent amount of new thoughts and emotion which were nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow. . . The excess must therefore discharge itself in some other direction; and in the way already explained, there results an efflux through the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive actions we term laughter (Spencer 1946: 305; Morreall 1987:106-107).

Even in this mechanized, physiological account, Spencer cannot avoid referencing intentionality, as theater viewers expect the personal reconciliation that the deer's appearance upsets. Of course, we are not merely minds, and so our bodies, accompanying our conscious experiences, experience a directed tension, aimed at an experience expected (the reconciliation of estranged lovers). Only it is the intentionality of a body, tensed and aimed as it anticipates the reconciliation of lovers, which relaxes at the appearance of the tame deer that dissolves one's expectations. Conscious intentionality lies at the root of the examples offered by the Relief Theory, and it is possible to explain the bodily component of such conscious intentionality through the kind of bodily intending that Merleau-Ponty described so well, instead of through mechanistic, causal explanation.

2. The Epoché of Humor: Clues for a Leap, Distance, Reflection

As has been mentioned repeatedly above, more is involved in humor, however, than merely the exploding of intentionality. For example, the intentionality of

an action is thwarted when one is driving to a concert and another car blind-sides one's own, injuring one of the passengers. Or a friend might describe the chagrin she felt when a colleague introduced her to the main speaker at an intellectual conference, and, as she was chatting with that keynote speaker, suddenly and for no apparent cause, the speaker may have commenced berating her, in total contrast to the collegiality the situation might have called for. Or in a theatrical performance of the tragedy of Macbeth, one can observe Macbeth scheming and acting to achieve predominance, only to find all his purposes thwarted in the end by the armies that rise to oppose him. In all these situations, intentional expectations, especially the aims of action, have been thwarted, and yet there seems to be nothing humorous involved in any of them.

What must occur for there to be humor, in addition to thwarted intentionality, is that one finds the upset intentionality enjoyable, amusing, or evoking laughter, as opposed to the sadness, awe, or pity that one might feel in the tragic disappointment of expectations. The emotions of humor, though, are inseparable from an overarching attitude or mindset, which, when adopted, leads one to expect to feel these emotions, and, when the intentionally is thwarted, one feels them. Following Alfred Schutz's essay «On Multiple Realities,» we can think of entrance into the humorous attitude, what Schutz would call a «finite province of meaning,» as involving a «shock» by which we break from the reality of everyday life, as when one leaps into the province of theatrical reality when the curtain opens in a play, takes up the theoretical attitude upon entering one's laboratory, or enters literary reality by opening a novel one is reading. Schutz suggests that one enters the province of a joke when «relaxing into laughter, if, in listening to joke, we are for a short time ready to accept the fictitious world of the jest as a reality in relation to which the world of our daily life takes on the character foolishness» (Schutz 1962: 231).

This «shock» or «leap» into another province of meaning, by which one takes up the humorous attitude, is also called a kind of *epoché*, resembling the phenomenological *epoché* by which one is no longer absorbed in everyday reality but turns toward it reflectively, no longer taking things for granted as existing, but focusing instead on how they appear and are experienced and the correlative experiencing acts to which such things are given.

Humor, too, involves a kind of distancing from everyday life, and the friend who was berated by the keynote speaker, perhaps, after some time has elapsed and she therefore has a certain distance from the event, can look back upon it as comical. Although the passage of time seems to make possible the distance from everyday life that enables the friend to find her being berated as comical, more often than not, we achieve the humorous distance from everyday life characteristic of the humorous *epoché* in a social relationship. Often one

or one's partner invites the other through signaling to leap together into the province of humor. Perhaps, this signaling occurs in the formulaic announcement of a joke, «Did you hear the one about the priest, the rabbi, and the minister ?». Or it could be that a mere mischievous smile on an interlocutor's face lets the partner know that what is about to be said is to be taken in humor. Or it could be that one is so used to a friend's sense of humor that without much signaling at all, any comment of the friend can catapult both parties into the realm or humor. Sometimes it is the case that only after a statement is made, perhaps because of its outlandishness, one realizes that it was intended humorously and that one has been, in fact, conveyed into the realm of humor, or at least was intended to be so conveyed.

The distance from everyday life that the *epoché* of humor introduces becomes clear in that the intentional actions and statements made within this province are no longer seen as they would be in everyday life. Seen within the humorous attitude, statements that would be insulting or rude in everyday life, for instance, suddenly become comical, they take on a humorous significance. It is as though they undergo a kind of trans-valuation—grasped in an entirely different light.

For instance, an African-American friend of mine, whom I have come to appreciate as regularly plunging both of us together into the humorous province of meaning with little prior signaling, was walking through a store with me and greeted three white women, none of whom returned a response. After the third non-response, he turned to me and asked «What is wrong with you people»? Of course, to find myself suddenly grouped by my friend as among those who were unresponsive to him possibly for racial reasons, simply because I was white like those women, evoked laughter. However, in everyday life, to classify someone as prejudiced against blacks simply because one's skin color is white would be perceived as itself a prejudicial, aggressive, and insulting classification. But, in this incident, I simply took the classification as humorous. My familiarity with my friend's sense of humor is such that in his presence I am always prepared for the possibility that his comments are intended humorously; in his presence I am perpetually ready to be initiated into the humorous realm with him. His comment not only invited me to leap with him into the finite province of humor, but within that province, the significance his statements would have had in everyday life, suddenly became trans-signified. They became part of a playful game in which expectations are disappointed and incongruities emphasized. In this case my expectation that my black friend of many years would not take me to be a racist was exploded, and the incongruity of his associating a long-time friend, for whom his race had made no difference, with those who may have been indifferent or even fearful of him because of his race, fueled the humor. By detaching this

statement from the aggressive and insulting significance it would have had in the context of everyday life, the humorous attitude establishes a context in which the classification of me as prejudiced could have been laughed at.

The humorous expression requires underlying layers of intentionality upon which it, in a sense, supervenes. The very construction of a sentence involves a lower layer of intentional purposive activity, ordering syllables, inflections, and word-order for the purpose, or the «in-order-to motive» in Schutz's language, of asking a meaningful question («What's wrong with you people?»). Furthermore, though the sentence my friend uttered has the structure of a question, it actually does not function as a question since no answer was expected in this case (I would not have been expected to reply «nothing.»). Instead, this rhetorical question serves the purpose of chiding me and my race, belying, in a sense, its grammatical form as a question. This chiding of white people, me and the women who ignored him, of course, presupposes as part of its underlying intentional activity the «you people,» which effectively groups me with the women who did not respond to him. This grouping of me as among the putative prejudiced ones just because I was white, would have in everyday life normally been perceived by me as an insulting attack. But when the humorous *epoch*é is enacted, a new purpose supervenes upon these underlying intentional linguistic processes, which now serve the goal of thwarting my expectations that I not be classified among these women but of doing so within a context intended to evoke laughter. These layers of intentionality are consistent with Husserl's view that an expression subsumes within it a series of subacts (Hussel 1984a:416-419; Husserl 2001: 113-115) and with Schutz's view that an overarching in-order-to motive furnishes the ultimate meaning for all the sub-acts leading to its realization (Schutz 1962:23-24). The idea of layers of intentionality could also explain how the thwarting of expectations at the base of humor (e.g. the man with the expensive suit falling into the pool), can also satisfy a purpose of taking oneself to be superior to another, as the superiority theory suggested. This phenomenological appreciation for the layering of intentional acts even converges with speech-act theory that distinguishes the mere locutionary formation of a sentence («I pronounce you man and wife»), the illocutionary level by which the pronouncing of the locutionary statement actually effects a state of affairs (effecting a marriage), and the possibility that the previous levels might serve a per-locutionary purpose (e.g., I pronounce this couple married because I want them to live together so that they find out how difficult the personality of each is, with the final hope that they will soon divorce) (Austin 1965: 101-103).

But my friend's comment, which placed us both in the humorous attitude, also converted the unresponsiveness he had experienced in everyday life into that comic setting, and diminished the sting he may have felt in being ig-

nored. At the same time, the unresponsiveness of the women, once detached from the hurt he might have experienced in the world of everyday life, would have been more easily discussible. After his transferring the experience of not being responded to into the realm of humor, I could have imagined us going on to discuss further questions. Were those women who were not responsive maybe unaware that he had said something? Had they heard him? Were they fearful? Were they prejudiced? Was my friend too sensitive or accurately aware of how he had been treated? Was this unresponsiveness typical of the way blacks are treated, but something which a white person like myself might not be conscious of and all too disposed to dismiss by attributing to my friend an oversensitivity on racial mattes? Of course, my friend need not have embarked upon such a discussion or answered such questions. His humorous comment transferred the experience of being unresponded to out of the context of everyday life, in which it was no doubt experienced by my friend as hurtful, into the humorous sphere. At that point, I felt I could have pursued with him all the questions I raised above, but we did not have to discuss them. However, if we had discussed them, we would no longer be in the humorous province of meaning, but perhaps in a reflective, semi-theoretical context.

Humor, though, is a kind of first step in ushering incidents or situations that are explosive or difficult to discuss, such as racial prejudice, into a more reflective context or even a theoretical province of meaning. As such, humor's distance from everyday life experience makes it an ally of reflection. At the same time and in contrast to what is involved in the theoretical sphere, humor is able to bring experiences to awareness without having to raise the further questions of whether one's perceptions were accurate (in this case, whether these women were really prejudiced or whether my friend's grasp of his being prejudiced against was accurate). My friend's turning on me and asking what's wrong with you people was humorous whether the women were really prejudiced or not, whether or not I should have been lumped with them as prejudiced against black men. The truth or validity of those claims became irrelevant in the humorous sphere. Humor resembles the theoretical *epoché* or the phenomenological *epoché* in detaching from the pragmatic world of everyday life, and yet it differs in not having to get to the bottom of whether the beliefs involved in one's experiences are valid or not.

3. The Intersubjectivity of Humor: Derivation and Intercultural Humor

Having seen that humor involves disrupting expectations within the context of the humorous province of meaning, we can consider another key feature of humor: its intersubjective dimensions. In fact, detecting humor can seem to be

a very solitary activity; one simply sees a situation of thwarted intentionality as comical, as we suggested might be the case with the friend who years later looks back on her berating at the hand of the keynote speaker as comical.

However, as we have seen, often others signal us to invite us to adopt the *epoché* of humor with them. The invitation, as we have seen, can be issued through a specific announcement, a facial expression, or simply making a surprising statement that transfers us to the humorous sphere. Because we live in our intentional, culturally reinforced expectations, usually without reflecting on them, someone who does not share our expectations or responses to situations is well-equipped to frustrate humorously our expectations. For example, my friend, who did not share my anticipation that I be regarded as someone who was not prejudiced against him, was freer to include me among those who did not respond to him and so to upset my expectation and to evoke humor.

When others thwart our lived-in, unreflected-on expectations, they make those expectations visible to us. But there are other ways, non-humorous ways, in which others intervene in our lives to make us reflectively aware of the ways we intend the world. Beginning in childhood, for instance, it is often a parent or teacher, whose comments make it possible that children become aware that they are engaging in certain behaviors (toward the world or others) or anticipating an outcome, of which they had been unaware. In addition, as we mature, others continue to assist us in becoming reflective about what we take for granted—and Plato himself recognized how knowledge is dialogically acquired is the fruit of Socratic midwifery. Though reflection is originally learned in an intersubjective context, a remarkable thing happens when one eventually internalizes the reflective processes learned from others and autonomously exercises self-reflection, uncovering what one has taken for granted. Such reflectivity attains a thoroughness and culmination in the phenomenological reduction. Similarly, it is possible to internalize another's sense of humor, to become to a degree cognizant of one's own expectations as the other might see them and to imagine them as being exploded by someone outfitted with another set of expectations or responding in a different way to the same situation as we do, without the other being present. In sum, the intersubjective intervention of another, whether in humor or reflection, helps one acquire the distance from one's lived-in aimings-at and makes them accessible to reflection. In addition, just as one internalizes what may have been originally an externally induced process of reflection and becomes self-reflective, so also one is able to internalizes another's sense of humor in a way that heightens one capacity for becoming aware of the intendings of the world that another might have highlighted. As a consequence, one can begin to see how the seemingly highly individual processes of self-reflection and the seeing of the comical are socially learned.

Although we deploy humor creatively, discovering the comical as unique situations seem to call for, within the repertoire of our ability to detect the humorous we can find various general styles of humor, and, by reflection on these styles, we are able to associate them with the styles of others from whom we may have learned and internalized them. It is usually not the case that one consciously decides «I am going to imitate x's sense of humor» but rather through regular association with another and repeated experience of their use of humor, one acquires by passive assimilation another's way of seeing the humorous, of focusing on expectations or the thwarting of them, and of strategies for inviting another to enter the humorous sphere or for pointing out the humorous.

The discovery of how one's sense of humor is acquired can happen after one has employed a particular style of humor, and then one undertakes what Alfred Schutz calls a «because motive analysis». Such an analysis begins with a past event, a decision made or a course of action completed or, in our case, the appreciation of a humorous situation, and then looks for those circumstances, events, or persons in the past before that action now completed, in «the pluperfect tense,» which could be interpreted as influencing or determining the actor to undertake that action now past (in our case to have exercised that style of humor) (Schutz 1962: 69-72; Schutz 1967: 91-96; Schutz 2004: 202-209). Of course, with the passage of time and depending on the interests prevailing when one undertakes a because-motive analysis, one might discover different events or persons to have played a more important role in influencing an action than one might have thought earlier.[1] The entire process involves reflective interpretation that associates just completed actions with events or circumstances in the more distant past.

For example, a former professor's style of humor involved asking seemingly harmless questions in a quasi-sincere, dead-pan manner, but these questions were intended to deflate pretensions and elicit laughter. In developing the introduction to my master's thesis in theological studies, I had rather pretentiously and self-consciously expressed at length gratitude to «One» (God) who had been with me in all my trials. In the oral examination on the thesis, this professor, as if simply asking a question of fact, inquired whether this «One» referred to Professor Doyle, from whom I had taken many of my courses because I considered him superior to other professors, including this professor asking the question. When I find myself at times asking what seem like sincere

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[1] 1   In "Life-Forms and Meaning Structures," the early Schutz recounts how different aspects of a past event emerge into prominence depending on the temporal perspective and prevailing relevances at that time from which we undertake the act of remembering, and one can extrapolate from this account how one acts selectively and interpretively in selecting the events that are because motives of an action that occurred after them (Schutz 2013: 68-72).

questions, stated in a dead-pan manner, that are actually intended to deflate others' pretensions in a humorous manner, I recognize the influence of the style of that professor's humor on my own. His particular style of humor, in addition, has made me more alert to pretensions in myself and others, thereby bringing to light anticipations (e.g. of one's self- importance) that one would rather not acknowledge.

My African-American friend's sense of humor, which plays across the racial divide, as the previous example illustrates, has also attuned me to the comical aspects of interracial relationships. For example, recently, when my friend, his children, and I were at a restaurant, the maître d' pointed to an empty booth to which I proceeded immediately, and when my friend and his children caught up with me and arrived at the booth, a waitress offered to find me a seat elsewhere, since for her it seemed inconceivable that a white man and a black family would be in the same party. Although the waitress apologized for her mistake, I found the situation comical (as did my friend, though neither of us laughed out loud) and of a piece with the kind of humor that will surface when the expectations of people of different races intersect and contradict each other. My capacity to detect humor in such situations is something I believe I have a keener eye for because associating with my friend has attuned me to the comedy in such situations.

A common theme in my friend's humor is that of something or someone little or powerless assuming their rightful place with others. This theme is not foreign to African-American culture, which, in my experience, often de-emphasizes competition between its members and practices a solidarity that appreciates the contribution of its less powerful members, such as children or the elderly. This theme appears prominently in the song «This little light of mine, I'm going to make it shine», which has often been thought of as a Negro Spiritual and which was prominently used in the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. One can detect the influence of this cultural background, as a because motive, in the following expression of my friend's sense of humor. In 1993, when there was severe flooding in the Midwest United States and caskets, dislodged from cemeteries, were seen floating down a river, my friend, who recalled that I had accidentally cut off the tip of my finger years before, joked about the tip of my finger floating downstream in its own little casket. Now, on occasion I find myself detecting humor in situations in which those less powerful unexpectedly assume their rightful place with others, playing their part, however small it may be, in a common enterprise. When I notice such situations as humorous—but with a humor that involves feelings of affection and admiration for those assuming their rightful place (as the fingertip in the casket example suggests)—I attribute the because motives of my ability to perceive this type of humor to this style of humor

in my friend's repertoire. Of course, I am also speculating on the because motives of this style in his repertoire, which I see as emerging from African-American culture to which he belongs.[2]

Because motive analyses like these unearth linkages to a past often forgotten, and they suggest that most, if not all, of our present conscious activities could be traced, if we were omniscient, to previous experiences and social influences that we no longer remember. To be sure, these influences are exercised on actions in which our own creativity is involved; we do not repeat by rote what we absorb from our associations with others, hence I have used the expression a «style of humor». A «style» is like a typification in Schutz's view, something that is learned from the past and usually socially transmitted but which is generalizable, undetermined, and open to novel application in the present (Schutz 1964: 281-288). However individual our ability to find humor may be, it no doubt emerges from a past and from others, however impossible it may be for us to reconstruct its origins.

Our awareness of individual persons or situations from which we have learned the styles of humor we practice belongs to our stream of personal history, only a little of which present associations prompt us to recover and most of which is forgotten. But as the example of my friend's deployment of humor about my finger-tip in its own little casket suggests, the style of humor we exhibit also has its origins in the massive and complex intersubjective network of culture. Culture affects us beneath the threshold of recognition; and one way of discovering the subconscious influence of culture is to simply notice how it marks our bodies, thereby furnishing material for humor. For instance, my African-American friend once remarked upon how I, and most white people he has observed, press the remote control to lock or open a car. We *aim* the remote at the car, whereas he and other black people he knows are more casual, simply pressing the remote buttons in their pockets. In addition, my friend imitates my exact pronunciation of English—and an imitation involves a kind of humorous explosion of expectation insofar as one does expect one's mannerisms or manner of pronouncing words to be embodied in another person. My friend jokes that I pronounce even the silent vowels and consonants in words. But the deliberateness or casualness with which one presses a remote button or the degree of linguistic precision which one deploys in colloquial settings indicate ways in which our cultures, our class, our families, and our

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[2] 2 Of course one must be cautious of broad generalizations, such as "African-American culture", but when one finds patterns of behavior that are similar to or associated with patterns found in a culture broadly defined, one can venture a because-motive explanation, without of course denying that the expression "African-American culture" encompasses a broad diversity of sub-cultures.

histories have left their mark on bodily actions which we carry out automatically, with little or no reflection. As Schutz observes, even the way we walk is shaped by the socio-cultural contexts from which we emerge (Schutz 1973: 110). Perhaps, the power of outside socio-cultural and historical formation on us is reflected most clearly in our bodily actions, our pointing, our speaking, and our walking, which we assimilate passively merely by repeated exposure to others who share our cultural heritage. We often do not recognize the distinctiveness of these bodily patterns until we meet someone for whom they are strange, for whom they can be comical because so unlike their own, and for whom they can be the target of humor that they share with us. When we leap with another into the finite province of humor, patterns that culture has already shaped beneath the threshold of consciousness, become the stuff of humor, disconcerting our taken for granted suppositions that our way of bodily engaging the world is the same as everyone else's.

In summary, humor is intersubjective in character because often another person subverts our expectations and often does so by inviting us to execute a particular *epoché*, that is, to leap with him or her, into the humorous province of meaning, like children leaping together into the realm of make-believe. In that province, the significances that words and actions have in everyday life undergo a transformation of meaning, a kind of trans-signification. The clash and exploding of anticipations are all the more likely to the extent that interlocutors differ from each other—and the different identities that are the stuff of humor are constituted, of course, along many different gradients, such as gender, race, culture, nationality, and class—to name a few. I have suggested further that styles of humor one finds in one's repertoire, what one finds funny, what one notices, what one is attuned to see as comical, how one practices one's humor, how one cues and invites another to undertake the humorous *epoché* (e.g., dead-pan, serious questions; a mischievous smile; an abrupt, confrontational comment for which one is not prepared) are intersubjectively derived. They are learned from others, as a because motive analysis, which associates just completed intentional activity with past experiences of others' intentional activity, reveals. Finally even the differences in physical behaviors that we live out of and that impress upon us expectations easily contradicted by those formed in other cultures, reveal that the entire field on which humor plays, including our bodiliness, is socially shaped.

4. Ethics, Trust, and Interracial Humor

In my friend's disillusionment with the white women whom he took to ignore him, which he transformed into a comic moment; in the bodily differences be-

tween us that he pokes fun at; and in the affectionate appreciation of the power-less assuming their place alongside others, the differences between European-American and African-American experience and the encompassing cultures may come to the fore. The broader American culture, as everyone knows, has developed widely shared interpretations of racial features, for example, typify-ing black men as dangerous and to be feared, and, consequently in response to such typifications, black men, like my friend, are prone to interpret white un-responsiveness to greetings as a symptom of such culturally formed fear. Such cultural significances, in the background of the humor we share, also form the cultural context for the non-humorous events that exploded in Ferguson in 2014, when a white policeman shot an unarmed black man whom he perceived to be threatening his life. The typifications that the broader American culture, particularly European-American culture, has developed and upheld over cen-turies has played a role in developing institutions that have isolated and seg-regated African-American culture and that have produced massive and tragi-cally destructive social and economic consequences for African-Americans. Within this long history of asymmetrical and oppressive relations, of course, racist humor has been pervasive, in which blacks have been cruelly presented as thwarting, often by falling short of, white expectations of how «civilized,» «intelligent», or «normal» people ought to act. Similarly, men have presented women, straights have presented gays, or members of majorities have presented minorities as falling short of their own expectations and as therefore deserving of ridicule. Hence, given the history of asymmetries across race, sex, gender, class or social groups, humor is always risky and always in danger of prolong-ing and deepening the society-wide asymmetries that contextualize any dyadic encounter between representatives of these groups. Given this context, in this section, relying on the account of humor I have developed in the previous three sections, I would like to explore the possibility for an alternative, an example of a kind of interracial humor that might bridge and even to a degree heal the racial divide, without contributing further to it.

One can imaginatively depict racist humor as involving a group (of racists) huddling together to build a type of someone from the despised race, much like the type an everyday actor would construct of a Contemporary, Prede-cessor, or Successor or a social scientist of his subject. Racist humor, though, often involves portraying this type as failing to fulfill the racists' expectations of how human beings ought to act, with the results that the type appears «stupid» or «ridiculous» and thereby evokes laughter among the racists who have leapt together into the humorous province of meaning. Of course, the victims of this humor (if they were even present as most often they would not be) would not leap with them into the realm of humor since they would be only the object of ridicule, laughed at, rather than participating in making

humor together with them. In fact, the racist group resembles the home group of the Schutz's stranger, which develops a picture of the foreign group which «has not been formed with the aim of provoking a response or reaction from the members of the foreign group» (Schutz 1964: 98). Likewise the racist group constructs its type of the victim group without any intention of sharing that type with them or eliciting their participation in this humor. In Schutz's vocabulary, the racists enjoy a we-relationship with each other and construct a type of their victim, which, unlike the type one forms of Contemporaries, Successors, or Predecessors through which one relates to others, resembles more the type of the social scientist, constructed without any intention of relating to the other through it (though racist types, unlike those of the social scientist, lack any scientific objectivity about their subject matter).

However, in the case of my African-American friend, we leap into the province of humor together, and maintain within that province a direct social relationship, a «we-relationship», in which we share space and time. In this immediate relationship with the other, Schutz comments that «My ideas of him undergo continuous revision as the concrete experience unfolds»(Schutz 1967:169, Schutz 2004: 321), and I become aware immediately of the correctness or incorrectness of my understanding of the other person (Schutz 1967: 171, Schutz 2004: 323-324). In the immediacy of the face-to-face relationship with my friend, in which typifications and their expectations are continually revised, he usually takes the initiative in upsetting *my* typifications, such as the self-typification that I am a non-racist friend of his (unlike the women who ignored him in the store) or that my pronunciation or (remote) pointing behaviors are normal and universal (though they are not). In a sense, he assists me in even becoming aware that I am (culturally) «white» and that our worlds are different. In the case of all humor, expectations are exploded, but in the case of racist humor, the victim explodes expectations by falling short of them, whereas in the humor in my relationship with my African-American friend, he explodes my expectations by showing them to be false or too narrow.

But one might argue that my friend's humor is, nevertheless, racist, insofar as he grouped me with the unresponsive white women and attributed to me their «wrongness» (being unresponsive because of fear of black men?) seemingly simply because my skin color was the same as theirs. In his defense, one might argue that, since his grouping of me among the women occurs in the province of humor, he puts in brackets the factual truth of the suppositions on which that humor is based, namely that the white women did not respond to him because they were afraid of black men or that I share their wrongness. But, of course, the white racists could claim the same thing, namely that since their statements are uttered within the province of humor, one cannot conclude conclude to the truth of any racist presuppositions underlying their

jokes. Indeed, one hears the authors of racist or sexist jokes often offering such a defense, «It was only a joke». To excuse their racist jokes as implying nothing factual about the races seems hypocritical insofar as their entire belief system seems predicated on the belief that cognitive or moral inferiority can be attributed to the bearers of the morphological features characteristic of the races mocked.

The racist then by not including the victim in the humor he creates and by other beliefs he or she espouses seems to be engaging in the degradation of another on the basis of the other's morphological features. But one might object, what if the racist were to tell racists jokes *in the presence* of someone from the race ridiculed, and what if that person were to find them comical but not offensive? Would such jokes cease to be racist just because they were uttered in the presence of someone from the race mocked? Schutz, in his essay, «Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World», points out that discrimination (racial or otherwise) not only involves the imposition of a typification by an outsider, in this case the humorous portrayal of another as inferior by a racist, but also «an appropriate evaluation of this imposition from the subjective viewpoint of the afflicted individual» (Schutz 1964:261). The key word here is «appropriate» because there seems to be something inappropriate, something needing explanation, if an African-American were to be in the presence of a racist joking about African-Americans and were to experience those jokes only as comical and not offensive. One might think that the victim of the joke had been so oppressed for so long and so cruelly that she may have lost all sense of own dignity. Or perhaps the racist is coercing the victim in some way not to object (e.g., he will be fired from his job unless he laughs along). One could, of course, make the moral case that to reduce an individual's moral or spiritual qualities to being nothing more than the product of physiological features is objectively wrong and to accept such a reduction is never morally appropriate.

But what about my friend's accusation, «What is wrong with you people»? It seems to group me among potential racists simply because of the color of my skin. It is necessary for me to show why from my subjective viewpoint this imposition of a typification should not be appropriately evaluated as an instance of racial discrimination. The discussion of humor has up to now taken place in what might broadly be called a semantic context: there are a set of expectations (which could be articulated as propositions) that an individual has (e.g. that I not be treated as a member of group racially prejudiced against my friend) and they can be conjoined with a statement that contradicts or undermines those expectations («What is wrong with *you* people?»). In this semantic setting, to produce humor, one has to be creative to be humorous, not to be bound by accepted expectations and to be able to break free of them, to

leap out of the province of everyday life, to make statements that mean something entirely different from what they would mean in everyday life, and to surprise an interlocutor's train of thinking by going in a direction never anticipated. My friend is a master at such humor, which involves undertaking, as we have seen, an in-order-to motive that orders all its sub-acts to a particular purpose. In order, though, explain why from my subjective point of view his humor is not racist, I need to address how the humor he deploys also achieves *interpersonal* in-order-to purposes *within our relationship*—and here one must address the pragmatic (as opposed to semantic) dimensions of his humor (Morris 1946: 217-220). In a sense, what follows will show how my friend's humor, which achieves the goal of producing comedy, serves further interpersonal goals, one that produces endearment and overcomes the racial divide while still preserving our difference from each other.

His «What is wrong with you people?» precisely expresses a viewpoint that a black person frustrated with what could appear to be prejudicial unresponsiveness might feel, namely that *all* whites are fearful of black men, including me. Nevertheless, he also typifies me as someone in whose presence this point of view, which the humorous setting can render hypothetical in character (he never states factually that all whites are afraid of black men), can be expressed, however offensive such a statement might be to a generalized, decontextualized white audience. He is also expecting to find acceptance for who he is despite venturing this possible accusation, and he anticipates that our friendship will not be disrupted by it. In a sense, he is allowing me to enter into his point of view, sharing it with me, giving me a kind of access and intimacy to himself that he most likely would not make available to other whites. Similarly, I typify him as typifying me this way. He, at one and the same time, seems (the humorous context makes this ambivalent) both to be separating himself on the semantic plane from me with his «you people» and yet sharing himself with me on the pragmatic plane, both giving expression to the idea that there may be a racial distance between us and yet crossing the divide. Furthermore, since he intends to evoke humor, the supposition that I am afraid of black men (to which his spoken word gives expression) must contrast with my expectation that I am not. But this expectation appears to be not only my own, but also his, insofar as he is associating with me in the store, leaping into the realm of humor with me, and actually venting with me feelings and hypotheses that reveal a kind of trusting, intimate relationship between us.

This pattern of using humor within a pragmatic, interpersonal context, in a way that reaches out to include me is one that he repeats often. For one thing his reaching out toward me, while upholding our differences, is consistent with his greeting the women who ignored him; he is an individual who seeks in many ways through kindness to cross racial boundaries.

But let me provide another example of his way of including while main-taining differences. Once, at a basketball game in which there was only one white person on the court, with all the other players and referees being black, the white person felt that the referee had made an unfair call against him. My friend, detecting the white person's dissatisfaction with the call, said to him, «Look, you are the only white person here, you can't expect to receive a fair call». Of course, this sentence was incongruous and evoked laughter because one might have expected that he as black person would take the side of the black referees and dismiss the white person's claim of unfairness, but he did not. When his comment suddenly launched the white person and him into the sphere of humor, one would have to be wary that he believed to be truthful anything he said. One should not conclude that he factually believed that black referees would be so determined by their racial background that they could not make an objective call. But the humor, again on a semantic level, seemed to posit a chasm between the races, as if people are so determined by their racial backgrounds that any hope of objectivity or fairness to the other race becomes impossible. On the other hand, he as black was empathizing with the white player, suggesting perhaps that the call was unfair. In addition, he sympathized with the suspicions that might arise for any minority person who is the «only one» of his kind in group dominated by a majority, namely that unfair decisions are made that always support the majority. At the same time, however, he perhaps gives the white player a glimpse of what it often must feel like for blacks when they are treat-ed unfairly in predominantly white society, whether in searches for jobs or before legal tribunals. The humor, which on the semantic level suggests an unbridgeable gap between blacks and whites, on the pragmatic level serves the further goal of bridging that gap through empathy and through suggest-ing to the white person that he in this moment is sharing with black people their experience of being unfairly discriminated against. In the same breath that my friend suggests an uncrossable breach, he welcomes the white player into the black world.

Similarly, at one point in which I had been frustrated with my friend's in-sistence on the differences between us, I said to him, «Surely it is not impossi-ble for white and black people to get along together?». He responded, «Yes, we can, after all I've learned to like your sorry ass». Here again the humor upsets expectations, with me asking a question, perhaps with the intent of bringing us into some kind of unity, and he, in his own sentence supporting that inten-tion («Yes, we can…»), only to have that expectation shattered by the second half of the sentence, «after all I've learned to like your sorry ass». The later part of the sentence stresses differences, that it was not easy to like me since I am a «sorry ass». Of course, the humorous context makes it dubious if he re-

ally thinks that I am hard to like or if I am a sorry ass. At the same time, the very expression translates us together into the humorous province of meaning and also seems to affirm, however cryptically, that he does like my sorry ass. Here again the humor in the semantic dimension asserts at distance between us that is also overarched in the pragmatic level by friendship.

One thing to be observed about the humor in our relationship is that he usually takes the initiative to challenge my expectations, and it is rare, if ever, that I undermine his expectations or expose expectations that he is unaware of. Perhaps this is because I simply am not as quick as he is, but also it could be because I am reluctant to enjoy humor that might appear to be enjoyed at his expense, perhaps because of the cruel history of interracial humor in American culture.

Perhaps the asymmetry I feel about not enjoying humor at his expense reflects the deeper notion of ethical asymmetry that Emmanuel Levinas has described: the asymmetric summons to my responsibility for the other that any other person makes to us. Such an asymmetric, ethical summons only appeals to us but never compels us to act—and the history of American racists humor abundantly proves that the ethical summons of the other is easily disregarded (Levinas 1980: 5-7, 173). It may be that, because of such a summons from another person, we are willing to follow the lead of any other, to trust any other, who invites us to leap with them into the province of humor with them, but even within that province, the ethical claims of others, beyond the one who has invited us to leap, continue to constrain us. Having trusted someone to lead us into the realm of humor, we find ourselves recoiling at jokes that belittle others in sexist, racist, and homophobic ways, and in such examples of humor we feel impelled to withdraw abruptly from the province of humor into which we entrusted the other to lead us. Sometimes people attempt to tell jokes about the deceased (e.g. the Kennedy or Lincoln assassinations), and one finds oneself overtaken with a sickening feeling that such a joke is not funny, and one again retreats from the sphere of humor into which the joker was leading us. If, as Scheler observes, the value differences among people depends on what objects can have an effect on their possible comportment, or on what objects could even tempt them, we could say that the morality quality of a person with reference to others is dependent on what they would be willing to laugh at (Scheler 1954: 178).

The asymmetry, which Levinas speaks of and which may underlie my reluctance to venture to explode the expectations of my friend the way he does with me, could paradoxically lead to the reciprocity, which Levinas also values, as, for example, is evident when he praises the «egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled (and which is to be set up…)» (Levinas 1974: 203). When discussing with my friend my reluctance to mock his mannerisms or

highlight the narrowness of his expectations, as he does with me, he suggested that I should be able to joke with him as he does with me. Perhaps, my unwillingness to exercise symmetric humor with him betrays a lack of trust, a fear that he will be offended and our friendship end. If that is the case, then his invitation that I be more reciprocal with him would paradoxically lead to the result that my feeling asymmetrical responsible to him—and hence responding to his invitation—could lead to greater reciprocity in our making humor together.

However, a kind of symmetry is already to be found in our relationship based upon a mutual asymmetrical responsibility that each of us exercises in relationship to each other. While I, for fear of succumbing to the long history of racist humor, asymmetrically receive passively his interventions without taking initiatives as he does, from his side he has been asymmetrically responsible for me, striving to prevent me from assimilating him in my world, ever reminding me that the black experience is not my own, all the while working to maintain our relationship, to honor me by giving me access to his world and offering me intimacy. My friend is an artist in his humor, and he shows the healing power that interracial humor can have, despite the delicacy it demands because of the wounds it has inflicted and can so easily inflict on those who are different from us.

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
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Phenomenological Alternatives of the Lifeworld: Between Multiple Realities and Virtual Realities

Denisa Butnaru

The concept of "lifeworld" is of high importance in the phenomenological context as well as in the comprehensive sociological theory, continuing to animate contemporary debates. Given the recent development of what is known as ICT (information and communication technologies) and in particular of the virtual reality (VR), the lifeworld configurations changed. The aim of this paper is to show first how the concept of lifeworld has been modified by the presence of ICT and VR. Second it shall be stressed how such instances as subjectivity and intersubjectivity are challenged in their phenomenological consequences by such transformations. In a further step, the discussion of these aspects shall be correlated to the postphenomenological orientation.

1. Introduction

The concept of "lifeworld" has been since long acknowledged as being of high importance in the phenomenological context and it never ceases to animate contemporary debates. In the comprehensive turn in sociological theory, the lifeworld has been already discussed as early as in the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey. However its plenary significance and its definition in relation to the intersubjective sphere was stressed in particular in the late writings of Edmund Husserl. In the phenomenological sociological paradigm, the concept of "lifeworld" has been particularly analysed by Alfred Schutz. His approach is innovative because he tries to orient open the phenomenological discussion towards an action-oriented perspective. In what follows I intend to show how the concept of lifeworld has been modified by the development of what is known as ICT (information and communication technologies) and more precisely by one of their recent outcomes which is the virtual reality (VR). ICT and VR modify both intersubjective relations as well as the social and pragmatic status of the subject and subjectivity. They also challenge the understanding of our relation to the real, qua "paramount reality" (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 226-229) in that such basic categories of experience as temporality and spatiality are reformulated.

Understanding the world as a matrix of meaning possibilities cannot be phenomenologically discussed without a complementary instance, which is that of subjectivity. As it has been often shown (Dodd 2004; Schnell 2007) these two poles that play a crucial role in the construction and constitution of the meaning configurations are interdependent. A discussion on the world and subjectivity cannot omit a third element which is just as important phenomenologically as the first two: intersubjectivity.

Intersubjectivity raised many debates among different schools and led to a proliferation of analyses in phenomenology. Just as the status of the world qua lifeworld, to which it is intrinsically related, intersubjectivty is one of the formal structures without which the status of the subject as such cannot be conceived. The recent development of ICT challenges such phenomenological notions as subject, world or intersubjectivity and the role they maintain in the constitution of our meaning possibilities.

Given these transformations, one of the main questions that is raised and that has its full justification for a phenomenologically oriented sociological perspective is how these instances are affected in their procedural position. A second question emerges if one considers the consequences that the new media structures have for a phenomenological understanding of the lifeworld. If some years ago ICT were still a realm of a special type of knowledge, being associated with a strictly specialized field of technology, at present their status changed. Such a redistribution of knowledge and experience requires thus a different understanding of the above mentioned instances: subjectivity, intersubjectivity and lifeworld. In addition, the media raise another problem, which is that of the presence and growth of the VR in the configuration of the everyday structures of the lifeworld. This state requires a further elaboration of such a concept as that of "multiple realities", discussed by Alfred Schutz. Given the presence of the "virtual" in the paramount reality, one witnesses not only a phenomenological mutation concerning general structures of experience, but also a shift in our conception of the real at a larger scale.

In order to sketch some answers to these issues, I shall consider in a first step classical views on the concept of the lifeworld in phenomenology, namely that of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. I will proceed with a discussion of the concept of "multiple realities" as developed by Schutz and further inquire on the pertinence of "multiple realities" when confronted to recent theories on virtual reality (Cogburn and Sicox, 2014) and "technological forms of life" (Lash, 2001). For a phenomenological perspective the main task would be whether such concepts as lifeworld, and its correlated instances, namely subjectivity and intersubjectivity, retain their pertinence in the context of a discussion of the VR and how their transformation may be understood in the light of the new orientation known as postphenomenology.

2. Phenomenological conceptions of the world and the virtual reality

2.1. From Husserl's concept of the world to digital media. Redistribution of the principle of reality

Husserl's late interest in the function of the lifeworld as universal matrix upon which any meaning possibility is realized brought him to a re-evaluation of the topic of eidetics, as well as of the presence and role that the egological consciousness plays in its determination. As many studies in phenomenology have shown by now (Carr 2010; Follesdal 2010; Farges 2006; Bermes 2004) the concept of lifeworld has a cardinal role in the Husserlian phenomenology and in the phenomenological debates tout court. What is important to retain for the present demonstration is the Husserlian idea according to which the lifeworld represents the background of any experiential possibility and of any practical and praxeological project. As Husserl argues in *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology*, "the lifeworld […] is always there, existing in advance for us, the "ground" of all praxis, whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is pregiven to us, [...] always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world" (Husserl 1936 [1970]: 142).

The lifeworld is the milieu where the subjectivity situates its specificity and also a common structure which the subject shares with other subjects. As experiential and intersubjective background the lifeworld has therefore a crucial role in that it legitimates any intentional and sub-intentional projects, holding a primordial originarity and originality in relation to the egological sphere (Husserl 1954: 469-470). It is in the lifeworld that the subject acquires experience. Further, through the structures of the lifeworld (Schutz and Luckmann 2003) new layers of knowledge and praxis become imaginable. The lifeworld is the level of the doxa which represents our possibility for further interrogations and constitutes the departing point qua epistemological separation for any scientific project. Actually the role of the lifeworld is crucial for the understanding of two types of knowledge in the Husserlian view: on the one hand, as it is argued in the *Crisis*, the lifeworld is the universal matrix of any experience and conditions the scientific stance (Follesdal 2010: 43-44). On the other hand the lifeworld is also the condition for the performance of the transcendental reduction, since originally the experience starts at the mundane level and acquires its transcendental status only in a second step, precisely through the realization of the reduction.

The reality of the lifeworld affects also the production of the scientific knowledge in itself and conditions the very result of the phenomenological

method in that the results acquired in the transcendental sphere can only be achieved by the presence of the mundane sphere. Thus, it justifies all possibility of meaning constitution and construction initiated by the subject, including her own subjective institution. Therefore, as Husserl notes, "we shall come to understand that the world which constantly exists for us through the flowing alteration of manners of givenness is a universal mental acquisition, having developed as such and at the same time continuing to develop as the unity of a mental configuration, as a meaning-construct [*Sinngebilde*] – as the construct of a universal, ultimately functioning (*letztfungierende*) subjectivity. It belongs essentially to this world constituting accomplishment that subjectivity objectifies itself as human subjectivity, as an element of the world" (Husserl 1936 [1970]: 113).

If the general mundane frame remains a constant presence, regardless any cultural and social variations, with the development of the ICT the redistribution of main meaning configurations; such as our representations of time and space, challenges the phenomenological status of the lifeworld. The VR produced by means of digital media has a strong impact on the practical principle characterizing the lifeworld and at a larger scale on the constitution of intersubjectivity. For if the Husserlian phenomenological conception of mundaneity expressed in the *Crisis of European Sciences* stresses a form of generality, the quality of being virtual introduces a redistribution of the semantic consistency in the worldly horizon to which we have access.

The VR was often understood as an alternative of the real concrete world (Wittel 2001) and shares principles of functioning with the world of life. It has similar inner horizons of meaning and provides in its turn a formal unity requiring from all the subjects participating to its creation and maintenance an analogous relation, despite any cultural or contextual differences. Actually it is precisely this levelling created by the existence of the network qua network that reinforces the similarity between the VR and the world of the everyday life.

For sure, at the level of the everyday world of life, the social and cultural structures introduce differences in the meaning that the subject realizes, and given these differences, the subject's place and her capacity of giving account of the relation to different experiential spheres may change. By their generalization and use digital media introduce a redistribution of the principle of reality as well as that of world/ worldliness, precisely by the semantic parallel they induce to many structures of the lifeworld.

Digital media are similar to any other technological products. They accompany and transform the articulation of the lifeworld. But their development and the way their functions are constantly redefined lead to hypothesize something new: despite their understanding in terms of a parallel reality, they have become a part of the everyday life itself. By this process

through which they colonize the structures of the lifeworld, digital media do not operate anymore in terms of a subtraction from the basic principles that constitute the paramount reality. They become the everyday life, offering the preliminaries for a new phenomenological approach to the lifeworld itself. Therefore the principle of generality which has been previously evoked and which characterizes the world as a constant presence is a characteristic that digital media and VR hold. Such a transformation has major consequences for the understanding and the role of the subject, of intersubjectivity and for the role that technology plays in configuring meaning.

ICT questions the status of the world as primary background of meaning and intrinsically the status of reality. Being responsible for the VR, digital media challenge the idea of a unique and unified mundane principle, as defended in the Husserlian perspective (Husserl 1936 [1970]: §37).

This transfer between the everyday world of life and the virtual reality is based on a meaning reorganization, which revises the status of the real and the virtual. Phenomenologically, the presence of digital media and their outcome in the support of the virtual reality reinvest as well the principle of intentionality. Such a transformation is related in Don Ihde's view to a more general principle of technology. Thus according to him, "technologies can be the means by which 'consciousness itself' is mediated. Technologies may occupy the 'of' and not just be some object domain" (Ihde 2009: 23).

This change modifies our experiential background and our relation to basic structures of the lifeworld since in many aspects, the virtual enhances the real. As Steve Woolgar argues, taking the classical example of a paperless office, "the new forms of electronically mediated communication sit alongside the continued use of memos, notes and so on. This gives rise to interesting forms of interrelationship between the virtual and the real, and the modification of both modes of communication" (Woolgar 2002: 16-17). The Husserlian principle of originarity of the lifeworld gains new facets precisely by the integration of new aspects coming from the virtual world.

2.2. Schutz's concept of the lifeworld and the multiple realities

Being interested in the continuation of Husserl's phenomenological project on the status of the lifeworld and on intersubjectivity, Alfred Schutz proposes a new perspective, which is necessary to mention in order to understand our experience of virtual reality. In a classical text, he defines the lifeworld as follows: "Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for other. It is a world of culture be-

cause, from the outset, the lifeworld is a universe of significations to us, i.e., a framework of meaning (*Sinnzusammenhang*) which we have to interpret, and of interrelations of meaning which we have to institute only through our *action in this life-world* (emphasis added)" (Schutz 1940 [1962]: 133).

In one of his famous articles, namely *On Multiple Realities* (1945 [1962]) Schutz evokes a few characteristics that give even more importance to the lifeworld and confirm it as a paramount reality. This perspective is parallel to the Husserlian view according to which the lifeworld is the main ground for any experiential project that we may elaborate; it is our originary horizon of experience and is characterized by an ideal unity (Husserl 1936 [1970]: §38). The originality of Schutz's perspective is that he acknowledges the importance of the lifeworld as being the matrix of our existence and the background for our pragmatic engagement. Thus, says Schutz "the world of daily life shall mean the intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by Others, our predecessors, as an organized world. [...] All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experience of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, which in the form of 'knowledge at hand' function as a scheme of reference" (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 208).

The analytical importance of the world of daily life is major both because it stresses its position in the forming of our experiences and our concrete engagement with one another, more precisely, our possibility to accomplish actions Further, the lifeworld is understood as the basic reality from which any type of knowledge and any type of intentional project shall be justified. In his intention to refine the phenomenological project, Schutz uses the concept of the lifeworld in order to complement the Husserlian idea of epoché. Actually, when discussing the relation that we have with the paramount reality, Schutz argues that the "man within the natural attitude also uses a specific epoché [...]. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him" (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 229). It is by this operation that what Schutz names "the epoché of the natural attitude" is achieved.

What is also necessary to recall in Schutz's theory of the lifeworld is that the concept of everyday life and the natural attitude are strongly related to the concept of reality, which can be declined as it shall be shown in many layers according to a specific principle: that of meaning bestowing (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 230). The process of meaning realization is in its turn legitimated starting from the property of attention. It is attention that individualizes different realms derived or based on the principle of reality. Schutz names these realms "finite provinces of meaning" (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 230) or multiple realities.

These provinces of meaning are qualified as "finite" because, as Schutz argues "[...] all of them show a specific cognitive style and are – *with respect to this style* – not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another. [...] To the cognitive style peculiar to each of these different provinces of meaning belongs, thus, a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific époché, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective" (Schutz 1955 [1962]: 230; 232).

Among these "finite provinces of meaning" Schutz mentions the following: first, the world of *phantasms* (where he includes the day-dreams, the reality of playing, that of fiction, the fairy-tales and the myths), second, the world of *dreams* and third, the world of *scientific theory* (Schutz 1962: 234-246; 340-347). It is also important to mention that even the paramount reality is considered according to Schutz in terms of a "finite province of meaning". However, one needs to note that the number of the "finite provinces of meaning" is not restricted only to the Schutzian typology. This concept of "finite province of meaning" may for sure refer to other experiences of the human mind and can therefore be extended. The VR for instance can also be included among these "provinces of meaning".

Another characteristic of the provinces of meaning is that, despite an experiential congruence, they display a certain complexity. One may experience different meaning organizations and thus different layers within the same province. According to Schutz, one has access to these provinces of meaning by means of a "shift" or "leap" which marks the change in the attitude of the subject and imposes the organization of a new "cognitive style". The cognitive style contributes to differentiate provinces from one another, and from the lifeworld.

The VR like the experience of other finite provinces of meaning, imposes a particular *attention à la vie*, a concept initially developed by Henri Bergson and often evoked by Schutz. The virtual reality is an imagined construction that detains a particular status in relation to the everyday world of life. If one takes the example of the video games, or of such metaverses as Second Life, they fall under a special category of narrative construction which is parallel for instance examples as the world of myths or fairy-tales. The status of being "finite" of the virtual reality starts to be strongly challenged by the development of the social networks and the new modes of communication and sociality that emerged. In this case, the pragmatic principle is redefined and we experience a transposition of the paramount into the virtual and vice versa. The emergence of VR questions the project of separation between the paramount reality proper and the virtual realm as such.

Similarly to other finite provinces of meaning, the VR of digital media plays highly upon a representative function. In relation to a literary work of art or to

a painting, our faculty of representation detains a certain degree of freedom, usually generated by an *aesthetic attitude* that is acknowledged by the reader or the person who is the addressee of the work in question. It is this attitude that contributes to what Schutz names "shift" of meaning from the "paramount reality".

In the case of the virtual experience one is engaged in a *representational transposition* that does not involve aesthetics, although it may, as the example of video games or of Second Life shows. However, other aspects and functions of the VR influence our pragmatic engagement with one another and therefore our "belief". The status of the virtual integrates and is in return integrated by the structures of the lifeworld. Moreover, as Steve Woolgar argues, "not only do new virtual activities sit alongside existing 'real' activities, but the introduction and use of new 'virtual' technologies can actually stimulate more of the corresponding 'real' activity" (Woolgar 2002: 17).

The Schutzian conception of provinces of meaning helps to understand our relatipn to the VR in terms of a change of cognitive style having an own specificity. But this needs a conceptual clarification. If on the one hand the cognitive style that characterizes the VR is understood as derived and therefore in terms of a "shift" from the paramount reality, on the other hand the VR is at present a clear structure of the lifeworld. As a consequence, the virtual world holds phenomenologically a double position: it remains partly factual by the consequences it has on our actions and activities in the everyday life, legitimating a praxeological aspect. And still, its virtual character individualizes it as a specific realm in itself, with own rules and possibilities.

Schutz's theory of multiple realities helps in such a context to understand virtuality in terms of a characteristic common to any use of technology developed and used all along the history of mankind. In order to exist, the VR depends on technology. Its possibility comes to fact as mediation. Similarly to such technological devices as glasses or pencils, computers, tablets and I-phones , which support materially experiences, the existence of the VR confirms actually an intrinsic modification of the structures of the lifeworld from a "non electronically mediated" (Woolgar 2002: 18) moment, often identified with the real, to a mediated perspective of the real, which becomes actually real by its consequences. In this context a new question arises. Does the passage to the virtual world question the validity and the status of its being a finite province of meaning? And if so, how?

In the Schutzian discussion on multiple realities the possibility of a special epoché in the context of the transition from one reality to another is also evoked. The passage to the virtual reality imposes a bracketing. And yet, by the pragmatic implications it has within the lifeworld, the virtual, unlike the realm of art or of scientific theory, holds a special status. As Don Ihde evokes when referring to the quality of our body to incorporate different techno-

logies, the same relation can be transposed to the case of the two types of worldly configurations (paramount and virtual) that are here discussed. What is suggested is that the relation between the paramount reality and the VR is one of incorporation. If as Don Ihde argues "embodiment or bodily intentionality extends through the artefact into the environing world in a unique technological mediation" (Don Ihde 2009: 36), the structures of the lifeworld are also extended by means of the virtual world.

In the Schutzian and Husserlian phenomenology, the primordial role of the paramount reality has been steadily highlighted. With the development of new digital technologies and of the virtual reality, one is confronted though to a crucial change. It is precisely by those mechanisms in which former functions and structures of the lifeworld migrate and transform themselves within the VR, that the digital media confirm their new status as a part of the real. As a consequence, our stock-of-knowledge at hand and our typifications are strongly affected.

Furthermore, communication which is one of the basic elements through which intersubjective processes are established and maintained is fundamentally influenced by the development of the VR. We assist therefore to a redistribution of the principle of reality which is highly important in the discussion of the status of the lifeworld but also of the principle of intersubjectivity. The latter is phenomenologically and sociologically just as important in the context in which both experience and social structures are reformulated due to the existence of the VR. Such transformations would lead implicitly to another understanding of what Don Ihde defined as "interrelational ontology"[1].

3. Virtual reality and technological forms of life: a phenomenological reconsideration

As Cogburn and Silcox note in a recent article (2014), the term "virtual reality" comes from an artistic field, namely theatre. It is Antonin Artaud who was the first to propose this concept long before its actual use to describe the reality constructed by the ICT. Artaud defined virtual reality as the reality displayed by a theatre play. In his view "virtual" is equivalent to "fictional", since, so he argues, "[…] the theatre […] is developed from a certain number of fundamentals which are the same for all the arts and which aim on the spi-

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[1] See Don Ihde, *Postphenomenology and Technoscience*, Albany: State University of New York, 2009, p. 23, where the term "interrelational ontology" refers to the fact that "the human experiencer is to be found ontologically related to an environment or a world, but the interrelation is such that both are transformed within this relationality."

ritual and imaginary level at an efficacy analogous to the process in which the physical world actually turns all the matter into gold" (Artaud 1958: 48). With the development of the digital media and more recently of the social networks, the status of the VR changed from the fictional-like to a specific form of reality in itself, which is borrowing characteristics from both the paramount reality and fictional realm. However, by the concrete impacts it has, the VR intrudes in the lifeworld and modifies it. It is not a reality in itself to which one may have access to by means of a shift, as the Schutzian theory promotes, but it is a form in which the lifeworld presents itself.

As Thomas Sutherland argues, "technology is never neutral – in utilizing various technologies […] that very experience becomes a property of the technology itself" (Sutherland 2013: 6). This view comes to reinforce the postphenomenological postion defended by Don Ihde, according to whom "technology […] becomes quasitransparent […] and thus the technology here is not "object-like". It is a means of experience, not an object of experience in use" (2009: 42). Under such circumstances, Schutz's division between paramount reality and multiple realities is strongly challenged, precisely because the experiential and cognitive shift that was evoked as a main mechanism for the transition from one realm to another does not function anymore. It is because technologies are responsible for different shifts that such a process – in as far as the status of the VR is concerned – does not rely on a separation mechanism, but rather on a connecting mechanism.

Thus, when discussing the status of the lifeworld in the context of the development of digital media one is confronted to a a crucial challenge: that of the consistency and coherence of the worldly character in which our experiences are embedded. It is precisely the constant transition, the fluidity of these new everyday life configurations, their liquidity, as Zygmut Bauman mentions (Bauman 2000) that challenges the idea of a separation between worldly levels, between multiple realities and paramount reality. Such a characteristic destabilizes basic parameters that ground experience, as time and space or the combination of the two, our timescape as Barbara Adam names it (Adam in Sutherland 2013: 6). By influencing time and space, flow and liquidity modify the consistency of our experiences and our intersubjective relations.

In Alfred Schutz's phenomenology, the lifeworld is strongly connected to the *intersubjective* presence. This association between lifeworld and intersubjectivity is not a completely new principle in phenomenology, since Schutz relies on a former discussion developed by Husserl on this theme in *The Crisis*. However, the originality of the Schutzian theory relies in his temporal stratification of intersubjectivity. According to him, there are three intersubjective layers which can be individualized, namely predecessors (*Vorwelt*), contemporaries

(*Umwelt*) and consociates (*Mitwelt*), and succesors (*Folgewelt*)[2]. Contemporaries and consociates are differentiated according to a spatial principle since both belong to the temporal layer of the present. Consociates are those individuals who are spatially closer to the subject, and belong to the same *Alltagswelt*, to the same context and with whom the subject may establish a face-to-face relationship. The intersubjective relation they facilitate is of a deeper consistence than that with contemporaries.

The development of the VR challenges precisely these relations *in presentia*, since contemporaries may become consociates, and face-to-face relationships are replaced by mediated relationships which exist via internet connections and through interfaces. These new infrastructures acknowledge a new understanding of the worldly principle in terms of a complex of "technological forms of life", as Scott Lash names them (Lash 2001). Lash borrows this term from Ludwig Wittgenstein and he understands this concept in the sense of "an empirical 'way-of-doing', and has to do with how a society accomplishes things" (Lash 2006: 327).

According to this author "in technological forms of life, we make sense of the world through technological systems. As sense-makers, we operate, less like cyborgs than interfaces. These interfaces of humans and machines are conjunctions of organic and technological systems. [...] We do not merge with these systems. But we face our environment in our interface with technological systems. [...] As technological nature, I must navigate through technological culture. And technological culture is constitutively culture at a distance" (2001: 107). The challenge that the VR addresses to the Schutzian understanding of intersubjectivity is precisely this culture of distance, in which the distinction between consociates and contemporaries becomes very fluid, in which time and space as categories of experience gain new representational forms. For sure technologies have always influenced the development of our actions and interactions with one another. And yet the digital revolution has consequences that are unique in the cultural history of the mankind. Especially their influence on the representation and living forms of temporality has major consequences.

In the world of life, history and the face-to-face relationships are characteristics which deeply influence the configuration of our experiential flow. In the VR and in technological forms of life, interactions are reduced to the very moment. The meaning that constitutes a principle of congruence for our being with one another and for our actions is influenced by the contingency of the networks and by their fluid character. It becomes a deeply "empirical

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[2] For a detailed description of this stratification, see Schutz's main work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Konstanz: UVK, 1932 [2004] especially the fourth chapter.

meaning", to quote once more Scott Lash. In his view, "empirical meaning is neither logical (as in classification) nor ontological, but everyday and contingent" (Lash 2001: 109). The effacement of the borders between the real reality and the VR results precisely from this characteristic of fluidity and sharpened contingency.

The empirical meaning is also characterized by a special form of temporality. "In this empiricist phenomenology" so he argues, "sense-making loses its interiority. There is a flattening of the interiority of the subject. The expressive subjectivity of the artist, the analysand, the philosopher, the interiority of proletarian is eroded" (Lash 2001: 109). What the VR imposes upon the lifeworld is a dissolving of the individual stance into the flux, into the network. "In technological forms of life, sense-making is for others" (ibid.: 110). Being defined initially as the originary soil of our experiences , and connected to our use of cultural and action typifications in the Schutzian perspective, the lifeworld is being challenged by the development of the VR and of the technological forms of life precisely in its being a field of originarity.

Technological forms of life and their implementation have strong phenomenological consequences in that they play upon both the construction of meaning and on the configurations of our experiences. It is in such a context that classical notions elaborated in the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz need further definitions. Lifeworld, paramount reality, multiple realities, or the above mentioned classification of intersubjective layers are at presented redistributed by the presence of the VR, which as Andreas Wittel claims is not a reality separated from the real reality, but it has become an important component of it. Some examples that Wittel mentions to defend his thesis are emails, online chat, or web surfing. These says he "are very real experience for the people utilizing them" (Wittel 2001: 63). They are real in their impact on our concrete life and they are real in the manner by which they condition our interactions and their meanings.

4. Conclusion

Considering the existence of the ICT and of the VR under a phenomenological perspective is certainly a provocation for both phenomenologists and social scientists. In the first case it is difficult to defend a phenomenological position in which technology is reconciled with the lifeworld if one sees it as a result of a positivistic implementation. This view is questionable because as James Dodd claims, "phenomenological philosophy itself is understood by Husserl as an expressive of this universality of the idea of science, one that recognizes the dependency of any sense of the universal on the historicity of thinking" (Dodd

2004: 211). Dagfinn Føllesdal argues as well in the same direction: "according to Husserl, the lifeworld and the sciences are intimately connected" (Føllesdal 2010: 43). To support the embedding of these worldly structures, namely the scientific/technological and the natural attitude, such philosophical and episte-mological programs as the one developed by Don Ihde show that phenomeno-logy is not a discourse that closes and separates, but rather it evolves with the structures of the world which it precisely questions. These interrogations are in the end crucial for the main phenomenological topic, which is meaning.

Given the presence of the virtual reality(es) and their impact on the li-feworld, one could admit that meaning is not annihilated but transformed. Meaning "becomes informational" (Lash 2001: 110). Individuals have learnt to use this new form of communication and social connection and their life-worldly horizons have been modified accordingly. For sure the new structures of the lifeworld resulting due to the VR are part of former stocks of knowledge and they should not be considered only as pure results of a present devoid of historicity. They influence intersubjective relations and the emergence of the-se relations, and they modify simultaneously the rhythm and the consistence of the real. The present implications of the VR confront us therefore with a new perspective on the foundations and functions of the worldly horizon, requiring a supplementary reflection on the active instances that are at work behind it (namely subjectivity and intersubjectivity).

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Future Structure of the Life-World

As an inevitable consequence of the «peer-to-peer»

Mototaka Mori

This article intends to draw theoretically a future structure of the life-world. The state interventionism in the late capitalism has been often argued by the critical theoreticians like Jurgen Habermas since the last half of the twentieth century. It was particularly the main problem how possible the life-world was in such the technologically systematized society. However, the highly technological development of telecommunication has changed our everyday life very rapidly and totally. If we know such the rapid change of coevolution between human life and technology, we have to fundamentally reconsider on the theory of life-world. Therefore, in this article I will firstly focus on the classical theory of mundane social world which Alfred Schutz presented in the early 1930s. Of course, his project of socio-phenomenology has been one of the most brilliant und important works still now. However, his theory also will have to be renewed. If we know particularly the «peer-to-peer» constellation of the computer network by the distributed anonymous persons, the classical model of life-world must be versioned up to a next theoretical level. Secondly, considering on the virtual currency like the Bitcoin, this article will show you a hypothetical aspect of transformation of the life-world. The mechanism of trust, which has been often understood as one of the most important key concepts for the community or the society, may be replaced with the computer technology of cryptographic proof. Such a theoretical examination will finally lead to an important opened problem. We will have to inquire whether such the social order will be spontaneous, or whether such the ordering will have to be decided only by the speed of computer's central processing unit.

1. Is the Critical Theory still possible?

In the 1970s Habermas described the critical and pathological situations of late capitalistic society as a well-known theme of the life-world colonialized by the system (Habermas 1973: 9). In those days it was an alternative to the next society that he would propose with this analogical dichotomy of the «life-world» versus the «system». He assigned the very famous theoretical terms, which were presented as the symbolic media theory by Talcott Parsons, to this dichotomy. It means that the two media «money» and «political power» are matched to the «system», and the other two media «influence» and «value-commitment» are matched to the «life-world» (Habermas 1980: 96, Habermas 1982: 413). Moreover, he reconsidered a sphere of latter two media

as a problem of speech act theory, what he called the universal pragmatics (Habermas 1971: 101-141, Habermas 1984: 353-440).

Indeed, it might have been very important at that time that the industrial society and social welfare state were interpreted as one of the most typical examples of the highly integrated complex society. According to the Parsonean presupposition, the members of a nation make their living with the internalized common value for them. Their personalities are uniformly molded in the social system where they are growing up. They are strongly committed to a set of values which are known as «success», «affluence», «efficiency» etc. in the modern industrial society. Such the uniformly patterned persons in the advanced industrial society might be the most typical image of man in the Parsonean social system theory.

However, we have to point out another connotation of the term «system». The technology has been developed more highly and rapidly since the last decade of the twentieth century. The telecommunication technology, typically the Internet technology, has totally changed our everyday life. It means that our taken-for-granted valid references like some common concepts and values in a patterned culture, such as marriage, sexuality, family, has changed themselves very rapidly. The above mentioned symbolic media like money and political power also has rapidly changed themselves with such technological development. For instance, the payment device of credit card has changed the form of money and its exchange style, and the mobile phone has strongly influenced on the action pattern of our everyday life.

Now we have to ask whether the critical theory, which was possible for Habermas in the late 1970's, is still now critical against the today's highly technologically structured society. It would be very important how we could criticize the life-world colonialized by money and political power, because I assume that our hyper modern society should already have been designed to be colonialized by various technological media.

For this purpose we have to grasp the life-world more fundamentally, because Habermas interpreted the life-world very simply as combinations between speech acts and their background cultural resources (Habermas 1982: 182-228). Even if the life-world had already been colonialized, we had to know more conceptually an original structure of the life-world, which is spatially unfolded by bodily movements and their extension, and which is temporally ordered by lived experiences and their continuity.

Therefore, we need firstly to refer to some fundamental issues on the original structure of life-world (2). Secondly we are going to reconstruct a relation between the original life-world and the symbolic media of money and political power (3). Thirdly we will examine a specificity of virtual currency and a constellation of the peer-to-peer computer network(4). Consequently we lead

to consider whether we will be able to maintain the original position of the critical theory, or whether we should newly find another theoretical way (5).

2. Classical Structure of the Life-World

Of course, if we would ask fundamentally, it may be proper that we refer back to the original conception of life-world by Edmund Husserl. However, we have to presuppose in this paper that the life-world is mundane structured. Alfred Schutz presented the society as a composition of four social worlds, and at the same time he grasped the life-world as the difference between the problematic and that which was taken for granted. In other words, his analysis consists of two parts, firstly an analysis on the temporal differentiation of social worlds, and secondly an analysis on the spatial constitution by bodily movements and their perceivable arrangement and enlargement.

In his first book in the 1930s Schutz had already theorized the society as the four social worlds which were spatially and temporally articulated (Schütz 1932[2004]: 313-387). If we follow the English translation, they are the four social worlds: «fellow-men in direct experience», «world of contemporaries», «world of predecessors», and «world of successors» (Schutz 1967: 176-214, Schutz, Luckmann 1973: 61-92).

These articulations are based on the difference of intimacy and anonymity. It means the difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation». The «Thou-orientation» arranges spheres of the life-world, which are constituted by various immediate lived experiences of the other. It is generally known as the «face-to-face» relation. In this point the first social world «fellow-men in direct experience» means this «face-to-face» relation.

On the level of simultaneity the difference between «face-to-face» relation and «world of contemporaries» is articulated spatially. The differentiation of «world of contemporaries» and «world of predecessors», or that of «world of contemporaries» and «world of successors» will constitute a temporal axis. Such an theoretical image of articulations will be illustrated like the following picture.

As mentioned above, the difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation» corresponds to the articulation of intimacy and anonymity. It means the degree of intimacy and anonymity. These two types of density will be simultaneously distinguished in a situation. In other words a situation appears inevitably as a difference between the one sphere constituted by the address terms of «I» and «Thou», and the other sphere distinguished as that of «We» and «Others». The former sphere will be opened out with the «Thou-orientation», and the latter one will be spread out with the «They-orientation».

This simultaneity is supported by the dual structure of the present. It means, the present is firstly the difference between the present at the moment and the present which has passed just now, and the present is secondly the difference of the present at the moment and the present which will appear soon.

The «world of contemporaries» is spread out with the present. It includes the sphere of «fellow-men in immediate lived experience» which the «Thou-orientation» will constitute. In other words, this «world of contemporaries» is assumed to be articulated with the difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation». Of course, the «We-relation» of «fellow-men in immediate lived experience» is constituted not only by one-directed perspective of the «Thou-orientation» from ego but also through the reciprocal «face-to-face» contingency of ego-alter perspectives. Moreover, it must be emphasized that such the reciprocal relation is not only sensorially immediate but also reflexively mediated. Therefore, I could change my standpoint with the others' points in such a situation. I would experience something from the perspective in his position, as same distance and reach as he does (Schutz, Luckmann 1973: 60). It is such the idealized interchangeability of standpoints as the simultaneity that makes the life-world taken for granted.

In the «face-to-face» relation «I» and «You» are taken as «We». As I mentioned above, this social world is articulated as the difference between «face-to-face» relation and «world of contemporaries». These «I» and «You» in the «face-to-face» relation grasp the others in their simultaneous level as «They».

However, including «I», «You» and «They», the «world of contemporaries» also can be taken as «We». We could call this «face-to-face» relation a «We-relation» in the «Thou-orientation» level, and at the same time we could articulate the whole «world of contemporaries» also as another «We-relation» on the fusion level of «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation».

Naturally each agent to whom each perspective is attributed is assumed to be a person. Each person has each own biography. Such a biography is constituted as the compiled knowledge stocks and it is already and always mediated reflectively between the objective ego «me» and the subjective ego «I». The personal relation between plural persons is also mediated through some habitual knowledge stocks. The person and the personal relation are both structuralized by variously arranged knowledge stocks.

Here is a reason why the Schuzean theory of life-world has been understood as the sociology of knowledge. It was this theoretical main theme how the «immediate lived experience» and the «mediated knowledge» could be differentiated and compiled in each other. This lived experience is always and already given originally, and the difference of this lived experience and the mediated knowledge is to constitute the fundamental core of life-world.

The «We-relation» of «world of contemporaries» is distinguished from the following two worlds: «world of predecessors» and «world of successors». The former is the past world which had already passed. The latter is the future world which will come up from now. These three articulated worlds are to be put on a temporal axis from the past to the future.

This temporality is originally based on the sensory or bodily perception of each attributed persons. Its mode depends on how events could be perceived and how they could be lined up on an axis. Needless to say, such sensorially perceived events themselves are already intervened not only by the natural processes like day and night or four seasons etc. but also by the interactions with other persons. The concerned events could be sensorially experienced as appearances for agents, and each biography would be articulated by the ob-

jective astronomical time and the interpersonal temporalities. Although any personal biography may be taken as each subjective consciousness, it may be difficult to continue to be a series of only subjectively closed lived experiences. Most of experienced events, although they could be experienced lively, would always be objectified and articulated as knowledge.

The phenomenological sociology of knowledge will observe such objectified and articulated events as the components of society, setting the difference between «face-to-face» and «world of contemporaries» as a fundamental premise. The articulation between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation» will be always and already given there originally. However, such an articulation or two kinds of density are given with the difference between intimacy and anonymity.

The difference between intimacy and anonymity derives from the distances articulated by the sensory perceptions, bodily movements and extensions. Such living activities are based on the difference between an attainable reach and an unattainable reach. This basic difference is developed to a more complicated one with the temporal axis. If man has ever experienced an activity as reached or performed, man could imagine that the same event or some events similar to them will be anticipated and experienced as attainable or unattainable.

Such the activities always come out with various bodily movements. The bodily movements and their instrumental extension make it possible to perceive something, to attain something and to reach to something etc. From such the perceived, attained and reached points of view, namely from a future point on a temporal axis, it is possible to control things and persons. Such the reflexively structuring is not anything other than the intention of living organism.

The differences between designed situations (of persons and things) and designing persons will appear on such a reflexively structured level. The latter designing persons could take the «observer-perspective» on their own temporal axis. They could design and transform the above mentioned «world of contemporaries» into something new. They could observe their «We-relation» on their own ways. It means that the «world of contemporaries» could be partially or totally objectified from the outside of itself.

3. Symbolic Media, Money and Political Power

It was the so-called «We-relation» that could be objectified as something by someone. In other words, this sphere could not continue to be immediate between the concerned participants, but it could be variously mediated by symbolizing. It would be difficult to keep the sphere of «world of contempo-

raries» continuously homogeneous. If anything, the division of labor and the functional differentiation presuppose such the inhomogeneous settings. Each of such the functionally differentiated societies must be properly symbolized and mediated by representing each own complexity. It is not difficult to enumerate such symbolic relations which are functioning as media: power, truth, law, love, city etc. They have been well-known as the «symbolic media» (Parsons 1977) or as the «communication media» (Luhmann 1974).

Money is used as a unit of account, as a means of payment, and as a store of value (Hicks 1967: 1). Firstly goods and services are exchanged and allocated by circulations of money as currency. Secondly we hold money for transaction, as precaution or as speculation. The transaction of buying, paying, receiving etc. is an exchange at a point on the temporal axis. The precaution as well as the speculation is a temporalized action process to the future by the function of value store. In other words, money as a vehicle of information makes possible the appresentative paring of present exchange and not present exchange in a temporalized action process. The motivation of using money such as paying, buying etc. will be interpreted as a meaning of temporal process of action.

Any person cannot live his own life without risk calculation in various temporalized processes. Since the nineteenth century the modern persons have been seeking more certain and more trustworthy instance for exchange and distribution of goods and services in the modernization and industrialization. The validity of money exchange must be secured by someone or something. The idea of the central bank has been a typical example in every nation state. As a result the next media of political power would be required for coordinating it.

The function of bank is not always to be limited to deposit and loan. Banking is originally a deed, by which the credit papers are issued. To deposit money, or to open an account in a bank means drawing a bill receivable. If man saves money in a bank, man receives a bankbook from there. Such the reception of evidence would be nothing else but issuing bank notes. To deposit money at present will lead to withdrawing it in the future. Money as a vehicle could bridge between a present event and a future one. This activity of banking makes it possible to create various credits and trusts.

Money connects one event (e.g. to want something) to the other event (e.g. to enjoy it). In this meaning, money plays a symbolic role of the appresentative paring between present occurrence and non-present occurrence. The material of this vehicle has historically been particular some goods, such as shell, cloth, fur, tobacco, rice, metal and paper. Today such the materials have transformed into the electronic signals, and the miners' technique also has been evolving to a highly technical computer program of cryptographic proof.

The bond of appresentative paring makes possible the validity of general exchangeability. It creates a functional community as a sub-universe of economic system. This economic relation relies on the paring between the appresenting member and the appresented member (Schutz, Luckmann 1983: 134). Such the difference between members is originally coming out from the contingency of their interactions.

As far as the personal acts are originally based on the bodily movements of human being, the damage and injury of them would have to be assumed. The conflict of all against all is always possible in every human world. Such the problem of Hobbesian order was a typical classic theme in sociology. Therefore, it was a serious problem how persons would organize the other persons without violence. The Hobbesian classical answer was an idea of social contract. Of course, it leads to the next problem how possible such the social contract is.

Generally speaking, any democratic government has police and military force, which should be known as the legitimately institutionalized violent power. However, the most important question would be how possible was the stable vantage point of the third party for legitimation. In this article, it would be asked who could mint coins and print bank notes and how possible is a stable vantage point required for the agency.

4. Coevolution of Technology and Society

The «face-to-face» relation is based on immediately lived experiences. «I literally see my partner in front of me. As I watch his face and his gestures and listen to the tone of his voice, I become aware of much more than what he is deliberately trying to communicate to me» (Schutz 1967: 169).

Such the «face-to-face» immediate situation has been totally changed with the development of communication technology during the last century. We could consider this change as a coevolution of technology and human-being. Firstly radio, subsequently TV, these devices have opened a new situation to us. They opened us the simultaneous and far distant relation of «one to n-persons». Of course, this relation is not immediate, but the broadcasted vision on TV could have often been taken as real, as if it were felt as immediate. The other classical mass media like book, magazine, newspaper also have delivered us various realities. However, the visually moving pictures on TV had decisively changed our everyday life during the last half of the twentieth century. We could have felt such mediated television pictures as real. They have fundamentally changed the classical structure of the mundane life-world which Schutz described in the 1930s.

The «one to n-persons» simultaneous relation may be typically a relation of clergy and his believers in church, player(s) and his(their) audience in concert, and teacher and his pupil in classroom etc. These relations are originally taken as «live».

However, the broadcasted relation, which may generally be presumed as «live», is always mediated as telecommunication. The broadcast like radio and TV has synchronized a spatial distant relation between the sender and the receiver, and it has developed another extended space and time. On the other hand, the recording, editing and compiling technique has bridged even the temporal distance. Such technological evolution has been transforming various materials of medium from the phonograph record through tape and CD to DVD and Blu-ray Disc. The devices which play them also have been metamorphosing themselves from the gramophone through the stereo record player and the Walkman to the iPod etc.

Moreover, in the last decade of the twentieth century the Internet has changed the simultaneous relation of «one to n-persons» to the freely accessible relation of «n-persons to n-persons». This network which as been stretched as the World Wide Web information system transformed our life scheduling tempo itself. Man can very easily access to this network and at the same time man can very easily get out there. Our human life itself has become to be totally adapted to the internet technology. The society has transformed itself very rapidly. Today we cannot live together without this coevolution of Internet-technology and society.

The difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation» is naturally presupposed in the classical structure of the life-world. This original difference has made us the clearly articulated «face-to-face» lived experience possible. The address terms like «You» and «They» represent a certain spatial distance articulated by a certain range of attainment which the bodily movements make possible. The life-worldly space and time perceived by the bodily movement and its extension are articulated and formed by two fundamental media of the light and the sound.

The immediate lived experiences also will continue to be perceived. All of them will not be replaced with the mediated ones which could be copied, duplicated, and altered. If anything, they will be related with the mediated lived experiences more complicatedly. Today we are experiencing the others in the «face-to-face» relation, at the same time, we can experience the human beings as well as almost everything, i.e. animal, machine, robot, animation picture etc., as if they were a kind of human beings, in a quasi «face-to-face» relation on the base of «n-persons to n-persons» network. Such the «peer-to-peer» computer network is supported by a tremendously great deal of distributed anonymous persons. In other words, they are appearing and standing

on each terminal of the network from moment to moment. The difference of connecting-to-network and not-connecting-to-network in there is basically constructing the space and time of our everyday life today.

The Internet users would believe that they could perform their own acts as their own intention and decision. However, if someone could objectively observe them from the outside, they were only the persons who could be showing up as users upon the terminal units of computer network. They are always theoretically outside of this network system itself. They can be not only persons in the meaning of human being but also organizations like co-operations or governments in the meaning of juristic persons. In a near future such the persons may be replaced by robots, cyborgs or androids. In other words, any ways of appearances of our everyday life could be decided from the outside of the network system itself. The Internet itself depends on the distributed anonymous persons, i.e. human beings, robots, cyborgs, androids, co-operations, organizations and so on. At the same time such possible agents and their extensions appear variously with the evolution of Internet technology.

Money also has been based on the distributed anonymous persons and organizations. It is the general exchangeability that money has been originally symbolizing. The general exchangeability has been signed as the numeral quantity by money. The difference between exchangeable and not-exchangeable makes possible an economic system, and the lemma of not-exchangeable itself is to be put on the next difference between exchangeable and not-exchangeable. Such secondary or sequential process has been transforming the human life to the monetary calculation world.

Moreover, even such money has been rapidly and highly changing itself with the evolution of computer technique. Metal for the coin and paper for the bank note have transformed themselves into electronic signals in the computer network. The money is originally based on the distributed anonymous persons. Therefore, this «peer-to-peer» relation in the Internet could be very easily fit to the today's monetized society.

Now in this context it will be the most important problem how the validity of general exchangeability could be guaranteed. Is it secured by the state or the nation? We know that various virtual monies like the Bitcoin are actually and world widely in circulation. What makes possible this currency? More briefly saying, it will be an interesting problem whether the trust of observer on the objectified position could be replaced with the cryptographic proof by the computer technology.

Satoshi Nakamoto, who created the Bitcoin protocol and its reference software, writes: «A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution» (Nakamoto 2008: 1). Very interestingly it will

be difficult to ascertain whether this Japanese male name attributes to a single person or a team, and it will be not so important whether this name attributes to the Japanese or the others. It may mean that the Bitcoin is a genuine money, because the origin of this creation itself has been maintained as anonymous.

If a payer A pays money to a payee B, its money itself will belong to this payee B. This payer A cannot pay the same money once more to the other payee C, because he has just paid it to a payee B. This impossibility of double-spending is fundamentally important. As long as the Bitcoin also is functioning as money, any double-spending must continue to be impossible. The usage of copied bank-note is severely punished by the criminal law. It is a forgery. Therefore, any national currencies are very strictly checked and controlled by the authority concerned. It is the typical raison d'être of the central bank or the national government.

However, lots of digital currencies like the Bitcoin have already been used transnationally without any central authorities. It is the most important theme how the validity of virtual currency can be secured. «What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party» (Nakamoto 2008: 1). The cryptographic technique is a secure communication only between two concerned entities without any particular and established third parties. It means that the virtual currency does not rely on the trust of various authorities like governments or central banks, but only on the special technique like cryptographic proof. The above cited «two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third part» mean any two parties in the «peer-to-peer» constellation. In the case of the Bitcoin this transaction is supported by lots of distributed anonymous miners. The miners in this context mean the engineers who can engage themselves in the practice of cryptographic proof. They can gain profit by their engaging in this cryptographic practice.

If the rate of return in the virtual currency users' community exceeds the cost which the miners need, this virtual community will be maintained, and if the miners who are expert in the cryptographic skills and their incidental problems could get enough profit to reflect their professional workmanship, this currency community will be growing up and enlarged. This growth will depend on the spread and scarcity of the technicians' effort and skill. The limits of growth will lead to a birth of the next virtual currency. Already the competitions between virtual currencies and real currencies have begun in this present world.

5. Open problem: Is Spontaneous Order autopoietic or culculated?

In the end of 1970s Friedrich von Hayek proposed the denationalization of money. His fundamental perspective was as follows. «History is largely a history of inflation, and usually of inflations engineered by governments and for the gain of governments» (Hayek 1978[1999]: 142). It would be here one of the most important philosophical themes how the political power and its arbitrariness of governments could be reduced to the minimum. The practical plan that he proposed in his book was to create a competition among plural currencies. It was no more and no less than the total privatization of the banking business and the totally borderless dealing with various currencies. In his plan lots of private and free banks could issue their own bank-notes and mint their own coins on their own responsibilities. In this very constructive proposal it was assumed that the monopoly of issuing currency by the central bank or the national government should be denationalized and abolished.

Undoubtedly Hayek supposed that people should be able to get proper information on the activities of various private banks and various markets (producing, consuming, exchanging etc.). He thought rather simply that the mass media like newspapers, radio, TV could deliver such information to the public. «For a decision so important for business as which currency to use in contracts and accounts, all possible information would be supplied daily in the financial press, and have to be provided by the issuing banks themselves for the information of the public» (Hayek 1978[1999]: 159). Certainly he assumed that the mass media co-operations also would put themselves to various competitions. Therefore, he could believe that such the competitions should assure the proper quality of information.

The competition is originally similar to the constellation of distributed anonymous persons as a premise. The economic activity is a system of actions. It is constituted of actions (buying, selling, paying etc.) and is mediated by a specific symbolic medium of money. The market exists as an environment for the economic system. Therefore, it is only a fluctuation of prices that this economic system could perceive as market information. In this meaning the market is never any economic system. The agents, who buy, sell and pay etc., show up temporarily with the events, to which such the economic actions are attributed. Such the events would be observed on the border between the economic system and its environment. Of course, the agents who perform such actions could show up as either human beings or the others. The human beings can be various human subjects, who express themselves with personal pronouns like I, you, he, she, they etc. The others can be only non-human subjects like such as organizations, mechanisms, institutions, facilities.

Observing various mechanical movements in a market, we could find out human players and impersonal effects in there. Such players include firstly distributed anonymous persons, and secondly their extensive derivatives, which should be considered as co-operations, governments, organizations etc.

Already in the end of the last century the information on market has become to be based up on the Internet. Most of economic activities, such as shopping, buying, paying, have not been done without any computer network. Such a combination between market and technology is functioning on the base of the distributed anonymous persons. Today it would not be sure whether such distributed anonymous persons in there always human beings were, as well as whether Mr. Nakamoto a human being were. We are not sure that making a decision would be done by a human being. Only a continuity of discontinuities which is constituted of the difference between access-on and access-off exists. It will be also uncertain that such the endless decision making is necessarily autopoietic or not. However, I presume that this uncertainty should be finally attributed to the speed of computer's central processing unit. But such electronic devices also will be attributed to the distributed anonymous persons like Mr. Nakamoto. Nobody knows whether human activities will be attributed to human beings in the future. Nobody knows how the classical articulation of social worlds will be still possible. Therefore, I assume that the philosophical basement of critical theory should have been already worn out by the coevolution of technology and human being. Now it is very difficult for us to find a philosophical basis for human existence.

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On the reiterability of *pragmata*.
A Schutzian «alternate» to the sociological concept of «practice»

Carlos Belvedere

My aim is to depict Schutz's concept of pragma as a phenomenological «alternate» to the sociological concept of «practice». I will argue that Schutz offers a description of the ego ipse pragmatically constituted. This means that he is dealing with a particular kind of phenomenon – not with a mere idea but with an actual experience – . Nevertheless, it is a kind of experience which ethnomethodology cannot account for since it seeks to describe «the body's ways» while Schutz observes not just the body's but the ego's pragma, which only in part can be externally observed since it not only has an objective but also a subjective aspect. Accordingly, pragmata are always pragmata of a self at work. They are the product of the ego working on its pragma. So the ego agens is the substratum and the origo of all pragmata and, through them, of social personalities. Finally, what makes Schutz's conception of pragma so refreshing is that it takes into account what most sociologists emphasize nowadays – that practices are objective, blind, unconscious processes – and at the same time what those sociologists let aside – which they call «subject» with a derogative nuance – . Moreover, it articulates the subjective and the objective long before that contemporary sociology had claimed that it had overcame «dualism». To that purpose, the key concept is «reiterability». Pragmata are reiterable not only by the same ego agens that once started them but also by others. That's why Schutz speaks of the «transferability» of pragmata, which makes possible the development of social habitus that play an important role in the constitution and stabilization of the system of our social attitudes.

The aim of this paper is to depict Schutz's concept of *pragma* as a phenomenological «alternate» to the sociological concept of «practice». I am drawn to the fact that Schutz provided an early alternate to the concept of practice – which nowadays has become mainstream (and in fact a real fad) in social theory.

Just as Gad and Jensen: «Practice has become a topic of increasing empirical and conceptual concern within sociology and neighbouring fields» with «a very wide range of connotations» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 1). For instance:

> It can refer to a location, it can locate actors in a context, and it can refer to action, or to construction. It is possible to be 'in practice', to 'have a practice', or to be 'constituted by practice'. Practice can be a cause, an effect, or an explanation. Given the widespread use of practice terminologies with conflicting definitions and analytical tendencies, practice seems to beg for disentanglement (Gad and Jensen 2014: 1).

Accordingly, «practice» has become an unproblematic category and a slippery term. On the one hand, it is used as «an unproblematic empirical category» as if they were «simply that of which the world consists, so as a matter of course one can find them wherever one looks» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 2). On the other hand, they designate «an analytical approach the scope and meaning of which is rarely explicated. Thus, practice approaches are slippery: they can slide easily between empirical and conceptual registers, without at any point losing their aura of common sense» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 2). Thus, the notion of practice is «an elastic word, which can be stretched or tightened depending on interest and orientation» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 5). Its vocabulary is often «applied without much argument» and as an «empirico-conceptual 'charm'», which is «more magic than real» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 8).

In the following, I will argue that, unlike the current ubiquitous and sloppy use of the term «practice», Schutz describes *pragma* with rigor and admirable precision and avoids the kind of flaws just mention by founding *pragmata* in the *ego agens* as its subtratum. That's why my claim will be that he provided *avant la lettre* a phenomenological «alternate» to the sociological concept of practice.

1. Ethnomethodological and phenomenological «alternates»

It was Garfinkel who first spoke of «alternates» as «Lebenswelt pairs» (Garfinkel 2002: 73). By «alternates» he meant:

> Any ordinary activity addressed in the fashion of its availability *in situ* as the *in vivo* work of living in and about and as and as of the activity as what anybody in the world knows consists of in its lived course of things will, if you use the certified methods of the established literatures, respecify that concreteness to exhibit it in terms that then no longer retain what's so coherent about those activities in the first place (Garfinkel 2007: 21).

Accordingly, «the 'ethnomethodological alternate' to the constructivist literature consists in the study of the methical accomplishment of the phenomena whose availability and intelligibility is otherwise taken for granted» (Hester and Francis 2007: 4). This taken-for-grantedness is the very possibility of its subject matters and «the topic of its inquiries» (Hester and Francis 2007: 5). Alternates are autochthonous, grounded practices «that spring up and exist alongside formal analytic inquiries whenever and wherever participants or members pursue investigations of any kind» which are «asymmetrical to formal analytic theorizing» (Maynard 2012: 7) in an «alternate way» (Roth 2009: 9).

Based on the above, what Schutz offers as a description of *pragma* can be understood as an alternate. Indeed, this is my claim. Although, an important distinction must be made here: that for Garfinkel, the study of alternates must not be pursued as a philosophical work. See, for instance, his comments on Merleau-Ponty:

> he had this marvelous love affair with philosophy. It was philosophy's subject as embodied action that he needed to retain. The result is that he had to depend on the anecdotes and the textual accounts of others to specify what embodied reflexivity could possible consist of […] as he was so beautifully clear-headed about, it was not going to deal with simply the intentionalities of consciousness and the circular, endless, going-over-and-over-again reflections on just those affairs held before consciousness with texts, even the literatures of the gestalt experiments, and the rest (Garfinkel 2007: 22).

In this viewpoint, the phenomenological description of intentionality from the first person perspective does not suffice. Garfinkel demands that the ethnomethodologist rely on accounts accomplished from the second person perspective. Consequently, he would not think of what I will show in Schutz's manuscripts of 1936/37 of as being an ethnomethodological alternate.

Now, how can we access what Schutz is trying to reach – namely, the *ego agens* as the ultimate substratum of *pragmata* – within the limits of ethnomethodology as conceived by Garfinkel? Sure he would discard such an issue by considering it mere «generic representational theorizing» supported by the «analytic privileges of the transcendental analyst and universal observer»[1] (Garfinkel 2002: 127). Nevertheless that's not what Schutz is doing since the *ego* is not an abstract, general concept but a concrete, personal experience[2] which one should think of as a *singulare tantum* (Schutz 2010: 41). What he offers is not mere general theorizing but a rigorous description of the *ego ipse* pragmatically constituted as the ground for social personalities and the *pragmata* performed through them.

Consequently, he is not doing speculative metaphysics but a phenomenological description of different strata of human experience. He is not either taking for granted what mainstream sociology does but describing embodied

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[1] Also Wes Sharrock, Bob Anderson, and Michael Lynch have opposed Husserl's subjectivism and transcendental idealism from an ethnomethodological perspective. For a reply to them, see Barber (2012: 84).

[2] This is also true of transcendental phenomenology, which – counter to what most ethnomethodologists might think – «does not involve leaving experience, whether commonsense or scientific, but attending more carefully to it» (Barber 2012: 83).

pragmata. So, in a way, he provides an «alternate» to Formal Analysis but it is a different alternate than that which ethnomethodology provides since he is observing what it cannot observe by being a mere empirical stance. Consequently, it is also an alternate to ethnomethodology.

When I say that Schutz offers a description of the *ego ipse* pragmatically constituted, I mean that he is dealing with a particular kind of phenomenon – not with a mere idea but with an actual experience. Nevertheless, it is a kind of experience which Garfinkel's ethnomethodology cannot account for since he states that «to define any phenomenon of human action is to describe the body's ways» (David Sudnow, quoted in Garfinkel 2007: 22). That's what Garfinkel called «the embodied reflexivity turn of affairs», which drove ethnomethodology to take «an interest in bodies » (Garfinkel 2007: 22). Even though Schutz *is* interested in «bodies», and while the *ego agens* he speaks of is an incarnated ego, what he observes is not just the body's but the ego's *pragma* which only in part can be externally observed since it not only has an objective but also a subjective aspect (as I will show latter, in Section 3).

Moreover, «the body's ways» and the «embodied reflexivity» are intentional themselves in many aspects. According to Garfinkel, any concern with intentionality leads to fantastic love-affairs with philosophy but not anywhere nearby sociology; contrarily, for Schutz, it is a precondition of any accurate description of many of sociology's heart matters – for instance, *pragmata* considered as the *origo* of the social persons. Off course sociology – even philosophy – must approach all practices as embodied but it's not the body who acts by itself but the incarnated ego. Just as Descartes have said: «It is the soul which sees, and not the eye» (Descartes 1985 [1637]: 172); meaning that the body expresses an element heterogeneous to the manifestation of bodily determinations (Henry 1985: 23).

Therefore, what phenomenology must account for is not just the body (like in biology and the like) but the *cogito*, which is not an «I think» but an «I can» (Henry 2006 [1965]: 75). Our body is the ensemble of our powers upon the world (Henry 2006 [1965]: 80) and it is that originary, invisible experience – the phenomenological being of the body, its real, absolute and subjective being (Henry 2006 [1965]: 79) – what must be accessed by the phenomenologist. That is precisely what ethnomethodology cannot account for; in other words, this is the phenomenological alternate that Schutz's phenomenology provides.

2. Pragma *in egological perspective*

Though Schutz approaches some main subjects of social phenomenology (such as the ones addressed here) in an egological perspective, he uses the

word «egology» only occasionally (Embree 2009a: 181). As a few respected scholars have pointed out in recent years, many of his «analyses of the modes of givenness of social phenomena proceeded in an egological perspective» (Eberle 2012: 288). In those cases, he seems to perform and assume something like an egological reduction (Embree 2009a: 204-205, 211) given that he actually operates within it (Embree 2009a: 206, 209). So, it is plausible to think that Schutz assumed that «the ego or I is something that accompanies the stream of consciousness in an inwardly transcendent way and that reflection discloses as always already and identically there » (Embree 2009b: 240).

I would like to add to this consensus that Schutz's manuscripts of 1936/37 on "The Problem of Personality in the Social World" are one of the most outstanding examples of egology as they are based on a description of the *ego ipse* as an *ego agens*. For example, Schutz speaks overtly of «a transcendental or phenomenologizing ego» in reference to the self (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 211) and to «the transcendental Ego» reached through «Husserl's transcendental reduction » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 233), and he situates this analysis within «the ego after exercise of the phenomenological reduction » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 252).

Within this framework, Schutz establishes «the general positing of the *ego agens* as *origo* of pure *pragma* » (Schutz 1936 2013]: 210). More precisely, he states that the origin of the pure *pragma* lies in «a general positing '*of my acting self*' [which] corresponds to the general positing of the *alter ego* (which is a general posting of the *alter ego cogitans*)» (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 209).

However, it is not easy to find a clear cut definition of *pragma* in these manuscripts. One thing to notice is that for some reason we have two different versions of the same piece, which indicates that it is a work in progress. It also means that Schutz left these considerations unfinished, which compels us to complete the task of giving an explicit definition of *pragma*. Schutz's manuscripts pay more attention to a classification of *pragma* and its relation to the *ego agens* than to an explicit definition of *pragma* as such. Although it furnishes insights and fragments that suffice for whoever want to work on an explicit definition. With that aim, I will briefly depict a number of features of *pragma* in order to systematize a unified concept.

3. Pragma *and action*

In his manuscripts of 1936/37, «Schutz moved beyond *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932) »[3] (Barber 2013: 4). He developed «a theory of the complete

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[3] See Schutz (1937 [2013]: 276-277).

pragma»[4]; which can be systematized as a set of four features.

The first essential note of *pragma* is that it relies on a general positing act. Secondly, note that this positing is related to duration since *pragmata* are acts of a self. Therefore, *pragma* is an experiencing in our *durée* (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 209). Yet, *pragma* is not just any act in our *durée* but one in which the self is «founded in duration *acts* in the external world and accordingly gears into world-time » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 209). So, the third feature of *pragma* is that it must gear into the world. Finally, we should think of *pragma* as a «sedimented experience […] accomplished by *me*» (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 226). Concisely, pragma is a sedimented experience accomplished by the *ego* as a positing act of its *durée* geared into the external world.

This fresh perspective on *pragma* shows Schutz's theory of action contained in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* as «insufficient » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 277). In his own words:

> This is because the course of thought in the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, and its specific theme of the 'meaning which binds the acting to its action,' does not go far enough even though here differentiation of behavior [*Verhalten*] from action [*Handeln*] has already introduces difficulties (*sic*). However, our present theme, simply establishing the pragmatic motives in the constitution of the self and its partial aspects, requires the full development of the *pragma* as *pragma* (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 277).

Although action is a kind of *pragma*, not any kind of *pragma* is rational, projected action. Schutz himself makes this very clear:

> We do not speak of 'acting' [*Handeln*], because the term is also involved with an inner attitude [*Einstellung*]. Instead we explicitly speak of 'working,' accordingly of the execution of the pragma in bodily movement itself, of the engagement of the self in world-space and in world-time by the changing of places by the body or its parts (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 276-277).

Indeed, bodily movements in space are clear-cut examples of *pragma* – for instance, a «change of place» (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 227) «by virtue of which an *illic* becomes a *hic* » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 286). Accordingly reflective, theorizing acts are «*pragma*-free actions» because «they are not bound to working in

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[4] Barber (2013: 4) also observes that Schutz's interest in *pragma* «reveal that even before his encounter with pragmatism on American soil after 1939, he was already thoroughly aware of and interested in the pragmatic dimensions of everyday experience».

the external world » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 231). So, there can be *pragma* which are not action as well as *pragma*-free actions. Moreover, only one out of for types of *pragma* is related to action, as it can be seen by taking a closer look to Schutz's stratification of *pragmata*.

Schutz's concept of *pragmata* is articulated into four *strata*: a) the *pragma* without the purpose and project; b) the *pragma* with the purpose but without the project; c) the *pragma* with the project and purpose; and d) the *pragma* with the project but without the purpose.

In this perspective, only the *pragma* with the project and purpose is rational acting. So, *pragma* is both more and less than rational action: it is more because it covers a wider range than action, and it is less because – with the exception of the *pragma* with the project and purpose – it has fewer requirements – it does not need to be consciously aware of the end (purpose) and it does not pursue it nor does it need to know about the adequate means to achieve it. What's more, Schutz believes that the first kind of *pragma* (without the purpose and the project) does not even need to be intentional.

Schutz developed these ideas further, explicitly distinguishing « conscious *pragma* » from «unconscious *pragma*». The conscious *pragma* is not only intentional but also directed to a purpose, whereas the unconscious pragma «lacks purpose as well as project». Based on such distinction, Schutz renames the first type of pragma – which he formerly called «mere reaction» or «mere behavior» – as « unconscious *pragma* ». Of course, «unconscious *pragma*» is what he meant by «mere behavior », except we know now that it lacks the specific feature of conscious *pragma* : the intended purpose. Afterward, Schutz speaks of habitual behaving as the second type of pragma, i.e., the «empirical behavior». Although we don't have here a new name for this, it is enlightening to know that this kind of pragma refers to habitualities since they play a role in the genesis of the social person. It is even more interesting to note that Schutz calls the third kind of pragma «action in the full sense», confirming what he had said about the pragma with the project and purpose.

Yet, the specification of *actio* as a kind of *pragma* poses one question. If the subject of social actions is the actor: Which is the subject of *pragma*? To address this question we need to retrieve egology since Schutz's (1937 [2013], 265) answer is that the subject who performs the *pragma* is the concrete *ego* or monad as a «subjective experiencing of temporality» – i.e. as a «constituted immanence» – and, in turn, as «a constituting moment for the stratification of the self» through a series of modifications of the «pure *pragma* of the self at work ».

As the pure pragma is constituent of the self at work, the *ego agens* is always the self «working on its *pragma*». This is what Schutz calls «the *ego ipse* in its totality and fullness» (Schutz 1937 [2013], 270). As such, it is a present self, actually working, and only this «self at work […] is the core of reality of the

surrounding world, the actual world within reach » (Schutz 1937 [2013], 284).

So, the *ego agens* as «the *ego ipse* in its totality and fullness» is the self now that operates and «creates its public time while operating » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270). All the other «basic attitudes of the self, comprised under the headings of 'interest' and 'attention,' […] are themselves pragmatically conditioned, i.e., are modifications of that *attention à la vie* originating in the pure pragma of the self at work » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265).

Such kinds of attitudes – which are modifications of the pure pragma – «modify the experiences of expectation and of memory that arise from reflection on the course of duration» and «these ramifications can be traced back to the frames of spatio-temporality constituted in the 'daily life' […, where] no self is simply given but always given in need of a temporal index. It is the self now, the self before now, and the self later on,» which Schutz calls the «tempora of the self» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265).

In this perspective, the *ego agens* (while «*ego ipse* in its totality and fullness») operates as my self now by constituting its *actiones* as *pragmata* and simultaneously co-constituting public time as «split up into a piece of world-time in which the *acta* have taken place in a sequential order of succession and in flowing duration and which my *acta* have constituted » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270). Briefly said, public time «is created by my pragma in the process of execution » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270).

All this occurs in the present. Even though «my self before» has operated in the past, it does not operate now. That is why I think about its *actiones* «only as its *acta* »:

> As *actiones* these *pragmata* are co-constituting of public time which was the complete Now for the previously operating self, but to me, as reflecting self, appear as 'then' emergent within the frame of public time. For detached from the *actiones* constituting it, public time is split up into a piece of world-time in which the *acta* have taken place in a sequential order of succession and in flowing duration and which my *acta* have constituted (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270).

Consequently, every *actio* is made up of two different but related phenomena: on one hand, it is «a series of experiencings in duration»; on the other, it is a «working (*pragma*) in world-time» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 209).

4. Ego ipse *and the social persons*

Only *pragmata* accomplished by «my self now» can be said to be actual and real. On the contrary, *pragmata* accomplished by «my self before» are char-

acterized as potential and, consequently, as a «reality in the mode of probability» derived from an «earlier core of reality» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 226). Accordingly, the «reiterableness of the same *pragma*» and of «an analogous *pragma*» by my self later on is «contained in the idealization of 'I always can again'» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 226). One could think that this reiterability not only makes possible the development of personal habits but also the establishing of social habitus since *pragmata* are reiterable not only by the *ego agens* that once started them but also by other *egos*.[5] That's why Schutz depicts them as reiterable *and* analogous.

Schutz not only distinguishes actual form potential *pragma* but also two different levels of potentiality. The first level is the one of «the previously actual *pragma* that potentially is reiterable» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). It is «the world of 'phenomena of probability',» which corresponds to «the full reality of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach » (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). Although, these «phenomena of probability which previously stood in the surrounding world of the core of reality» refer not only to the actual world of my self now: they also «refer back to my prior self for which it was the core of reality» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 284).

> In so far as the level of the first potentiality lies within the range of the actual projects of the self at work, the phenomena attributed to the self belong to my self now. But that is also to say that the reiterability of working under the pragmatic ideality of 'one can always again' bears in this case the character of greatest probability. For this level of first potentiality it is characteristic that the protentions directed to the reactualization of the *pragma* obtain their intentionalities from reproductions and retentions of their own receding pragmas (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 284-285).

Accordingly, the *attention à la vie*, which in the purely actual *pragma* is «limited to my self now», here is «extended to my self later on, however always related back to my previous self» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). This sort of extension makes possible that «protentions procure their intentionalities from reproductions and retentions of pragmas that have receded into the past»

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[5] Even though Schutz does not mention it, his description of how the reiterability of analogous *pragma* works is quiet similar to Husserl's argument on intersubjectivity as based on the past experiences of my own transcendental *ego* (see San Martín 2008: 8-9). Schutz argument is that: «the sedimented experience is a *pragma* (e.g., kinaesthesias) accomplished by *me*, in the memory of which this potentiality (reality in the mode of probability) proves to be an earlier core of reality: Once this *hinc*, now a 'phenomenon of probability,' was a reality for me, but a reality *illinc*. For by my pragma my earlier *hinc* has now become an *illinc* » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 226).

(Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228) and thus it is a *sine qua non* condition for the reiterability of *pragmata*.

The second level of potentiality is the one of the «potential *pragma* », which is «always stemming from the level of the *ego ipse*» and whose boundaries «lie only in the compatibility and compossibility of the in-order-to motives, of the projects, of specific relations of ends or means with the whole experience, especially with respect to the experience of one's own pragma, its practicability and «its own powers » (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). Schutz describes it as «the level of the world in reachability» and as being «quite different in structure» in comparison with the first level: it is «a level of the reality of future working» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). As such, it «belongs to my later self, at the most to my self itself later on and is without an essential relation back to my prior self. It is then the case that, like all anticipations, it is founded in the actual stock of experience of my self now which, for its part, genetically refers back to my prior self» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285).

That the experience of one's own ego's *pragma* is related with the experience of one's own powers means that the self is a pragmatic unification since human powers are always, in the most radical sense, powers of an *ego*. Indeed:

> The 'self *per se*' is *a pragmatic* unification: *ego agens et semper idem agens (volens)*. In this context, *agens* as *self* contains as well, to be sure, the relevant index to the social person (*ego* qua *pater familias,* qua *civis Romanus,* (*iaphilosophus,* etc.). As a consequence, all of these modifications are shown to be precisely modifications of the one *ego* ipse *agens* (volens) (appearing in the general positing of the *ego agens* as *origo* of pure *pragma*) (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 209-210).

Around the *ego agens* there is a stratification of the social persons based on the «split of temporality» between *durée* and cosmic time originating from «the subjective experiencing of temporality as constituting immanence" (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 220) which is stratified «into my self now, my self before now, my self later on…» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 221).

Thus, social persons are based on «the subjective experiencing of temporality as constituting immanence» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 220) which, in turn, is «the situation in its original fullness» and «the basic attitude of *attention à la vie* in the solitary self » (Schutz 1936 [2013], 238). My acting self, «the *ego ipse agens* is constituted at the same time as the center of working (the center of action) from which all habitualities and automaticities take their departure» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 279). Thereafter, through habituality (as well as through will, sociality, education and culture), an interdependence and hierarchy of *attentions à la vie* is formed (Schutz 1936 [2013], 239). In accordance, the new levels of personality become «eccentric from the levels of personality that until

now were central» and also, in the reverse process, potentialities that have become eccentric «can become central again or devolve into 'partial death' » (Schutz 1936 [2013], 239).

The «orientation of all other personalities around the *ego agens*» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 224) produce a stratification of the self (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265) arranged in «a continuous transition from the absolutely intimate person to the highest anonymous behavior» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 236). While «only *actio* creates a unity of relations» and is «ascribed to the unitary *ego ipse*», *acta* are to be ascribed «to partial social persons» which are constituted in the sedimentation of these *acta* (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 221).

5. All of my selves and the reiterability of pragmata

The different *tempora* of the self that were mentioned in Section 3, open the horizons (past, present and future) of all possible *pragma*. As we already know, personalities are created around the *ego ipse* which is a pragmatic unification. As such, the *ego ipse* is produced in the Now, which provides for it the opportunity

> to come into view in its fullness and totality as an operative [*wirkendes*] self in its *action*, while my self before now is already split up into its partial aspects and can never be visible in its fullness and totality but always only in its partial aspect. For only the *action* creates the relationship of unity [*Einheitsbezug*] of the *ego ipse* [...] Only the self now operates so as to be able to achieve this production [*Leistung*] of the relationship of unity (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

Unlike my self now, my self before now does not operate but has already operated. That is why it does not create the unification of my *ego ipse,* although its *acta* are constitutive of my past, partial self. This is Schutz's exact wording:

> My self before now does not operate, it *has operated and its* acta *do not become allotted to the unitary* ego ipse. Rather they are already revealed as *acta* of a partial self. Indeed, we can say right away that each of the partial selves which, in retrospect, make up my self before now, are nothing else than my *acta* constituting each of the partial selves such that I allot them specific attitudes of my self (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

For Schutz, «to allot» means that the reproduction of my partial selves' *acta* «results in specific attentional, and, for their part, new pragmatically conditioned modifications, thus sedimented [*geschichtet*] according to hypsographi-

cal contour lines of relevance the center of density of which likewise lies in my self now » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

So, my self now is the center of all my partial social persons, constituted through the sedimentation of my *pragmata*. Some of these «partial persons of my self are referred to as belonging to my self now », while others, whose aspects «belong just to Now, bear the marks of the self later on-all of this to be sure only when in its totality the *ego ipse* does not presentively realize them in an actual *pragma*» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 273-274).

Besides, actual *pragmata* performed by my self now are phenomenologicaly real, while past and future *pragmata* remain or await in the horizons for my actual working self. This means that each *tempora* of the self has its own peculiar features. While it is essential to my self now and my self later on to constitute public time – along with its postestativeness, its possibility, and «its possibility of freely calculation probability and freely choosing among probabilities» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271) – , it is proper of my self before now to be complete, i.e., unchangeable and irrecoverable because it «is no longer postestative and no long allows for a choice» since «I no longer have the choice of what I will have done » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

As far as I find my *pragmata* in the Before – which «is free of protentions and anticipations» – , «they are reproducible or retainable as experiences of duration» and «carry their horizons open with them because they belong to my actual duration» though, «in so far as my self before now belongs to world-time, there no longer are no protentions and anticipations in a genuine and original sense because my previous protentions and anticipations have either been fulfilled or unfulfilled» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271). This is why «the acts which have entered into my world-time are as they are, unique, unchangeable and can no longer be freely varied» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

On the contrary, my present *pragmata* – performed by my self now as «the completed synthesis in public time of the present *pragma*» – have their «open and undetermined, freely variable protentions and anticipations» which are «protentions and anticipations-now that carry with them a maximal probability of fulfillment » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).

The later on, in its turn, «simply remains undecided and open» while in the «genuine past» there are «only completion and certainty » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271). Indeed, when it comes to the self later on, «the ideas of the future self accompanying protentions and anticipations are unfulfilled and remain essentially unfulfillable from the standpoint of Now» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274), as it is «universally the case of all expectations and also all phantasies whose transport into reality, whose realization, as we say, is not excluded beforehand » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).

Schutz even draws up what could be thought of as a rule of proportionality: the further in the future, the more vague and unrealizable the protentions and anticipations of the self are. He puts it in these words:

> the protentions and anticipations directed to the future self are the more vague the greater the distance at which the levels of the self-phenomenon are apprehended, until they are finally dissolved completely and, in fact, become also unrealizable [*unvollziehbar*], as soon as they are directed later on to the *ego ipse* in its totality. In fact, the future total self can barely be imagined as an empty form (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).

Yet, another rule of proportionality is proposed by Schutz: the vaguer and more distant the partial self is from the social person's representation of the self later on, the closer they lie to the intimate person. In Schutz's words:

> even these partial selves later on are the more vaguely represented, are endowed with more and more empty places, the closer they lie next to the central, intimate person. Conversely, in the standardized and normative attitudes that constitute the relative periphery of the partial selves there are proportionately fewer empty places shown at least where the process of self-typification of the self has advanced the furthest (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).

As mentioned before, the sedimentation of my *acta* constitutes my different partial selves allotted with specific attitudes (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271). These attitudes are partial personalities orientated around the *ego agens* and constituted by «habitualities and their automatisms» (Schutz 1936 [2013], 224) by virtue of the transferability of one's own pragmata (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). Also, they do not exist disconnectedly but compose a system «defined by our attitudes toward the different phenomena of the social world » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 247). It is «a system of interconnections of motivations» simply accepted «as habitual, traditional or affective givennesses » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 247).

This system of attitudes is given in diverse ways, starting from standardized normative attitudes in the cultural world of daily life, moving on to «the ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of the law, of the economy – in short, all of those phenomena of social being that form the specific object of the social sciences» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 248).

Accordingly, habitualities play an important role in the constitution and stabilization of the system of our social attitudes. The more habitualized and rationalized the different levels of the social person are, the more visible they become (Schutz 1936 [2013], 238) – here there is, by the way, another rule of proportionality – . In turn, this process of stabilization is based on common

knowledge since it retrieves apprehensions of the world which, as such, always refer back:

> to the stock of experience which the self previously constructed out of multiple polythetic and monothetic concatenations of meaning already contained in previous experiences. And also belonging to this stock of experience in principle are the memories of modifications which the cores of reality of the previous surrounding world have undergone by *acts of genuine working* (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 282; Schutz's emphasis).

In addition, «what can be anticipated as the reality of future working must […] be compossible with this actual stock of experience» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285) which involves «experiencings of my own pragma, of its 'transferability' (actualizableness) and thus the 'estimation of its own power' » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285).

Based on these estimations, I can work in the world within reach, which is related to my self later on and accordingly «remains subject to the double concurrence of probability which is universally characteristic for my self later on» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). Once again, Schutz sketches out what seems to be a rule of proportionality: «The farther the world within reach is spatially and temporally at a distance from the actual center of the surrounding world, the less probability [*Wahrscheinlichkeit*] there is. For the more the protentions remain open the more they remain unfulfilled » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285).

Summarizing what has been shown in this Section we may say that Schutz thinks of social personalities as being constituted in a process going from the intimate person pragmatically constituted by the *ego agens*, to the partial social personalities articulated by the system of our attitudes toward the social world. This process is, in turn, ruled by the *four laws of proportionality* already mentioned, which we can now formulate as follows:

1. *Rule of the realizability of the future protentions and anticipations of the self.* The realizability and accuracy of the protentions and anticipations of the self are inversely proportional to their distance in time towards the future.

2. *Rule of the intimacy of the representations of the self latter on.* The distance from the representation of the self latter to the partial self of the social person is inversely proportional to the distance of these representations to the central, intimate person.

3. *Rule of the visibility of social persons.* The visibility of the different levels of the social persons is directly proportional to their habitualization and rationalization.

4. *Rule of the fulfillment of the protentions of the surrounding world in the world within reach.* The distance in time and space of the world within reach from the actu-

al center of the surrounding world is inversely proportional to the probability of fulfillment of its protentions of the world within reach.

These laws can be ranked according to two interrelated criteria. On one hand, they follow an increasing order of constitution of higher ontological strata: the self now, the self latter on, social persons and the world within reach. On the other hand, they indicate a progressive expansion of our range of action: pretentions and anticipations, representations, visibility and potential reach. Finally, both articulated series show that the constitution of our being in the social world and our range of action in it is a gradual irreversible acquisition, giving the *ego agens* priority over the other elements of the set.

6. Egology as a way for Social Phenomenology (Final remarks)

So far, we have seen that Schutz conceives of *pragmata* as the *pragmata* of the *ego agens,* not as mere practices of social agents (like major contemporary social thinkers do[6]). *Pragmata* are always the *pragmata* of a self at work. It is not that social agents (for Schutz, social personalities) do not exist. They are the product of the *ego* working on its *pragma*. Moreover, social personalities are not persons constituted in full but partial personalities which rely on the *ego agens*. Consequently, they do not act on their own. It is the *ego agens* which acts through them. Therefore, Schutz's way of articulating the social personalities with the *pragmata* and the habitualities is quite different from the way in which contemporary sociology articulates social agents, practices and the *habitus* (cf. footnote 5) since it is not circular. According to Schutz, *pragmata* belong to the *ego agens* who constitutes the social personalities[7] which in turn only «act» in a secondary, metaphorical way and by no means can act back on practices. This indicates that practices (for Schutz, *pragmata*) have a substratum, namely the *ego agens*, which is the *origo* of *pragmata* and, through them, of all my dead selves and social personalities.

This is precisely what neither sociology nor ethonomethodology can see, for different reasons. Sociology, because it is reluctant to accept any kind of foundation, somehow following Durkheim's dictum of explaining the social through the social; ethnomethodology because – as shown in Section 1 – it

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[6] Take for instance Pierre Bourdieu. As I argue elsewhere (Belvedere, 2012: 75; Belvedere 213: 1096ff), he considers that agents are constituted by practices and in turn constitute those practices, in a circularity which leaves ungrounded the whole set of actors, practices and *habitus*.
[7] This does not mean that the ego constitutes the social personalities freely and in absolute loneliness. As Schutz shows elsewhere (1955 [1964]: 253), they are the *result* of our participation in social circles constituted by «parts» of the personalities of the individuals integrating them, whose «total personalities» remain outside the «common area» of social circles.

rejects these kind of issues taking them as general, abstract and merely philosophical. Both perspectives, in turn, object to an alleged subjectivism implied in any sort of first person perspective (which is needed to access the *ego agens* as an immanent flux of experiences). Thus they both look at Schutz's stance as an unacceptable subjectivism.

But things are quite different since Schutz is not just a subjectivist. Of course he made an eloquent praise of the subjective point of view but, as seen in Sections 2 & 3, *pragmata* are a twofold reality: they have a subjective, immanent dimension but also an objective, transcendent one. The former has an identity and systemic properties, the latter is schizophrenic-like and multiple; one of them acts, the other is just a mask for acting. So, the point is not to deduce the actual, in vivo, autochthonous practices from generalizing procedures and formal analytic assumptions but to account for each dimension of the *pragma* for its own sake − including, of course, the one and only dimension which is accessed inwardly − . Accordingly, egology is not everything but *it is needed*; otherwise we would have a one-sided view of *pragma*, conceiving it as only external and self-organized.

Precisely what makes Schutz's conception of *pragma* so refreshing is that it takes into account what for many sociologists is nowadays like a mantra − that practices are objective, blind, unconscious processes self-organized that tend to reproduce themselves in a recurrent, naturalized, mechanistic way (see Giddens 1984: chapter 1, Giddens 1979: 66,) − and at the same time it takes into consideration what those sociologists let aside − which they call «subject» with a derogative nuance (cf. Truc 2011: 158, and Swanson 2005: 5). Moreover, it articulates with admirable rigor and precision the subjective[8] with the objective, the active and productive with the passive and reproductive − shortly, it offers an alternate to dualistic perspectives long before that contemporary sociology claimed that it had overcame «dualism» (Giddens 1979: 4-5, Bourdieu 1979, 1980)[9].

The key concept here − the one that allows to account for the subjective and the obejctive, the inner and the outer − is «reiterability». As seen in Section 4, *pragmata* are reiterable not only by the same *ego agens* that once

[8] Sure Bourdieu and, particularly, Giddens are aware of the importance of subjectivity; the problem here is not «subjetivity», «reflexivity» or anything like that but *the subject* which for Schutz is the very «subtratum» of *pragmata* − i.e. the *ego agens* − . Instead, contemporary sociologists refuse to go further than just «practices», and take them as the ultimate field of their interests, missing its very substratum or *hypokeimenon* − which according to Schutz (1937: 252) is the *ego ipse* − .

[9] Elsewhere (Belvedere 2011) I discuss further the misreading of Schutz by contemporary sociologists.

started them but also by other *egos*. That's why Schutz speaks of the «transferability» of *pragma*, which makes possible the development of social habitus. Indeed (as shown in Section 5), habitualities play an important role in the constitution and stabilization of the system of our social attitudes. The more habitualized the different levels of the social persons are, the more we share experiencings of our own *pragma* and of its «transferability». This is what allows us to have a habitus –which, by the way, is a set of generalized schemes of comportment that can be transferred from one *ego agens* to another[10]. It is the reiterability of analogous *pragma,* facilitated by the stabilization of shared social attitudes, what constitutes the social personalities, which are an interplay of subjective and objective aspects, real and irreal, actual and potential.

That's why Schutz thinks of the *ego agens* as being split up and teared apart: because it has to mediate between *durée* and social time, inner and outer experiences, the individual and the social; briefly, the subjective and the objective. In accordance, Schutz's theory of *pragma* does not need to criticize and overcame dualism because it does not produce it in the first place since from the outset it takes into account both aspects of social practices, the subjective and the objective. And that's why it can provide for an alternate: because better than to have a solution is not to have a problem.

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[10] I address this issue more broadly in Belvedere (2013: 1105-1106).

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Relevance as Social Matrix of Attention in Alfred Schutz

Enrico Campo

Attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western societies. What is surprising is the fact that attention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phenomenon. Scientific research that treats attention exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously complex situation. Instead, according to the idea defended in this essay, one cannot think of attention and perception without regard for cultural conventions and social norms. This article therefore proposes to investigate attention precisely in its social dimension. In particular, the specific objective is to highlight the contribution Alfred Schutz's theory of systems of relevance can give to the understanding of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In order to demonstrate the viability of the Schutzian proposal, here are discussed some recent perspectives that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. The article will briefly revisit these contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective attention, and will focus especially on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and Yves Citton. Then is analyzed the role of attention in the theoretical edifice of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of relevance.

1. Introduction

To affirm that attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western societies is by now a truism, almost a banality: in a world where the fundamental economic mechanisms essentially operate in real time on a global level; where virtually any event can be digitally reproduced and distributed in the network and thus become a possible object of experience on the part of anyone who can connect to the internet; where we have access to a quantity of information and experience that definitely exceeds our individual ability to manage them; where an incredible quantity of goods is offered daily to our attention; where diagnoses are formulated that certify an attention disorder; where a notice of our mobile devices (an email, a message, a call) can always reclaim our attention; in a world configured thusly, we can say that our ability to pay attention to certain stimuli (objects, human beings, events, actions) rather than others that are potentially accessible is in fact fundamental.

Yet, beyond this specific historical juncture, we should note how attention is still pervasive in our individual and collective life. To realize this ourselves

just think about the fact that every act of our mental life and all our actions are somehow attentionally modulated. Attention is pervasive, a sort of "basso continuo" of human activity (Depraz 2004: 12). It is not a coincidence then that attention has been an object of study central to Western thought. To outline the overall history of attention as a topic for analysis in Western civilization would imply reconstruction of the traces of a millennial path. What is amazing, however, is the fact that attention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phenomenon (Desideri 2011: 49). Traditionally interest has mainly been directed at the means by which a subject (often male, Western and adult) directs attention to this or that object, to the number of simultaneous objects or operations to which he can simultaneously pay attention and so on. The idea that attention is separate from culture is based on a fictitious conflict between nature and culture, and thus a kind of bifurcation between the natural world (pre-cultural, of which have access through perception) and the cultural world, which instead is bound by our cultural conventions. Instead according to the definition that we want to defend in this essay one cannot think of attention and perception without regard for cultural conventions and social norms (Parsons 1988).

In this article, however, I propose to investigate attention precisely in its social dimension. I am convinced that attention should be understood primarily as a cultural and social phenomenon in order to try to grasp, at least in part, its complexity. Although Alfred Schutz analyzes the problem of attention and of relevance from an isolated subject, the social is still inherently present. In particular, the specific objective of this paper is to highlight the contribution the theory of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can give to the understanding of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In the first section we will try to return briefly to the different definitions that one can follow in order to study intersubjective and social attention. In order to demonstrate the viability of the Schutzian proposal, we will discuss some recent perspectives that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. In particular, we will devote more space to the contributions of Eviatar Zerubavel and Yves Citton that, from very different perspectives, analyzed attention as a collective phenomenon. In the next section, we will recall Schutz's theory of systems of relevance. Finally, we will attempt to identify within this theory some theoretical elements useful for clarifying the nature of social attention.

2. Attention as a social phenomenon

We have just said that, unlike most studies on the subject, we want to investigate attention as an eminently social phenomenon. Scientific research that treats attention exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously

complex situation. As a first step to better define our field of inquiry we analytically distinguish three different levels. At the first level attention detects in so far as aggregate attention of several subjects on a single object, or as collective attention turned towards an object. The second level is that in which the purely intersubjective dimension emerges: my attention is driven by another actually present subject with whom I share the same attentional scene. Finally, we can analyze attention, even at the individual level, as disposition anchored in a social context that then poses norms, constraints and the potentiality to individual attention. The three levels are, of course, interrelated and interdependent; the boundaries are also not as clear as we have presented. In any case, we, through Schutz, will be interested primarily in the third. Yet, precisely because of this interdependence, we cannot help but revisit the others, albeit very briefly.

2.1 The collective attention

The first level, that of collective attention, is probably the most investigated in sociology. Here, the interest is pinned on those events that have the ability to channel the attention of a large amount of subjects. In societies such as ours, whose dominant sectors potentially work in real time, one could give many examples. We can think of the constant and cyclical repetition of media events followed worldwide: the Olympics, the World Cup, Oscar night. Or even unique events that mark the memory and collective representations of entire generations: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the attack on the twin towers, and so on. Or finally, the fact that the very functioning of the means of mass communication is based on measuring the amount of collective attention (share) that the public grants to media products. That of the mass media, however, is merely one example, certainly macroscopic, of how certain events are able to capture the attention of various subjects and thus mark also their representations and collective memory. At this level, the fundamental question concerns the study of the mechanisms of construction of collective relevance and the identification of social groups that are able to control their operation. No wonder then that today the interest of research on collective attention focuses mainly on the media and their ability to determine the politics of attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).

2.2 Joint attention

At the level that we called intersubjective, attention is studied with respect to an interaction between individuals actually present. In psychology the expression joint attention is used to indicate an interactive situation in which

the adult and the child coordinate their attention on a third object. The child's ability to follow the direction and focus of attention of the adult develops around the age of nine months. In other words the child begins to follow the gaze of the adult and focus their attention on a common element. At this stage, the interactions between the child and the adult pass more and more from a dyadic to a triadic structure, in which the child must learn to coordinate its attention and action with the attention and action of its partner in the interaction (Moore and Dunham 1995). Around the first year of age, children begin to use deictic gestures, the prototype of which is pointing. Despite its apparent simplicity, the deictic gesture has great communicative power (Tomasello 2008). Joint attention is therefore based on the child's ability to coordinate its attention and action on the object and on the adults. In turn the other coordinates its attention and action on the child and the object. Already at this level therefore, a first form of cooperative communication of a prelinguistic nature is achieved. The child, in a situation of shared attention, can understand and act in the world along with and through others. We can then start to give more validity to the claim that attention can be read as a social phenomenon: already at this level in fact, *"How I perceive the world, and what salience I find there, –* writes Shaun Gallagher *– are to some extent put in place by the gaze and the action of the others. My action with respect to the world, and with respect to the others, emerges in the context set by those other"* (Gallagher 2010: 116 emphasis added). Consequently, the attention of others structures both the perception of the world and the salience of objects present in it. It is therefore through the attention of others that I can identify which elements are most important in my perceptual field. It is precisely for this reason, that attention must be investigated even in its contextual dimension. The interaction that occurs between child and adult is placed in a very complex network of social relations. If we expand the breadth of the context of interest, we move to the last level we identified previously. Let's move on then to analyze the social matrix of attention.

2.3 The social matrix of attention

The contributions that we propose to place in this category investigate the social conditions of exercising attention. The premise behind this approach is that attention is exercised on the basis of social norms shared socially in a socially structured context. The aim of this essay is, we said, to highlight the contribution that Schutz's theory of systems of relevance can give to the understanding of attention as a social phenomenon. We've already anticipated that, before turning to a discussion of this theory, we will revisit two recent theoretical proposals that precisely analyze attention from its social structure.

The first is that of Eviatar Zerubavel who continues under the banner of cognitive sociology[1]; the second perspective that we propose to revisit is instead that of the *Ecologie de l'attention* as expressed in a recent book by Yves Citton (Citton 2014).

2.3.1 Cognitive Sociology

The proposal of Zerubavel is to analyze attention within a sociology of thinking that elects as its object of privileged investigation that which pertains to *sociomental*. According to this perspective, our cognitive faculties depend not only on their biological configuration. Nor would it be correct to analyze them solely on the basis of the specific individual. The scope of research is thus distinct from that of cognitive individualism, based on the idea of the isolated individual whose thoughts could not be other than the product of his/her own personal experiences. But it is also distinguished from cognitive universalism, the dominant perspective in modern cognitive science. These in fact assume a "universal, *human* mind" and are dedicated to researching "the universal foundations of human cognition" (Zerubavel 1997: 3). Instead, according to cognitive sociology, it is possible to analyze our cognitive faculties through a different formulation. Zerubavel distinguishes three different levels of analysis in light of the fact that "we think both (a) as individuals, (b) as social beings, and (c) as human beings" (Zerubavel 1997: 5). Obviously, cognitive sociology focuses on the second of these levels, the *sociomental* to be precise, to demonstrate *"the social fondation of cognition in general"* (Zerubavel 1997: 116 emphasis added). That is, we live in *Social Mindscapes*, to borrow the title of the book-manifesto of this approach, that have a historical and conventional nature.

The idea that there might exist an isolated individual is rejected in favor of the thesis that our cognitive faculties are hinged in a network of social relations that substantiate and make them possible. With respect to attention, this means that the image of the subject who directs his attention guided solely by his own will is incomplete and misleading: our attention is guided by rules that govern it. The study of attention within this perspective thus aims to emphasize the great cultural variability of the ways in which we manage our attention. That is attention is drawn by certain objects, rather than others, also because we have been socialized to certain norms of attending. As Zerubavel wrote in a brief essay in 1993, "it is unmistakably social 'rules of irrelevance'

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[1] However the term is to be understood in a different sense from that which is attributed to Cicourel in *Cognitive sociology* (Cicourel 1974).

that make us perceive certain parts of social situations as mere background that can be practically ignored. Separating the relevant from the irrelevant is not a spontaneous individual act but, rather, a *normative* social act" (Zerubavel 1993: 401). The selection of the perceptual field, in which we operate through attention, is therefore driven not only by universal laws of human perception, but also by purely social norms (Zerubavel 1993: 398). Attention as "social gate of consciousness"(Zerubavel 1997: 35–52), determines what goes into the consciousness: a significant part of that which we perceive is guided by social norms of relevance and irrelevance.[2] There are therefore social norms of focusing that guide the determination of that which is not worthy of attention, but also that which should be explicitly ignored. That is we can identify the rules that guide our attention, but also social norms that invite us to deliberately ignore things that we actually notice (Zerubavel 2006).

The recent *Hidden in Plain Sight* (Zerubavel 2015) is dedicated to increasing the issues raised in previous studies with regard to attention. In this text, attention is investigated departing from a metaphor that Zerubavel had already introduced in previous studies: "*Attending* something in a focused manner – he writes in *Social Mindscape* – entails mentally disengaging it (as a 'figure') from its surrounding 'ground', which we essentially ignore" (Zerubavel 1997: 35). Zerubavel therefore revisits the theory of the perception of Gestalt for the study of attention precisely because that which is recognized as a "figure" corresponds to the part of the world to which we pay attention, while "the background" is the unattended part of our world. The application of the figures-and-background model of perception is by Zerubavel extended far beyond the visual perception: "to non-visual (auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile) forms of perception as well as to altogether non-sensory modes of cognition" (Zerubavel 2015: 7). Unlike the Gestalt theorists however, Zerubavel emphasizes the conventional nature of that which we identify as figure or as background: nothing is intrinsically figure (and therefore relevant) or background (and therefore irrelevant). We distinguish that which is figure or background as our attention is socially "deliniated" (Zerubavel 2015: 8). That is we learn where to direct our attention through attentional socialization. Attentional socialization that is also revealed in the learning of a language (Zerubavel 2015: 63-65). The words somehow prestructure our perception as they provide a grid of relevance to our field of perception.

It is possible to study the conventional nature of attention through a survey of our socio-attentional patterns, or models of management of attention that are shared by some groups of subjects but not others. Attentional pat-

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[2] Zerubavel here makes explicit reference not only to Bateson and Goffman (with whom he studied at the University of Pennsylvania) but also to Schutz.

terns vary both in time and between cultures or within the same culture. Western culture, for example, stimulates a perception of objects of the "field independence" type, that is which tend to focus on objects in their individuality as separate from the context in which they are inserted: "this remarkably distinctive feature of Western civilization is in fact a product of its emphasis on independence. Indeed, cultures that promote social interdependence tend to adopt a somewhat less-focused attentional style than those promoting social independence" (Zerubavel 2015: 54-55). According to this hypothesis, therefore, Westerners would be more likely to let emerge individual specificity as a figure and to relegate the background the relationships that connect the object to its environment. Conversely, for Easterners these relationships represent the figure of their perceptual field.

2.3.2 Ecology of Attention

The other approach we briefly revisit here is of Yves Citton. Despite the theoretical reference points of Yves Citton and Eviatar Zerubavel being very different, they both share a distance from the paradigm that confines attention exclusively to the scope of the individual. According to Yves Citton, the first operation to be accomplished to bring the analysis of attention out from an individualist paradigm is to place it on a historical level. Looking at attention from a historical point of view offers at least two important advantages. On the one hand, it shows the different ways of standardization of attention in different historical periods, and on the other it makes it possible to identify periods in which the management of attention becomes a real social problem (Crary 2001). The second theoretical operation consists of inverting the individualist paradigm of attention, the order in which attention is traditionally thought about, in common sense as well as in the traditional sciences. If in fact we follow an individualist perspective, the starting point is the individual attention. Collective attention is nothing more than a mere aggregate of individual phenomenon, the sum of individual acts. Yves Citton sets us out to follow the opposite path, or to read attention as "*an essentially collective phenomenon:* I' am careful about that to which *we* collectively pay attention" (Citton 2014: 39 emphasis added). Therefore, according to the *ecology of attention* to also understand individual attention we must always take into consideration the ecological context in which individuals are placed. Attention, as a subjective act, is to be framed within collective "attentional regimes" that guide, bind and manage the ways in which individuals pay attention.[3] According

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[3] For this concept Citton refers to the work of Dominique Boullier (Boullier 2009).

to this ecological approach, attention is a fundamental mechanism for the adaptation of the organism to the environment. In this key, the relatedness of attention is to be emphasized above all: it is primarily an interaction (Citton 2014: 45). According to Citton, collective attention must be considered a priority over that of the individual: "The attention I pay to what surrounds me and that which I encounter is sentenced, at least initially, to follow the routes pioneered by the images and discourses that circulate around us and in us. [...] *Through me, it's always us / nous who pay attention*" (Citton 2014: 55). An affirmation that perhaps is more evident today, if we think about the fact that we live in an environment of intense media coverage: according to Yves Citton, it is difficult for us to escape the representations conveyed by the media and thus to the structuring of relevance they build.

Attention should therefore be understood in relation to its operation in the social environment. Thus one of the first characteristics that emerges is the fact that my attention is magnetically attracted by the objects to which others direct their attention. Precisely because of the importance of attention with respect to our survival, it should not be surprising that we, as social beings, tend to notice that to which others pay attention. A principle which probably has its ontogenetic origin in the development of joint attention, which we briefly discussed above, and that today arrives at its maximum evidence thanks to the means of mass communication.[4] Somehow for us it is important to pay attention to that which others pay attention. Yves Citton proposes the formulation of the principle of selective collectivization: attention has a dual function; on the one hand it ensures *a functional adaptation to the environment through a pre-selection of what interests us*, and on the other it simultaneously makes sure that there is a kind of automatic collective composition of individual desires (Citton 2014: 59). Obviously, here Yves Citton doesn't aboslutely allude to some sort of harmonization of interests, but rather to the fact that through a spontaneous alignment of our individual attention to that of others, we share the same systems of relevance, to use a Schutzian term that we will discuss better in the next section.

For Zerubavel and also for Citton, perception is anchored in selection mechanisms that have their origin at the collective level. Our attention is therefore guided by networks of salience that are the precipitate of knowledge accumulated by previous generations. These *clichés*, operate as sensory filters that allow us to quickly select the relevant elements from our environment. "These *clichés* – writes Yves Citton – provide the basic tools that our 'auto-

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[4] We note, only in passing, that the approach of Yves Citton hollows out the apocalyptic criticism of the media as weapons of mass distraction, while collecting the critical scope. The incredible "gregariousness" produced by the media is based on the same mechanisms that are constitutive of our subjectivity.

matic' attention needs to quickly identify the objects around us as sources of pleasure or danger" (Citton 2014: 63). However, these clichés are not static selection tools that we inherit and simply use as they have been transmitted. Rather, we put them to the test regularly and then help to reproduce and modify them. If, for the principle of transindividual attention, I can pay attention to something only to the extent that *we* pay attention, it is because "this mutual fund of clichés in perpetual re-elaboration conditions my ability to identify phenomena that I meet in my environment" (Citton 2014: 65).

Let us now turn to the analysis of systems of relevance in Schutz. During our exposition, we will see how different points of contact exist between the approaches just mentioned and Schutz's analysis of attention.

3. Attention and relevance

3.1 The function and role of attention in Alfred Schutz

Despite the fact that Schutz does not devote a systematic study to attention, it is still a central and recurring theme in his work. It is possible to try to identify three broad thematic areas in which attention emerges as an essential component of the argument addressed.[5] A first problem area, in which Schutz makes reference to attention, concerns the analysis of the tension of consciousness, of *attention à la vie* and the study of the constitution of meaning. The theme of attention then returns in the analysis of the transition from finite provinces of meaning and of the structure of consciousness. Finally, and this is the area that interests us most, attention is analyzed in the light of the system of relevance. Before we turn to the central theme of this essay, namely the relationship between attention and relevance, it would be good to touch briefly on the first two areas mentioned above.

As noted, in the first phase of his theoretical production, Schutz attempts to provide a more solid philosophical foundation for the comprehensive sociology of Max Weber. According to Schutz in fact, some theoretical concepts fundamental to the Weberian framework remain unexplained and need to be further examined. The same notions of comprehension (*Verstehen*) and meaning subjectively understood remain insufficiently investigated and Schutz approaches the phenomenology precisely to overcome these limitations of We-

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[5] This first schematic does not intend or claim to be exhaustive: precisely because of what we already called pervasiveness of the concept of attention it is probably possible to identify areas other than those proposed by myself.

ber's thought. The only book published while Schutz was alive, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, was driven precisely with this intent (Schutz 1967). At first however, Schutz believed he could tap into the thinking of Henry Bergson to provide an adequate theoretical foundation to comprehensive sociology.[6] So despite the fact that the framework of the 1932 volume was clearly phenomenological, the influence of Bergson is still visible, even if the concepts derived from the French philosopher are implanted in an entirely different structure. Then with time, the weight of Bergson in the overall economy of the Schutzian theoretical system became significantly reduced (Protti 1995: 47-73). From Bergson Schutz revisits the dual structure of the levels of consciousness: that of *durée* and that of spatialized and uniform time. In the *durée* experiences connect to each other in a continuous flow, from a now to another now, in a purely qualitative flow. The stream of consciousness in *durée* is necessarily irreflexive: the conceptual reflection instead pertains to spatialized time and the work of "cuts" in this continuous flow of itself: "In everyday life the Ego, as it acts and thinks, lives on the level of consciousness of the space-time world. Its "attention to life" (*attention à la vie*) prevents it from becoming submerged in the intuition of pure duration" (Schutz 1967: 47). Attention to life then, indicates the degree of interest in encountering reality, to face it, and therefore it is the principle that governs our power of consciousness. The highest level of attention to life corresponds to the plan of action in which the interest in encountering reality is maximum (Schutz 1945). Since the first early works, Schutz is interested in the concept of attention to life in order to emphasize the selective function: the subject acts in a world that preys upon him, that somehow imposes itself on him, and attention to life permits one to select and isolate certain objects of a perceptual field that otherwise would be potentially unlimited (Wagner 1977: 193-194).

Consequently, it is necessary that attention to life is relaxed so one can reflexively grasp the flow of consciousness. That it is possible to become aware of an experience only by turning our gaze in the direction opposite the flow. At this point, Schutz basically follows the analysis of Husserl on the turning of attention (*Zuwendung*).[7] It is that act of attention to an experience already

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[6] Three manuscripts testify of this early attempt: *Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur, Sinnstructuren der Sprache* and *Sinnstructuren der Novelle: Goethe*. For an analysis see Wagner H.R. (1977), *The Bergsonian Period of Alfred Schutz*, in «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», Vol. XXXVIII, n. 2, and Id., *Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, Id. (1983)..

[7] As for the extremely complex problem of attention in Husserl we will refer to the rigorous and original works of Natalie Depraz (Depraz 2004; Depraz 2014) and the interesting considerations that Fabrizio Desideri has dedicated to the subject (Desideri 2011).

passed that confers to the same experience a new status; experiences are collected, identified, while to simply live in the duration implies a continuous transition from one experience to another without them being clearly distinguished from each other. To fully understand the importance of attention in this context it is good to remember the objective of Schutz. The Austrian sociologist wants to provide a more precise and solid foundation to comprehensive sociology, and then, in particular, the problem of meaning. An experience becomes significant when it is reflexively collected thanks to the ray of light of attention: it is attention to an elapsed experience that allows it to be given a meaning: "Only from the point of view of the retrospective glance do there exist discrete experiences. Only the already experienced [*Erlebte*] is meaningful, not that which is being experienced [*Erleben*]. [...] From the point of view of passing experience, the predication of meaning is necessarily trivial, since meaning here can only be understood as the *attentive gaze* directed not at passing, but at already passed, experience" (Schutz 1967: 52 emphaisi added). Consequently, even if meaning can only refer to the predicative scope of consciousness, it is necessarily based on the prepredicative: the act of attention reveals an experience that otherwise would remain "unilluminated".[8]

As anticipated, a second area of problems concerns the interrelated themes of the passage between provinces and the structure of consciousness. The theory of finite provinces of meaning is fairly well known: Schutz picks up from William James the idea that we live in different orders of reality, but he prefers to use the term finite provinces of meaning to emphasize that it is the meaning of our experiences that delimits a province and not the ontological status of the objects. The essay *On Multiple Realities*, probably one of the best known of his theoretical works, explicitly addresses this topic. The provinces in which we live are many, Schutz cites the world of dreams, fantasy, art, religious experience, scientific contemplation, the games of children and the mentally ill, but the list could be enriched further still. The Austrian sociologist indicates that all other provinces are modifications of this intersubjective world of everyday reality, the paramount reality. The world of everyday life is the province from which we start and to which we return. In living a province, we bestow the focus of reality and in so doing we relegate the other provinces to the background. The transition between a province and another comes via a shift, subjectively perceived as a shock due to the change in tension of consciousness founded on a different attention to life. According to Schutz, at least in this essay, the transition is experienced subjectively in terms of a trauma. He returns to the theme of the pas-

[8] For a detailed analysis of the characteristics of attention in Schutz on this theme see Perreau 2010: 83-84 (Perreau 2010: 83-84)..

sage explicitly and without significant changes in *Symbol, reality and society*, and implicitly in many other texts. The author explicitly addresses these issues in the *Introductory Notes to Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, an unfinished volume that remained unpublished until 1970, to which we will return in more detail below (Schutz 1970). In this text, the image of the shift does not fully satisfy Schutz for the fact that, on closer inspection, each activity often involves the commingling of more than one province. The same for the essay on relevance, where Schutz says it implies the unification of a number of activities each belonging to its own specific field. As noted, for Schutz consciousness always has a theme, namely that which is the focus of attention, and a horizon, that which is merely coexperienced together with the theme. The focus here seems to have the function of unifying the field of consciousness and thus allows the pre-eminence of a theme: even if in the field of perception there are several potential objects to which to direct attention "none of these perceived things is at the moment thematic for me. My attention is concentrated on a quite specific task (the analysis of the problem of relevance), and my present writing under these and those circumstances is but one among several means by which I could bring about this goal and communicate my thoughts to others" (Schutz 1970: 94). The shifting of the focus of reality to a province and the turning of attention toward a particular activity seems therefore to be the first instance of determination of the field of consciousness that at the same moment allows its unification. The preeminence of a theme becomes the element able to bring up a series of activities belonging to different provinces as a single activity which confers the focus of reality to the prevalent province: "all others receive merely the accent of derived reality – namely, they become horizonal, ancillary, subordinate in relation to what is the prevailing theme"(Schutz 1970: 98). Although, in fact, the subject confers the focus of reality to a province, on closer inspection all the other activities involve us to varying degrees and so we pay some form of attention to them. Schutz therefore concludes the vision of the passage between the provinces through a leap is revealed to be "an oversimplifiation" (Schutz 1970: 14): we live simultaneously in many provinces. As evidence of the close relationship that ties the theme of attention with that of consciousness, Schutz feels the need at this point to make two assumptions about subjectivity that take into account the fact that we live simultaneously in different provinces. According to the schizophrenic-ego hypothesis we can perform some typical or semiautomatic activities that involve only superficial levels of our personality and we can do it even when a particularly moving event has altered the deepest levels of our personality. Although we can give our full attention to routine activities, we still haven't abandoned the issue of the deeper level. But not even this metaphor fully satisfies Schutz, who aimed to introduce an additional image borrowed from music. The relationship that exists between two themes that run simultaneously in the same stream of

consciousness is similar to that of the counterpoint: two themes flow simultaneously and "listener's mind" can pay full attention now to one, now to another topic, but continues to flow independently.

All these problems are, however, according to Schutz, expressions of a single fundamental phenomenon whose analysis brings us precisely to the specific theme of this essay: "Living simultaneously in various realms of reality, in various tensions of consciousness and modes of attention à la vie, in various dimensions of time, putting into play different levels of our personality (or different degrees of anonymity and intimacy), the counterpointal articulation of the themes and horizons pertaining to each of such levels (including finally the schizophrenic patterns of the ego) are all *expressions of the single basic phenomenon: the interplay of relevance structures*" (Schutz 1970: 100-101). The phenomenon of relevance for Schutz is therefore placed at a more radical level than the others. Through the concept of relevance he wants to give an account of the methods and norms that guide attention. The subject in fact is not completely free to direct attention at any object available in his/her perceptive and conceptual field, there are limits, conditions, paths that we must follow: "Husserl has investigated the functions of what he calls the "attentional ray" for the constitution of the thematic kernel and therewith for the structurization of the whole field. At any moment there are many experiences going on simultaneously. What constitutes one (or better, one strain) of these temporally ongoing and simultaneous experiences as the thematic one is the fact that I voluntarily turn to it or reflect upon it (and hence this is an ego-activity, insofar as the ego is the source of all the activities of my conscious life). *Husserl's description of this activity may lead to the misconception that this selection, this choice, may be performed at random within an unlimited range of freedom or discretion*" (Schutz 1970: 95 emphasis added). The decision to direct one's attention to certain themes, to focus attention on some objects and to relegate others to the background, takes place in a narrow range of discretion. These acts of selection, continues Schutz, have their own history and are interconnected: modes of relevance are in fact organized into systems. The systems of relevance are the "engines" of selective activity (Muzzetto 2006: 164), they determine the regulative principles of construction of reality over consciousness and experience of objects, events and relationships (Nasu 2008: 92). The systems of relevance are thus the matrices, socially derived and socially conditioned, which guide the attention and therefore the selection of useful elements to subjects to define and manage the situation in which they are immersed.

3.2 The Theory of Systems of Relevance

Before addressing in detail the analysis of Schutz's systems of relevance it is appropriate to clarify the role of this concept in the overall theoretical system

of the Austrian sociologist. As we just mentioned, the concept of relevance is placed at a level of depth that permit us to treat all the other themes which have occupied Schutz. If it is certainly true that in light of the systems of relevance, attention emerges above all in its operational component (Perreau 2010), as an essential element for action and reflection in the world of everyday life. But it is also equally true that one must be cautious in attributing this new setting to the influence of the new American intellectual environment and in particular to pragmatism. I do not think it is entirely correct to establish a contrast between a European and an American period. According to this approach, in the period before his migration attention is analyzed mainly in its active and reflexive dimension, like the spotlight that can illuminate an experience. Following his migration, instead attention is detected especially in relation to a wholly grounded subject in the world of everyday life. In this second moment attention would then be analyzed mainly in the passive dimension and in relation to its role in the constitution of the world *taken for granted*.

However, I believe that this change is all inside the original development of the phenomenological path of Schutz. A path that has been enriched thanks to the contributions of American authors, namely James and Mead, but that has maintained a substantial coherence (Luckmann 1973). There definitely exists a change of focus or perhaps rather of setting in analyzing the role of attention, but this change should be framed within the complex relationship between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenology of the natural attitude in the thought of Schutz[9] and particularly to the gradual self-autonomy of analysis of the mundane sphere. The world of everyday life is imposed progressively more and more as a privileged place of phenomenological analysis to the point at which Schutz in last phase of his life saw fit to proceed solely on the ground of mundane phenomenology (Letter to Gurvitsch of 22.3.1957 in Grathoff 1989).

Therefore along this path the life-world in its everyday social dimension acquires an increasing role but the fact remains that some problems were well presented even before Schutz had reduced the role of transcendental phenomenology. Precisely for this reason it is possible to identify different references to some central questions of the problem of relevance across the theoretical production of Schutz and particularly in the works before emigration. Among the questions raised in this period, in fact, some of the issues that Schutz faces in the following years are already present in embryonic form. Especially the

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[9] The analysis of this particularly delicate and complex problem certainly can not be developed here. For a detailed analysis see Wagner (Wagner 1983: 287-328) and Muzzetto (Muzzetto 1997: 23-69).

idea that selective attention can be read in terms of relevance to everyday life; a relevance guided by interest. Another manuscript then, that Wagner places between 1927 and 1928, is explicitly dedicated to relevance. The text, entitled *Relevanz* (Schutz 1927), is of utmost importance because it testifies to the transition from the Bergson period to that one more strictly phenomenological. Here Schutz is very clear in stating how the problem of relevance selects from the totality of a pre-existing world, an old problem in philosophy, which regards the social sciences, but is of vital importance in everyday life: "The concept of relevance is the central concept of sociology and of the cultural sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*]. However, the basic phenomenon of relevance reaches beyond them into every life; it permeates our existing, our living and cognizing experience" (Schutz 1927: 3). In *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, then, the attentional modifications are analyzed in detail in paragraph 13 in relation to the constitution of meaning. And here, we have already said, attention is studied in relation to reflection and thus regards its active dimension. Yet, in the same text, the concept of relevance is revisited multiple times and in the concluding section, "A Glance at Further Problems", Schutz affirms that among the issues to be addressed is certainly "the *whole problem of relevance*, which has kept cropping up again and again in the present study. The definitive clarification of this problem will be possible only through an over-all phenomenological analysis, which nevertheless can be begun within the field of the social sciences" (Schutz 1967: 249). The central role is thus recognized, but the systematic treatment is postponed to a later date. Schutz follows this same strategy in many other later essays: even when explicitly dealing with certain aspects of the problem, he does not fail to specify how in reality it is a far more complex issue that deserves more space and a more detailed analysis. The Austrian sociologist tries this analysis only in *The Problem of Relevance*, a book that, as we have said, remained unfinished and was published in 1970, eleven years after his death. It is unclear why the planned book on relevance was not completed. On the other hand, these tormented pages (Protti 2001), although provisional and incomplete, represent the main source for studies on the concept of relevance in Schutz. Even as the project was abandoned, interest in the issue has not waned. In the following essays, the author continued to make reference to the subject and devoted a substantial part of *The Structure of the Life World* to it.

If we look at the overall production of Schutz the problem of relevance meets a strange fate. In fact it seems the role of the concept of relevance in Schutz is similar to that of attention in Husserl: both are as central as they are hidden in the theoretical architecture of the two authors (Depraz 2004: 5; Depraz 2014). This is especially true if we look at the work that Schutz published while he was still alive: the concept of relevance seems a sort of thread

that emerges only partially in published essays until 1959, the year of Schutz's death. Yet, this concept can in fact be considered a sort of base concept of the whole concept of the social (Natanson 1986) that, according to Nasu, is present in all the works of the Austrian sociologist and that connects them with each other (Nasu 2008: 91). So let's now analyze the systems of relevance, particularly in relation to the problem of attention.

3.3 Systems of Relevance

The systems of relevance, we have already said, can be seen as the social matrix within which the individual attention operates. These determine both the form and the content of our stream of consciousness (Schutz 1945: 213) and, as a consequence, indicate what pertains to the situation with which the individual must come to terms (Schutz 1950: 284). As Nasu effectively wrote: "relevance is a regulative principle of reality construction in the sense that it is a regulative principle of knowing and experiencing objects, events, and, in turn, the subject, as well as a regulative principle for defining the situation" (Nasu 2008: 93). Schutz however does not begin with a general definition of the systems of relevance to then investigate the different types. At the outset of his study on relevance, the author resumes briefly the theory of perception as choice of Jankélévitch, that of the problematic possibility of Husserl and the theory of choice of Bergson. According to Schutz, however, the more complete description of the phenomenon was given by the skeptic Carneades with his theory of verisimilitude. The exploration of the theme of relevance, is therefore carried out on the basis of the example of Carneades: a man in winter enters a dimly lit room and his attention is immediately drawn to an object in the corner; the man is undecided: it is a snake or a coil of rope? Schutz chooses to frame the attention and relevance from a sample taken from an everyday situation. Already this is an indication of the path he wants to follow: the attention it is not a theme for his role in the reflection, but as a guide for the operation of our systems of exploration and management of the situation with which the subject has to come to terms.

In any case, what interests Schutz is that all these authors cited recognize that within the field of consciousness there are a number of objects that compete for our attention: "Still, all of these theories – those of Carneades, Husserl, Bergson, Jankelevitch – have in common the assumption that within the given field of our consciousness, several configurations (perceptual or fancied or otherwise) compete with one another for our interpretive assent. They compete in the manner of problematic possibilities or alternatives: each has a certain appeal to us, each has its particular weight, each is capable of being connected with previous experiences, at least as to the type inherent

to them" (Schutz 1970: 105). It is the absence of the problem of the alternative that Schutz criticizes the Gestaltists: who don't explain why, among the different possible configurations, just this Gestalt configuration is privileged over another. Or put another way, every Gestalt already presupposes a choice between problematic possibilities, or alternative interpretations of the same object of perception. In the form of a question: why among the many objects present in my own field of perception does this object catch my eye? And why among the many possible alternatives am I undecided between a coil of rope and a snake? Obviously Schutz tries to answer these questions with the theory of systems of relevance.

3.3.1 Thematic relevance

Schutz identifies three systems of relevance: thematic, interpretative and motivational. The distinction is purely analytic and proposed for heuristic purposes: in everyday reality the process is completely unified and the boundaries between the three systems of relevance are difficult to separate. But on this point we will return later; we begin now by addressing the systems individually. Schutz distinguishes between imposed thematic relevance and intrinsic thematic relevance. We see the first characterization that provides us with examples of imposed thematic relevance: "This is the *first form* of relevance: namely, that by virtue of which something is constituted as problematic in the midst of the unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity – and therewith the field into theme and horizon. We shall call this kind *topical relevance*. It is worthwhile to note parenthetically the fact that the Greek root of the term "problem" is equivalent to its meaning to the Latin root of the term "object." The original meaning of both is "that which is thrown before me. [...] to make an object a problem, to make it the theme or topic of our thought, means nothing else than to conceive it as a dubious and questionable one, to segregate it from the background of unquestionable and unquestioned familiarity which is simply taken for granted" (Schutz 1970: 107). That which attracts the attention of the subject is what breaks the expectations, that is the object that cannot be brought back automatically to the type of things that, on the basis of knowledge sedimented in its own foundation of experience, he expects to find in that given environment. The relevancies are imposed because it is the unusual, unfamiliar experience that forces us to pay attention precisely because of its strangeness (Schutz 1970: 108). The thematic relevancies imposed thus concern the experiences that are not subject to making themes through an act of will. Schutz refers not only to unexpected and unfamiliar experiences as we've just seen, but also to other forms of imposed relevance, like the involuntary passages of the province or changes in the level of personality involved.

The author does not address in detail the different ways, but they all seem to implicate a certain thematic and cognitive discontinuity, or a discontinuity between the theme that occupied the consciousness before the onset of a new theme unrelated to the former. In fact, in an attempt to identify a general characterization of imposed thematic relevance, Schutz writes that "any interruption or modification which necessitates discontinuing the idealizations of 'and so on' and 'again and again,' which are at the root of all our experience, created imposed topical relevances" (Schutz 1970: 109).

The intrinsic thematic relevancies, however, concern those cases of voluntary change of theme and that Schutz explicitly connects to the phenomenon known in psychology as voluntary attention. The sociologist distinguishes two cases of voluntary displacement of attention: the transition to the new theme can be done gradually by expanding or deepening the theme of departure, or by the voluntary changing of attention towards a theme that has no connection with the theme of departure. Especially in the latter case, the distinction between imposed and voluntary is thin and appears to relate to the presence or absence of motivation. As a result Schutz focuses on the first category and is sure to revisit how these remain ideal-typical distinctions: it is not possible to find them in concrete reality in their pure form.

The choice of the expression "intrinsic relevance" associated to voluntary seems however to want to emphasize that the voluntary nature does not mean full discretion. Although Schutz in the text on relevance is not entirely clear on this point (remember they are still notes), the two sub-categories identified seem to corroborate this hypothesis. We have just seen how they can give two cases of voluntary thematic relevance: extension of the theme of departure and identification of a new theme. The first case is easily distinguishable from imposed relevance that involves a thematic and cognitive discontinuity: the extension of the theme is to the contrary characterized by a continuation of the theme of departure. In this sense it is an "intrinsic" relevance to the theme; this means that an established theme of departure does not have full and complete discretion to further thematizations. As for the case of voluntary identification of a new theme, the situation is more complex since a discontinuity exists. The latter however, is a limiting case for Schutz (Muzzetto 2006: 172). The distinction between imposed and intrinsic seems to concern the existence of a motivation to change attention. In any case, that which we want to emphasize is that the reference of Schutz to motivation serves to clarify that also in the case of voluntary attention there exists a direction and limits (also these are social in nature). Schutz, on one hand, is reluctant to associate voluntary attention to full discretion but, at the same time, tries to safeguard subjective autonomy: *"by the establishment of the paramount theme as home base both the direction of the intrinsic relevances leading into the horizon and the limit up to which*

they must be followed are to a certain extent already constituted. To be sure a voluntary act is needed to perform this translation of horizonal material into topical terms, but this freedom is limited" (Schutz 1970: 112).

3.3.2 Interpretative relevance

Once an object has attracted attention it must be interpreted, and it is here that interpretative relevance comes into play. For Schutz, to interpret a phenomenon means to bring it back to its typicality under other previous typical experiences. However not all sedimented experiences are useful in this process, but only those relevant to the thematic object for the subject. The systems of interpretive relevance thus serve to select those experiences that should be revisited for the interpretation of the object, but also which aspects of the object are relevant for interpretation: "This kind of relevance reveals, however, *a curious double function. Not only is it interpretatively relevant that part of our stock of knowledge at hand has "something to do" with the thematic object now given to our interpretation; but,* by a single stroke, *certain particular moments of the object perceived obtain the character of major or minor interpretative relevance for the task of recognizing and interpreting the actually experienced segment of the world."* (Schutz 1970: 113). This operation, of comparison between the percept and the material previously experienced, is often performed at the prepredicative level, through what Husserl calls *passive synthesis of recognition.* In this way, the percept, which has a certain shape range and color, is associated "with the recollection of previous perceptions of corporeal objects having typically similar, like, or same shape, extension, color, and so on" (ibid.). Therefore, most of the processes of interpretation takes place at this level without the aid of the sphere of judgment. It is on this basis that Schutz makes the distinction between imposed interpretative relevance and those intrinsic. The imposed relevances are such because they remain at the level of passive syntheses: the object is automatically brought back to the same objects or those typically similar to ones previously experienced and the knowledge of this object is adequate to come to terms with the situation (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 200). Just because it does not reach the level of awareness, this relevance is according to Schutz imposed. Therefore, most of the objects that do not attract my attention, remain in the background because they are automatically led back to the already known. The intrinsic relevances come into play when the level to be involved is predicative. If the guaranteed automatic interpretation of passive synthesis is not sufficient or is not adequate, then it is necessary to resort to voluntarism. It is thus the case of the problematic possibility, for which an act of self-will is necessary that thematizes intrinsic aspects of the dominant theme. If I therefore should interpret an object that caught my attention, I have to voluntarily move my attention to

other aspects or objects that are associated with this theme. As for the intrinsic thematic relevances, Schutz specifies that even they have limits. To return to our example, Schutz says, the man who enters the room is undecided whether to interpret the object that attracts his attention as a snake or a rope, but he doesn't ask himself whether the object can be a dog: *"The system of interpretative relevances is founded, in short, upon the principle of compatibility –* or, as Leibniz would call it, of compossibility – *of all of its coexistent moments.* And for this very reason the volitional acts which supervene in establishing additional intrinsic interpretative relevances are limited in scope (not everyone is freely available), as are the acts establishing intrinsic topical relevances"(Schutz 1970).

To introduce the motivational relevances, we can mention a theme that we will deal with more fully later. Schutz makes reference to interest both at the conclusion of the analysis of thematic relevances as well as to that of interpretive relevances. We have seen that something is the object of our attention and therefore needs to be interpreted by its strangeness, its non-familiarity. We need to make it familiar. But what determines the level of familiarity necessary? In principle it is possible to penetrate indefinitely the exterior and interior horizons of a theme. According to Schutz it is "a set of current interests" of the subject that determines the degree of familiarity sufficient: that is, it is only based on the interest that we can distinguish the portion of the world that needs further investigation and with which we want to familiarize ourselves, from that which can be taken for granted and therefore remain in the background. In turn however, the current interest *"is itself a form of relevance"* (Schutz 1970: 118) and to its analysis we will dedicate the next section. For now it is sufficient to note how the systems cannot be treated separately: when Schutz analyzes a system he must necessarily refer to the others.

3.3.3 Motivational relevance

Let's return to the case of problematic possibilities and to our example of the man who enters a room and is undecided whether to interpret the object that caught his attention as a snake or a rope. If he has no further interpretive elements to establish with a sufficient degree of probability what the object in the corner is, he may decide to continue the process of interpretation and hit it with a stick. In this way, he would obtain additional interpretative material to resolve his dilemma. The man, that is, can not remain in a situation of doubt because the solution to the dilemma (rope or snake?) is relevant to his future conduct. The motivational relevance indicates that "what has to be done is motivated by that for which it is to be done, the latter being motivationally relevant for the former. It is a chain of interrelated motivational

relevances which leads to the decision concerning how I must act" (Schutz 1970: 119-120). However, Schutz warned immediately, this formula is not entirely clear: the interpretative decision (to clarify whether it is a snake or a rope) motivates the action to hit with the stick; in turn however it is the end of this action (to avoid danger) that motivates the interpretive process (or the acquisition of other relevant elements of interpretation). There is thus an ambiguity that must be clarified between motivating and motivated experiences. To this end, Schutz distinguishes between "in order to" and "because" motives. The first refers to the planned end of the action, namely to the state of things that the subject intends to realize through the action taken. The imagined end of the action in turn motivates the single operations to be done to realize the state of things planned. So in order to remove the danger the man has intension to take a stick for striking the object. We can express the same concept through a language formula equivalent if, instead of asking ourselves at the moment that precedes the action, we look at the moment that follows the beginning of the action: the man took the stick because of the fact that he wanted to hit the object. These two forms are equivalent and thus for Schutz we are still faced with motives such as "in order to": "in both the state of affairs to be brought about, the paramount project, motivates the single steps to be taken. In other words, the paramount project is motivationally relevant for the projecting of the single steps; the single steps to be performed are, however, "causally relevant" for bringing about the desired result"(Schutz 1970: 121). So if we express this kind of motive through the formulation "because of" we are facing the "*spurious* because sentences" (Schutz 1970: 121).

The second form of motives is instead that of the genuine motive because. These have a different nature and concern the motives that underlie the determination of the dominant project. In our example, if the motive *in order to* of the action is to remove the snake, as the end of the action, the motive *because*, which is behind this end, is the fear of snakes. The genuine because motives are therefore substantially different because they sink their roots into the experience sedimented in the foundation of knowledge and are not entirely available to the subject. Every because motive "has its autobiographical history as well, referring to many series of previously experienced relevances – topical, interpretational, and motivational ones which now 'subconsciously' stir the tension of my consciousness and determine the intimacy of the level of personality involved" (Schutz 1970: 122). The genuine because motives are not necessarily subject to the conscience. They are presented as a habitual possession constituted by a series of typical expectations present in neutralized form, but potentially actualizable when certain typical circumstances are verified. It is then this habitual possession

that activates the predominant project, present in its typical form at the bottom of consciousness.[10]

We can note, as we did before, how Schutz should refer to the other systems of relevance in the analysis of a system taken separately. Before addressing the problem of the relationship between systems, which will be the subject of the next section, we must clarify the distinction between intrinsic relevances and those imposed for the motivational relevances as well. Only the choice of the predominant project is an intrinsic motivational relevance, because only this choice is derived on a voluntary act. After having made the choice of the dominant project to be realized, all other motivational relevances will be experienced as imposed.

3.3.4 Interrelation between systems of relevance

The different systems of relevance are mutually distinguishable, but not separable. We've seen during the course of our exposition: Schutz distinguishes three different systems and when he analyzes them individually he still must refer to the others. Every rupture between the systems is completely artificial. They show a "genuine *interdependency*" (Cox 1978: 91). They are therefore experienced by the subject in their absolute indivisibility; only the reflexive gaze can break them down. In everyday life that which is the theme is the "topic at hand", not the because reasons of the action or the systems of relevance. Obviously, according to Schutz, even the systems of relevance can become thematic: we can ask ourselves why that object caught our attention, if our hierarchies are correct, and so on. Just as aspects of a single phenomenon, it is possible to choose any one of the systems of relevance as a starting point for the analysis.

We have already had occasion to note, when something catches our attention it becomes thematic for us, becomes a problem, a question emerges from the background of objects simply taken for granted. In this sense, that which draws attention and that which starts the interpretive process is not familiar. Familiarity therefore has a subjective meaning that depends both on the biography of the subject and on actual circumstances. When we encounter an unusual experience "What emerges as a strange experience, then, needs to be investigated, *if it is interesting enough*, because of its very unfamiliarity. It has become questionable. And there with new topical relevances arise" (Schutz 1970: 132). It is the current interest that depends on the biographical and

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[10] The structure of because motives is highly complex and cannot be analyzed in detail here. For further reading see Muzzetto (Muzzetto 2006: 186-226).

current circumstances which determines the level of investigation necessary, or put differently, how long an object is worthy of attention. But Schutz asks, what then is interest? At this point it should not be difficult to answer in terms of motivational relevances: *"Interest in this sense is the set of motivational relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind.* These relevances may be either actually operating when I turn to an "intrinsic topic," or they may be present as the sediment of relevances which were formerly actually operative in a neutralized form, namely as habitual possessions of my stock of knowledge" (Schutz 1970: 127-130). In this case, the author points out, there is a dual, bidirectional relationship between thematic and motivational relevances: the interest stimulated by the unusual experience generates new thematic relevances; these new thematic relevances in turn can be the source for new motivational relevances: something that did not interest me, now attracts my attention and I can want to familiarize myself with it. This situation in turn, can only change the system of interpretative relevance, "those which bear 'subscripts' as regards the main topic prevailing thus far. On the other hand, it is quite possible that a shift in the system of interpretational relevances – as with the introduction of a new concept – becomes the starting point for building up a set of new motivational or topical relevances which do not thus far pertain to the familiar stock of knowledge at hand" (Schutz 1970: 133). Therefore, it is not possible to attribute a priority to one of the systems of relevance: the process is unified and therefore each system can become the starting point from which originate the changes in the other two.

4. Systems of relevance as social matrix of attention

Now that we have reassumed the theory of relevances in Schutz, we can investigate the relationship between attention and relevance to show precisely the social nature of attention. First we must try to resolve an apparent contradiction. In *Reflections* Schutz writes that "The most critical omission made thus far refers to the fact that we have handled our problem – and will in this and the following part continue to do so – as if there were no social world at all, as if an isolated individual experienced the world of nature disconnected from his fellowmen" (Schutz 1970: 135). Does this means that for Schutz the idea of an isolated subject is somehow possible? If it were so, Schutz would not come out from the individualistic approach to attention. We must therefore clarify this aspect.

We must first make note of the fact that Schutz moves within a noetic analysis of consciousness and this necessarily influences his vision of attention as well. As noted, the noesi designates the experience of the object while the

noema is the object-as-experienced. This point is very important for the implications that this choice entails: in following this perspective, attention has been studied mainly in relation to the subjective experiences sedimented in personal history. The interests and the biography of the actor function as constituent elements of his attention. Quite different instead is the approach of his friend and colleague Aron Gurwitsch, who follows the noematic perspective. Gurwitsch is interested in a theory of relevances as theme-relevance while Schutz in a theory of ego-relevances: "With Schutz *a certain item is relevant to me* on account of the projects and pursuits which engage me. As we use the term relevancy, *a certain item* is said to be *relevant to the theme* (which may well be a plan of action or a pursuit) and also to other items because of their relevancy to the theme" (Gurwitsch 2010:333)[11]. Embree believes the two analyzes compatible (Embree 1977) and proposes to carefully read the difference departing from the diagram ego-cogito-cogitatum: Schutz is focused on the first part (Ego-cogito) and Gurwitsch on the second (Cogito-cogitatum). Therefore in following Schutz, subjective interest is necessarily emphasized as an element that "colors" the objects for their greater or lesser ability to attract attention. Interests as we have seen, must be understood in a broad sense, to include fears and hopes, experiences sedimented at different levels of one's personality. Due to the noetic approach, the biography of the subject thus has a key role in understanding the functioning of attention. The sociologist then is interested above all on the basis with which structure is determined in theme and horizon. However this does not mean that the analysis of Schutz remain caged within exclusively subjectivist explanations.

The omission of sociality primarily has the function of simplifying the problem treated in the analysis. The option for methodological individualism implies that Schutz always starts from a subject that may possibly relate to another subject. However this doesn't at all mean that the social dimension isn't present. In *The Phenomenology of the Social World* Schutz is already very clear on the fact that the reality of the You and the We precedes even the ego as mine. This means that the experience of us that is given in the We-relation, in which the self and the other are physically present and interacting, is a primary pre-predicative experience and "that it is only after that relationship is established that individuals are born into the world, even phenomenologist" (Natanson 1978: 70). Intersubjectivity is the foundation of all other human categories: "As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity

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[11] This is not the place to analyze the interesting theory developed by Gurwitsch in *The Field of Consciousness*, written at the same time as *The Problem of Relevance* during the period of greatest collaboration between the authors. For a recent development of Gurwitsch's theory we refer to the work that Arvidson has continued over the years particularly (Arvidson 2006).

and the We-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence" (Schutz 1957: 82). In the mundane sphere intersubjectivity is taken for granted, yet it is constitutively present: the world is common to most subjects and so my experience of it always refers to others. There is no subject in which society is not always present: society is an integral part of the individual (Schutz 1942). "Sociality, in these terms – writes Maurice Natanson – is the *always* already existent milieu of man related to fellow man in multiform temporal, spatial, corporeal, *as well as cognitive and emotional terms*" (Natanson 1977: 110 emphaisis added).

Thus if the subject is always in society, and the choice of starting from an isolated subject has a heuristic function, any opposition between individual and collective is forced in the case of Schutz (Embree 1991: 210). The Austrian sociologist categorically excludes the idea of a private experience. On this point he is very clear in his letter to Gurwitsch of April 20, 1952 "I had of course only pedagogical reasons for taking a theoretical solipsistic ego as my point of departure and only subsequently introducing the structures which are involved in the social world. But that of course doesn't mean that I believe that a *private experience that is not socialized from the beginning is possible*" (Grathoff 1989: 177). We have also seen that sociality is always present at the cognitive level. If we also extend these considerations to the subject of attention, we must note that the treatment that provides an isolated subject that directs its attention towards an object is in fact a simplification. Therefore we can try to locate the first stable reference point of attention in Schutz, in connection with the framework that we have taken up in the second section. As it is for Eviatar Zerubavel and for Yves Citton, for Schutz attention is always socialized from the start. Attention is indeed an eminently social phenomenon.

We go even further in detail and see in what sense is it possible to identify the social dimension of attention in Schutz's analysis of systems of relevance. First we will clarify the role of the systems of relevance within the stock of knowledge of the individual and then point out the role of the social in the concrete functioning of the systems of relevance.

The description of Schutz's life-world always starts from the assumption that it is an intersubjective world and thus a social world. Every subject, to come to terms with this world, to interpret it and act in it, has available a stock of knowledge that is the result of the sedimentation of their previous experience. These are derived either from direct experience or from experiences transmitted to the subject by others (peers, teachers, parents, and so on) (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 7). The stock of knowledge however does not consist merely of a necessarily explicit knowledge, it's not propositional and is in fact intersubjective (Banega 2014). Although it has a certain unity, the stock is not an integrated and coherent system.

Knowledge for Schutz is socially derived and socially distributed. The stock of knowledge has a intersubjective genesis: this means that a large part of the expectations and subjective values are learned and inherited from others and that, consequently, only a very small part of my knowledge comes from direct experience (Schutz 1953: 13-14; Schutz 1976: 133-134). But not only: because the direct experiences are not private experiences (a hypothesis that, as we have seen, Schutz excludes) they are always socially mediated. In *The Well-informed Citizen* Schutz explains in detail what it means to say that the world is a common intersubjective world of culture: personal knowledge is in reference to that of the others and comes to us as an inheritance; it refers to a single world common to us all; and this world is subject to confirmation by the others (Schutz 1946).

Since the systems of relevance are also the result of sedimented experiences, they are a part of the stock of knowledge. However at the same time, they have a special position within the stock: they belong to it and they constitute somehow its structure because they order the various elements based on the importance and appropriateness of typical situations. The systems of relevance represent the "driving force" (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) of the stock of knowledge: they govern its dynamics and its use. The stock of knowledge, that is, cannot be understood in static terms, like a warehouse from which the subject simply draws; it is not the subject of mere possession (Nasu 2008: 98). It is rather a flow that changes in the structure based on the specific situation: "It has to be constituted on each occasion according to the prevailing system of relevance" (Nasu 2006: 392). Consequently as a rule, the stock of knowledge is always unfinished and open: the acquisition of knowledge is never definitive, the problem always emerges within what is taken for granted. Each knowledge taken for granted is always subject to "new announcement" and always with respect to an end. For if the interpretation consists of the attribution of that which we have in front of us that is already noted, we can not fail to highlight the circularity of the process: the new experience feeds back on the stock of available knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 161; Muzzetto 2006: 63). The system of relevance then regulates both the appropriateness of knowledge with respect to the concrete situation, as well as the importance of the new experience with respect to the stock as a whole and to the same system.

Therefore, since they are a part of the stock of knowledge, the systems of relevance are also socially derived and socially distributed. Thus the ways in which we pay attention to objects based on the specific situation are, in large part, socially derived. This approach also enables Schutz to escape the risk of sociological determinism. Because, although it is certainly true that the systems of relevance are mostly socially derived, it is also equally true that it is impossible that the systems of relevance are identical to its subjects. The systems of relevance

in fact depend ultimately on the personal history of the subject and since there cannot be two identical biographies, there can be no systems of relevance that perfectly overlap. The systems of relevance then, are socially distributed. As a result, not all social groups share the same matrix that guides attention. Schutz hasn't particularly deepened these aspects, but we find an important indication in his essay on the stranger. The stranger has a hard time coming to terms with the new environment, not sharing the same system of relevance of the society in which he finds himself, he pays attention to elements the host group takes for granted. At the same time, he doesn't pay attention to other elements that for the group are of vital importance. Ultimately, since he doesn't have the same system of relevance, he has trouble identifying the pre-established alternatives for the appropriate definition of the situation (Nasu 2006).

The systems of relevance are socially derived and socially distributed. As for the former, we can say that the matrix that guides our attention has a social origin. The second aspect reminds us instead that not all groups and subjects share the same systems of relevance. Let us now move on to analyze the specific working methods of the systems of relevance.

We have seen that an object[12] draws our attention when it becomes a problem for us. Whether it requires our attention, or whether that attention is driven by a voluntary act,[13] this object becomes problematic for us and we have to familiarize ourselves with it. That familiarity is however a very complex concept. The familiarity of an object cannot be understood in an absolute sense, as if it belonged to the ontological structure of the object. As we saw when we discussed Zerubavel, an object stands out like a figure in a background based on social norms. Similarly for Schutz, familiarity cannot be understood in an absolute sense for at least two reasons, which we've already discussed in previous pages. On the one hand something catches my attention depending on my current interest, which in turn depends both on the specific situation and on those experiences sedimented in my biography. On the other, the object that captures me is also that which is not within the typical expectations of the situation. But what does it mean to say that an experience is not within typical expectations? And how are these expectations built?

A characteristic of our habitually acquired knowledge consists in the fact that it typically refers to other potentially similar knowledge. Obviously, we

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[12] Throughout our essay we followed Schutz and have always talked about *a* theme present in consciousness. Of course this is a simplification, as Schutz has well presented. A theme is always inserted into a system, is always connected to a network of other themes that are related with it.

[13] Again for the sake of clarity, as for Schutz, voluntariness does not correspond absolutely to the full discretionary power. The feelings that guide our will also have a social origin.

constantly experience a certain atypicality compared to what we typically anticipate. An experience is therefore always unusual compared with the expectations built on the basis of typically accumulated knowledge: "It is precisely this 'not so but otherwise' which gives the new experience the character of being an unfamiliar one" (Schutz 1970: 132). These expectations however, even though they depend on my biography, have an eminently social nature.

The world is, according to Schutz, experienced from the beginning according to types. This implies that for the natural attitude, the world makes sense, is pre-ordained, is not merely an aggregate of disordered sensations (Schutz 1945: 208). It also means that each typification brings with it expectations, or the ability to repeat at least in principle similar experiences: "The unquestioned pre-experiences are, however, also from the outset, at hand as typical, that is, as carrying open horizons of anticipated similar experiences. For example, the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as "mountains," "trees," "animals," "fellow-men" (Schutz 1953: 7-8). Typification is therefore an important part of the social and cultural world: this means that as typifications certainly vary between cultures, there can not exist a cultural world that faces less typification. As clearly stated by Barber: "Hence, typification, that is, typified ways of conceiving the world and typified patterns of behavior, will vary from one social world, or cultures, to another, but it is necessarily the case that if there is a socio-cultural world, then people will function within it by employing *some* set of typifications" (Barber 1987: 117). On the other hand, typification is essentially social, that is, socially shared, derived, transmitted and constantly rebuilt. Barber masterfully sums up: "For Schutz the social character of typification is invariant and essential such that there cannot be typification which do not reflect the social milieu out of which they originate and in which they are utilized. The social is not just accidentally affixed to necessary structures of typification whenever they are concretely instantiated, but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world typification pattern" (Barber 1987: 118 emphasis added). The language of common sense represents " the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group" (Schutz 1955: 233). So for Zerubavel and Citton, as well as for Schutz the language guides and prestructures, predominantly at the prepredicative level, our perception and attention. Typification thus becomes one of the ways through which the cognitive organization of the world is socially transmitted.

Therefore, if interests guide the level of knowledge required to gain respect from the situation and the interpretation of the world is always done in terms of types, according to Schutz there can be no such thing as a pure and simple type: they always originate from problems of the group. The socially approved typifications, that constitute the systems of relevance, originate in com-

mon situations and in collective problems: "the world taken for granted by the in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems emerges within a common horizon, problems requiring typical solutions by typical means for bringing about typical ends." (Schutz 1955: 236) The expectations of the subject, even if they come from direct experience, still originate within the scope of typifications of the membership group. Let's take a page from Schutz in which he summarizes some of the issues we tried to analyze in this section: "The socially approved system of typifications and relevances is the common field within which the private typifications and relevance structures of the individual members of the group originate. This is so, because the private situation of the individual as defined by him is always a situation within the group, his private interests are interests with reference to those of the group (whether by way of particularization or antagonism), his private problems are necessarily in a context with the group's problems" (Schutz 1955: 238).

Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to highlight the contribution that the theory of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can offer to the understanding of the social dimension of attention. I have therefore briefly revisited some recent contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective attention, and we focused in particular on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and Yves Citton. I then analyzed the role of attention in the theoretical edifice of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of relevance in particular. I then tried to stress the importance of the mechanisms of social regulation of attention, with respect to both the origin of the systems of relevance as well as to their operation. Regarding the first aspect, I noted how for Schutz the systems of relevance are socially derived and distributed and are formed from sedimented experiences. With regard to their operation, I attempted to emphasize the elements of interest and social typification.

One of the great merits of the theory of relevance in Schutz is, as Laurent Perreau writes, in allowing attention to emerge as "an activity of consciousness in direct contact with our practical enrollment in the world" (Perreau 2012, 80). At the same time, the theory of systems of relevance provides the opportunity to read attention starting with the subject, but without tying it exclusively to a determinist theory of action or based solely on motives. Hermida-Lazcano for example, (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) sees the theory of relevance as an antidote to hyperrationalist theories of action for three main reasons: its relative concealment of projects in the consciousness, the plurality of roles, and the problem of multiple realities and the schizophrenic ego.

Exporting these considerations to the subject of attention, we can say that for its relative concealment of projects my attention can also be drawn by objects without me fully understanding why. Perhaps for this reason it is important to reflect on the mechanisms through which we manage our attention, both individually and collectively. In an overstimulated environment it is crucial to cultivate our "reflexive" or "critical" attention (Citton 2014). Or to put it in Schutzian terms, it is essential that our systems of relevance are set to a theme.

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Elements of a theory of social time.
A Schützian approach

Gerd Sebald

The paper discusses in the first place the Bergson's pragmatic concept of time and successively the Husserl's concept of time and the lifeworld to define their influences for Alfred Schutz whose considerations on time started from Henry Bergson's philosophy of duration. The Austrian sociologist uses Husserl's considerations on the inner-time consciousness as a complement of Bergson's theory. It's a well-know fact that time is a foundamental topic for Schutz expecially in his Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music (1944). Schutz's phenomenological research on music takes in to account the Bergsonian connection of mind and body, of (inner) time and space and their theoretical characterizazion. The paper examines finally Ilja Srubar's differentiation between constituted an produced time. Coming a conclusion the paper distinguishes analiticaly a multiplicity of forms of time and the types of mechanism for their formation trying to describe the kind of interrelations are to found between these different forms as necessary elements in order to conceive a sociological theory of time.

One of the genuine achievements of the Schützian Theory of the Social is the introduction of a concept of time into sociological theory both as central and fundamental. In starting from Max Weber's concept of subjective meaning Schütz relies on Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl's philosophical considerations for his «philosophical founded theory of method» (Schütz 1967: xxxi) for the social sciences. Nevertheless, his theory of time is rather neglected in the reception of his work, with the exception of Ilja Srubar (1974, for a condensed version see Srubar 2007), whose differentiation between constituted and produced time is discussed later in this article. Neither Elias (1984) nor Nowotny (1989) mention Schütz at all. Nassehi (2008) at least mentions Schütz' theory of time, but states that Schütz «remains a captive of phenomenological thinking» (110, my translation). Two more recent articles discuss certain aspects of time in Schütz's works: Muzzetto (2006) asks for the function of time in the constitution of experiences, but in the end diagnoses a structural difficulty in Schütz, because in «the relationship between the subject and the social world» there are used «two different modes of discourse» (25). Another way of investigation leads Renn (2006b) to a similar result. In starting from the

concept of constitution in Husserl and Schütz he detects two different modes of it in Schütz: appresentation and synchronization, which would lead to two different theories of communication. But in Schütz' detailed analysis of the time horizons in communication he finds potential for an amendment both of pragmatically and phenomenologically based theory of communication. So, all in all theories of social neglect the Schützian approach, even if its potential is recognized. In order to work out some elements of a theory of social time, I will ask for the temporal dimensions as developed by Alfred Schütz, in order to pave the way onward to a sociological theory of time. Therefore, Bergson's and Husserl's conceptualizations of time are shortly reconstructed. Then, the time concept that Schütz developed in his *Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932/1967) is outlined, before some clarifications and later considerations in his *Fragments Towards a Phenomenology of Music* (1944/1996) are discussed. After a brief sketch of Srubar's distinction between constituted and produced time a short prospect will summarize draw the conclusions for a theory of social time under the condition of social differentiation of high degree.

Bergson's pragmatic concept of time

Schütz began his theoretical work in the 1920s relying on Henri Bergsons pragmatic philosophy of the durée. Bergson conceptualized the durée as a continuous flow of experiences constituting a «succession of indistinct elements» (Muzzetto 2006: 7), as a permanent coming-to-be and passing away of experiences. This stream is the inner kernel of consciousness, not accessible by reflection (or only in «rare moments», see Bergson 1913: 231), but it can be symbolized, spatialized, conceptualized, transformed into an discontinuous and quantifiable time. It is the base of a lot of levels of consciousness, that differ in the degree of attention towards life. So, we have two forms of time in Bergson: the inner time of the durée, an unmeasurable continuity, and the reflected, symbolized and measurable time outside of it. The link and mediation between both forms is the body. It is conceived as the active center of the subject in the spatio-temporal world. Through the body experiences are transmitted into the durée and occurrences as stimuli from the durée are turned into action in the spatial world. Perception and action (or working) are located in the body, it is only a kind of transitional place also in a temporal sense. It is located in the spatio-temporal sphere of the outer world and reaches into inner time through sensations and in taking on impulses from the durée. Thus, Bergson finds a way out of a dualistic conception. Bergson's concept of memory adds two more important aspects to his theoretical stance of time. On the one hand recollections are triggered by pragmatic usefulness

for the present situation, a kind of pragmatic relevance (Bergson 1911: 188-89) that modifies also the recollected according to the present context. On the other hand, it orders and stores away experiences. But to reflect upon experiences they must have expired. Reflection is only possible in retrospection. Memorization means also the making of a kind of temporal succession in the inner time produced by memory. So, memory is a central concept in Bergson's theory.

Alfred Schütz uses Bergson's ideas as a foundation in all his writings in the 1920s and also his conception of time (see Schütz 1982). But his early writings of this time are not least fragmentary, because he wrestles with the problem of the inaccessibility of the durée. He solved it, when he (re-)discovered Husserl's phenomenology with the epoche as a methodological instrument to analyze the stream of consciousness. But, as we will see, his concept of time rests still on Bergson's considerations for a great part.

Husserl's concept of time and the lifeworld

Edmund Husserl's investigations both into time and the life-world are most influential for Alfred Schütz. Therefore, a very short sketch of his theory of time is necessary. I want to distinguish three forms or maybe strands of time in Husserl's work.[1] Husserl states in his *Ideas I* that «time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty» (Husserl 1982: § 81, 193). Temporality designates for him not only something «belonging to every single mental process, but also a necessary form combining mental processes with mental processes» (194). Thus, a stream of mental processes is constituted and within the stream a temporal order. Each actually present «now» is punctual and is accompanied by a «just now» (retention) and a «before» (reproduction). And it is also accompanied by a «soon» (protention) and an «after» (anticipation). So the temporal order of the stream of consciousness constitutes in its constant references to the past and the future phenomenological time. With his method of phenomenological reduction Husserl clarifies this inner consciousness of time, the «phenomenological time» as the «unitary form of all mental processes» (Husserl 1982: § 81, p. 192). That is the core of Husserl's phenomenology of time: the detailed description of the constitution of subjective time in inner time-consciousness.

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[1] I do not discuss the often problematic connections between the concepts and the development of them in the context of the development of his work. See Ricoeur (2012), Römer (2010), de Warren (2009), Mensch (2010).

But, he distinguishes another form of time: the objective or cosmic time. This, from the point of view of a single consciousness, is a transcendent (not: transcendental) form of time. It resides in the outer world and is measurable by the position of the sun, clocks or other physical means. And it has to be suspended for all investigations into the subjective form of time.[2]

And maybe there is also a third strand of time to be found in Husserl: the time of the life-world. The term 'life-world' as developed by Husserl has two functions. It is conceptualized as a foundation for all knowledge, especially the scientific knowledge, as the «general 'ground' of human world-life» and the «foundation for science» (Husserl 1970: 155). And it is conceptualized as the social environment we live in:

> the concrete life-world must first be taken into consideration; and it must be considered in terms of the truly concrete universality whereby it embraces, both directly and in the manner of horizons, all the built-up levels of validity acquired by men for the world of their common life […] the world of straight-forward intersubjective experiences (Husserl 1970: 133).

As such it is a social world, given in its specific cultural and historical way: «The world is the sole universe as what is pregiven as obvious» (Husserl 1970: 180). And in its givenness and validity inherent is a intersubjectively constituted time based on and constituting the transcendental intersubjectivity. Like all his attempts to establish intersubjectivity on phenomenological ground this one can also be seen as just a statement in the last resort.

To sum up, there are three strands or forms of time to be found in Husserl's work: the intensely and very lucidly analyzed subjective time, the intersubjectively constituted time of the life-world and the objective time of nature (or of Newton's physics?, see Römer 2010: 47 ff.). In attempting to found all these forms on the first one, Husserl tried to lay the foundations for the «unity of one time» (Husserl 1970: 169), but he never succeeded. Maybe that would be impossible, as Paul Ricoeur stated in his aporias of time. What remains, then, are three separated forms which have to be mediated and analyzed in their relation to one another.

Alfred Schütz used Husserl's considerations on the inner time-consciousness as a complement of Bergson's theory. Husserl's method of the epoche, the way of observing the consciousness from within the consciousness offered him a way to access the stream of consciousness in a controlled way and to ask for the constitution of subjective meaning in its temporal dimensions.

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[2] On the other hand Husserl tried to base the objective time in the inner time-consciousness. For a critique see Ricoeur (2012) and Römer (2010: 47 ff.).

Schütz's considerations on time in the Phenomenology of the Social World

a) Time and subjective meaning

Alfred Schütz used time always as a central concept in his philosophical foundation of Weber's interpretative sociology. His first attempt started from Henri Bergson's philosophy of duration:

> Our I-experience is banished into time and space; it is tied to consociates through language and emotions; it is accustomed to thinking, that is, to spatialize streaming changes of quality and to form them into concepts. […] This is so because our world of thinking, our concepts, our science demonstrate their time-space character at every move (Schütz 1982: 32).

However, Bergson's concept of duration or of inner time allows as developed above no controlled analytical access to the stream of experiences, because every form of description, of conceptualization, or representation involves alienation, exteriorization, and disassociation. When Schütz discovered Husserl's *Phenomenology of inner time consciousness* in 1928 or shortly afterwards, he had an instrument to access the processes of mind and of constitution of time. But he didn't abandon Bergson, instead he combines him with Husserl to solve his problem of a clarification of Weber's concepts especially the concept of meaning: «The problem of meaning is a time problem» (Schütz 1967: 12). In his investigation he starts with «Bergson's distinction between living within the stream of experience and living within the world of space and time» (Schütz 1967: 45). That opens up a double perspective, on the one hand we have enduring processes, like for example the flowing motion of an arrow, and on the other frozen, spatialized acts, the space traversed by the arrow divided into single points.

> Indeed, when I immerse myself in my stream of consciousness, in my duration, I do not find clearly differentiated experiences at all. […] I cannot distinguish between the Now and the Earlier, between the later Now and the Now that has just been […]. For I experience my duration as a unidirectional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now, I have grown older. But I cannot become aware of this while still immersed in the stream. As long as my whole consciousness remains temporally uni-directional and irreversible, I am unaware either of my own own growing older or of any difference between present and past. The very awareness of the stream of duration presupposes a turning-back against the stream, a special kind of attitude toward the stream, a 'reflection,' as we will call it (Schütz 1967: 47).

Schütz combines this distinction with Husserl's concepts of retention and reproduction, because especially retention allows the constitution of an order of different Nows in the duration, in the ongoing flow of experiences. Reproduction on the other hand ensures the identity of an object, as only with recollection a comparison and a judgement about likeness is possible. Because meaning constitution presupposes discrete experiences, it is not possible to ascribe meaning, while living in the stream of experiences. That is possible only in reflection, in a retrospective glance, an act of attention to the past experiences (a movement taken again from Bergson). Then, a single experience can be selected as a discrete one and just in selecting it it is bestowed with meaning. It is also interpreted with schemes of experiences at hand. So, the memory functions, retention and reproduction and also protention and anticipation, arrange and order the unstructured stream of consciousness, so that subjective time is constituted. This way, Schütz could describe the production of order between the elements of the durée, which in Bergson's conception remains unclear.

We have here developed in combining Bergson and Husserl the form of time in Schütz's theory: the subjective time of the consciousness, which is the base for all processes of subjective meaning constitution and action.

b) Intersubjective time and simultaneity

While subjective meaning can only be bestowed to one's own past experiences, the situation changes with the establishment of intersubjectivity. This is done in leaving the transcendental analysis of the stream of thoughts and changing to the natural attitude of everyday life. Social situations imply the encounter of two or more individuals:

> By merely 'looking' I can grasp even those of your lived experiences which you have not yet noticed and which are for you still prephenomenal and undifferentiated. […] You and I are in a specific sense 'simultaneous', […] we 'coexist' (Schütz 1967: 102).

Schütz states here, that two streams of consciousness are synchronized by and in interaction, in the practical operations involved in perceiving one another, communicating, or acting together. The two or more streams of consciousness involved have their own rhythm, their own feeling of time, heir own subjective time constituted as described above. But meeting at a certain point of time leads to synchronization of these separated times. The mediators are, with Bergson, the bodily expressions of the participants of the situation. The mutual perceiving and interpreting the other happens in the present of the encounter, and, as the formal structure of both streams of consciousness involved is the same, they are synchronized in their mutual reference to the

other. So, production of synchronicity is a practical achievement. And it holds true only for the specific social situation. That means, the newly constituted intersubjective time is not a temporal dimension for itself, but just two or more interconnected or interwoven subjective times. This way of «growing older together», of coexisting in simultaneity in spatial immediacy is the basic social situation. The temporal dimension of such a situation is structured by the involved subjective times phased on to the other. This is the second form of time, Schütz describes. It implies quite a lot of presuppositions, that are necessary, if the intersubjective time should be connected to both the subjective times: awareness of the other, perceptibility of the other, and bodily mediation of perceptions and actions. These presuppositions are necessary, if the egological constituted time should be fundamental for intersubjective time, which then is only a short-termed deduction of subjective times.

In addition the in pragmatically constituted intersubjective time in the world of working ("Wirkwelt") Schütz mentions an objective time, which seems to be the physical time of the objects «which is quantifiable, divisible, and spatial» (Schutz 1967: 103). This is also the time of history (see Schütz 1967: 212 ff.). Summing up, we can find, at a first glance to Husserl three forms of time in Schütz' *Phenomenology of the social world*: the subjective time of consciousness, the intersubjective time of a specific social situation and the objective time of things and of history. But at a second glance at least the subjective and the intersubjective time differ in a quite great extent from Husserl. In both forms elements of Bergson's theory are introduced, not at least to pave a more durable way for a sociological theory of time. Therefore, the body and the pragmatic context of working ("Wirken") function as a replacement for the transcendental explanation of Husserl and as a connection to the sociality of the everyday life-world.

Schütz's later considerations and clarifications on time

Time remains an important topic for Schütz all through his work. Especially, in his *Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music* (1944/1996) he dwells more intensively on the subject of time and adds some detailing to his theory of time:

> If you look at your watch, you will find that it takes about three minutes to play one side of a twelve-inch record. This is an important fact for the person in charge of making up a radio program. It is entirely immaterial for the listener. To the listener, it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to the slow movement of a symphony was of equal length to the time he lived through while listening to its finale, although each movement needed the playing of two sides of a twelve-inch record (Schütz 1944/1996: 254).

There are two modes of time shown in this example: the (external) time of the watch, the radio program, the record and the time of the subjective experience of music. Both modes of time are incommensurable and as it seems, unlinkable. But there is a link between the record and mind of the listener: the music coming out of the loud speakers. Again, the bodily perception of the music functions as mediation to the mind. And there is another link: What is not mentioned is the practice of turning or changing of the record right in the middle of the adagio or the allegro. In this moments the action, the world of working interrupts the pure experience of music and links the subjective time to the temporal dimensions of the outer world. It is a leap between two modes of consciousness and between two spheres of time. Again, the bodily action mediates the two temporal dimensions. In both cases the body bridges the difference between subjective and external time through pragmatic action or perception. Combined with the Schützian theory of multiple realities, we have here a first reference to differentiated forms of time (see Sebald 2011), even if the social status of these different provinces of meaning remains unclear.

«Inner time projected into space becomes the dimension in which our actions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellow men, and which, by a supervening idealization, may be conceived as the cosmic time or the time of the physicists» (Schütz 1944/1996: 254). Eventually that leads to Riemann's and Einstein's conception of spatial time, wherein time is the fourth dimension. The theoretical link between these different spheres here is just named «projection». The background of this conception is not so much Husserl, but Bergson. For him, the time of the durée is the unaccessible base of all subjective and social life. Taking this, all forms of time seem to be rooted in the egological subjective time for Schütz.

But when he develops the temporal dimension of music further it becomes clear that the subjective time is not only and entirely constituted in the consciousness itself. It is triggered also by the outer stream of tones, its rhythm, its specific articulation:

> We have to consider what we called the articulation of the musical flux into unit and sub-units. Any musician knows this problem very well. It has for him the name of musical phrasing. The art of musical phrasing consists in making each unit and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phrase what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phrase by a very short interruption of the flux of music – so short, sometimes, that even no sign of notation is required in order to mark the short pause between the end of the first and the beginning of the next phrase. It is these small fractions of time, incommensurable in our current notation, which the singer or the wind instrument

player needs for breathing, or the string instrument player needs for changing the stroke of his bow. The composer of our times order the players by the use of ties or rubato, or even in special cases by the use of rests, to observe these thematical units and sub-units (Schütz 1944/1996: 274).

The point here is not so much the thematically structured stream of music, but that this structure is transposed in listening into a structure of the stream of consciousness of the listener: «The listener is invited and incited by them [the short intermittences] to look from this end-phase back to initial phase» (Schütz 1944/1996: 274-75). The division into units «incited» (not: determined) by the phrasing of music is then not only a thematical division, but also a temporal one, because the points of reflection, for the mechanisms of retention and protention are thus induced into the subjective mind. «The attitude of the listener, his decision to follow the flux of music, involved his preparedness to perform the reflective attitude as soon as the flux of music itself invites him to do so» (Schütz 1944/1996: 275). Again, the bodily perception takes on external sequences and synchronizes the mind with them. This also holds true for the situation of communication or making music together: in perceiving and phasing in with the other(s), in a specific tuning-in-relationship, the foundation of common, intersubjective time is achieved.

There are two more important clarifications to be found in this fragment. First, Schütz describes the process of time constitution with the example of listening to a piece of music in a very detailed way:

> This attitude of reflection is made possible by that peculiar function of our mind which is generally called the faculty of memory. The Now which turned into a past does not entirely disappear; it may be recollected; it is no longer an actual vivid experience, but it subsists as remembrance of things past. It is this faculty of memory, which makes the stream of our consciousness an unbroken and interrelated sequel of our thoughts in inner time (Schütz 1944/1996: 255).

In distinguishing with Husserl the short term memory called retention and a long term memory, called reproduction, Schütz develops the time-constituting potential of memory further. A similar differentiation holds true for the dimension of the future: the short termed form, protention and a long term form, anticipation. Both the memory of past and of future not only ensure the unbrokenness and interrelatedness of the stream of consciousness, but in connecting the different points of time to a unbroken line of time and therefore to the ground of each subjective consciousness. In changing between the different modes of time (past, present, future), time itself is constituted and memory

becomes the founding operation for it. The second clarification deals with the role of the body in time constitution. In a only shortly published appendix to the *Fragments towards a phenomenology of music* Schütz discusses the phenomenon of rhythm and, again, links it to the body:

> We are not only aware of the sensation which the air we breathe creates in our oral-nasal tract at any inhalation and exhalation, we feel also distinctly the movement of our breast as a rhythmical movement of a part of our body, a movement which we do not only percieve as a recurrent experience in our inner time, but which can be altogether experienced as an occurrence in outer space—the optical and the haptical space—in which our body as an extended thing partakes like any other object (Schütz 2013: 20-21).

That means, Schütz's phenomenological research on music takes into account the Bergsonian connection of mind and body, of (inner) time and space and their theoretical characterization. The important point Schütz makes here is that rhythm is a occurrence in inner time, but bound to movement and especially bodily movements and its kinaesthetic perception. It seems to me, that here is the point to understand the unwillingness, which Schütz expresses in the *Fragments towards a phenomenology of music*, to recognize rhythm as a basic and universal element of music, because the close connection to the bodily sphere lets music step out of pure inner time. Nevertheless, the rhythms of the body seem to have an impact on the constitution of inner time[3].

The problem in Schütz is the attempt to root all time dimensions in the egologically constituted subjective time. From here he develops unspecified, but mostly body-based links to other levels of time and assumes an unproblematic transition between the egological consciousness and the intersubjective life-world. He concludes that a parallelism of the temporal structures leads to kind of synchronicity, to the constitution of an intersubjectively shared time. But there are some hints to be found that point to synchronization as a practical achievement through bodily perceptions and movements. If the unproblematic transition between the levels is discarded, there are three levels of time left: the subjective time (maybe distinguished between a time of the consciousness and a time of the body), the intersubjective time as a pragmatic achievement and the external, objective or better: socially produced time. Before coming to a conclusion, the last form shall be discussed with Ilja Srubar's notion of «produced time».

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[3] Husserl came to a similar conclusion in his last manuscripts, when he founds subjective time on bodily instincts (see Mensch 2010: 247ff.).

Ilja Srubar's differentiation between constituted and produced time

In relying on great parts of the phenomenological tradition Ilja Srubar (1974) accentuates the conception of time with his differentiation of constituted time and produced time. The constituted subjective time is, as in the whole phenomenological tradition, the time of the own durée, the time of the inner stream of experiences. But additionally he tries to show a social dimension in it, an intersubjective validity. In starting from Schütz' General Thesis of the Alter Ego, which includes the parallelism of the temporal structures of both minds. Both are operating in a present using retentions and reproductions, protentions and anticipations. Discussing persons with an associative disorder (aphasia), he concludes that the disorder is a lack of a shared temporal structure, which produces an inability to speak and act in a meaningful way. Srubar concludes that the temporal structure of the life world has to be intersubjective in order to enable communication and interaction. Thus, he circumvents the phenomenological problem of bridging the gap between the egological conceived I and the social situation.

Meaning and intersubjectivity are built up on and with these shared temporal structures. But the temporal objects constituted in everyday life world transcend this sphere and point to another temporal structure: the produced time. This form of time is defined as a temporal rhythm or a temporality of its own right (Srubar 1974: 102) independent of the life world. Therefore, it appears in the life-world (or «constituted social world» in Srubar's terms) as anonymous and maybe as a form of estrangement. Furthermore, it is the base for establishing types and roles in the social environment. These ways, the produced time reaches into the life-world. Srubar shows with the examples of unemployed people and prisoners that a breakdown of the produced time prohibits an adequate comprehension of situations.

The produced time is produced socially, but not easy if at all to change with individual intentional action. The produced time is result of the division of labour and is located primarily in the economic production of a society. The material processes of (re)production, the time for the circulation of capital and the relation of the working time necessary for reproduction and the additional working time set specific rhythms and an time of its own right. It cannot be controlled by the participants of the production process. It is a social form of time, social in the sense of social facts as conceptualized by Durkheim. If the Marx-induced preference for the economic sphere is extended to other or all social fields of order, we can take the produced times as a product of the differentiation of society, in so far as all fields of order develop their own temporality, their own time structures. Srubar has complemented the phenomenological forms of constituted temporalities

with the produced social temporalities of societies that are differentiated in a high degree.

Conclusions

To sum up, we have complex collection of time forms both in the subjective and in the social sphere. All of them could be necessary elements for a theory of social time. In a first step I will try to collocate them:

1. Forms of time on the subjective level:
   a) The time of the body: The body is not just an mediator between world and mind. The rhythms of a living body, its needs and drives, constitute own temporal structures. Chronobiology is active in this field, but as these forms of time are also constitutive for action and reflection, they are also relevant for a social theory of time.
   b) The time of the consciousness: The subjective time, as analyzed by Husserl and Schütz, with its form of the specious present, its references to the past and future, is central for the perception and feeling of time.

2. Forms of time on the intersubjective level: In social interactions and situations the subjective temporalities encounter each other and are confronted with produced time forms. The result is a complex conglomerate, which has to be synchronized.

3. Forms of produced time on the social level: In societies differentiated in a high degree, the different and in a certain sense independent and self-contained fields of order develop an own temporality, dependent on the rhythms of the processes, that built them up. This way, provinces of meaning (if they are social), organizations, bureaucracies or social systems have their own temporality, established by the speed of their communication, the circulation of objects in them, and their integration of past and future into present operations.

If we distinguish this multiplicity of forms of time, there remain two problems to solve. Firstly, is there a common mechanism for the formation of these different forms of time? And secondly, what kind of interrelations are to found between these different forms?

For an answer to the first question, I would propose to rely on Husserl's and Schütz's form of time constitution. Time is constituted in the permanent change from present to past and future, the permanent oscillating between past, present and future as Luhmann (1996: 38-40) in an explicit reference to Husserl has called it. The operation necessary for that is memory. Not only the individual memory of minds, but especially for the produced temporalities

the specific social memories of organizations, of systems, of collectives (see Sebald 2014). The processes laying the ground for a social unit or a specific field of social order, in their rhythm, in their repetitions and recurrences, in their references to past and future produce an own and autonomous time.

But if there are so much different social times and temporal structures, there would be no interaction, no communication, no social process at all. Therefore, it is important to take a look at the relations and the connections between the forms and levels of time. I would propose to take the differences and the demarcations between the different forms seriously in this way, that we may not assume an easy crossing and linking between them. Instead, we should, like Bergson but without stating an inaccessibility, act on the assumption that a crossing between and a linking of different forms always involves a change of them. Luhmann coined the term «structural coupling» for that link, but doesn't really fill it. Renn (2006a) offers the metaphor of translation, that seems to be more adequate, because it implies a transformation that is not entirely disconnected from the primary condition. This translation is a pragmatic one, achieved in communications and interactions, that make synchronization of the temporalities involved necessary. As a means for this synchronizations the coordinated universal time has been introduced and is widely used in our globalized world. But that doesn't mean that all different forms and levels of time vanish, on the contrary, the more societies differentiate the more temporalities emerge.

Both answers are just short sketches of what has to be done yet in order to conceive a sociological theory of time, but that would mean a lot of further work and is for now left to anticipation.

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Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in Alfred Schutz

Riccardo Venturini

In this work I tackle certain aspects of the relationship between time and intersubjectivity in Alfred Schutz. I present a summary of the methodological architecture of the Austrian sociologist, outlining the specificity of the relationship between time and consciousness. I discuss the treatment of the musical experience as an example of the peculiar declination of a series of temporal dynamics connected to the intersubjective creation of meanings. Finally, I set out some thoughts related to the debate on the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and music in Schutz.

The musical relationship is a context endowed with meaning, not the object of conceptualization, that allows us to identify in a paradigmatic way the relationship between the subjective sense and experience of the other. The theory of appresentation of Schutz is the center of the process of constitution of meaning of the understanding of the other. The emergence of meaning is related to the dynamics of the passive and active poles of the consciousness and the constitution, in the we-relation, of a radically intersubjective dimension that exceeds the Cartesian distinction between inside and outside.

1. Time, consciousness and action

Time is one of the central categories of the noetic analysis of Schutz. It's well known that one of the criticisms of the Austrian sociologist of the comprehensive sociology of Weber is that of not having given sufficient attention to time in the examination of meaning, subjectively understood. Schutz reworks the theses on time of Bergson and Husserl in a synthesis that helps us to understand a number of processes related to the constitution of subjectivity and the intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life[1].

According to Schutz, «the problem of meaning is a time problem», it pertains to «internal time consciousness» (Schutz 1967: 12). Time is not a matter of conscience: it is consciousness that constitutes time.

[1] I'll take for granted the theory of finite provinces of meaning, which constitutes the scope from which emerges the problem of time in the eyes of Schutz and the fundamental theme of the typicality of experience, which Natanson explains, is perhaps one of the main terms of the vocabulary of Schutz (Natanson 1973: 111).

The first aspect of the link between temporality and experience implies the distinction between sense of action and sense of the action accomplished. According to Schutz, we must clearly distinguish between the current *action* (*actio*) and the *act* made (*actum*) (Schutz 1967: 39). The act performed refers to the past, while the action is related to the future, the present course with its protentions and anticipations. Since the action of the actor is future-oriented this anticipatory nature leads to the engagement of a project that precedes it in the timeline (ibid.: 82-83). The project is the temporal expression of intentionality, it has the form of the future perfect (*modo futuri exacti*) and has as its object the action accomplished in fantasy. Only the completed actions are accessible to the reflective glance, they are acts conceived in the form of time past (*modo praeterito*), while in planning future action the subject refers to its hypothetical conclusion[2].

As in Weber, the sense of action is linked to the motives; between project and motives for action there is a fundamental temporal connection. The author distinguishes between "final" motives (in-order-to) and "causal" motives (because):

> From the actor's point of view, 'in-order-to motives' concern the future [...]. In short, the aim motivates the project. "Because motives" instead refer to the past and represent the motivation of the aim itself of the action. [...] The nature of this type of motive is complex: it is rooted in the actor's personality, in his unconscious. It is sufficient here to recall that Schütz affirms the quasi-causal nature of such motives, given that they operate behind the actor's back, so to speak. Furthermore, while I am living the course of the action, I am also turned towards the future. I am therefore driven by in-order-to motives. To grasp the "because motives" the actor must turn to his past (Muzzetto 2006b: 15).

According to Schutz, there are two distinct attitudes towards experience: the direct and the reflective attitude. The direct attitude is the direct experience over the course of events of that which is experienced in the "here and now." In this "to live in their own actions" the actors have a very low level of awareness of the acts they commit. In the reflective attitude, however, the ac-

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[2] Moreover, says Schutz, the knowledge now available «at the time of projecting [...]must necessarily be different from that which I shall have when the now merely projected act will have been materialized. Until then I shall have grown older and if nothing else has changed, at least the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowledge. In other words, projecting like any other anticipation carries along its empty horizons which will be filled in merely by the materialization of the anticipated event. This constitutes the intrinsic uncertainty of all forms of projecting» (Schutz 1962: 69).

tor turns his attention to his own experience by engaging in an act to reverse the flow of consciousness, figuratively "stops to think." With reflection they delineate clearly those experiences that flow indiscriminately in *durée* (Schutz 1967: 102). The change of attitude leads to a change of the temporal structure. With reflection you stop to think, time is metaphorically stopped by awareness, even if the reflection does not stop the flow of internal time and the changing of knowledge underlying this change. Thus emerges the problem of the time lag between the flow of experience and the acquisition of knowledge[3], that according to some is a paradox. The paradox of meaning that would imply the contradiction between lived experience and present experience: if only the first is delineable reflexively, then the second would seem excluded from the attribution of meaning[4]. The solution to this paradox is present in the same theory of action of Schutz, that is the frame in which the study of the structure of consciousness occurs. In the predicative moment of reflection there is also active a set of experienced imagined futures. If in Weber only the action is meaningful, and not the behavior[5], for Schutz the meaning of the action is in the act. We have seen that the project is taking a position on the future. The meaning is the result of the intentionality of the reflective act. As Muzzetto explains, this

[3] Muzzetto notes that the relationship between sense and temporality is further complicated by the character of the intentional units. The structure of these units of meaning emerges in the predicative sphere of transversal intentionality, but has its roots in the pre-predicative sphere of longitudinal intentionality. The latter is connected to a context, which assumes the temporal relationship between current, future and past experiences. The context consists of *quanta*, by indivisible elements in the flow of internal time that depend on the passive syntheses (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 56). Put another way, the intentional units are relational units that consist of idealizations of the and-so-on (e-cosi-via) and the you-can-always-renew (si-può-sempre-di nuovo) idealizations connected to internal time. «The structure of *quanta* is consistent with the notion of flux. Thus, the *now* of the stream of consciousness, the present of human experience, is not an instant experienced as separate from the preceding and the following instants: it is a "vivid present" which, like James's "specious present", 17 is tied to the past and to the future» (Muzzetto 2006b: 11).

[4] According to Cox, this paradox is the result of a misinterpretation of the theses on inner consciousness of time by Husserl. Schutz would read through the pattern of Bergson and would face an insurmountable predicament. As Muzzetto explains, «Cox fails to discern the originality of Schütz's position (Although it is certainly true that in his use of Husserl and Bergson, Schütz is not greatly concerned with proving the compatibility of their theoretical approaches, nor with providing an analytical demonstration of his own stance)» (Muzzetto 2006b: 13).

[5] Giolo Fele speaks of "Weber's paradox": if behavior endowed with meaning is only that which is conscious, that in which one has a «reciprocal intentional orientation [...] in which the meaning is given by sharing a repertoire of meanings, a common set of symbols that draw on» sender and receiver, then most of the daily actions, such as those of routine, are foolish (Fele 2001: 204).

represents the central point of the solution of the problematic node related to the relationship between time and meaning: the project makes significant both the act and the action. Only the possibility of imagining an action completed allows me to design and then to genuinely bring into being the individual phases of the action: these depend on the final outcome to be achieved. The action can be understood as consisting of partial actions each of which represents a step towards the final result. The what resolves the problem of the unitary character of the action and its articulation. The view that the meaning does not belong to the immediacy of the experience in the stream of consciousness thus does not mean that the sense operates as a sort of Paretian "derivation" or in any case a rationalization. The what would be inevitable if it were attributable only to a reflection *ex post* on the experience. But we can anticipate our steps reflexively. The possibility of the meaning of the present is thus in the capacity to anticipate, to think in advance about the results (imagined) of our steps. Even the action, not only the experience is therefore endowed with meaning. And so the present also acquires sense from the anticipation of the future (Muzzetto 2006b: 14).

To argue that the meaning is in the project, doesn't mean to establish an exact match of the future results of the action, nor does it mean to put in place an ontological separation between spheres. The project is not realized, for example, because the reality is in itself risky or because the actor is unable to discover a "right combination" able to put him/her in the condition to discover a state of future things connected to a presumed actual uniformity. This view leads to naive realism, because it would mean bringing to the world of science aspects of the world of common sense, in which uncertainty is suspended "for practical purposes". The central point is that the future will always be configured differently from what has been sketched previously because the knowledge available and the system of relevances of the subject will necessarily be different[6]. The meaning given to a point in time "A" will always be different from the meaning given to point in time "B". In a certain sense the changing of knowledge is an important imposition. The relationship between project and reality is a relationship of construction in which the time elements of the project shape what is called "reality"[7]. This

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[6] Schutz writes: «Until then I shall have grown older and if nothing else has changed, at least the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowledge» (Schutz 1962: 69).

[7] One must always bear in mind that "reality" in Schutz is a deliberately controversial concept that expresses a tension between the idea of common sense, of something that exists "out there", and the phenomenological conception that what exists "out there" is always something

applies not only for the future but also for the attribution of meaning to past events[8].

I think the central aspect of the paradox of time is not its solution, impossible as in all paradoxes, but its neutralization. This recalls the comprehensive methodological system of Schutz, who translates the principle of "return of things to themselves" of Husserl into a radically empirical analysis. With this in mind, the meaning that can be established from the "specious present" of the social relationship is central, a time that cannot be absolutely defined[9].

> It seems that the reason for this is the following: We have no power to define the limits of our specious present, to draw its border lines over against the past or the future. Our stream of consciousness is itself articulated. Impulses and resting places, periods of tension and relaxation alternate. Wave follows wave, each wave having its crest and valley. Each of these impulses is experienced as a unit, a movement in inner time which tends to fulfil its final phase as soon as

meaningful that becomes such only after being experienced. The author says: «I am afraid I do not exactly know what reality is, and my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I share my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of all time» (Schutz 1964: 88).

[8] The vision of Schutz can be considered a special variant of the hermeneutical circle. It has a reciprocal relationship between the constitution of experience, sedimentation in the depths of knowledge available, activation facing a new experience.

[9] One of the sources from which Schutz draws is Augustine of Hippo, according to which time is made of more moments that follow one another without ever being present, of past moments that are collected when they no longer exist, of future moments that never exist. According to Augustine, time exists in the consciousness and not outside of this, consciousness is the only way to measure it. Time does not have a factual consistency, that is to say it does not have a measurable extension outside of consciousness. The past is no longer because when it is collected by the consciousness it is no longer present, the present is elusive because we grasp it when it has already passed, the future is never present because it is anticipated by the conscience. Augustine writes: «What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who asks, I no longer know. And yet I calmly affirm to know that if nothing passed there would be no past, and if nothing happens, there would be no future, and if nothing existed there would be no present. So in that sense there exists two of these times, the past and the future, if the past is no more and the future is not yet? With regard to the present, if it were always present and were not to lapse into the past, there would not be time, but eternity. So if the present, to be a part of time, exists inasmuch as it elapses into the past, in what sense can we say that it also exists? If indeed its only reason for being is that it will not exist: in reality it's true, as we say, that time exists only as much as it tends not to be» (Augustine 1989: Book XI, 14:17). The size of conscience recalls the reflexive centrality of the present. Humans measure time through the soul, understood as a reflection on the past, the present and the future. Augustine speaks of "trinity of the present." The past, present and future, Augustine substitutes, respectively, the present of the past, recalling the memory, the present of the present, linked to perception-attention, the present of the future, related to anticipation (ibid.: Book XI, 20:26).

it starts. If we interrupt this development before the impulse comes to an end, if we make this impulse abortive, we cannot grasp our specious present and the relevant sector of our past adherent to it (Schutz 1996: 274).

2. Time, intersubjectivity and music

2.1 Time and intersubjectivity

The time difference between direct attitude and reflection is essential to understanding the difference between comprehension of experiences, of one's self, and that of the experiences of others, of the Alter. Schutz says:

> We cannot approach the realm of our Self without an act of reflective turning. But what we grasp by the *reflective* act is never the present of our stream of thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past. Just now the grasped experience pertained to my present, but in grasping it I know it is not present any more. And, even if it continues, I am aware only by an afterthought that my reflective turning towards its starting phases has been simultaneous with its continuation. The whole present, therefore, and also the vivid present of our Self, is inaccessible for the reflective attitude. We can only turn to the stream of our thought as if it had stopped with the last grasped experience. In other words, self-consciousness can only be experienced *modo praeterito*, in the past tense (Schutz 1962: 172-173).

In this step, Schutz further specifies a crucial moment in time: to live in our acts, the "vivid present", as opposed to the indirect reflexive grasping of the ego or self, in time past. The vivid present, or "specious present", is the civic time or common time, is the result of the union between the internal time of the flow of consciousness, quality, and external time, cosmic, quantified. The vivid present is the matrix of all social relations, it is the dimension that regulates the various levels of actors' lives, making possible the intersubjective coordination among human beings (Schutz, 1962: 222)[10].

The vivid present is particularly important because it is linked to that idea of "being in the world" as pre-predicative evidence of human experiences.

[10] Berger and Luckmann emphasize the "constriction" of the present vividly: "The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous time and finite. The same temporal structure [...] is coercive. I cannot reverse at will the sequences imposed by it" (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 41).

Schutz takes some concepts present in the thought of Merleau-Ponty to explain how this temporal mode, full of intersubjectivity from the start, is fundamental for the categories of thought:

> According to Merleau-Ponty, the thinking of the normal mind does not consist in subsuming experiences under categories. The category imposes upon the terms which it unites a significance which is exterior to them. This synthesis originates in the vivid present, that is, in the pre-predicative evidence of the unique world to which all our experiences refer. This primordial world is structurized by a system of significations, that is, of correspondences, relations, participations, which the concrete subject spreads around himself, living in them and through them and using them not by an explicit conceptual procedure but merely by his being within the world. From there the higher structurizations of our conscious life are built up by reactivating our sedimented experiences and amalgamating them with the actual vivid thought (ibid.: 274).

According to the Austrian sociologist, intersubjectivity is a given in the world of everyday life. The author believes that the vision of Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity leads to a series of insurmountable aporia. In the world of everyday life, the other is cultured appresentatively[11] by the size of the we-relation, which is the social relationship in which you live a kind of fusion with the other. In this relationship the other body is the pre-eminent vehicle of understanding the other[12]. This understanding does not imply an act of inference, there is no perception of a body and then the attribution of meaning through a reflexive act. The understanding of the other comes directly. I gather the other in the pre-predicative sphere because the signs of his/her body (facial expressions, proxemics) immediately recall "our" experi-

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[11] Schutz reworks the theory of appresentation of Husserl adapting it to his analysis on intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life. «It seems to us that Husserl's theory of appresentation covers all cases of significative and symbolic references dealt with by the various authors discussed before. In all these cases an object, fact, or event is not experienced as a "self," but as standing for another object which is not given in immediacy to the experiencing subject. The appresenting member "wakens" or "calls forth" or "evokes" the appresented one. [...] These appresentational relations may occur on various levels: appresented an object may in turn appresent another one, there are signs of signs, and symbols of symbols, etc. Moreover, the appresenting immediate experience need by no means consist in the perception of the physical object: it may be a recollection, a fantasm, a dream, etc» (ibid.: 297).

[12] In the natural attitude, the body functions as an index of the experience of others, «the mere existence of a frame of reference referring to the Other, of a system of interpretable signs or symbols, for instance, is sufficient for the belief in the existence of other persons» (ibid.: 177).

ence. The size of us is constitutive of social reality; as Natanson explains, it is the systemic root of society[13].

> The fact that I can grasp the Other's stream of thought, and this means the subjectivity of the alter ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp my own self only by way of reflection on its past, leads us to a definition of the alter ego: the alter ego is that subjective stream of thought which can be experienced in its vivid present. [...] The alter ego, therefore, is that stream of consciousness whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities. This experience of the Other's stream of consciousness in vivid simultaneity I propose to call the *general thesis of the alter ego's existence*. It implies that this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness (Schutz 1962: 173-74).

The union of the streams of experience is the main theme of the reflections of Schutz on intersubjectivity. It is a theme that recalls the size of the preconceptuality of the sense of social relations, the human universe of pure sociability emerging in the temporal sphere of the vivid present.

2.2 The musical relationship and its characters

The analysis of the constitutive dimension of time is configured in a particular way in the analyzes on the musical relationship. Schutz was interested in music as a social phenomenon to be understood as an act of co-construction and conveyance of meanings. The intent of the Austrian sociologist was to provide a rigorous theoretical basis for the "scandalous" problem of intersubjectivity, a theme taken for granted in the social sciences (as was the problem of language). The correctness of following a melody, whether its a piece of music or a symphony, is the nucleus of the analysis on the intersubjective character of music. According to the author,

> music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet this meaningful context can be communicated: The process of communication between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individual performer or a group of coperformers. Among all these participants there prevail social relations of a highly complicated structure (Schutz 1964: 159).

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[13] Natanson asserts that, with the theory of *we-relation* as «systemic root of a shared world» (Natanson 1977: 110), Schutz passes from an ego-centered approach to one centered on society and intersubjectivity.

When Schutz speaks of a meaningful context he wants to underline that there are social rules followed by the actor to establish the correct meaning: the interpreter's task is to understand the correct meaning (Schutz 1996: 243). In addition, the standards of correctness are not connected to the conceptual aspect. Schutz contrasted language with music. Language has a function of mainly semantic representation, it is formed by a series of terms (nouns, verbs, adjectives) which refer to a conceptual scheme. This allows interpretation of the world and presents an syntactic apparatus applicable to propositions that can be correct or not on the basis of operational rules. To the contrary, music does not have a representative function, does not follow operational rules (ibid.: 244). Nevertheless, the experience of music has its own syntax, which is connected to the relationship between time and intersubjectivity: it is therefore always possible to determine whether the execution of a piece of music is correct or not.

The musical experience has a meaning that can be grasped only polythetically[14], because it is connected to the flow of internal time. The music is an entity made of time that is apperceived "step-after-step" independently of the spatial perception[15], it can not be grasped monothetically, which is equivalent to saying that it is experienced without a conceptual scheme connected to objects defined spatially. Schutz writes, when we hear a piece of music we participate in the flow of the music, «the flux of music and the flux of the stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a unit which is indivisible» (ibid.: 250).

The focal point of the musical experience, then, is the presence of a nucleus of meanings unable to be conceptualized. The significance of this nucleus is similar to that of the social relationship of us[16] because in the here and now of

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[14] The attribution of meaning can happen in two ways: polythetically or monothetically. Polythetic understanding involves reconstitution of the steps through which the sense of an experience is formed. With a polythetic act those courses of events that have made the experience are retraced by searching for the explanatory connections. The monothetic understanding, however, is the synthetic grasp, in a single act, the polythetic sense of the experiences (Schutz 1970b: 80-81). One essential point must be stressed: the ability to monothetically grasp experience polythetically constituted indicates the presence of connections of meaning between the experiences themselves.

[15] «Music does not require any kinaesthesia on the part of the listener» (Schutz 1996: 253), because it is an ideal object independent of the vehicle that transmits it (ibid.: 247). Music is an event of internal time, «the time within which we grow old, the inner time of our stream of consciousness, is entirely free from elements of space» (ibid.: 254).

[16] Kersten believes that this is a paradox. Being the ideal-typical sociology of Schutz, it is centered on reflection and presents some methodological tools, such as the postulate of adequacy, which permits work on this theme. Like all paradoxes, however, the non-conceptual aspect of music and social relationship is always the starting point and not the final stage of analysis (Kersten 1976: 64).

the specious present, this nucleus is a kind of Arianne's thread that allows the orientation towards meaning.

Schutz summarizes some invariant elements of the musical experience. First, the experience of music is «in the flux of inner time, in the stream of consciousness. It does not necessarily refer to objects of the outer world» (Schutz 1996: 260). The external dimension may be required to coordinate the events of internal time with spatial events. Schutz writes of appresentative references, which are vehicles of meaning, that is to say media that «originated in the suggestions of movements and, first of all, in the movements of the human body, which occur simultaneously in both dimensions – the inner *durée* as well as the spatialized time» (ibid.).

Secondly, the music experience is a temporal synthesis that «takes place in a specious present which, by means of recollection and expectation, includes elements of the past and the future» (ibid.).

Furthermore the music is experienced as a whole, it is a theme that is configured with gestalt. «The basic element of all music is a unique configuration called the theme. It is itself extended in inner time. It is apperceived as a unit (*Gestalt*), or as a combination of those units» (ibid.). The theme may be used, repeated, replaced and recur again; it can be combined with other issues or with parts or modifications, successive and simultaneous, of the theme itself. Despite these modifications, the theme is always experienced as "the same" theme (ibid.: 261).

Finally, the author addresses the problem of rhythm which, is not part of the musical experience. Rhythm is an ambiguous concept, it refers to physiological events like the heartbeat or breathing, to events in the outside world like marching, walking, dancing and «to specific structurizations of our modern musical ideas (rhythm as a function of harmony)» (ibid.).

Schutz examines a number of basic categories of the musical relationship: continuity and repetition, identity, movement.

The first category is the binomial of continuity and repetition. «By way of retention the intermittent repetitions of the same tone are brought to coincidence and apperceived as a specious continuance, although actually repetition of the same occurs» (ibid.: 263). The apperceptive mode is the intuitive reference to something different with respect to the present experience (Schutz 1962: 296), it is the reference to a meaningful relationship. The virtual unity is then a sort of "coherence" of sense of the continuous elements in the musical flow, which are retentively mediated in the apperceptive process. Schutz speaks of "virtual coherence". The repetition, however, «is merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is intermittence of a sameness» (Schutz 1996: 263). He notes that when the continuity and repetition refer to a functional unity, to themes or «to independent parts of the musical forms.

Then they do not originate in pure retention. They are based upon the other forms of memory; the repetition originates in a synthesis of recognition between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually experienced recurrence, and the continuance originates in a fulfillment of the previously anticipated development by the actual experience» (Schutz 1996: 263). With this affirmation Schutz means that retention alone is not sufficient for the determination of meaning, reproduction is also necessary through a synthesis of recognition which recalls the category of identity.

The second category addressed by Schutz is identity or uniformity, «the question of 'sameness' is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology» (ibid.). It is necessary to distinguish identity from sameness. It has identity when you are in front of an object that during the moment of attribution of meaning it is changed, because it has been identified as the same object at a different point in time than the first. It has sameness, however, when we are faced with two different objects that can be distinguished because they are not the same object. Schutz gives the example of the repetition of two *re* notes: they are the same note, but interspersed with a break. The second *re* is different from the first *re* because it is a repeated note that begins after the first is finished. First, then, there is a temporal differentiation, «the retention of the actual experience of the first tone in its complete development - initial phase, enduring phases, end-phase – has been retained when the second tone was actually experienced» (ibid.: 264). In the second place, the repetition of the note changes our fund of knowledge, albeit imperceptibly; the second *re* has a different meaning because it is placed later in time and thus is no longer the *re* of before because, again imperceptibly, it has also changed the system of relevances of the subject who listens. In this sense, «the entry of the second tone certainly adds something new to our previous experience. But it is not entirely new, there is no contrast between this experience and the previous one, as it was the case when the first» *re* followed a *do* (ibid.). The interaction of retentions attributed to a *re* that follows a *re* has a different character from that of a *re* that follows a *do*. Identity is therefore characterized by a change of the internal time of consciousness. «The same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same, it is not even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infinitesimally, but, nevertheless, changed by already having once pre-experienced» the *re* note «in the same context» (ibid.).

The third category is that of movement[17]. Schutz explains that the identification of the experiences of objects of the external world, in the manipulative

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[17] Skarda says Schutz is not very clear in defining this category. The analysis of the movement seems a continuation of the analysis of identity. Previously, Schutz had written that the spatial

sphere, can take place by means of kinesthetic acts. For example, it is possible to see and touch an object, stop the perception, return to seeing and touching the object, check and see if it is the same or not. Schutz says he has an intermittence in the understanding of the object, which implies the abandonment and restoration of the field of experience, and the identification of the object as the same object as before. «In the case of visible or tangible objects, the synthesis of identification can be verified by releasing it from my field of experiencing through the performance of an appropriate kinaesthesia and by re-establishing the previous field through the performance of an opposite kinaesthesia which undoes the first one. These kinaesthesias interrupted my experience of the enduring sameness of the object» (Schutz 1996: 265). It is possible to perform the same operation in order to compare the uniformity of two objects. For example, to control the length of two objects I can move them together and compare them in order to see or touch and determine whether they are uniform or not. The same thing does not apply to objects acquired in the purely auditory field, like musical objects. Schutz gives the example of the sound of a waterfall: if you approach it is possible to hear it, if you move away it is no longer possible to hear it. The auditory object, therefore, remains in the stream of consciousness even if it is no longer perceived. Schutz writes that the knowledge of sound «is based on my knowledge that the object, "cascade", exists and that it has lasted while my experiencing of it was interrupted. It is the knowledge of a lasting quality of an external object which is in question» (ibid.). In the auditory field, the intermittency of a continuity cannot be attributed to a kinesthetic change that «re-establishes or even verifies sameness. Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear. This other one may be like the first but it is, strictly speaking, never the same one» (ibid.). In internal time the synthesis of the identification does not presuppose, as in external spatialized time, the possibility of comparing, to superimpose an object and another. If in space the coexistence of two objects as different and separate units is possible, namely sameness is possible, «in the sphere of inner time, in the sphere of purely auditory experiences, there is no coexistence. Likeness or sameness refers to succeeding objects; there is not the possibility of looking from one object to the other in order to perform the synthesis of identification or of recognition. And, nevertheless, we identify the recurrent tone as a tone like the first, or we even say that the same tone has been repeated» (ibid.: 266). The author's conclusion is that in the flow of internal time

category of movement, of kinesthesia, is stranger than internal time, the auditory sphere in which the musical experience has a place (Skarda 1979: 73).

and in the auditory musical sphere, «in the dimension of inner time, or in the purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the term, "sameness", exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness [...]» (ibid.).

2.3 Passive synthesis in the experience of music

The recognition of an object of experience, «the synthesis of recognition or of identification…is a passive synthesis which does not require any activity of our mind» (ibid.), that is to say it does not require a reflective effort. Schutz addresses three aspects of the problem of passive synthesis in musical experience: «a) Sameness and likeness having meanings in the spatial world of visible and touchable objects different from those in the world of pure music which has its existence merely in the dimension of inner time. b) Within the experience of pure music the synthesis of recognition is another one if referred merely to recurrent times or to recurrent thematical units. c) It is quite another kind of synthesis at work if I recognize musical recurrences when listening to a work of music for the first time living within the ongoing flux (or if I re-establish such a situation), or if I recognize a piece of music or its thematical elements, not being immersed in the ongoing flux but reproducing in my mind music with which I am familiar» (ibid.: 268).

The first aspect is related to the irreversibility of internal time, that is the basis for describing the difference in meaning between the objects perceived in the spatial sphere and those perceived in the sphere of internal time. If the objects of the spatial sphere can be caught both monothetically and polythetically, the objects of internal time can be caught only polythetically. Visual and tactile understanding of objects in space can be modified in order to see that previously we have had experience of the same object that now has changed (Schutz 1996: 266, trans. com. 1996: 72). For example, I can turn back when I go the wrong way, I can return to a base point, I can go back to the position of familiarity and security that allows me to understand the mistake and maybe take the right path. Going back where I was before, I have not encountered any spatial obstacle. Consequently, through an monothetic understanding I made a comparison between the memory of what happened and what is now. This example is a case of what Schutz defines as illusion of passive synthesis of overlap. The illusion is in the fact that, from the point of view of the meaning, you can never return to the same point in space time where we were, you cannot ever tap into the same flow. The comparison, therefore, can only take place after the event and what I'm actually doing is a comparison between the memory of the total picture of the experience I had in mind at point in time A and the memory of the overall picture of the experience I had at point in time

B. These two points, from a spatial perspective, are the same; but from the point of view of meaning are the same only after they have been understood, which is to say a monothetic understanding through which, with a single glance, I canceled the infinite number of changes that have occurred in the course of my absence from "home base." Schutz says: «I grasp the field monothetically by one single ray, and I find that there is a coincidence between the actual monothetic experience and the recollection – and the monothetically recollected, previous one. What gives the illusion of a 'passive' synthesis is merely the superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built up» (ibid.: 267). The illusion of passive synthesis disappears when I consider my experience in a polythetic manner. Retracing step-by-step the way that I traveled from A to B, «if any step actually performed corresponds to *like* steps previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step had a sedimentation *like* the ones recollected, I say that the field re-perceived, or the objects re-experienced, are *the same* or the same, although modified» (ibid.). Returning to our example, I can spatially retrace the way I have already come and ascertain if it is the same way or another. In the spatial sphere monothetic recognition is possible because in this sphere one has the freedom to return to the basic position and undo the changes that have inevitably occurred in the meantime. Also in the spatial sphere I can achieve polythetic recognition, which will be apparent if that what is expected as familiar will in fact be different. This double possibility does not apply to objects in the temporal sphere, which can only be grasped polythetically. «Objects existing merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, especially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically» (ibid.).

The second point involves how you have different identification depending on the reference to the succession of time or on the occurrence of thematic unity. In the first case we are completely immersed in the flow of internal time, we do not have any attitude towards temporal objects. Ours is a polythetic experience in the indistinct flow of inner consciousness of time. In the second case the identification refers to recurring thematic units. These gestalt units are in the basic position that alternates with indistinct flow. Schutz refers to the points of flight and rest of William James to explain the exit and entry from the flow of internal time. The theme is a sort of key to understanding, anchored to the Self, of what is happening. This theme may be taken up «any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it before my inner ear» (ibid: 268).

The last point is closely related to the previous one. There are two types of synthesis, according to which an actor listens to a piece of music for the first time or recognizes it then as familiar. When I listen to a musical piece

that involves me for the first time, I live in the inner flow of time, I surrender to the flow; with the retention and reproduction I can bring out uncontrollably reflexive thoughts and memories. We are in polythetic indistinct step-by-step experience, but we are out of the passive synthesis of identification. The second type of synthesis is exactly that passive identification. We are in the environment of thematic reflection, I can attribute the piece I listen to past experiences of functional thematic aspects of the music that is flowing or not.

3 Significant aspects of the relationship between time, music and intersubjectivity

The investigations of Schutz on musical relationship are of great value to the social sciences. They allow you to identify a number of problems that are related to the intersubjective establishment of meaning. I will isolate a number of points that should be understood in an ideal-typical way: the synchronization of time of the actors, the problem of transition from the polythetic to the monothetic, the link between intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience, music as a finite province of meaning.

3.1 Synchronization of time of the actors

The first point is related to different modes of synchronization between different streams of consciousness of the actors involved in the musical relationship.

The constitution of meaning of the musical experience takes place in the internal time of consciousness, it is mediated by appresentative references that in the world of everyday life take the form of objects made by sounds and perceptions of movements. Schutz identifies three ideal-typical subjects in reciprocal interrelations in musical relationship: the listener, the composer and the performers[18].

The listener is one who grabs a piece of music created by another. He is therefore not involved in the construction of the meaning of the same song, but is interested in rebuilding the meaning. Goettlich holds in *Fragments of phenomenology of music* that Schutz describes the ways in which the listener becomes aware of the "right" meaning of a piece of music (Goettlich 2014: 247).

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[18] The analysis of Schutz concerns opera, but it can also be extended to other types of musical genres. As Goettlich explained, through three ideal-types, the Austrian sociologist showed the ways in which, in individual experience, a musical meaning is experienced: «(1) as a listener, e.g., sitting in a concert hall or listening to his iPod; (2) as a musician, that is, as member of an ensemble or as a soloist; (3) as a composer» (Goettlich 2014: 246).

Music is an ideal object that exists independently of physical conditions on which it bases its communication, conditions that relate to external time[19]. The listener or beholder[20] is linked through the music to a number of meaningful aspects connected to the depth of internal time. These meaningful aspects involve the synchronization of internal times both with performers of the musical text that interpret the text and with the composer and with the other actors who listen to the musical means. The music blends the inner experience of the listener with that of other actors in the here and now of *we-relations* listen to a piece of music. In this sense, Mori speaks of music as a means of expression of the spontaneity of the human being. Music is a vehicle that allows the reciprocal tuning of the actions of the actors. The meaning of words is secondary to the musical atmosphere created by the apperception of sound and rhythm. The musical atmosphere is «intrinsically related to the inner life of the public» (Mori 2014: 270). The atmosphere is therefore a meaningful intersubjective structure that is conveyed by the music, recalling the primordial world of inner experience of the other. The musical atmosphere allows the sharing of meanings between performer and audience, although in "quasi-simultaneity"[21]. Fele observes how a musical composition is brought to life, "is embodied" in the relationship between composer and beholder, through the exclusive moment «of the use (of the reading, listening, execution) through concrete reflective practices during the musical flow» (Fele 2001: 209). The temporal process of listening to a piece of music brings out the role of knowledge as intersubjective communicative skill. These reflective skills[22] and indexicals give effect to the meaning of the song, actualizing in a continuous way and «existing while the sound flow develops» (ibid.: 210). Fele emphasizes that the analysis of "endogenous" time of Schutz recalls the

[19] Goettlich highlights how Schutz was interested in the social aspects of music, how his scientific aim was to analyze the act of intersubjective understanding mediated by music. For this reason, the work of the Austrian sociologist is an example of fruitful connections between phenomenology and sociology. The author observes that the concept of music as a backdrop given meaning with no conceptual framework is unclear. "Context" is too general a category, the term "sound" seems to be more appropriate: «Music is a sound, or a sequence of sounds, provided with meaning. Since the same can be said of spoken language, one has to further clarify: Music is a meaningful sound, but the meaning is not expressed in words» (ibid.: 244).

[20] Schutz states that «the term "beholder" will include the executor, the listener, the reader of music» (Schutz 1964: 169, trans. com. 1996: 103).

[21] The experience of the "quasi simultaneous" stream of consciousness of the mediator and the listener is also present when listening via other media such as CDs and videos.

[22] It should be noted that the reflexivity mentioned by Fele refers «to the embodied practices through which social members produce prospectively and retrospectively courses of action recognizably ordered, explainable, normal, natural» (ibid.).

"light" moment of ordinary interaction, a moment located inside the context from which emerge the experienced meanings[23]. The internal time connects the composer, who is spatio-temporally in a past epoch, to the audience, who listen to the music in a "here and now" in a "quasi-simultaneous" way[24]. The author observes that the analyses of Schutz are important because they highlight how the interaction between composer and performer is a temporal process in which the notion of meaning emerges as a procedural constitution to investigate step by step. In other words, Schutz demonstrates how meaning is radically contextual, «where the context is not a false attribute that "adds" or that qualifies a meaning predetermined, autonomous in its definition» (Fele 2001: 212). It seems that Schutz, in examining how the viewer is bound to the composer through internal time, «wants to recover the historical dimension (in a macro-sociological and structural sense: the size of the tradition, that had been raised by Halbwachs), under the form of a personal interview, continually present in the music, between the living and the dead» (ibid.: 213-214). The ideal type of the composer represents the dimension of the tradition, that in Schutz takes the form of a cultural pattern transmitted by the predecessors and acquired by members of a social group. According to Goettlich, the typification of Schutz aims to investigate «the constitution of subjective meaning (Sinn) without the construction of objective meaning (*Bedeutung*) [...]» (Goet-

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[23] Fele explains how Schutz refutes the idea of a pre-existing meaning to guarantee mutual understanding, and does not agree with the assumption, found in George Herbert Mead, that language is the foundation of social relations. This way of approaching the problem of meaning, according to Fele, is exemplary of Schutz's refusal to treat the social and musical relationship with a mentalist model; on the contrary, these relationships are non-conceptual forms of interaction (Fele 2001: 206). Music is based on a precomunicative relationship in which you can live simultaneously with each other in specific time dimensions. In other words, like other non-conceptual social relations (for example walking together, dancing, making love, playing tennis, etc.), the musical relationship is based on the *we-relation*. Fele observes how «Schutz [...] is not interested in analyzing music in itself, the musical experience or the structure of sounds, but rather to examine the problems that arise» during the realization of a piece of music (Fele 2001: 206).

[24] Fele cites Garfinkel, who says that the mutual orientation of two subjects always involves a "minimum consensus" of normative order to follow in the course of interaction, implies a minimum common denominator. Garfinkel speaks of this moment as a "full-moment" (*fat moment*) «that is to say an interval to be treated as a point. A succession of such dense moments produces the notion of temporal sequence» (Garfinkel 1952: 146-147). Garfinkel also writes that the analysis of this point in time involves leaving the same time stream, and thus the loss of those time relevancies that define the peculiar sense of inner time, relevancies that are the basis of the definition of action. Consequently, «we must look elsewhere, and not in the analysis of the time, the answer to the question arises: where to look for the factors that determine the conditions of regularity of temporal succession?» (ibid.: 147).

tlich 2014: 249). The meaning of the music refers to previous experiences and reproduction processes, that is to say to a scope of reconstruction of meanings already established. The question that is raised here is whether the way of establishment of meaning of music is the same for both composer and listener. Goettlich says the difference between the mode of use of the meaning experienced of the music of the composer and the listener is bound to a boundary between phenomenology and sociology whose analysis implies an assumption of the practice of a composer who is neither empirical nor psychological. To specify this peculiarity, Goettlich reflects on the modality of understanding of a melody. As we have seen, Schutz says that understanding a melody involves the creation of a thematic unit, a "place of rest" in the sense of William James. This "place of rest" is a reflexive aspect that is alternated with a "place of flight", which is connected to the indistinct flow of internal time (ibid.: 252). The relationship between composer and listener is characterized by the reflexive production of a theme, that is to say a gestalt configuration by which the music sequence can be apperceived as the "correct" one. It is a process of construction and reconstruction which, to an extent and in accordance with different modes, also affects the ideal-typical figure of the musician. As for the composer, his/her task is not to create a melody out of nothing, because if it were so he/she could proceed arbitrarily and compose musical sequences that would always be correct. On the contrary his/her task is to give life to musical meanings different from those that came before, but linked to the latter on the basis of a relationship that "inexplicably" is already present in the internal flow and must reflexively be brought to light. Goettlich says there are two ways to understand the act of composing a musical sequence: the creation and the discovery:

> On the one hand, it is clear that the composer is creating something new: a sequence of tones played in a specific tempo and with specific phrasing; that is, a musical theme which comes into existence in the very moment the composer plays it for the first time; it is not there before. On the other hand, in a certain sense, the meaningful melody is already there before the composer managed to arrange the precise tones in the right sequence. This is suggested by the fact that the composer can easily discriminate between those series of tones which are wrong and the one which is right (ibid.: 250-251).

The music, then, is both creation of something totally new, and an ideal object that already exists. As one can conceive of a musical theme that already exists it's understood: the composer imagines, in his/her mind, that the theme is something that is already there. The same invariant process is followed by the performer and the listener, which respectively reproduce with action in

the outside world a series of sounds and, in the world of interior meanings, a series of meanings connected to sound. Listener, musician-performer and composer share an intersubjective appresentative core that remains the same on the basis of the principle of the relative insignificance of the vehicle (Schutz 1962: 302). Goettlich observes how the basis of the significance of a piece of music, defined as "existing" or "already there", will be the experience of the theme, and not some prior ontological existence (Goettlich 2014: 251).

The ideal type of the musician refers to an individual who plays alone or in a group a score written by himself or by someone else. Goettlich explains that Schutz is talking about an expert musician who performs a piece according to standards of correctness, and not a musician who improvises or a beginner who wants to improve their skills. If you also consider the relationship with the listener, you could speak of a triple correlation, in which the player acts as a mediator between composer and listener. The central aspect of the figure of the musician is to be the central pivot of articulation of the foundational dimension of the *we-relation*. The musician assumes the relationship of mutual harmony, that is, a relationship in which you have the fusion of the flows of the experience of people who "grow up and grow old together in the vivid present". This applies both to the members of an orchestra, who make music together in the here and now of *we-relation*, and for the relationship between composer and performer, outside the *we-relation*, because they live in different eras. The reason for this view is that the "mutual self harmony in relation" has as a reference the internal time and not the external one. Consequently, even if the relationship between composer and performer derived from the face to face relationship, derived from the "outer" meeting space, it is in any case based on elements of the "internal" experience that can not be separated by the sedimentation of past subjective experiences. The creation of a piece of music and the musician's interpretation of the composer's opera comes "step-by-step", in a polythetic way. The polythetic process of the constitution of meaning makes the sharing by two individuals of the same or different external times irrelevant. The crucial point is that the partners, living through the same process, establish the simultaneity between their streams of consciousness; the sharing of internal time is more important, for Schutz, than the fact that making music together is also an event of external time. Goettlich repeats the central thesis of Schutz's view that «this sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, constitutes what we called [...] the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the "We", which is at the foundation of all possible communication» (Schutz 1964: 173). Fele focuses his attention on the process of the "step-by-step" setting up that invests time synchronization of experience between the musician and the composer. For the performer of a song the musical score is

not an self-explanatory instruction packet, but a set of meanings necessarily vague and open to different interpretations. As for all instructions from the world of everyday life, the Austrian sociologist believes that an interpretive work of "closure" of the musical text is necessary. This work of closure, continues Fele, was held in accordance with located "social determinants": «tempo, dynamics, and expression, or directions as to the connection with other sounds (by such devices as ties, slurs, and the like)» (Schutz 1964: 166). In this context, therefore, the closure of musical text takes place in accordance with non-formalized practices of the performer, which emerge as the imposed relevances of the context of interaction. The radical context of meaning, according to Fele, highlights the constructivist matrix, intersubjective and radically contextual of the investigations of Schutz; the musical experience «is not based on the survival of individual interpretations of disembodied documents such as written scores (or even on a set of informal interpretive traditions), but on the continuing review of the experience again, each time, that piece of music in its individuality» (Fele 2001: 209)[25]. Furthermore, the central element of the connection between internal and external time of most performers of a piece of music that play together is the externalization of social interaction «in a concrete and visible shared space» (ibid.: 215). Through the procedural explication, step by step, of the spatial sharing of the stream of consciousness of the other, by means of mutual bodily movements, Schutz «overcomes a purely *private and interior* model of musical use to establish the very conditions of intersubjectivity» (ibid.).

3.2 Transition from polythetic to monothetic

The musical experience has a non-conceptual structure. This aspect raises a number of problems associated to the central assertion of Schutz according to whom the meaning emerges in the predicative sphere, although it has its roots in the prepredicative sphere of consciousness. The polythetic character of musical experience and its connection to monothetic understanding is one aspect of this issue. First of all, the difficulty of rendering logically coher-

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[25] Fele emphasizes that the aim of Schutz is to understand «what happens in the effective performance of a musical piece» (Fele 2001: 209). In this sense, the critique of Costolloe of the idea of meaning of the Austrian sociologist as an exclusively private matter (Costolloe 1994) misses the central aspect of his analysis: the social relationship between a listener and a composer, who share a wealth of typical knowledge, radically social, that emerge interactively and simultaneously through the musical experience. The viewer synchronizes the internal time with the composer through a "semiotic-textual" legacy (Fele 2001: 214), that is, by means of a score played by the performer.

ent the translation of meaning from an unreflective field to a reflective field emerges. Furthermore, there is the fundamental problem of awareness and knowledge of the Self. Finally, there is the methodological problem connected to the background of the construction of the idealtype.

Sebald says there are two ways of dealing with the "pseudo paradox"[26] between polythetic and monothetic. The first method is that derived from the elaboration of the theory of William James' succession of transitive and substantive phases in consciousness. Schutz considers conscious reflection that unifies the object of experience a "resting point", while the indistinct succession of "points of flight" to be not immediately conscious. The second method, however, recalls the stream of consciousness that seems to be triggered and addressed by external events as in the articulation of musical phrasing (Schutz 1996: 274-275). In other words, the musical experience is an imposed relevance that brings out "step-by-step" cognitive aspects which are contextually relevant.

Goettlich and Mori tend to interpret the relationship between polythetic flow and monothetic experience in the first sense. Sebald, Fele and Stascheit are closer to the second perspective.

According to Goettlich, the reconstruction of the meaning of music needs the understanding of the polythetic flow of the meanings of a piece of music, but implies monothetic reflection on the entire experience. Goettlich observes how the alternation between polythetic and monothetic actually signals that the listener is able to understand the music during his listening only through the use of "themes" or musical units that imply "a sense of virtual purpose". A sequence of tones is experienced as a melody if it puts the viewer in a state of mind in which one can stop look back at oneself and attribute meaning. This recalls the importance of the alternation of "places of rest and flight" from the theory of William James. Mori retains that the distinction between polythetic and monothetic signals a differentiation between orders of consciousness. The problem faced by Mori is the phenomenological representation of the inner life of consciousness. The author affirms that we can consider music a solitary art through which it is possible to spontaneously express one's Self. For example, the technological supports are vehicles through which, alone, the actors can listen to their favorite music. In this sense, the use of musical experience as artistic experience is a spontaneous activity in the world of everyday life that enables us to reflect on the relationship between the structure of conscious-

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[26] Notably, this paradox is present in the world of science, in the world of constructs of the second degree, not in the constructs of the first degree of everyday life, in which the experience of music and interaction with others are taken for granted, are "data of the natural attitude."

ness and intersubjectivity. Music is an event of internal time that mediates between the various expressions of the mental life of others (Mori 2014: 271). Mori picks up Schutz's distinction between internal time and external time, considering the first a spiraling and indistinct time and the second to be linear. The descriptions of Bergson discuss a cone of light, of Husserl who draws a triangle, and of Schutz who elaborates in a more complex way the triangle of Husserl, are metaphors that seek to significantly order polythetic internal experiences that are increasingly difficult to express. The Japanese sociologist places emphasis on how the linearity of the flow of consciousness is a metaphor that aims to monothetically simplify the complex process of sedimentation of knowledge in the memory[27]. The difference between the polythetic and monothetic structure of Schutz can be seen as mirroring the contrast between two temporal orders. Mori writes of polithetically synthesized order and monothetically synthesized order. The polythetic order is the interconnection between exclusively graspable perceptual experiences as a complex. The monothetic order, however, is the linear order. Schutz reworks the idea of polythetic flow and of monothetic understanding as a function of the concepts of simultaneity and quasi-simultaneity between two people (ibid.). Music is a polythetic flow of the internal consciousness of more people that acts as a vehicle of meanings.

The second solution, which seems more innovative, opens up new perspectives on the role of the body as mediator between internal time and external-space time. It should be emphasized that Schutz expressly denies that the spatial experience can be the origin of the musical experience. Even rhythm is an experience that has its origin in internal time. Nevertheless, Sebald[28] argues that Schutz's theory can be reorganized in a coherent manner as occurrence of internal time confined to bodily movements. The structural opening of the phenomenological machinery of Schutz allows a harmonious integration of the relationship between internal time, consciousness, and external time, understood as corporeal sphere, as the basis for developing a theory of emotions (ibid.: 15). Fele is of the same opinion, who states that the role of public space and external time, understood as a «concrete physical place where music is shared» (Fele 2001: 215) is fundamental because the face-to-face relationship

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[27] «A perception, namely a perceptively lived experience, can be positioned as a distinction. Therefore, a perception can entail distinct differences. However, whether these positioned points can be put onto the same straight line or not, is dependent on each view point, from which man pays attention to something intended» (ibid.: 272).

[28] Sebald poses a series of problems: the non-conceptual structure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis, the phenomenological concept of ideal object, the problem of thematic units, the connection of body, mind and space (Sebald 2013: 11).

can emerge, understood as the mutual physical presence of other bodies in the present experience. The bodies of the performers of a musical piece become an additional score from that of the semiotic-textual composer. The interaction of gestures between performers is unthinkingly assumed as a set of commands that guide the mutual behavior. Fele writes: «Schutz in this way is transported into the open, to the surface of social relations, as embodied scenic features, those conditions of possibility of sharing a stream of activities that were previously hidden: they are no longer confined within the consciousness, as events of internal time, but they see the light in the concrete interaction with my direct interlocutors in the flesh in front of me» (ibid.: 215-216). Fele accentuates the importance of the mutual physical presence in communication, reworking the idea of Schutz according to which the knowledgeable communicative intent is not always present. The musical relationship is an example: «The Other's facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative intent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the Other is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own behavior» (Schutz 1964: 176). Fele stresses that Schutz was one of the first sociologists from which Garfinkel was inspired to investigate communication as a procedure located in a "here and now" that is linked to the external time of interaction. Schutz «laid the foundations of a sociology of interaction, in which the body takes on a significant value. No longer are the intentions or the will that determine the communication: the processes of communication no longer take place in the recesses of consciousness, but relate primarily to the presence of at least two persons» (Fele 2001: 217). Fele cites the analysis of Schutz of the steps constituting the process of construction of meanings that are «a little gem of a study of social interaction» (Fele 2001)[29]. The investiga-

[29] Fele's use of Schutz to explain some aspects of the vision of Garfinkel is a great example of how to confront the theoretical between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology in a balanced way. Fele is very diplomatic in his elaboration of the themes of the empirically intersubjective experiences of making music together. This in light of a series of unbridgeable distances between instances of postanalytical ethnomethodology and those of comprehensive sociology: one among many is the underestimation of the subject in ethnomethodology and the importance of memory and internal time in comprehensive sociology. The ethnomethodological interpretation made by Fele of Schutz can be understood as a methodologically interesting extension that, nevertheless leaves open many questions. Chief among these issues is the relationship between the internal time of consciousness and spatialized external time. In ethnomethodology there is a substantial elimination of internal time and a reduction of social relations to external time, spatially located contexts (see Rawls 2015). According to Schutz, although the body, with its symptoms of expression, is the element of mediation between internal

tion on the processes of coordination between social actors in "the flesh" and the relationship between the internal and external time of Schutz are an example of ethnomethodological "respecification" of traditional objects of conventional sociology, in order to «penetrate into the practices that constitute a culture, trying to return from inside the same logic that participants adopt to make their conduct, in the same moment in which they are mutually related to each other, coherent and sensible» (ibid.: 218-219)[30].

According to Michael Stascheit, monothetic reconstruction of meaning refers to a context of objects, not a monothetically synthesized single element. He retains that the interpretation of musical experience as a relationship given meaning that doesn't have a conceptual framework of reference leads to the core problem of the hermeneutic interpretation (Stascheit 2014: 121). The hermeneutic circle recalls the problem of the prepredicative dimension and extra-linguistic meaning. This theme is a real challenge of Western thought: the author speaks of borderline experience. The experience of the hermeneutic circle is connected to sociability and its many forms. The most radical form of sociability is the experience of the "we-relation". From the empirical point of view all social relations are experiences of time objects that have a polythetic structure, they flow in the consciousness of internal time. The problem of Stascheit is coherence between the polythetic and monothetic plane of distinct streams of experience. The meaning of the experience of temporal objects is contained mainly in the polythetic structure of the elements present in the consciousness of time (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53). In order to grasp the

time and external time or space, he is also drastic in the assertion that the spatial and rhythmic element is not the origin of the musical experience and is irrelevant (Schutz 1996: 253-254).

[30] Although many ethnomethodological studies can be considered an empirical application of the theories of Schutz on the musical relationship, «it should be emphasized, however, that ethnomethodology is not interested at all in issues of internal time, but considers social interaction as theatrical devices that are publicly available» (Fele 2001: 219). According to Fele, one of the nuclei of ethnomethodological analysis is in the four-page essay on comunicative relations in the outside world that Schutz intended to pick up again and develop. The analysis of the heirs of Garfinkel seems to be of a different opinion however. Anne W. Rawls, Michael Lynch and Wes Sharrock, for example, have repeatedly stressed the dissonances rather than the similarities between the vision of Schutz and Garfinkel. This was well demonstrated by Alex Dennis in a lively debate with Lynch and Sharrock, the latest interpretations of postanalytical ethnomethodology equated Schutz to a kind of scientist that would separate the world of science and the world of common sense. Because of this view, the thought of the Austrian sociologist would be an obstacle to the attempts of Garfinkel to empirically analyze the world of daily life. It should be emphasized that between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology there are even some stark differences, but it is equally true that the elimination of Schutz by the authors to better understand the ethnomethodological movement is a misinterpretation that produces only a loss to the same ethnomethodology (Dennis 2004).

meaning of the experience of a temporal object the subject must complete in a reflexive way the polythetic constitution of that experience. The problem is that the sharing of monothetic transformation is problematic. The solution of Stascheit is found in the presupposition of a common level of physical attention rooted and expressed in the relative tension of the bodies. The perception of the body is the vehicle of the synchronization of time of the experiences between subjects who are involved in the musical flow. The intensity of the tension between the bodies is the temporal measure that is experienced as a succession of steps of mutual attention. The author speaks of a number of stages of the musical experience. The first level is that of listening to music as it usually is found in the world of everyday life, a mode that we can define as naive. It has a low tension of consciousness, the musical experience is presented in an indistinct way. This naive mode of the undifferentiated flow of music is defined as mode of resonance. The second level is the intentional mode: it has a greater attention which commits the subject to perceive sounds related to a focal moment of the musical experience, a moment connected to the continuous co-presence of the musical flow. Finally, there is the co-performative mode, in which listening is focused on a part of the musical flow and is directed towards the future (Stascheit 2014: 117). The demarcation of these three levels makes it possible to clarify the problem of the "independence of hands", that is to say the problem of how the junction between body movements and the polythetic musical flow come about. In this case, the medium that allows simultaneous access to the experience of polyphony, coherently maintaining the pace of hand movement, is the piano (ibid.: 115)[31].

[31] The analysis of Stascheit is articulated by the theoretical systems of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, translating the appresentation of Schutz into an intersubjective field theory, of a gestalt matrix, that seems to oversimplify the relationship between experience, intersubjectivity, music and the body. The result is a kind of Okkam's razor centered on the theme of "incarnation" of meanings. Consequently, Stascheit develops the problem of the hermeneutic circle in a vision that emphasizes the non-conceptual nature of the intersubjective relationship. This is in contradiction with the central aspects of the vision of Schutz, which is divided on the primacy of the selection. For the Austrian sociologist the hermeneutical circle is certainly present in the form of a link between appresentative reference and totality of experience. It is equally correct to say that this recalls some gestalt aspects, integrating them with concepts of pragmatism - as the idea of points of flight and rest in James. Nevertheless, his perspective is linked to that of a reflexively oriented subject (a "weak" subject), even if a non-Cartesian one. In other words, the vision of Schutz is essentially noetic. Schutz has always had strong reservations about the theory of the field of gestalt matrix. For a long time he debated vigorously against the attempts of his friend Aron Gurwitsch to eliminate the idea of the subject (see Schutz, Gurwitsch 1989, Sacchetti 2010). On the contrary, Stascheit seems to help the noematic dimension prevail, emphasizing the holistic aspect of the lack of reflection and of the perception of the body. The danger of this operation is to eliminate key aspects like the theme of meaning understood and

3.3 Intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience

The musical relationship is an empirical example of sharing of prelinguistic meanings within the field of the "we-relation": it has the union of streams of consciousness and the establishment of a "common We" which is the basis of the "grow together" in the specious present. This idea involves crossing the classic Cartesian distinction between internal and external knowledge and also forms the basis of the conception of the socio-centric meaning of Schutz. The idea that intersubjectivity is a given in the world of natural attitude and its articulation through the theory of signs and symbols has been the object of several criticisms.[32] The latter is of particular importance to Zaner who criticizes the idea of "mutual tuning-in relationship", the basis of the "we-relation" and constitutive aspect of the musical relationship. In summary, Zaner argues that Schutz articulates intersubjectivity in a Cartesian manner by treating it the same way as a kind of interior that would emerge in relationship with the Other. Because the interior is accessible only to the subject, it would spring from an elusive symbolic interpretation in communication and is therefore meaningless. In addition, the author evaluates the theory of problematic apprensentazione because it does not permit understanding of how one can catch the Other. Finally, he sustains that the notion of the Other as a given in the world of everyday life is incomprehensible. The "we-relation" is a enigmatic concept (Zaner 2002).

One of the clearer responses to Zaner's observations is that of Belvedere, which can be summarized in three points: first, intersubjectivity emerges through mutual reflection in the world of everyday life; second, the appresentation of the other implies the empirical perception of a body that is constitutively experienced as a set of meanings; and lastly, the other is a given in the world of daily life because, in this context, he/she is an immediate and indubitable manifestation.

The first point is placed within the now classic critique of psychology that is leveled, by different authors at different times, at phenomenology and specifically at Schutz[33]. The development of the theory of language by Luckmann,

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of reflection, the problem of the relationship between individual experience, musical experience and system of relevances.

[32] For a detailed analysis of the critiques of the idea of intersubjectivity of Schutz see Muzzetto (Muzzetto 1997).

[33] A paradigmatic example is represented by the arguments of Gorman (Gorman 1977). He charges Schutz of moving himself from a psychologist's perspective, without explaining the meaning of intersubjectivity and, in fact, placing himself within the category of naive realism. Not to be missed, the biting work of Edward G. Armstrong, who believes there is a general trend of "anti-phenomenological" thought – a sort of "phenomenologofobia" – accuses phe-

as articulated by the encounter with the other that is captured as the body conveys appresentativamente meanings, is a fruitful example of radically empirical co-construction of meanings themselves. The appresentative understanding of meaning is "direct" because it takes place in a situation of face to face interaction in which one has the "mirroring" of the Self in another Self and vice versa. With mirroring one has the attribution of subjective meaning to that which has been caught by an interpretative scheme (Luckmann 1983: 83)[34]. Belvedere shows how the reflection has a perceptive basis given by synchronization between elements of internal time and external events. This perceptive basis is present in every intersubjective relationship and forms the core of the "theory of the existence of the alter ego".

Secondly, Zaner says that the theory of appresentation of Schutz is obscure. Actually Schutz and Luckmann well explain the analytical steps of the perception of the other starting from the process of passive synthesis. The body of the other, with all its expressive symptoms, immediately recalls the idea of being human that Schutz calls "my fellow". The other is caught, first, in an immediate way, with an appresentative perceptive synthesis; only in a second moment have you the reflexive categorization[35]. Schutz's theory of im-

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nomenologists like Schutz of being psychologists and solipsists. The "phenomenologofobes", evoking the solipsism as a common sense term, do not address the philosophical problem of the minds of others. In fact they face solipsism from a solipsistic point of view. Armstrong finds irony in this position, which would mask a «last line of defense against the terrors of the unknown» (Armstrong 1979: 68).

[34] Luckmann summarizes the relationship between theory of appresentation and meaning in the following points. 1) When two details are both present in the unity of perception and are characterized by the transfer of meaning (inference by analogy), then we are faced with associative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, is associated with B, which is also present. 2) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by analog transfer of meaning, then we are faced with appresentative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, appresenta B, which is not present. 3) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by the theming of that which is absent through that which is present, then we are facing meaningful coupling (reflexive). In this relationship A, which is present, means B, which is not present. There is a relationship at increasingly complex levels that involves the following elements. 1) The flow of consciousness, 2) the passive syntheses, 3) the thematisation, 4) the activation of the ego through the attention, 5) experience 6) the reflexive outlet (the return to experience), 7) the significance of the experience, 8) the project, 9) the project directed towards the alter ego, 10) social action (Luckmann 1983: 77-78).

[35] Belvedere points out that «one of Schutz's main contributions on the subject is (regardless of Zaner's criticisms) to reveal that intersubjectivity relies on my perception of the other's body mediated by signs and objects of the outer world, ie, that there is no perception of his inner time flow involved in intersubjectivity, even though I can experience the same flux of experience as others, not by grasping it through empathy but reproducing it on my own by a synchronization of our fluxes of experiences mediated by a pre-conceptual kind of 'communication.' Put otherwise, I do not

mediate perception of the other (i.e. appresentation in the world of everyday life), according to Belvedere is the foundation of empirical certainty of the existence of the other (certainty, however, that is "always subjected to contrary evidence")[36]. This means that the other is grasped within a pre-conceptual level on the basis of body language. This prelinguistic level is the basis of the entire intersubjective relationship and is based on an attitude that has to go beyond the limitations of positivism, whether by vulgar empiricism or sensible intuition. Schutz's settings offer us a model that allows «a profound and multifaceted description including not only sensorial data but also, and particularly, the types and categories that shape our perception of things» (ibid.: 226).

Finally, Belvedere clarifies the steps of Schutz's theory of *alter ego* that Zaner found confused. Intersubjectivity theory articulates the idea that «the other is constituted in a passive synthesis of our minds; thus, our knowledge of the other is not the product of our active reflective grasp but it is imposed on our perception in a compelling and indubitable way» (ibid.). The other is a given in the world of life intending it as a body through which, in a pre-reflective way, «I can start a *social* relationship. Thus, the given of the Other is not the appresentation of his inner stream of consciousness but his bodily signs, perfectly presented to my perception and which work along with mine in a prelinguistic 'conversation'» (ibid.).

3.4 Music as a finite province of meaning

Music separates the reality of the art world from the world of everyday life (Schutz 1964: 197), the language that accompanies music refers to relevances

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reproduce other's experiences: I produce my own, in a similar by way means of communication mediated by signs, living in a We-relationship while growing older together» (Belvedere 2014: 225). Belvedere continues: «Although Schutz does not say so, we could think of this as a non-intentional bond to the Other given that - just as Zaner argues - in Schutz's position the only intentional relationship is between my noesis and my noema – i.e., there is no intentional relationship between my noesis and the other's. So one could say that I do not experience the flux of experience of the other but I do experience the same as him, not only in his *duree* but in mine. Consequently, perception is a good enough fundament for stating intersubjectivity in the framework of a phenomenology of the natural attitude, which means that no empathy is needed» (ibid.).

[36] According to Belvedere, «for transcendental phenomenology, this kind of attachment to perception would give us no more than a subjective and relative experience and would lead us to reject philosophical certainty and remain in skepticism. On the contrary, for Schutz (and the author), perception is the ultimate fundament of all certainty. Our claim here is not to drop back into relativism and skepticism but setting universalism on different grounds arguing that all certainty comes from the natural attitude, which shall be described not as mere subjective and relative but – in "thick description" – as objective and absolute» (Belvedere 2014: 225-226).

(Schutz, 1996: 245) and to reordered symbolic meanings at almost infinite levels (Schutz 1964: 187). The analysis of alternation between musical melody and rhythm as the basis of the passage between orders of reality is an example of how «music expresses and creates spontaneously ordered lived experiences which are composed of sensory perceptions and bodily movements» (Mori 2014: 273). According to Mori, melody, harmony and rhythm are three musical elements of the constitution of a configuration of meaning articulated in time. In the same mode as intervals of perception of the sounds of one's body (for example heartbeat, pulse, respiration and step), the musical experience is a lived experience which constitutes a primordial rhythm based on a subjective axis and temporal primary present in the mind of every individual (ibid.). The melody is closely linked to this axis of time, because it is an element of the perception not objectively definable: once created it disappears from the flux of experience. Similar to harmony, when combined in various ordinative shades of the experience, the melody is a set of meanings perceived in a unified way. The rhythm, however, is nothing more than a division of the melody in the field of space and time. Rhythm is caught through a perception experienced in the form of intervals that are followed and distributed back into a melodic flow. The function of mediation between orders of reality of melody and rhythm can be exemplified by the role of language. The sound of the words and the rhythmic accompaniment of body movements are the basis of the transition from a time dimension to a spatial dimension. The sound of language invokes a mutual duality: on the one hand, it has a conceptual meaning inherent in words; on the other, the sound of the speaker's voice or song is similar to a melody that conveys meanings that transcend the cognitive and conceptual aspect. The voice becomes a vehicle for mediation of emotions that you express through words. Put differently, the cognitive order mediated by the sound of words is always linked to other aspects that recall different symbolic orders. Music has a meta-trascendental specificity «which is *a priori* creating and coordinating an order of lived experiences, depends very strongly on an experienced duality of rhythm» (ibid.: 275).

Another aspect is the problem of understanding the specific difference between sound and music. The use of the theory of signs and symbols of Schutz can distinguish three possible types of meanings of music: an indicative meaning, an emblematic meaning and a symbolic meaning. The latter meanings are related, respectively, to small, medium and large transcendences.

In the first case, music is understood as an indication, overcoming so-called "Small Transcendencies"; in the second case as a sign, overcoming so-called "Medium Transcendencies"; in the third case as a symbol, overcoming so-called "Great Transcendencies". According to the "Principle of the Relative

Irrelevance of the Vehicle" [...], music may be used as an indication as well as a sign or a symbol" (Goettlich 2014: 245).

Music is a means of overcoming a small transcendence when it is used as an index, for example, like the sound of an alarm clock that reminds you of the time when you have to wake up. Obviously, this is not the meaning of the music Schutz intended, but it is a sort of "indebted appropriation" of the intrinsic end of music. The indicative meaning of music is derived and does not furnish distinctive criteria with respect to sound. The emblematic or symbolic meaning of a musical expression tells me something of my interlocutor, for example, the sound of teeth grinding can suggest to me information about his mental state. As Goettlich explains, the more comprehensive distinction between mere sounds and music is to be found in the third sense, relative to the symbolic meaning.

Music, in opposition to mere sounds, has the capability to overcome a "Great transcendency". In other words, music is an acoustic phenomenon occurring within the paramount reality and referring – at least potentially – to a transcendent sphere of reality, that is, the world of arts. It is this third potential meaning which distinguishes music from mere sounds" (ibid.).

Conclusions

According to Schutz, the inner consciousness of time is an indispensable universal structural basis of all the processes of the attribution of meaning. I agree with Skarda when he maintains that the Austrian sociologist examines the problem of music with an emphasis on how the acoustic field of the spatial sphere depends on a temporal structure that may remain implied, but that is methodologically essential. This structure recalls the knowledge sedimented in the past[37]. Among the egological and internal temporal dimensions there is a indissoluble link. To eliminate the internal time dimension means to elimi-

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[37] Skarda writes: «Emphasis should be placed on the word 'spatial' here. Although Schutz does not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of the absence of spatial structure, I believe that is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not spatial. For example, if there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of temporal depth, i.e., the past, that is meant» (Skarda 1979: 99). Pedone is of the opposite view, who claims that this thesis is unfounded, «for the lack of an explicit consideration of the symbolic processes that come into play when listening» (Pedone 1996: 20). The observations of Skarda are a stimulus for further reflection on the centrality of the egological dimension, of that symbolic and that of constitution of meanings that can not be developed here.

nate the dimension of subjectivity and the intended meaning. The sociology of Schutz is noetic, it is radically anchored to an entity that continuously reconfigures the meanings as a function of systems of relevance that emerge from time to time in the multiple fields of experience. One can parenthesize the internal temporality, for methodological purposes (for example in dealing with the musical rhythm and the dimension of the body), but always bearing in mind that the reflective dimension, linked to the Self, cannot be eliminated.

The egological dimension recalls the theory of appresentazione, the theme of music as a finite province of meaning and that of the relationship between individual and collective dimensions of meaning. The musical relationship is an example of "we-relation", in which it has a fusion with the others in a symbolic "We" in which the appresentative is the common situation and the appresented is the participation in a world of ideal categorizations. Music is thus a relationship that expresses in a non-conceptual way symbolic aspects that can form the basis of an infinite chain of appresentative relationships[38]. Among these symbolic aspects those related to intersubjectivity are nodal. The musical relationship therefore constitutes a potential vehicle of union between individual center and social center of the constitution of meaning[39].

In Schutz the attribution of meaning is always based on emergencies of the "here and now." These emergencies are a sum of imposed and intrinsic relevances, and are never defined *a priori*. The voluntarism or passivity, the reflexivity and the irreflexivity are methodological hypotheses not likely to be of clear demarcation. In the world of everyday life, the realization of a project cannot be subjected to a control system that can bring into being clear dividing lines between intrinsic or imposed relevances, between reflective or irreflective aspects. Only if the actor could master all the total connections of their experiences past, present and future, and all possible combinations between these links might one arrive at a precise demarcation. This hypothesis of hyper-rationality, however, would be a metaphysical hypothesis[40].

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[38] Schutz explains how, for example, Kierkegaard uses the work of Mozart as a symbol which is the starting point of a symbolization of different degree. Specifically, Kierkegaard contrasts the immediacy of the music, connected to an aesthetic-erotic plane, the reflection of the language, connected to the ethical plane (Schutz 1964).

[39] According to Schutz, in the works of Mozart the characters are ideal-types that express universal feelings. These feelings are developed intersubjectively through action, highlighting aspects linked to the interior life and to personality. In the works of Mozart, musically, an atmosphere is created that characterizes the social climate; more people express their individuality in a unified manner, making the complexity typical of the experience clear to the public. In other words, the multi-dimensionality typical of social situations is created (Schutz 1964: 199).

[40] Awareness of the impossibility of accurately controlling the context of future predictions is an epistemological hinge of the antipositivist thought of the author. In the essay on Tiresias,

The anthropological model of Schutz shows how internal time is the key and uneliminable element in the process of attribution of meaning and intersubjective constitution of reality. The division between internal and external time of Schutz is not similar to the Cartesian distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, but it is a heuristic distinction which aims to clarify the phenomenon being studied, which stands out from the idea of intentionality of consciousness. In this view, time and intentionality are analytical elements inevitably subordinate to common inter-subjective time. The problematics of the nonconceptual aspects of the musical experience and of intersubjectivity is a way to conjugate the relationship between the process of polythetic construction and monothetic synthesis. The intersubjective coconstruction of meaning always implies a tension between related areas that entail, for example, subjective and intersubjective experience, language (constructs of first and second degree), finite provinces of meaning (the world of everyday life and symbolic worlds).

Notwithstanding the analysis of Schutz on the musical experience being but an outline, the depth and richness of his reflections are still unsurpassed. The openness with which the sociologist articulates the meaningful themes of the relationship between intersubjective time and musical relationship can be exemplified in two non-mutually exclusive points. The first point is the notion of musical relationship as "step-by-step" co-construction of meanings, that has been the area of origin of a series of empirical studies on the located construction of meaning. As Fele explained, Harold Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967) took cues from essential surveys of Schutz on the interaction of experiences in musical experience, on the temporal relationship and intersubjectivity. The father of ethnomethodology, with the appropriate differentiation, then empirically developed part of the assumptions of Schutz, attempting to make a connection on the side of taken for granted. Aaron Cicourel (Cicourel 1964; 1973) was another author who, on the one hand, developed in a critical key the problem of *Verstehen* by applying the methodology of empirical research, and on the other, reorganized the study of temporal processes of interaction and procedural practices with which the actors attribute meaning, in an empirical key consistent with the assumptions of Schutz. The second point is that

Schutz applies that principle to the relationship between time, forecasting in the world of everyday life and the assumption of risk that that particular prediction will be wrong (cf.. Schutz 1964). The view of the Austrian sociologist not dissimilar to the wholism of Pierre Duhen, which, in physics, explained how one «can never submit an isolated hypothesis to experience, but only a whole set of hypotheses. When the experience is in disagreement with his predictions, it [...] teaches that at least one of the assumptions constituting the set is unacceptable and should be modified, but does not [...] indicate which must be changed» (Duhem 1906, trans. en. 1978: 211).

of the link with the social construction of meanings and connections with the social structure. As Mori explained, the scope of music is connected to an intersubjective structure of meanings mediated symbolically, that go beyond the situationality of the context or subjective goals. Through the linguistic experience – for example, the tone, the pauses, the volume of the sound of the words – appresentatively called and created meanings that have a spectrum of almost infinite shades. With this in mind, Luckmann proposes a theory of language that unfolds from the appresentative elements connected to the sound of the voice (Luckmann 1975; 1983). In a manner consistent with the symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead, he develops themes related to the later attempts of Schutz to address the phenomenological problem of language (cfr. Schutz 1958). Cicourel, however, articulated an ethnography of located contexts centered on the idea of language as a typical vehicle of knowledge and social practices that multidimensionally structure, "from the beginning", relations between the actors in interaction, allowing the connection between individual and social structure (Cicourel 1973; 1981)[41].

Finally, I borrow a thought from Schutz to say that I'm not sure if I was able to highlight the relevant aspects of the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and musical experience, and I'm not even sure if my observations are adequate to either the author or to those of whom have studied him. Of one thing, however, I am certain: that the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and musical relationship is a central aspect of the debate in the social sciences that has not yet been overcome.

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[41] These two aspects of the *Verstehen* of Schutz can only be mentioned here and should be the object of deeper study.

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
Henri Matisse, *La Danse* (1910)

Alfred Schutz's main contributions to the field of economic reflection

Daniela Griselda López

For several decades, contemporary social theory has held a considerable misunderstanding around phenomenologically oriented sociology, which has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, has pushed its conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. In contrast, our article aims to recover that hermeneutical framework in order to think economic phenomena such as the economic action and the order of the market processes. It is undeniable that Alfred Schutz's work provides theoretical and methodological elements for the sociological analysis of the economic world. The linkages between Schutzian sociology and economic reflection vary widely, ranging from his formative stage within the context of the Mises Circle to the current recovery of his work by Economic Sociology. Within this framework, the aim of this work is to summarize Schutz's main contributions to the field of economic reflection. The recovery and systematization of the Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between sociology and economics- can contribute with new elements not only to think from a theoretical point of view but also to address economic phenomena empirically.

Introduction

For many decades, contemporary sociological theory has held a considerable misunderstanding around phenomenologically oriented sociology, which has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, has pushed its conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. Thus, Alfred Schutz's sociology has frequently been interpreted as a paradigmatic example of «subjectivism» given that it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on the actors' «subjective» interpretations, occluding –not to say denying– the possibility of thinking «objective» social structures such as power relations or social order. However, the indication that there exists a misunderstanding around labeling Schutz as subjectivist is not new. Some years ago, an expert on his work (Endress 2005) defended phenomenology against the accusation of subjectivism when he critically examined the way in which Pierre Bourdieu shapes his slogan-like label «subjectivism». Along these lines, in previous research, we demonstrated the groundless character of the dominant criticism against

Schutz's work shedding a new light on his reflection around themes such as social order (López 2012, 2014a, 2014b) and power (Dreher & López 2015). In the framework of that research, the recovery of the connections between the author and the Austrian School of Economics became a central theme, because it is in that intellectual context that his sociology develops and where his notion of the life-world is based, a notion which makes clear the author's interest not only in the subjective aspects but also in the objective dimension of social reality (López 2014c). The ideas we present herein stems from those previous investigations and from an interest in recovering Schutz's contributions both to the theoretical and to the empirical sociological research on economic phenomena. The reflection will be conducted in the interface of phenomenologically oriented sociology and economics, specifically highlighting the theoretical potential of the Schutzian paradigm for the study of the economic world.

In order to accomplish this goal, the first section presents a detailed overview of the links between Schutzian sociology and economic reflection. Our attention is primarily focused: a) on the Austrian roots of Schutzian epistemological concern which – as we will show later in this work – was directed not only at social sciences in general but also at economics in particular; b) on the Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics, i.e., in the debate opened some decades ago about the links between hermeneutics and economics; and, c) on the appropriation of Schutz's work by European economic sociology, i.e., the studies which make fruitful use of Schutzian phenomenological program for the empirical research of market processes. In the second section we propose that it is the problem of economic coordination that at first glance seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspective and we present a review of the main contributions of Schutzian sociology to that paradigmatic problem of economics. Finally, in the third section and closely related to the previous one a critical analysis of Schutzian alleged political liberalism is sketched out.

Schutzian sociology and economic reflection

The Austrian roots of Schutzian reflection

The analysis of the links of Schutz's sociology with the economic reflection constitutes a rich and prolific field of study not only for the specialists in his work, but also for interpretive economics and for economic sociology itself. The first of the multiple cross-links which can be highlighted organizes around the Austrian School of Economics. As mentioned before, what

motivated our previous work was the inquiry on the «Austrian roots of Schutzian reflection», which go through his project of a sociology of the life-world (López 2014c). There is ample evidence[1] to assert that the discussions within the *Mises Circle* constitute the immediate antecedent of Schutzian sociology: «economic issues (…) are important to Schutz's early intellectual development and provide much of the context of Schutz's great work, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 15). Motivated by the purpose of finding a response to the problem posed by Misean apriorism Schutz largely concentrates on the phenomenological foundations of the concepts of social sciences. Misean theory of catallactics was part of a pure *a priori* theory of action considered as abstracted from its historical circumstances: «though the men of the Middle Ages would not have understood the law of marginal utility, they nevertheless did not and could not act otherwise than as the law of marginal utility describes. Even the man of the Middle Ages sought to apportion the means at his disposal in such a way that he attained the same level of satisfaction in every single kind of want» (Mises 1933 [2003]: 103). The implications of such a theory included a disconnection of economic concepts from worldly life and a rigid dichotomy between theoretical and historical sciences. While the object of inquiry of catallactics was subjective actions, the methodology of formation of objective categories consisted in an intellectual intuition which involved «oblivion» or a disconnection of the subject understood as a real person. The problem of formalism that the Austrian tradition represented by Mises' work entailed, involved a separation of theory from the contact with the life-world. Against this background, Schutz's epistemological concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but also at economics in particular. As Lester Embree clearly explains, Schutz's reflection on economics as a theoretical social science «is expounded in relation to his theory of science especially what he calls 'postulates'» (Embree 2009: 165). These postulates of wide application -called «procedural rules» or «rules for scientific procedure»- are the postulates of *subjective meaning* and of *adequacy*. As viewed by Schutz, and in stark contrast to the Austrian tradition of Carl Menger and Mises, the concept of action *must* refer to the subjects *within* the social world and to the interpretation of the actors in terms of systems of projects, available means, motives, relevances, plans, and so on. With regard to this postulate of subjective meaning it is worth remembering the repeatedly cited quotation by Schutz that applies to our discussion:

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[1] See also Prendergast (1986), Foss (1996), Koppl (1997), Boettke (1998), Kurrild-Klitgaard (2001, 2003), Knudsen (2004), Barber (2004), Wilson (2005), Srubar (2007).

Is it not the "behavior of prices" rather than the behavior of men in the market situation which is studied by the economist, the "shape of demand curves" rather than the anticipations of economic subjects symbolized by such curves? Does not the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as "savings," "capital," "business cycle," "wages" and "unemployment," "multipliers" and "monopoly" as if these phenomena were entirely detached from any activity of the economic subjects, even less without entering into the subjective meaning structure such activities may have for them? (…) Closer investigation, however; reveals that this abstract conceptual scheme is nothing else than a kind of intellectual shorthand and that the underlying subjective elements of human actions involved are either taken for granted or deemed to be irrelevant with respect to the scientific purpose at hand - the problem under scrutiny - and are, therefore, disregarded. Correctly understood, the postulate of subjective interpretation as applied to economics as well as to all the other social sciences means merely that we always *can* - and for certain purposes *must* - refer to the activities of the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the actors in terms of systems of projects, available means, motives, relevances, and so on (Schutz 1962: 34-35).

On the other hand, the postulate of adequacy «deals with the *formation* of ideal-typical constructs» and «states that the type must *be sufficient to explain the action without contradicting previous experience*» (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 236. Italics in original). As stated by Schutz, each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the lifeworld by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor him or herself as well as for his or her fellows in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality (Schutz 1962: 44).

Both postulates «serve to anchor the second-order constructs of the cultural scientists in the first-order constructs through which the actors themselves understand the social world» (Embree 2009: 171). The cultural sciences «develop a model of the social world in terms of a system of mutually coordinated ideal types of actions as well as relationships, situations, and products». The ideal types «also called "constructs" (…) are actually concepts of a higher level, i.e., constructs about constructs» (Embree 2009: 169).

All in all, as a social scientist both economist and sociologist try to explain the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective interpretation and the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor within the social world. The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of Schutzian theory of social sciences. The life-world is conceived as a subjective formation resulting from

the activities of the subjective pre-scientific experience: «Schutz's big achievement in the present context is the "*descriptive analysis of economics*" (…), which elucidates what economists do. Most of them, including Mises, overlooked the lifeworldly ground of economic theory» (Eberle 2009: 505. Italics in original).

Closely related, Schutz is very critical of the principle of marginal utility «the fundamental hypothesis of modern theoretical economics» (Embree 2009: 175). He offers a critique to that principle which, he believed, functions as a regulator of the creation of concepts in economics. Schutz agrees with Mises that social theory should seek *a prioris*. But, in agreement with Husserl, he proposes a different notion. The *a priori* cannot be stated as propositions, such as laws and principles, but rather should be sought after at a more fundamental level, mainly in the constitutive features of the life-world. As I have shown elsewhere (López 2014c), the concepts of the social sciences are grounded in the structure of the life-world. The postulate of subjective meaning leads quite quickly to the sphere of intersubjectivity. As a consequence, the structure of the life-world not only has its roots in the experience of the solitary ego but also in the sphere of intersubjectivity: in the realm of the directly experienced social reality, the face-to-face relationship; and in the realm of the indirectly experienced social reality, the realm of contemporaries, predecessors and successors. In both areas Schutz develops two *a priori* structures of consciousness related to intersubjectivity: the pure We-relationship and the pure They-relationship. The pure We-relationship constitutes an *a priori* structure of consciousness linked to the realm of the directly experienced social reality and is characteristic of the domain of face-to-face relationships. Schutz calls «pure We-relationship» the face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other's lives for however short a time. But likewise, the «pure We-relationship» is only a limiting concept. The directly experienced social relationship of real life is the pure We-relationship concretized and actualized to a greater or lesser degree and filled with content. On the other hand, the pure They-relationship constitutes an *a priori* structure of consciousness linked to the realm of the indirectly experienced social reality. My face-to-face encounters with others have given me a deep prepredicative knowledge of the Thou as a self. But the Thou who is merely my contemporary is never experienced personally as a self and never prepredicatively. On the contrary, all experience of contemporaries is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees of explicitness. The term «They-orientation» is defined by the peculiar way in which I apprehend the conscious experiences of my contemporaries. For I apprehend them as anonymous processes. The «They-orientation» is the pure form of understanding the contemporary in a predicative fashion, that is, in

terms of his or her typical characteristics or ideal types. These make up first order constructs, the foundation and reference point for any second order construct in social sciences. That's the reason why the concepts of social sciences are grounded in the constitutive features of the life-world. However, there are no propositions related to the contents of those formal features; these contents may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts and should be empirically explored (López 2014c: 22).

Schutzian criticism toward Misean formalism and his reflections on the need to find the foundation of the concepts of social sciences in the constitutive features of the life-world brings to mind Karl Polanyi's criticism of economic theory for being essentially «formal» (Polanyi 1957 [1992]), i.e., a kind of logic focused on choice, the means-end relationship, and the alleged scarcity of things that people want. To the formal concept of economics Polanyi counterposes a «substantive» concept, grounded in reality and not in logic (Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 13): «the substantive meaning of economic derives from man's dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows» (Polanyi 1957 [1992]: 29).

By distancing himself from those formal principles of catallactics Schutz distinguishes theoretical economics with economic history or economic sociology[2]:

> The so-called 'principles of catallactics' certainly have as their subject matter human acts considered as finished products, not actions in progress. The meaning-content of these principles is exhausted in the subsumption of such acts under the interpretive schemes of economic theory. To be sure, no economic act is conceivable without some reference to an economic actor, but the latter is absolutely anonymous; it is no you, nor I, nor an entrepreneur, nor even an "economic man" as such, but a pure universal "one." (…) However, one can study the economic actor as such and try to find out what is going on in his mind; of course, one is not then engaged in theoretical economics but in economic history or economic sociology (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 137).

According to Schutz, economic sociology is not engaged in theoretical economics; instead it aims at studying economic action with reference to an economic actor, not a universal «one», but a concrete actor living among other fellows in social, cultural and historical contexts.

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[2] In *Collected Papers II* (1964a), Schutz reworks this contrast between theoretical economics and economic sociology in the distinction between *pure theory* and *applied theory* (Embree 2009: 167).

The Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics

Within the framework of the analysis of the links of Schutz's sociology with the economic reflection it is also possible to trace the «Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics» in the debate opened some decades ago about the links between hermeneutics and economics. The discussions within Austrian tradition around the importance of sociological analysis constitute a development independent from and parallel to contemporary economic sociology which has a common ground in the strong criticism against essential principles of neoclassical economics regarding the economic behavior of the individual[3]. During the late 80's and early 90's an «interpretive turn» was introduced in the economic sciences. These economists, interested in recovering the relevance of interpretive theory for Austrian Economics, formulated what was called «economics of meaning» (Boettke, Lavoie, & Storr 2001) or «interpretive economics» (Boettke 1990; Prychitko 1990)[4]. This movement gave place to a paradigmatic book on the epistemological turn edited by Donald Lavoie, *Economics and Hermeneutics* (1991), which mainly deals with the link between those two intellectual traditions that until then had been total strangers. The two economists who provoked the debate on the use of hermeneutics to revise Austrian Economics were Richard Ebeling (1985, 1986), who had drawn principally from the works of Schutz and Paul Ricoeur, and Lavoie (1986), who made use of Hans-Georg Gadamer's ideas. Both authors found inspiration in the work of Ludwig Lachmann and his book *The Legacy of Max Weber* (1970), immediate precedent for the attempt at establishing bridges between sociology and Austrian economics. In fact it is maintained that Lachmann's book on Weber can be called «the first explicitly hermeneutical contribution to Austrian Economics» (Lavoie 1991: 13). Schutzian sociology allowed overcoming the limitations of neoclassical thought. In opposition to the rational maximization of the individuals, these authors pick up Schutz's claims regarding the existence of intersubjective structures of meaning which enable the individual to act in the social world. In his book, Lachmann sought to articulate how the troublesome aspects of the Weberian concept of ideal type could be replaced with the notion of *plan*. According to the author, human action exists as a scheme of plans designed to reach imagined futures:

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[3] For a comparison of mainstream economics and contemporary economic sociology see Swedberg and Smelser (2005: 3-6).

[4] It is important to mention that Werner Sombart was the first sociologist who pointed out the need for a «*verstehende* economics» (Sombart 1930 [2003]).

One trait distinguishes all cultural phenomena from natural ones. When men act they carry in their minds an image of what they want to achieve. All human action can be regarded as the carrying out of projects that are designed to give effect to imagined ends. But every man pursues a multiplicity of ends, the achievement of at least some of which precludes that of other ends. Moreover, the scarcity of the means at the disposal of each actor imposes further restraints upon his choice. In other words, men have to choose the purposes they wish to achieve, and they have to make such choice within the constraints of a given 'situation'. To act at all, men have to make plans, comprehensive surveys of the means at their disposal and the ways in which they might be used, and let their actions be guided by them (Lachmann 1970: 30).

This background was the kickstart for further developments. In *Austrian Economics: a hermeneutic approach* (1991), Lachmann was critical of the success that after 1930 had obtained the method of classical mechanics among economists. Economists all over the world followed Pareto in embracing that method as the only truly «scientific» method. In the decades that followed «this became the dominant style of thought in all countries» (Lachmann 1991: 132). In this environment, rational action became the methodological tool *par excellence*. The *mainstream* advocated the powerful tool of positive analysis, the objective model of rational action. The interpretive turn in social thought demanded a fundamental rethinking of basic questions given that modern discourse concerning economics and sociology was stalled at this point «concentrating on the merits and demerits of the rational choice framework for social analysis» (Boettke 1998: 57). Then the hermeneutical Austrians' challenge was primarily aimed at mainstream neoclassical economics, which they charge with the vice of formalism: «formalism is the artificial severing of economic theory construction from application, in effect the separation of theory from contact with the lifeworld, with everyday reality as we know it» (Lavoie 1994: 55). However, the challenge had implications for the mainstream of the Austrian tradition as well:

the overall hermeneutical challenge to tradicional Austrian economics can be summarized by referring to (…) three 'core methodological tenets' of the school, subjectivism, methodological individualism and market process (…) For the school to take its own interpretive turn it will need to overcome its tendency towards atomism, which mistakenly locates the domain of meaning in isolated individual minds, and objectivism, which over-dichotomizes theory from history, and scientific from everyday understanding (Lavoie 1994: 55-57).

Given that Schutz had already drawn attention to the problem of formalism characteristic of his intellectual context, the recovery of his work by contemporary Austrian tradition was not a random decision.

Economic sociology

The third cross-link can be found in the appropriation of Schutz's work by economic sociology in the studies which make fruitful use of the phenomenological program for the empirical research on market processes. In the «Introduction» of the *Handbook of Economic Sociology* (2005), Swedberg and Smelser acknowledges that new economic sociology is primarily a U.S. phenomenon. However, many European contributions to economic sociology are mentioned, among which Schutzian phenomenology occupies a special place: «Knorr Cetina in Germany and Aspers in Sweden have independently of one another embarked on the project of applying phenomenology to economic sociology» (Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 19).

In an article published in 2002 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002), examines the patterns of integration which distinguish the global social system embedded in economic transactions. Called «global microstructures» these patterns, which are global in scope but microsocial in character, constitute the basic features of the interaction order. The authors draw on Schutz's reflection on the temporal coordination as the basis for the level of intersubjectivity for their analysis of global markets, which posit «a form of market coordination that supplements relational or network forms of coordination» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 905). In an article of 2004, they clarify this point: «one important purpose of this chapter is to bring together elements of several microsociological literatures –interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology– with elements from new economic sociology, specifically, its interest in institutions (…) in embeddedness, and in symbolic and expressive dimension of economic objects and activities» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2004: 159).

The authors highlight the relevance of Schutzian approach or «microsociology» to issues of globalization and to the understanding of markets «when they are sketched out in geographical space» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 907). In those fields participants bridge the geographical distances and orient toward one another using patterns of relatedness and coordination called microstructures that are global in scope but microsocial in character and that assemble and link global domains. The authors also draw on Schutz and Luckmann's notion of *appresentation* to advocate that participants' reciprocal observation of markets in screens, combined with temporal coordination mechanisms, may constitute a basis for both a form of intersubjectivity and the

integration of some global spheres. Making use of this core notion of Schutz's theory of symbols they describe the transportation of local details from particular time zones and geographical regions where they are observed to the global arena on screen. The «screen world» is the global market into which local details are transposed (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2004). This clearly shows the central role of the Schutzian approach to intersubjective structures and the importance of his theory of symbols in the analysis of economic phenomena. The strategy for organizing their argument consists on recovering Schutzian analysis of temporal coordination at the level of intersubjectivity in order to «supplement» relational or network forms of coordination. The goal here is to complement or «bring together» Schutzian «microsociology» with the interest of economic sociology in relational or network analysis.

The major difference between Knorr Cetina's approach and Aspers' (Aspers 2009) is that the latter does not aim at making use of Schutzian phenomenology in order to «supplement» other perspectives. Instead, his main objective is to introduce empirical phenomenology as an approach in its own right:

> phenomenology has taken three routes that are relevant to social sciences. The first is the one taken by Schütz and his followers, which is essentially non-empirical. The second is ethnomethodology, which is only remotely related to phenomenology, and the third and perhaps most well known is the integration of phenomenology into the mainstream of social science. (…) I present what can be seen as a fourth route, empirical phenomenology, which is a development based on interpretations of the phenomenological literature (Aspers 2009: 4).

The author intends to make Schutzian approach «more empirical applicable» highlighting that the basic premise of empirical phenomenology is that an explanation in the social sciences should be connected with the meaning structure of real people. From this perspective, both the postulate of subjective interpretation and the postulate of adequacy proposed by Schutz are recovered. The author's assessment of the practical implications of empirical phenomenology leads him to conclude that a fruitful strategy for accessing the perspective of actors could be participant observation and interviews. In order to «ensure that the actors' perspective comes through, and thus that no scientific explanation exists unless what is studied is related to the first-order constructs of those studied» (Aspers 2009: 10). As claimed by Knorr Cetina: «[w]hat the phenomenological approach means in regard to data collection and data treatment is first of all a focus on actor's meaning» (Knorr Cetina 2006: x).

In the same line, Aspers (2006), recovers the phenomenological perspec-

tive for empirical qualitative investigation in the fashion markets. The author conducted an empirical study of fashion photography in Sweden, an investigation of an understudied market. He maintains that a variety of actors are relevant to understanding these markets (fashion photographers, agents, editors of fashion magazines and art directors). As stated by Aspers, the three main goals that have been addressed in the book are: «to understand, and thereby explain, the market fashion of photography in Sweden, to present and ethnography of this market, and to incorporate the phenomenological approach to the social sciences» (Aspers 2006: 155). The author examines the relation between the different positions in those markets from Schutz's notion of reciprocal expectations. This recovery of Schutzian work opens the discussion on its general relevance to economic sociology and allows analyzing how far it is possible to go with this approach.

The problem of economic coordination

Fundamentally, it is the problem of economic coordination that at first glance seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspective. According to Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002), the starting point for an understanding of global microstructured domains is the distinction between «embodied presence» and «response presence», a differentiation which has a family resemblance to Schutzian distinction between We-relationship and They relationship. The first one corresponds to the face-to-face situations, while the second corresponds to situations in which participants are capable of responding to one another and common objects in real time without being physically present in the same place. The question that lies at the core of the notion of a response-presence-based social form that extends across global distances is: «what are the possibilities of its inherent connectivity and integration as the key to overcoming the geographical separation of participants?» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 911). The response to this problem of coordination is the notion of global we-relationship which is based on temporal coordination. The notion suggests that a level of microintegration, or intersubjectivity, is possible in global fields.

In global markets, adjustments must be made to compensate for the geographic distance between participants. Schutzian concept of intersubjectivity allows the authors to characterize the social binding in this kind of markets, bringing into focus the idea of temporal coordination which is central to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Rather than two individual facing each other, they are interested in the example of two subjects watching a third object, for instance a bird flying, for the conceptualization of sociality of global fields:

«to illustrate global orientation in financial markets, we address the three elements that are central to intersubjectivity: (1) participants' orientation toward and observation of a common object, (2) the reciprocity of these orientations, and (3) interlocking time dimensions» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 923). As opposed to face-to-face situation, the authors coin the concept of face-to-screen situation. The face-to-screen concept replaces the face-to-face one in response-presence-based situations, i.e., the orientation of participants toward the global sphere that is present on screen. Secondly, the reciprocity of orientations takes place when the screen itself, like a mirror, reflects market participants' activities to one another in real time: «the reciprocity of observation is an essential and invariable aspect of these temporally focused global interaction systems, in addition to being an underlying source of intersubjectivity» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 925). Finally, temporal coordination within the authors scheme means that these markets are communities of time, a condition that is central to their historical particularity conceived as a social system that overcome the geographic separation between participants. The aspects of temporal coordination between participants are: synchronicity, continuity and temporal immediacy. Moreover, «temporal coordination involves a temporal division of labor across time zones, such that the community of time extends around the clock». All this complex structuration and reciprocity allow the authors to maintain the argument of a level of global intersubjectivity that extends beyond the face-to-face situation. It is important to indicate here that, according to the aforementioned point of view as regard the use of Schutzian phenomenology in order to «supplement» other perspectives, the authors point out the need to distinguish between different forms of market coordination reciprocally related: the network form of coordination and the reflexive, temporal form of coordination.

The problem of coordination has also occupied contemporary Austrian tradition. In a similar manner, they highlight the problems that involve the temporal and geographic distance between participants:

> how men, mutually dependent upon each other in that system of division of labor, can successfully coordinate their activities for assurance of a balance between the multitudes of demands and supplies for various goods and services in a complex and developed market order (…). Clearly, such coordination of a vast number of interpersonal plans, in which the market actors are separated from each other in terms both time and space, requires some mechanism through which expectations can be formed (Ebeling 1999: 120-121).

In this regards, contemporary Austrian economics have benefited from Schutzian insights. The centrality of Schutz's theory of ideal types and of

the notion of stock of knowledge is recovered by authors such as Storr (2010), Knudsen (2004), Kurrild-Klitgaard (2001), Mote (2001), Ebeling (1999), Koppl (1997), Foss (1996) and Pietrykowski (1996), who claim that one of Schutz's biggest contributions to the methodology of the social sciences is the introduction of a scale of ideal types based on growing degrees of anonymity. In this sense, several authors consider that Schutz's studies foster understanding of the properties of the order creation of the market processes (Ebeling 1999; Foss 1996). And this coordination demands a mechanism through which mutual expectations are formed. The Schutzian system of ideal types can help build that theory of expectations. Thus, Koppl, Foss and Pietrykowski «have looked to the ideal-type method as a way to better understand and model two primary economic phenomena: economic expectations and social order/market coordination» (Mote 2001: 223). Foss, for instance, claims that in their daily-life situations, actors are skilled at coordinating their actions, because there are things that are more «prominent» than others. In their everyday lives, actors draw on the stock of knowledge they have in common, which consists of shared typifications of the social world. They are able to coordinate their actions because they are equipped with that everyday life knowledge, which includes an ample repertoire of courses-of-action and personal ideal types and because that common-sense knowledge is presupposed and has an origin and social acceptance. Foss makes use of the concept of «prominence» of Thomas Schelling, which functions as a principle for organizing common sense knowledge and typifications. However, he (as well as Koppl) disregards these typifications as being organized in domains of relevances, as Schutz states. It is Pietrykowski who moved forward in the direction of recovering Schutz's theory of relevances, a key theme which has not yet been paid the attention it deserves. The author makes use of the notions of «intrinsic» and «imposed» relevances. Intrinsic relevances are related to the freedom of the individual to choose what he/she is interested in, whereas imposed relevances have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as significant although they are not related to our own interests. Pietrykowski contends that «negotiation» of these (in some cases) conflicting relevances is a matter of «the readiness with which individuals accept or resist the imposition of the other's relevances systems» which «differs from situation to situation»[5].

Together with the aforementioned importance of the theory of the ideal types to give an answer to the «paradigmatic problem» of the economic theory, the limitations of Schutz's theory regarding the concept of «unintended conse-

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[5] As I have shown elsewhere, through his valuable observations Pietrykowski opened the analysis to the Schutzian problem of relevance in the field of economic reflection (López 2014c).

quences» are also highlighted. The focus on the «unintended consequences» is based on the concept of the spontaneous social orders proposed by Friederich von Hayek, who emphasizes, among other things, that those orders are not the result of human intention. As Storr (2010) points out, for Hayek «spontaneous orders are the unintended consequence of the nonetheless purposeful action of multiple individuals». As mentioned by Lavoie, «in economics *market processes* stands for what is really a more fundamental category which applies not only to markets, but to all sorts of institutions: *spontaneous order.* It is the principle that the social manifestation of meaningful action is that of an evolving system which exhibits systematic, but generally unintended, consequences» (Lavoie 1994: 56). The critics claim that in the Schutzian scheme there is no reflection around this notion and, in this sense, the Schutzian categories are insufficient. Even Koppl, who has made one of the biggest contributions to enlighten on the strengths of Schutz's theory for the Austrian audience, asserts that Schutz does not recognize clearly that human action can produce unintended systemic consequences (Koppl 2002: 54). However, Storr (2010) proposes that this criticism of Schutz is unfair: «first, the second order constructs that social scientists employ are based on first order common-sense constructs that individuals use to negotiate the social world which necessarily make reference to unintended consequences and spontaneous orders. Secondly, Schütz himself often engaged in causal spontaneous order analysis» (Storr 2010: 176). Storr argues that «social stock of knowledge emerges spontaneously» and that as a consequence of the pragmatic motive governing the actors in the social world understood as a spontaneous social order that contains multiple and emerging «made orders», the actors should resort to their stock of knowledge to explain the unintended consequences of their actions and other people's actions. He adds that «individuals are necessarily spontaneous order theorists». Here, Schutzian theory, as though it had fallen into the bed of Procrustes, is forced to fit the size of the Hayekian liberal theory of order as regards the notion of unintended consequences. However, Schutz resorts to categories of his own to understand the social order resulting from his particular notion of the life-world and the analysis of the unintended consequences in Schutz's work not only implies the reification of the author's heuristic framework but also entails defining him as a theorist of liberal order.

Economic theory and liberal politics

A systematic and explicit reflection on the connection between Schutz's thought on social order and liberal politics can be found in a recent article by Koppl and Augier (2011) on the occasion of the publication of an inter-

view with Schutz dating from 1958 (Greaves 1958). In the introduction to the interview, the authors contend that: «it may still be true that many of Alfred Schutz's admirers have a limited appreciation for the importance of the *economic theory* and *liberal politics* in Schutz's formative years as a young scholar» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 15. Italics in original). Mises was a powerful advocate of the political philosophy of classical liberalism and, given the strong connection between Schutz and the Austrian School of Mises, which was strongly liberal in the old-fashioned European sense of peace, free trade, and limited government: «liberalism and the Austrian School of Economics were twin influences on the young Schutz» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 16).

The authors also make reference to Schutzian review of Mises' 1933 book *Grundprobleme der Nationalökonomie*[6]. They critically analyzes the editor's preface to Schutz's review where Wagner, Psathas, and Kersten speak of an «adherence to an utterly unrestrained principle of free competition» shared by Mises and the rest of the «Viennese School of the theory of marginal utility». There, the editors contend that «Schutz himself would not seem to have been enthusiastic about a theory of unrestrained (better, cut-throat) competition» (Wagner, Psathas, & Kersten 1996: 88). It is reproached that the editors «supply, however, no evidence» for their claim (Koppl & Augier 2011). As stated by Koppl and Augier, the evidence points the other way. Their manuscript sets out the theoretical elements of Mises' and Hayek's liberalism, quotes excerpts of their works which highlight the non-conservative nature of their claims, and takes for granted the fact that Schutz inherits that liberal thought without presenting the theoretical traits of his hermeneutical framework in order to support the assertion. There is not even a single quotation of passages of his work where his liberalism becomes evident. The evidence provided by the authors refers to the intellectual context of Schutzian reflection: «the evidence suggests that Schutz upheld the liberal views championed by Mises» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 23). First, Schutz was a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, an association of liberal thinkers; second, Schutz's review of the aforementioned article of Mises, an outline which is not critical in nature; finally, the last evidence comes from Schutz's work for the Austrian Banking Association. What calls special attention is the fact that the introduction that precedes the interview does not provide theoretical evidence to support Schutzian alleged liberalism. Moreover, the interview only captures the differences between Mises and his students:

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[6] This work by Mises has been translated as *Epistemological Problems of Economics* (Mises 1933 [2003]). Helmut Wagner's English translation of Schutz's review appears in volume 4 of Schutz's *Collected Papers* (1996) as chapter 9, «Basic Problems of Political Economy».

with respect to the differences between Mises and his students, Mises was the only consistent thinker in terms of liberalism who made no concession. He has fought all kinds of interference by government. He has always been so radical that everyone has had as an argument against Mises that his proposals *are not possible politically in our times*. You have to make concessions (…) If somebody didn't accept liberalism in its purity, Mises suspected that he was a socialist, Marxist, etc. (Greaves 1958: 30. Italics in original).

Despite the value of Koppl's and Augier's insights, a brief remark with regard to methodology cannot be avoided. In order to attain a deeper understanding of a particular sociological theory, the researcher needs to analyze several dimensions. According to metatheorizing perspective (Ritzer 1991), the first dimension entails turning to the sociological theorist him/her-self and examining, among other things, networks and backgrounds, such as his/her biographical context, his/her life-worldly experience, his/her correspondence with colleagues, his/her institutional affiliations and professional involvement. In the case of Schutz's theory, this is the dimension developed by Koppl and Augier. However, this analysis should be supplemented by a second dimension: a detailed examination of the sociological theory itself, in our case, Schutzian texts. The third dimension concerns turning to other academic disciplines for ideas, tools, concepts, theories and the like that can be used in the analysis of Schutzian theory, for instance, the influences of the economic discussion in the context of the Austrian School of Economics and the *Mises Circle* and the subsequent impact of his work on the intellectual circles of interpretive economics and economic sociology. Finally, the fourth dimension calls for shifting to the more macro level to look at the larger society and the nature of its impact on sociological theorizing. For instance, by examining the sociohistorical context in which Schutz lived and worked and the national and international settings. In this regard, should also be recovered the impact of Schutzian historical context on his production, as well as the social, political and economic problems of his time. Taken together these dimensions would lead to a detailed understanding of Schutzian sociological theory. And, for this reason, we believe that the analysis of the intellectual context is insufficient to conclude that Schutz upheld liberal views. Due to space constraints, in the following lines we would like to introduce some theoretical elements that appear in Schutz's work which serve as a base to complement the first dimension analyzed by the authors. The elements presented do not allow us to make any conclusive statement about Schutzian alleged liberalism. On the contrary, they unveil the internal tensions present in Schutz's work.

To begin with, we must turn our attention to Austrian liberalism in order to analyze to what extent Schutzian reflections on social order, politics, soci-

ety and government reproduce the liberal views championed by Mises and, specially, by Hayek. As Koppl and Augier claim «Mises and his followers had set about to defend Austrian liberalism, which they interpreted as an offshoot of the British liberal tradition of David Hume and Adam Smith. The Austrian liberals of Mises and his circle defended property rights as essential to liberty. Far from being a threat, private property is necessary to ensure that power is dispersed and the dangers of state power are kept in check» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 17). In «The principles of Liberal social order» (1967), Hayek mentions this fact. At the beginning of the manuscript he also contends that liberalism «derives from the discovery of a self-generating or spontaneous order in social affairs (…), an order which made it possible to utilize the knowledge and skill of all members of society to a much greater extent than would be possible in any order created by central direction» (Hayek 1967: 162). Moreover, a distinction between *spontaneous order* and *organization or arrangement* is presented in the text as a differentiation between individual and common purposes: while organization or arrangement is based on commands, the spontaneous order is based on abstract rules which leave individuals free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes. The spontaneous order of a free society will contain many organizations (including government). However, the two principles of order cannot be mixed in any manner. The characteristic of a spontaneous order is that by using its ordering forces, i.e., the regularity of the conduct of its members, it is possible to achieve an order of a much more complex set of facts that it could ever be achieved by deliberate arrangement. Particularly, the order of the market rests not on common purposes but on reciprocity, that is «on the reconciliation of different purposes for the mutual benefit of the participants» (Hayek 1967: 163). It is in this regard that Hayek «criticizes the idea that orderly arrangements must be either born of nature or arranged through artifice. His alternative, spontaneous order, relies on the unintentional coordination of intentional actions» (Heath 2005: 69). As a consequence, the very idea of spontaneous order is linked to a political theory of liberalism (Heath 2005). As stated by Hayek: «free men who are to be allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes must therefore not be subject to rules which tell them what they must positively do, but only to rules which tell them what they must not do (…) the rules of just conduct thus merely delimit the range of permissible actions but do not determine the particular actions a man must take at a particular moment» (Hayek 1967: 167).

Schutzian review of Santayana's text on «Dominations and Powers» (Schutz 1964b) provides a first access to recover his position on social order, politics, society and government. In the same manner as the review of Mises' manuscript, «the presentation of Santayana's thought follows as closely as possible his own wording» (Brodersen 1964: xiv), i.e., without a clear critical intention.

Santayana's study of society and government is structured in three different levels: the generative, the militant and the rational orders. The three orders are, as Schutz claims, ideal-typical constructs in the established terminology of the social sciences. The first «Powers and Dominations» occurs in the generative order which is the order of growth, custom, and tradition. But as soon as the natural growth of the human family is disturbed or disrupted, and the dominance of a different social unit is substituted for it, complications may arise within traditional society. The new social order is no longer biological but is voluntarily imposed, because potentialities in the psyche now come to consciousness before they are habitually realized in action. There is therefore a contrast, and often a conflict, between the new prompting at work and the traditional convention. This conflict constitutes the militant order of society, which includes all voluntary associations that cross the generative order of society (not only military bands, but also political parties and religious sects). The generative order corresponds as a whole to Power because it gathers the emergence of those elements society needs; the militant order corresponds to Domination or to the emergence of control and the imposition of some powers upon others; the third one, corresponds to virtue, because democracy or representative government are displayed as the rational way to harmonize former elements (Moreno Moreno 2007: 134). As stated, these ideal-typical constructs are interwoven in reality. The construction of the three orders is only a methodical device adopted in order to study «Powers and Dominations» within each of them, as well as to mark the Domination which each order exercises over the rest. According to Schutz, it is in the militant order that the interplay of Dominations and Powers appears most clearly (Schutz 1964b: 210).

Schutz makes clear two attitudes toward Santayana's ideas. Santayana leaves the reader «in a state of bewilderment as well as of admiration» (Schutz 1964b: 224). Firstly, with bewilderment Schutz confronts Santayana's materialistic-naturalistic position, the key concept at the foundation of his conception of society and government. Schutz criticizes Santayana's metaphysical assumption that the generative order of society is the paramount social reality upon which all the other orders are founded. This is due to the attempt to deal with individuals from the point of view of a naturalist and materialist «who is not satisfied with an analysis of the world as taken for granted but aims at founding life, psyche, and spirit, in brief, human nature, upon the physical order of nature» (Schutz 1964b: 224-225). Secondly, admiration is due to his truly philosophical craftsmanship in organizing the problems of a philosophical anthropology around the existential experience of the human situation within the world; admiration is due also to the consistency with which social and political life is described in terms of a *drama* of will, psyche,

and spirit oscillating between the vacant, the indifferent, and the vital forms of liberty, and the forms of necessary and voluntary servitude (Schutz 1964b: 224). The realm of vital liberty – the inner liberty of the spirit, understood as the «awakened inner attention» – opens a chasm between the demands of the natural powers of primal will and the path open to action. This conflict is manifested in various forms of servitude. Government has traits of the militant order of society in which the drama of will manifests. This drama «of primal will, psyche, and spirit in the various realms of vacant, contingent, and vital liberty, undergoing the various forms of necessary and voluntary servitude, is one of the constituent factors of the genetic order of society» (Schutz 1964b: 213).

This is not the first time that Schutz recovers Santayana's thought. According to Schutz the mainstream of Husserl's argument in *Ideas II*, has similarities with certain themes presented by «William James, Santayana, Dewey, George H. Mead, Cooley, and others» (Schutz 1966: 36). Moreover, Schutz takes up the notion of animal faith proposed by Santayana in order to support his definition of intersubjectivity:

> Intersubjective experience, communication, sharing of something in common presupposes, thus, in the last analysis faith in the Others truthfulness, animal faith in the sense of Santayana; it presupposes that I take for granted the Other's possibility of bestow upon one of the innumerable sub-universes the accent of reality, and on the other hand that he, the Other, takes for granted that I, too, have open possibilities for defining what is my dream, my phantasy, my real life. This is the last insight into the intersubjective dialectic of reality (Schutz 1964a: 155).

This theoretical evidence suggests that Schutz has strong connection with Santayana's ideas of animal faith. And animal faith, in turn, has a connection with Keynesian notion «animal spirit» (Padua 2014: 37). However, we cannot be conclusive on this point and these guidelines need to be further developed. What is important to mention here is that an argument focused on the intellectual context of Schutzian thought should be further enriched with an analysis of the conceptual and philosophical work of the author. Taking this dimension into account, it should be nuanced, as Wagner does, the statement that the mere membership of Schutz to *Mises Circle* constitutes evidence that Schutz was a liberal thinker. According to Wagner, what kept Schutz within the *Mises Circle* were «its underlying interpretive assumptions» in terms of which economic processes were explained. It is with this backdrop in mind, that we can support Wagner's idea that: «Schutz accepted marginal utility theory in principle. However, in contrast to von Hayek and in agreement

with many other students of von Mises, he did not subscribe to the extreme economic liberalism of his teacher» (Wagner 1983: 12).

As seen previously, Schutz appreciates Santayana's reflections on conflict and drama of will that the author highlights as characteristic of social and political life and which is described in terms of a *drama* of will, psyche, and spirit that oscillates between the vital forms of liberty and the forms of necessary and voluntary servitude. As I have shown elsewhere (López 2014a), another kind of tension or conflict appears in Schutz's early work as one of the preliminary conditions of social order. And this tension has certain similarities with the one proposed by Santayana. In Schutz's words, the multiplicity of social persons that «revolve» around the nucleus of the self range from the intimate person to the full development of the process of anonymization in the social world. The incorporation of the external world means that the person finds:

> givennesses and structures that do not stem from me, myself, but instead are pregiven from without forcing on me an attitude along with an *attention à la vie* coming from the things themselves but not from the sources of my *durée*, from my intimate person, and that are, so to speak, imposed upon me (Schutz 2013a: 235-236).

At all levels, we find «a continuous transition from the absolute intimate person to the highest anonymous behavior» and «the tension continues» to the highest anonymous contemporary world. There is a development of the process of anonymization in the social world. Supplementary typifications appear because it is not I alone who carry out my own self-chosen plans, but I work together «with others and against others, also caring and setting goals not just for my self but also for others» (Schutz 2013a: 237). This issue «concerns the problem of intrinsic relevance (…) in contradistinction to the type of relevance imposed» (Barber 2013: footnote 139). The process of anonymization in the social world involves imposed relevances which prescribe our personal choice:

> custom and culture, customary and self-imposed duties and rights, inclination and upbringing, prescribe certain of our attitudes toward our fellow human beings, our personal choice and the external need assign us our place in the social cosmos with which we are *satisfied* or which we may strive to *change* (Schutz 2013a: 243-244).

As a citizen of my community, for instance, «as someone who belongs to my political party, as a member of my church, over against these contemporary, more or less anonymous institutions, *I take up attitudes that have their origins in quite distinctly anchored levels of my self*» (Schutz 2013b: 247. Emphasis added).

Occasionally, it would seem that all of the sides of my self are independent persons with their own wishes and wills. However, «it is consistent with the unity and unification of self-consciousness that always other sides of ourselves; other moments of our personality, are put into play in our daily social life while other and perhaps more essential sides, where not entirely excluded, are thus still in such measure crowded in the background» (Schutz 2013b: 249-250). There is the diversity of standardized or normative attitudes demanded of me at every step by living in the cultural world of daily life (for instance, If I am to travel by train, then I must conduct myself according to the prescriptions required when traveling by train). In everyday life, specific attitudes in their standardization and normativeness are imposed on us. They touch upon a peripheral sphere of ourselves, we incorporate them on the basis of our education, inclinations, our settling of goals, without thinking too much about them. The ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of the law and of the economy are of an entirely similar nature.

In short, a tension or interplay between intrinsic and imposed relevances constitutes one of the preliminary conditions of social order in Schutzian scheme. The freedom of the individual to choose what he/she is interested in, is confronted with the fact that we work «with others and against others», and this incorporation of the external social world involves that imposed relevances prescribe our personal choice. Among the diversity of standarized or normative attitudes which are imposed upon us, the state, the law and the economy establish the ultimate goals of our bearing. However, the tension is reflected in the fact that we could be satisfied or we could strive to change the imposed duties and rights. It is important to mention that this tension, which may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts, should be empirically explored.

The connection between Schutzian theory of relevances and Hayekian theory of spontaneous order has also been explored by Mori (2009). The author suggests that «Schutz should have already understood Hayek's view on so-called given data as the problem of relevance» (Mori 2009: 529). Additionally, he points out that the relevance theory itself «leads to a *spontaneous* order». In our view, there is not in Hayek's theory such a tension between intrinsic and imposed relevances. Free men who are to be allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes must not be subject to duties, that is, to rules which tell them what they must positively do. In this respect, the main dangers of state power are pointed out. On the contrary, Schutzian theory of relevances points out to the very existence of a conflict and a tension within social order between intrinsic relevances, which are related to the freedom of the individual to choose what he/she is interested in, and imposed relevances, which have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as signifi-

cant although they are not related to our own interests. For these reasons, we argue that it is no possible to explain the theory of the intrinsic and imposed relevances as an extension of Hayekian theory of unintended consequences. There is not a self-regulation or reconciliation of the different interests and purposes nor an unintentional coordination of intentional actions within social order but interplay of intrinsic and imposed relevances. Pointing out this deficiency in the economic theory of the self-regulated or spontaneous markets from Schutzian sociology not only allows placing Schutz on the same critical line as the new economic sociology regarding the marginalist economic school, as it supposes the existence of self-regulated markets and of a *homo economicus* who organizes his/her actions according to perfect rational criteria, but mainly, it may be asserted that, in contrast with Hayek and Mises, Schutz did not subscribe to extreme liberalism in his intellectual context.

Final comments

In this work, we aimed to synthesize a phenomenological program for sociological analysis of economic action and of the order of the market processes which serves as a foundation for the development of a phenomenologically oriented economic sociology. In this regard, we showed that there is in Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology an economic sociology in embryonic form which has not been deeply explored and which can build bridges between sociology and economics.

Firstly, we showed, against the background of the *Mises Circle*, that Schutz's epistemological concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but also at economics in particular. Social scientist both economist and sociologist need to explain the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective interpretation and the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor within the social world. The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of Schutzian theory of social sciencies, of sociology and of economics. Secondly, Schutz's contribution to reflections on economic sociology is also based on the subsequent reappropriation of his work. The subsequent recovery of Schutz's work shows its relevance both for theoretical and empirical research in economic sociology. For this reason, a phenomenological program for theoretical and empirical research of the market phenomena from Schutzian sociology must incorporate his reflections on intersubjectivity and notions such as common-sense of knowledge, the theory of the ideal types, the theory of expectations, the theory of relevances and the theory of symbols. Finally, as regards the problem of coordination as a way to approach the order of the market processes, we demonstrated that Schutzian sociology makes it possible to point

out the limitations of the economic theory of the spontaneous or self-regulated market orders to such an extent that it can be asserted that Schutz did not subscribe to extreme economic liberalism in his intellectual context. This recovery and systematization of Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between sociology and economics- many times ignored in sociological reflections on economics, can contribute with new elements not only to think from a theoretical point of view but also to address the economic phenomena empirically.

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Alfred Schütz con la moglie Ilse Heime, sposata nel 1926

Biography and Action:
A Schutzian Perspective to Life-world

Hermílio Santos

Starting with the discussion on free-will and action, this paper discusses how Alfred Schutz approaches these issues for the comprehension of life-world. After a brief overview on how contemporary philosophers as Ernst Tugendhat and Ulrich Pothast face these problem, it is argued that for Schutz action plays a central role in his conception of life-world. The article goes further and advocates for the importance of exploring individual biographies as a way to provide an accurate understanding of actions. By the end of this text, it is suggested that the biographical narrative approach, as proposed by Fritz Schütze, as well as by Gabriele Rosenthal, is an important contribution to the Schutz' perspective of the life-world and to adequately explore the most different social phenomena.

Contemporary thinkers devoted their attention to the problem of action, in which the question on how free individuals are to make choices plays a central role. Although still remaining a disputed issue, the sociology of Alfred Schutz discusses mainly the genesis of action as a central matter for the comprehension of social phenomena. The aim of this article is to focus on how Schutz deals with this subject, arguing that understanding individuals' biography is seen by the Austrian sociologist as the most adequate way to approach it. It should also be emphasized how sociologists have been tried recently to go further and make the Schutzian perspective feasible for empirical research approaching the comprehension of individuals' action.

On free-will and action

Even though considered as a classical issue, some contemporary philosophers have dedicated themselves to the discussion of free-will. Ernst Tugendhat (1992), for instance, conceived this problem as intimately related to the meaning of imputability (*Zurechnungsfähigkeit*), that is best understood through the elucidation of the spheres of praxis: the moral sphere, the sphere of the penal law and the sphere of the practical reflection in general.

In the moral sphere it can be seen a deep disagreement between Tugendhat and the Kantian school, since for Tugendhat the moral exigency implies im-

putability, given the fact that if we act immorally, we could have also acted morally.

The question of imputability is also relevant for the penal law, made problematic through the expression "he/she could have acted differently". The establishment of a punishment is dependent on the understanding of this expression – in the case that the punishment is legitimate at all. Anthony Kenny (1978) lists four meanings for the use of the verb "to can" that appear in this sentence. One of these meanings indicates the presence of the capacity as well as the opportunity. It is precisely this meaning of "can" that is discussed here, that is to say, when free-will implies the capacity of acting in another way. In this sense, to be able to do X freely, one has to have the capacity as well as the opportunity of not doing X. Kenny defines this meaning of "can" as the starting point to establish the imputability or not of someone facing his/her own act. However, it would not be fair to consider someone responsible for his/her own acts if he/she lacked the relevant freedom, in this case, i.e., the possibility to act differently.

Ulrich Pothast (1987) argues about the conditions to talk about "guilt", especially if someone has decided to do the "wrong thing", although he/she could have decided for the "right thing". In conclusion, Pothast idea is not only different, but it also opposes the argument presented by Kenny, which is already anticipated in the title of his book *Die Unzulänglichkeit der Freiheitsbeweise* (*The insufficient demonstrations of liberty*). It seems that for Pothast, the expression "he/she could have done differently" doesn't make any sense. He suggests as an alternative "punishment" for criminal acts, to substitute the penalty by a therapeutic treatment or the introduction of the mechanism of a "social quarantine". The most positive side of this kind of "punishment" is that the criminal will be treated as a "friend" or "guest", since he/she will not stay isolated for a very long time, and during this period there will be always someone talking to the intern and willing to restore a trust relationship.

A question that arises here is how not to recognise the imputability and at the same time to admit any kind of punishment, even a therapeutic treatment? Assuming the definition of Tugendhat for imputability (understood as the responsibility of someone for an event) or the definition proposed by Kenny for the term "responsibility" (to be subject of a punishment), it can be asserted that it is inappropriate to think that Pothast tends to deny the possibility of imputability, even if he wants to. His attempt is a contradiction, since that to deny the imputability would imply in not admitting even the possibility that someone could be object of a forced therapeutic process because of a criminal act. Therefore, the disagreement between Pothast and Kenny and between Pothast and Tugendhat is not very concerned with the existence or not of imputability, but on how to deal with those that violate laws.

There is another sphere, in which the concept of imputability is not directly concerned: the practical reflection in general. What is relevant here is the possibility to act freely. As proposed by Aristotle, two conditions should be considered when establishing limits for acting freely in a determined situation: a) that we know what we are doing and b) that we do not act under coercion. But Aristotle was referring just to the external coercion. Things become more complex if one introduces the phenomenon of internal coercion. In this case it is also referred as a compulsory action, when there are obstacles to the extension of the autonomy, i.e., for the extension of the possibility of thinking and to make effective the result of the thought. For some sociologists, the idea of an internal coercion explains the limits for an action without visible restrictions.

Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu represent two schools of sociological thought that seems to postulate the idea of an internal coercion. In his structuralist perspective, Giddens (2003) conceive the structure not as been external to the individuals, but as mnemic traces made visible in social practices. In this sense, individuals incorporate restrictions "imposed" by others. Operating this way, individuals anticipate the limits for their action, restricting the possibility of talking about freedom of action. Because of this internalization process individuals are rarely aware of the restrictions they face in everyday life. Giddens (1993) asserts that individuals are in some way compelled to choose and define the lifestyle that synthesize their place in the world; here lifestyle implies a whole range of practices, not only because such practices fulfil utilitarian necessities, but because it gives material forms to a particular narrative of self-identity. However, based in his structuration theory, this definition is only apparently dependent on individuals' own criteria.

Another influent sociologist postulated the idea of a social process which result is the creation of a kind of internal limitation not only to the free action, but also to the free-will, considered here as a necessary and preliminary moment of the action without restriction. The concept of *habitus*, as employed by Bourdieu (1980), i.e. a system of socially constituted dispositions that generates and unifies the whole of practices and ideologies of an agent, defines the agents' practices in a regular and constant manner (Crossley 2001: 83). Bourdieu states that *habitus* makes possible the production of all thoughts, of all perceptions and also of all actions; in this sense, it seems to enormously restrict the possibility of individuals' interpretation of their own *habitus*. Exploring concrete possibilities of internal coercion, Bourdieu presents the idea of a symbolic violence, in which the masculine domination is just an example. According to Bourdieu (1999), the subordination of women in contemporary societies is so deeply sedimented that it doesn't need to be made explicit with the use of more visible instruments of domination, as the physical or psycho-

logical violence. Through the consent of the dominated person, the masculine domination is exercised without the conscience of that.

In opposition to those philosophers and sociologists that could be considered affiliated to a "soft determinism" (Kenny 1978), Alfred Schutz seems to solve this problem assuming that individuals, distinct to the objects of the natural sciences, have the faculty to interpret the world and to interpret themselves in the world. The interpretive work of individuals implies, in the Schutzian sociology, having at their disposal a system of relevance and typification that is part of what is transmitted to the members of an internal group through education (Schutz 1979: 119). Although both concepts refer to distinct problems, we can affirm that relevance and typification are elements of the same system, whose role is precisely to "naturalize" or harmonize social life. According to Nasu (2008: 92), relevance is the most important problem for the phenomenological investigation of life-world, since it implies asking for the ways individuals experience objects and events around them, which means how they perceive, recognize, interpret, know and act in everyday life through the selection of facts in each situation. The experience itself occurs as a process of choice and not as a fatality or as a passive reception of data and information, due to the fact that individuals choose which elements of meaning should receive their attention, that is, which elements among those involved in a situation are made relevant. In this sense, the investigation of the motives for an action plays a key role.

The Schutzian sociology presents an explicit pragmatic component, since the individual is considered from the point of view of action, or of the imminent action. Individuals are neither adrift nor submerged under the stream of the facts they experience, since they are "equipped" with the instruments needed to orient them. These instruments are the relevance and the typification system, which selects the knowledge on hand, that is relevant to their action (Nasu 2008: 91); thus, pure events or facts do not exist, but only interpreted facts and events.

Action and life-world

It should be clarified that Schutz assumes that the raw material for the action, not being a trivial one, is the "objectivities and events which are already found …" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3), which represents a limit for the possibility of free action. This limitation is given, for instance, by the pre-existence of a natural language in a culture in which individuals are socialized or even by the acts and the results of actions of others. This conception gives the idea that individuals are not isolated objects, on the opposite, they are seen in

their horizons, which are submitted to the interpretation of the individuals themselves. This context is called by Schutz as the reality of the everyday life-world, in which "man can engage himself and which he can change while he operates in it…" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3).

Life-world (*Lebenswelt*) is the pre-existing intersubjective world that an individual "takes-for-granted" in a "natural attitude" (Schutz 2003: 182), recognizing objective elements of life as laws and customs that can guide the individual's action, as well as the conditions for the action (for instance, the other's intention and his or her own). A natural attitude in everyday life does not suspend the belief in the existence of elements from the environment; to the contrary, what is suspended is precisely the doubt concerning the existence of these things (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 27), since all past experiences are lived in the present as if they were ordered, as knowledge or as expectation that something in the near future will occur exactly the same way it occurred in the past. However, everything that is taken for granted in the life-world is surrounded by uncertainty (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 9). Thus, a natural attitude occurs simultaneously to the interpretation conducted by individuals, mostly based on the stock of knowledge available to individuals and on their previous experiences and of others with whom they are directly or indirectly in contact (for instance, parents, teachers, teachers of teachers, etc.), that means, based on the knowledge on hand (*Wissen vorhand*), which serves as a "reference code" (Schutz 1979: 72) for the individual. In this sense, this knowledge system – as the result of the sedimentation of subjective experiences in the life-world (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 123) – assumes for those individuals that recognize themselves as internal members of a group, community or movement an aspect of coherence, clarity and consistency sufficient for all to have a reasonable chance to understand and to be understood (Schutz 1979: 81). This way, the assumption that the sociology of Schutz would emphasize a too individualist perspective, "disconnecting" the individual from his/her reality (the social context) is obviously at best a misreading of his writings.

Schutz dedicated himself not only to argue for the action as an expression of freedom, even with its constraints and limitations, but he went further and proposed that the sociology should investigate the motivation for the actions. The comprehension of a social phenomenon would not be accurate, from a schutztian sociological perspective, without having as starting point the interpretation of the interpretation of those with experience in the phenomenon under investigation. Proceeding this way would avoid replacing the experience of the actors by the view of the scientific interpreter, since any sociological study would be possible by simply replicating the ordinary view of common sense.

To investigate the motivation for an action is to consider the subjective meaning for the agent, since it is intrinsic to the idea of action, at least in a We-

berian perspective, that when action is concerned the agent assign a meaning to his/her action and, at the same time, gives a direction to it, which should be understood by others as meaningful. However, Weber was not very accurate in explaining how sociologists should proceed to access the actor's subjective perspective and reach the construction of meanings. Schutz proposes that the subjective meaning of individual actors could be approached through the knowledge accumulated in direct and indirect experiences. Experience is not restricted to the practical events in which the individuals were personally involved, but also events in which their contemporaries or even their predecessors were involved, transmitted in some way (Schutz 2004: 69). It is exactly the knowledge acquired through experiences that will organize the different levels of relevance mobilized by individuals in all situation of everyday life. At the same time, the constitution of the meaning process could be accessed by the social scientific observer through the knowledge of the motivation of individual actors (Dreher 2011: 493). Here, we see how Schutz developed the sociology inaugurated by Weber when the Austrian sociologist proposed the distinction between "in-order-to motives" and "because motives" (Schutz 2004: 110). While the in-order-to motives refer to the actor's future expectation, the because motives concerns the past experiences and convictions anchored in the environmental and socio-historical circumstances in which the actor was involved (Dreher 2011: 493; see also Barber 2004).

The distinction between these two kinds of motivations offers a theoretical key to understanding the complex process of individual decision-making and action. By considering the temporality, the scientific observer obtains access to different aspects involved in the action, especially the past experience and the future expectation. The time aspect is probably only rarely incorporated as a clear criterion for defining a guide of action and is maintained implicit, even though time is a constitutively part of meaning (Muzzetto 2006: 5) as will be see next. In this sense, sociology is about making things explicit, through theoretical considerations and arguments or through empirical evidences, even if individual actors are not aware of all these aspects involved in their action.

Even after decades of these contributions from Schutz to sociological theory, we still see a marginal interest of social researchers for this temporal aspect. Here, again, most sociologists – when and if they put the question about the reason for having done something at all – are not very much convinced that the answer or at least a significant part of it can be found in the agents themselves. Even after the emergence of many sophisticated approaches in sociology, the most influential ones are still very loyal to the precursors of the discipline that tends to refer the question to an external, collective sphere, as classes, hierarchies, culture, social inequalities, gender, race, etc. It could be mentioned several recent examples of researches that do not consider both

the subjective component of the agents and at the same time the distinct time lived by the individual actors as a key issue for the comprehension of a social phenomena.

A balance of the literature on social movements, for instance, shows that these analyses grant a privilege to approach this phenomenon almost exclusively from a systemic perspective. Paradoxically, an analytical dimension that is left aside by many in approaching social movements concerns the comprehension of the everyday life-world of those engaged in such movements. To know how a movement acts and the meaning of social movements for contemporary societies is not the same as to know how the members of this movement act, and the meaning of the movement for them. Knowing how the participants of a movement act means to know their motivation and their interpretation of the movement itself, which means to understand the subjective meaning they conferred to the movement, considering the time perspective in this interpretation. To offer an analysis on social movements based on the subject's perspective could open new possibilities to understand current societies. Actually, this is possibly the only way to conduct an investigation that could deserve the label of sociology, since the natural sciences as well as the positivist-oriented social sciences doesn't assign a relevant role to the experience of individuals to understand the social reality. The same is valid for any other social phenomena, such as migration, the practice of violence, unemployment, for instance, since an "insider's" perspective is the only way to get access to the experiences of those that are intrinsic part of any social phenomena. Even if this aspect is made clear in the writings of Schutz, a persistent critic on this theoretical perspective is that it doesn't sufficiently consider the social context or the social structure. This kind of criticism assumes that the elements of a social structure are made valid without the active intervention of individuals, as if it could be considered as "something" external to those living in a specific time and place. In a schutzian perspective we could state, on the opposite, that there is no social context without the meaning assigned by individual actors, or at least its existence is sociologically irrelevant without the consideration of the subjective meaning, since no social context is socially inanimate.

Indeed, sociologists who dedicated to investigate and discuss social action are not totally inattentive regarding the motivation aspect of action when they discuss or ask for the reason of an action. However, not considering the temporality significantly constraints the observers to be satisfied with a partial answer to the individual's reasons for the action. When dealing with the problem of the reasons for action, social scientists are usually much more concerned with the future expectations of the agent, there is to say, with the in-order-to motives. There is no doubt about the value of this topic for any sociological investigation. What is, then, the conflict pointed out by sociolo-

gists when dealing with the concept of the "because motives"? One problem might be the fact that sociologists are permanently afraid to be considered as been performing a kind of psychology. Another conflict might be the fact that questioning about the "because motives" implies two kinds of difficulties: a philosophical and a methodological problem. The philosophical question refers to the issue discussed at the beginning of the text, i.e., the scope of responsibility from individual actors for their own actions, which is of difficult solution since it implies convictions already encrusted in the life trajectories of the researchers and is only hardly changed. To argue about the "because motives" would lead to admit a reasonable spectrum of individual responsibility. The methodological difficulty concerns the sociological access to the socio-historical context of the individual actor. In many different passages Schutz indicates that the biography of individual actors is what should be considered in order to obtain any knowledge about the past experiences, especially in the articles *The Problem of Relevance* (Schutz 2004: 69), *Choosing Among Projects of Action* (Schutz 2004: 251) and *The Biographical Situation* (Schutz 2004: 208). It should not be forgotten that any biography is located in time and space and cannot be understood without taking into consideration its historical background (Schutz 2004: 209). This warning is just to remember that there are some relevant aspects of the structure and genesis of biographies that are singular and specific for an individual, but others that are shared by those living in the same socio-historical period. For an accurate comprehension of social and historical phenomena, it is important to incorporate the biographical component in the sociological investigation.

Biography and the motivation for action

Biographical situations play a particularly important role in the definition of individuals' relevance system. Of course, part of one's biographical experience is determined not by the individuals themselves, for instance the language in which he/she was socialized and which is considered as his/her "mother tongue", or the legal system in all locations the person may visit or live, or even the different means of transportation used in these places. In these cases, individual actors have to deal with imposed relevances (Schutz 2004: 92). However, how the mother language will be in fact used, or the interpretation and the relation to the legal interdictions or even the evaluation of the transport used are not defined *in absentia* of the users themselves. These experiences can be considered as unique, even though it can be shared with others, it cannot be shared with all individual actors. Biographical experiences are an integral part of all future situations, but it doesn't mean that all

these experiences will be maintained intact in memory or even that the meaning of these past experiences will be preserved. The opposite is what might be the case, due to the fact that new experiences play an important role when the individual is mentally reviewing what occurred in the past. In this sense, even the past is slippery and may occupy another place and role in the present and in the future; in short: past experiences are constantly reinterpreted and the result of this process is that, to understand as much as possible the action of individual actors or of a group of individuals that share some experiences in common, their biographical experiences must be considered. Even though the intention of accessing these kind of register of the memory is not to necessarily obtain the facts as they occurred in the past, the importance of this methodological approach is ratter to gain perspective from a primary source (those that experienced events under investigation), their interpretation of their own experience, that should not be crystallized as the most reliable report of the past. It doesn't matter if the discourse about the actor's own past corresponds to concrete facts; important is that it will be confronted to reliable narratives that correspond to the interpretation of those that narrate.

Even referring to a subjective interpretation, the sociology of Schutz cannot be accused of not giving the adequate attention to individuals' socio-historical experience. Unlike the most influential contemporary sociological theories, especially the new versions of critical theory and the post-structuralism approaches, the social and historical experiences, as well as the social context with its constraints, are incorporated and should be incorporated in any sociological (empirical) inquiry following the writings of Schutz. Biographical experiences are the key component to track the motivations for any action, due to the fact that motivational relevance is made out of sediments of previous experiences, which were relevant for the person (Schutz 2004: 115). Not all experiences can be considered meaningful, only the already lived experiences when viewed in retrospective (Muzzetto 2006: 10). To say that experiences are meaningful implies that it is possible for individuals to distinguish and accentuate them, which means to confront them with other experiences when it is not possible to manage current experiences (see Muzzetto 2006). This can only be undertaken if the experience can be delimited through what Schutz calls "an attention act". So, to assign meaning to an experience is to interpret it *ex post* through the recovering of the memory.

Although Schutz did not delineate instruments and guides for empirical research based on his phenomenological-oriented sociology (Hitzler and Eberle 2000: 117), this can be undertaken through biographical narratives, since the approach makes it possible to recover the most important elements for the subjective interpretation, i.e. the system of relevance and the typification process.

Biographical and everyday life narrative approach, although very influential in European sociology, especially in the German scenario, mostly based on the sociology of Fritz Schütze (1983), is still unknown in many national sociological communities. The biographical narrative approach is capable offering a very important access to the narrator's interpretation, but also to the connections between individuals and their groups, communities and movements (Carvalho 2003: 293) in a specific period of time. Nonetheless, it must be considered that any narrative is an interpretation viewed from a specific biographical situation, since a biography is a description of processes and lived experiences by the individual him/herself. In this sense, biography is someone's "subjective interpretation of their own life trajectory" (Born 2001: 245). To approach a problem this way implies a research concerned not only with the narrator – since his/her interpretation on life-world is what will be analyzed – but also with the researcher perspective, who plays simultaneously the role of the interpreter and a partner in the construction of a narrative. Individuals whose narratives are the object of analysis are guided by their own relevance system. Here, the analysis of everyday verbal language (vocabulary and syntax) permits the access to the comprehension of the relevance and typification system, since "everyday life is, above all, life with language" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 51).

Fritz Schütze is the leading German sociologist from a group of researchers that in the 1980s at the University of Bielefeld proposed the approach known as "biographical narrative"; the main contributions were a) to propose an specific way to conduct open interviews in a way that the relevance system could be expressed without the systematic intervention of the relevance system of the researcher as usual in most qualitative research using interviews, and b) to introduce in the sociological analysis the distinction between different kinds of discourses that appear during an interview, i.e., arguments, description and narrative itself (Schütze 1983). This distinction comes from the socio-linguistic and is essential for the sociological approach based on the experience of actors having as starting point their own narrative, since it is the discursive resource more strictly connected to the chain of actions (Rosenthal 2004: 53; Labov and Waletzky 1973), i.e., it is the kind of discourse most related to the way the narrator presents his/her interpretation of the development of facts (Küsters 2009: 25).

According to Gabriele Rosenthal, whose writings brought enormous contributions to the biographical narrative approach, especially in the process of analysis by distinguishing the life history and narrated life story (see Rosenthal 1995 and 2004), the comprehension of individual action requires investigating the actor's subjective perspective as well as the course of his/her action. That means to investigate experiences considering the meaning that individu-

al gave to their action by the time it occurred and the biographical context in which the narrators place their experiences (Rosenthal 2004: 49). In this sense, the resource of biographical narrative can be assumed as a possibility of combining a diachronic (the biography) with a synchronic approach (the interpreted biography from a biographically specific moment: the present).

Regarding the past is in some way an interruption of the flux of *durée*, when the biographer makes his/her acts objects of reflection (see Muzzetto 2006: 10). In this sense, dealing with one's own biography is a systematically way to define provinces of meaning, which are delineated as past experiences. As Muzzetto remembers quite well, "past experiences are not stored in this 'stock' at random. Nor are they isolated experiences. Experiences are, on the contrary, interconnected through manifold types of relationships…" (Muzzetto 2006: 16). However, all these connections are not always explicit for those who are systematically presenting their own past experiences. In part, the act of speaking of events that occurred in the past is already a constitution of meaning, but a great part of it can only be accessed through the explicit reconstruction of these experiences by a scientific observer, a sociologist for instance.

With the analytical distinction introduced by Rosenthal in the biographical narrative approach just mentioned – between the experienced life history and what the "biographer" narrates about it (or the life story) – it is possible to make explicit in the biographical flow important elements for the comprehension of different kinds of social actions in a specific historical period and in a specific social context. The starting point is conducting the interview in a way to avoid what we could call a "colonization of the biographer" with the relevance system of the researcher. Of course, in any interaction there is a pre-given exchange of perspectives, but the process of invasion can be minimized as much as possible. The way found and used by biographical narrative researchers – trying to maintain loyal to the epistemological principles of the Schutz sociology – is to conduct the interview without been anchored to the research interest. It means, defined that the person could potentially provide reports from his/her own experience of a phenomenon under investigation, that it doesn't matter which subject is being explored (for example, migration, violence, unemployment, etc.), the task of the researcher is to stimulate the interviewees to tell their all life, in as many details as possible (for more information on how to conduct biographical narrative interviews, see, Rosenthal 1995; 2004; 2008). Proceeding this way it will be more feasible that the interviewee will expose spontaneously elements of his/her thematic field.

The thematic field, as postulated by Gurwitsch (see Rosenthal, 2008), is the main structure of someone's biographical presentation, even if the interviewee

is not very much aware of it. An important contribution of Rosenthal to the comprehension of individual's life-world is to "decant" the large volume of information obtained during a biographical interview through several analytical steps. In this process, the already mentioned distinction between the possible discourses used in a life's presentation – especially arguments, description and narrative – plays a central role. An advantage of this kind of distinction is that these discourse modalities may allow the access to the variation of temporalities in the biographical presentation. For instance, arguing can indicate the interest of the biographer to justify in the present an idea or a past action when facing the researcher or an interlocutor in general. On the other hand, Schütze and the socio-linguistics prefer to call narrative the kind of discourse that register the action on the move that occurred in the past, doesn't matter when in the past occurred the reported action, important is that it is possible to the interlocutor to follow the sequentiallity of an event through acts of the biographer him/herself or of any other person. Having these elements available for analytical means for the social researcher, to deal with important elements of the interviewee's subjective interpretation of the life-world. The analysis follows the principle of abduction. Unlike the inductive proceeding, the empirical material collected, in this case, biographical narrations, does not aim to verify hypothesis formulated in advance, nor sustains hypothesis originated from a theory, as in the deductive approach. According to the abductive approach, proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce and largely adopted in biographical narratives researches, as well as by the so-called *Grounded Theory*, by Glaser and Strauss, the empirical material guides the formulation and tests of hypothesis able to make the case under investigation understandable (Rosenthal 2008: 58). Proceeding this way makes it possible to uncover the complexity of social phenomena by bringing new knowledge provided from the reality itself.

If Schutz brought to the social theory the pathways of how to understand the everyday life-world, the German sociologists, especially Schütze and Rosenthal, provided a feasible approach on how the social researcher could have access to it. The combination of the Schutz theory of life-world and the biographical narrative approach (as proposed by Schütze and incremented by Rosenthal) represents the enlargement of the horizons and possibilities of a sociology anchored in the writings of Alfred Schutz. Although very well established, especially in the German social sciences community, and internationally recognized, posses the potential of refreshing the sociological contribution to understand the complex dynamics of social realities.

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Alfred Schutz

Peter L. Berger

Thomas Luckmann

Schutz, Berger and Luckmann.
The question of the natural attitude

Luigi Muzzetto

The purpose of this paper is to highlight different interpretations of the fundamental characteristics of the natural attitude, as formulated by Berger and Luckmann, and Alfred Schutz respectively. The first part of the paper explores the notion of taken-for-granted in the everyday life-world in The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann and The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil by Berger. The two essays show the presence of a articulated vision based on the same theoretical matrix. The second part of the paper analyses the essential characteristics of the natural attitude in the work of Husserl and Schutz. Although Berger and Luckmann are commonly viewed as being Schutzian scholars, their work actually presents significant differences, not only with respect to Husserl, but also to Schutz himself.

Part I

Among the various aspects of Schutz's work on the "life-world" which require study, the nature and characteristics of taken-for-granted knowledge is undoubtedly a key element. A clear vision of the semantic spectrum of this concept, and that of the natural attitude, is essential for a correct interpretation of the entire structure of the life-world.

The first part of the paper aims to show how the well-known essay by Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, follows a similar theoretical path to that of Schutz, but presents significant differences with regard to key aspects of the latter's work. It significantly modifies Schutz's theoretical framework on the essential point of the type of belief that belongs to the natural attitude, yet without discussing this change, or discussing the differences with respect to Schutz's original vision. Berger's essay *The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil* moves further away from Schutz's ideas but can be interpreted as a legitimate development of the model presented in *The Social Construction*.

The change in the original theoretical framework, together with the fact that the work of Berger and Luckmann is commonly viewed as an organic

development of Schutz's ideas, contributes to creating misunderstandings and clouding the concepts of taken-for-granted and natural attitude, which occupy an important place in Schutzian thinking[1]. First of all let's take a look at the main issues mentioned in *The Social Construction*.

1. In the introduction the two authors repeatedly underline the difference between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge: the first deals with issues that concern the methodology of the social sciences, and therefore philosophy, while the second regards issues to do with sociology as an empirical science. The central terms of the work, according to the authors, are "reality" and "knowledge". For the actor living in the world of daily life, his world is "real", "albeit in different degrees, and he 'knows', with different degrees of confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics". All of this is therefore taken-for-granted by the actor. «The philosopher, of course, will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this 'reality' and this 'knowledge'» (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 13). The sociologist takes a different stance: "One could say that the sociological understanding of 'reality' and 'knowledge' falls somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the street and that of the philosopher" (ibid. 14). In the sense that the sociology of knowledge cannot simply adopt the actor's perspective on reality and knowledge of it, or investigate these phenomena on an ontological or epistemological level. «Within the frame of reference of sociology as an empirical science it is possible to take this reality as given, […], without further inquiring about the foundations of this reality, which is a philosophical task» (ibid. 33). The sociology of knowledge has to deal with the relativity of reality and knowledge with respect to the social context and «the general ways by which 'realities' are taken as 'known' in human societies» (ibid. 15).

Berger and Luckmann, therefore, separate the sociology of knowledge from phenomenology. But, as I hope will become clear further on, in *The Social Construction* the phenomenon of taken-for-grantedness is not fully investigated, and retains a high degree of indeterminacy.

I cannot say whether this is the *necessary* consequence of the separation between sociology and phenomenology. But it is certain that Schutz indicates the *need* for "a philosophical analysis" to capture the world of daily life. A need that therefore regards the matter in hand (Schutz 1962a: 117). Only a philosophical (phenomenological) analysis enables us to explore the self-evidence of the natural attitude and highlight its characteristics. As Natanson underlines,

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[1] I analysed some aspects of this topic in my work *Il Soggetto e il sociale. Alfred Schütz e il mondo taken-for-granted* (Muzzetto 2006).

the phenomenology of the natural attitude is not «simply a methodology but an anatomy of man's existence with his fellow-man in the midst of everyday life, within what Husserl called the 'natural attitude'» (Natanson 1974: 35).

The need stressed by Schutz is disregarded by Berger and Luckmann. I therefore believe that Endress is more than justified in arguing that it is necessary to move beyond the different interpretations of the path opened by Schutz, in "protosociology" and "phenomenological sociology" (the author proposes a "phenomenologically based sociology" which takes full account of the complexity of Schutz's vision, something which is not captured by the two previous positions) (Endress 2005a: 4).

To return to the work of Berger and Luckmann, the first chapter, dedicated to the foundations of our knowledge of the world of everyday life, «is based on Schutz, as developed by Luckmann in *Die Structuren der Lebenswelt, in toto*» (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 219). It is specified that the considerations made in this chapter regard "the philosophical prolegomena", that are «in themselves, presociological» (ibid. 34). Considerations that represent the theory of finite provinces of meaning in a nutshell. It should be underlined that the authors report Schutz's ideas without any critical annotations, including the question of the natural attitude, and the belief that characterise it[2]. In these pages there is no significant departure from the ideas of Schutz.

The second chapter opens what Berger and Luckmann view as the more strictly sociological component. And in this case, though Schutz is the key frame of reference, their interpretation draws on various authors from Marx to Hegel, Durkheim, Weber, Mead, Plessner and Gehlen, to name a few of the main authors.

Given the relevance for the issue we are addressing I will refer to only two areas of the general theoretical framework.

a) The first regards the central aspect of Gehlen's philosophical anthropology.

In Gehlen's view, animals, including higher mammals, but with the exception of humans, have a environment that is common to the species. «The environment is structured by its own instinctual organization» (Gehlen 1983: 33); in other words it is the biological apparatus that determines the relationship with the environment (so the animal world is therefore a "closed", pre-given world).

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[2] «The reality of everyday life is taken-for-granted *as* reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply *there*, as self-evident and compelling facticity. I *know* that it is real» (ibid. 37). In any case, the suspension of disbelief that characterizes the natural attitude «is so firm that to abandon it […], I have to make an extreme transition» (ibidem).

Man, on the other hand, is lacking when it comes to instinct: his instinct is not enough to give his conduct stability. The basis for stabilisation must therefore be sought in culture, which becomes a second nature. Man however remains «an as yet undefined animal, in some ways never really finished» (ibid. 43). Man and culture, man and world mutually complete each other. The result is a social order that is objectified, externalized and lastly internalized: this in a nutshell is the dialectical process of the construction of reality as Berger and Luckmann see it. Given the contingent nature of the construction of man's world, the latter is intrinsically precarious, as is his "reality", his belief in it, and its binding nature.

b) The second section consists of an "existentialist" reinterpretation of Durkheim's notion of anomie. Berger and Luckmann underline that "the use of certain perspectives on 'anxiety' (*Angst*) developed by existential philosophy makes it possible to place Durkheim's analysis of *anomie* in a broader anthropological frame of reference" (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 226-227).

So Gehlen's ideas (the notion of man as characterized by an instinctual deficit, and his consequent openness to the world) are combined with issues such as the fundamental insecurity of life - the negative and destructive aspects of existence. Hence the image of a social world that is not only inherently fragile, but also dominated by a fear of disintegration, chaos, anomie, and as a consequence, a constant search for *nomos*[3].

Both of the aforementioned points are related to the natural attitude. Although this is not directly considered, in Berger and Luckmann's interpretation, belief in the world is severely weakened. And therefore the whole theory of finite provinces of meaning is transformed.

It is no coincidence that the authors believe that symbolic universes serve not only to lend coherence to the social world as a whole and the biographies of the actors inside it, but also to ensure that the reality of the world of everyday life remains paramount, dominating that of the other finite provinces of meaning.

> We may now inquire further about the manner in which symbolic universes operate to legitimate individual biography and the institutional order. The operation is essentially the same in both cases. It is nomic, or ordering, in character. The symbolic universe provides order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experience. Experiences belonging to different spheres

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[3] Blin, after highlighting the "uncertain state" of the relationship between philosophy and sociology in the work of Berger and Luckmann, asserts that the work contains "a call for the construction of an existential phenomenological sociology" (Blin 1995: 106).

of reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching universe of meaning. For example, the symbolic universe determines the significance of dreams within the reality of everyday life, re-establishing in each instance the paramount status of the latter and mitigating the shock that accompanies the passage from one reality to another. The provinces of meaning that would otherwise remain unintelligible enclaves within the reality of everyday life are thus ordered in terms of a hierarchy of realities, *ipso facto* becoming intelligible and less terrifying. This integration of the realities of marginal situations within the paramount reality of everyday life is of great importance, because these situations constitute the most acute threat to taken-for-granted, routinized existence in society. If one conceives of the latter as the 'daylight side' of human life, then the marginal situations constitute a 'night side' that keeps lurking ominously on the periphery of everyday consciousness. Just because the 'night side' has its own reality, often enough of a sinister kind, it is a constant threat to the taken-for-granted, matter-of-fact, 'sane' reality of life in society. The thought keeps suggesting itself (the 'insane' thought *par excellence*) that, perhaps, the bright reality of everyday life is but an illusion, to be swallowed up at any moment by the howling nightmares of the other, the night-side reality. Such thoughts of madness and terror are contained by ordering all conceivable realities within the same symbolic universe that encompasses the reality of everyday life - to wit, ordering them in such a way that the latter reality retains its paramount, definitive (if one wishes, its 'most real') quality. This nomic function of the symbolic universe for individual experience may be described quite simply by saying that it 'puts everything in its right place'. […] The symbolic universe allows one 'to return to reality' - namely, to the reality of everyday life (ibid. 115-116).

«The origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the constitution of man. If man in society is a world-constructor, this is made possible by his constitutionally given world-openness, which already implies the conflict between order and chaos» (ibid. 121). «The legitimation of the institutional order is also faced with the ongoing necessity of keeping chaos at bay. *All* social reality is precarious. *All* societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of anomic terror is actualized whenever the legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened or collapse» (ibidem).

In this context, the belief that underpins the natural attitude can be understood as a "force" that sustains the daylight vision. But this force is limited. It is in constant struggle with the forces that belong to the night side, those marginal realities that constantly threaten to destroy the reality of everyday life. This vision seems to indicate the presence of an eternal conflict, similar

to that between Eros and Thanatos, between forces that strive to maintain the sense of everyday reality, and others intent on destroying it.

The weakening of the belief that belongs to the natural attitude is accompanied by more fragile borders, compared to Schutz's vision. For example, in Schutz's view the idea that the world is an illusion resides naturally in the provinces of philosophy, literature, and the imagination, but can only become part of the paramount reality in extreme situations. Within the confines of the world of everyday life, this idea would be a sign of madness.

There is no doubt that the symbolic universe performs the essential function of lending coherence to the vision of the social world and individuals' biographies. It undoubtedly represents an inescapable individual and collective point of reference for constructing a meaningful world. We are not concerned about the role of the symbolic universe, but the importance attributed to it. It appears to operate as if the natural attitude had restricted the importance of its influence. In the image provided by Berger and Luckmann, the fact that the nature of reality is given, in the first place, pre-predicatively remains in the background. As does the fact that the assumption that among the various provinces, the world of everyday life is the province of fundamental reality, is also given pre-predicatively. All of this is given with absolute certainty. A certainty that underpins the symbolic universe. There is undoubtedly a complex relationship between the characteristics of the natural attitude and symbolic forms of experience that cannot be avoided.

In an essay written many years later (1995), Berger and Luckmann confirm their vision of the fragility of the universe of life. In the essay that explores the crisis of modern man, the authors raise a preliminary issue: is this really a new crisis, as much of the literature appears to assert, or is it just a variation on the angst that grips man every time the order of the world begins to falter? And also: is this crisis not based on the eternal problem of meaning when faced with the inevitability of death and the fear that this meaning does not exist? (Berger and Luckmann 1995). Harbouring doubts about the nature of the crisis of modern man should have prompted an in-depth analysis of taken-for-granted knowledge, but this is not the case.

2. Berger's essay *The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil* (1970) can be viewed as the most significant "implementation" of the model formulated in *The Social Construction*. I believe that there is a broad convergence between the visions that underpin the two works, although Berger's essay moves down the path that takes him further away from Schutz's theory.

It should be noted that the differences mentioned can be traced throughout Berger's work, and were present in works that pre-date the essay written with

Luckmann. *The Precarious Vision* (1961) presents the core of Berger's vision and, I would say, even traces of the deep concerns that inspire his thoughts[4].

Berger formulated his interpretation drawing on authors such as Weber, Mead and Cooley, and more generally the Chicago school, Goffman and his dramaturgical analysis, the sociology of knowledge, from Mannehein to Scheler, etc. A decisive role is played by elements from Heidegger and Sartre such as "inauthenticity" and "bad faith". These concepts are presented as enabling us to grasp the artificial nature - as construct, fabrication and manipulation - that lurks under the surface of the social world. The latter is a drama, not without comic or grotesque aspects: humans perform in the comedy of life, playing the roles or parts that society assigns them. But sociology is not the only prism that enables us to capture this unsettling characteristic of the social world. There are many social experiences which allow the actors of common sense to abandon their usual vision to capture deeper, less visible aspects of the world. This phenomenon is known as *alternation*[5]. Given its presence, despite the natural attitude's tendency to accept that the social world is the pre-given world, and is "real" in itself, the image of the social world is ultimately precarious.

In short: the social world constitutes itself as a reality that is as «self-evident and as solid as those of the natural cosmos. Very likely, society could not exist otherwise» (Berger 1976: 10-11). Nevertheless, the author believes that «this consciousness of what Alfred Schutz has called the 'world taken-for-granted' is not of such solidity that it cannot be breached. When such a breach occurs the world is transformed, takes on new dimensions and colors» (ibid. 11).

But why does this awareness that society is not a pre-given reality, external to man, and cogent, but merely a construct formulated by the actors themselves (i.e. the awareness that there are no "social laws" similar to natural laws, but only rules created by man) not translate into a moral stance against «the crimes committed in the name of that society?»[6].

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[4] The essay, which revolves around the issue of whether it is possible to be a Christian today, is not, according to the author, strictly scientific. We could describe it as a "sociologically informed" essay, as it draws on sociological theories and "material from the social sciences" (Berger 1976: 9).

[5] It is interesting to observe that, according to Fontana and Van de Water, something very similar to the notion of alternation can be found in Sartre. The experience of seeing the world "in different ways", the experience of nausea, enables Roquentin (a character in the novel La Nausée) to see "things in a different reality". By means of an optical displacement Roquentin experiences "a Husserlian *epoché* without the long preparation involved in Husserl, but occurring suddenly, by accident, and resulting in a vacuum feeling of terror, not one of reassurance, as in Husserl" (Fontana and Van de Water 1977: 106).

[6] For instance, why do we continue to accept the death penalty, and why do we continue to accept war, once we have understood that these are not caused by entities outside of ourselves?

Berger's response is that assuming "fiction as reality" can become a "moral alibi" and lead people into a state of "inauthenticity" (ibid. 84). The author does not mean to say that "bad faith", as conceived by Sartre, is responsible for the taken-for-grantedness of the social world. But that this characteristic is an intrinsic part of the taken-for-grantedness of the social world, and is therefore a function of taken-for-grantedness. «Bad faith means that society assists us in hiding our own actions from our awareness. The role becomes a moral alibi. It goes without saying that possibility is inherent in the most basic way in our social existence" (ibid. 89). This has another possible function. "Function which can be described by Heidegger's concept of 'das Man'» (ibid. 95). Heidegger believes that resorting to "social generalities" enables us to «evade confrontation with the reality of death» (ibidem). Death, and more generally anything negative, "the terror of our existence", is thus tamed by tracing it to the world of everyday life and the characteristics of the latter[7].

Therefore while on one hand the fact that the social world presents itself as something taken-for-granted is perhaps inevitable, on the other this phenomenon has significant consequences, such as offering alibis for human behaviour, and an antidote to the fear of death.

There is no need to recall that the concepts of bad faith and inauthenticity are not Schutz's[8]. The phenomenology of the natural attitude is radically descriptive. Taken-for-granted knowledge is viewed as an essential part of the natural attitude. There is no intention to explain how it functions as a form of self-deception. Or to prefigure the inauthenticity of *das Man* as conceived by Heidegger. (Anonymity is an essential feature of society, a trait associated with the typifying nature of consciousness).

The following quote shows the image of a world strongly characterized by the fear of dissolution, chaos and also by the need for *nomos*, which represents the urge to construct a taken-for-granted world. This image both enables us to grasp the affinity with existentialism, and introduces a theme that is also central to *The Social Construction*.

> One does not have to be an existentialist to perceive that existence lurks with
> terrors. Thrown into the world in one brief moment of consciousness, we are

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[7] These aspects appear in various essays that refer to Schutz's work, as well as that of Berger and Luckmann. As if there were an evident continuity between the two, without noticeable differences. See in particular the essays by R. W. Maloy (Maloy 1977) and L. Baron (Baron 1983).
[8] As Natanson underlines, "without going into Heidegger, it might be said that for Schutz the anonymity of types and the entire dynamics of typification has an ontological ground fundamentally different from Heidegger's placement of the inauthentic '*Man*'" (Natanson 1974: 91). As for Sartre, in various essays Schutz expresses criticism that underlines his distance.

surrounded on all sides by mystery which includes our own destiny and the meaning of a universe not too obviously constructed for our comfort. From the first reassuring smile of the mother bending over a frightened infant, society provides us with structures in which we can live with a measure of ease and which announce to us every day that things are in order. Busying ourselves at the warm, well-lit spots of the marketplace we can forget the howling visions of the night. Existence is leaning over a bottomless abyss. Society is the Potemkin village that shelters the abyss from our fearful eyes.

It happens sometimes in the middle of the night that we wake up and cannot fall asleep again. It is in such hours that strange thoughts may come. Our own existence and identity suddenly cease to be matters of course, but highly doubtful fabrications in a world constantly threatened by nightmarish transformations. If we are what is regarded as sane, well-balanced individuals there are very definite ways of coping with such experiences. We tell ourselves very forcefully who we are. Nonsense, we tell ourselves, we have nothing to do with the faceless horrors of our dreams. There can be no question about our identity. We can promptly give name, address, profession, marital status. If necessary, we can wake up wife and children, who will laughingly confirm the identification. We can switch on the lights and walk around in our house. We call this process of recollection a coming back to reality. We would contend, however, that it is a very special reality that we come back to in this way. It is the daytime reality of society as taken-for-granted. And it certainly is reality. But let us not too easily dismiss the nighttime from the domain of the real. Names, addresses, professions, and wives have a way of disappearing. At the latest it will be in the confrontation with death that we will be thrown back into that night-time world where identities are questioned (Berger 1976: 97-98).

Various subsequent articles, also prior to *The Social Construction*, explore the nature of the social world as a construct. The theme of the institutions is a central point.

Le Mariage et la Construction de la Réalité (1964), written with Kellner, emphasizes the social function of marriage and the institutions in general. While Durkheim examined *anomie*, Berger believes it is more useful to draw attention to the opposite dimension, namely the nomic dimension. The latter is much more important than the former because it is within the socially created order, within this set of rules, «that our experience of life [...] gathers meaning»(Berger and Kellner 1964: 3). In this way "a coherent reality is constructed, preserved and if need be modified" (ibid. 4). «Reality shared as such by the members of a group and therefore taken-for-granted and lastly considered the only social reality, the world 'tout court', the only world that ordinary people can constitute» (ibid. 7).

A later essay, written with Kellner in 1965 (*Arnold Gehlen and the Theory of Institutions*), explores Gehlen's theory of institutions more directly[9]. The two authors return to the differences between the instinctual dimensions of humans and animals, and the consequences of these differences. These include man's instability. The latter must therefore ensure the stability of his conduct by means of "structures produced by himself", namely culture. But these structures must be continually reproduced. «Social institutions are the core of this process of cultural stabilization», producing a «'background' for human activity» (ibid. 112).

Another essay, also dated 1965, written with Pulberg, *Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness*, represents a further step in the formulation of his vision of the construction of the social world: reification is a greater degree of stabilization of the social order.

3. Now we have clarified the background to the essay he then authored with Luckmann, we come to *The problem of multiple realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil*, published in 1970. The essay, as we have already noted, moves further away from Schutz's theory, but in the direction already taken in *The Social Construction*[10].

In the essay on Schutz and Musil, the theory of finite provinces of meaning is the central focus of the analysis. In this case the analysis does not regard the world of everyday life in its structural, static characteristics. It concerns the processes under way in a period of epochal change[11] such as that of the col-

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[9] Institutions that constitute «the core of [the] […] process of cultural stabilization» (Berger and Kellner 1965: 112).

[10] Nasu recalls the interpretation of another phenomenon in which Berger moves away from Schutz's theoretical framework. Berger interprets the pluralization of social worlds (a phenomenon linked to post-modernity) from the perspective of finite provinces of meaning. But these are actually separate phenomena. There are a few similarities between social sub-worlds and provinces, but substantial differences prevail. The main difference highlighted by Nasu is that the sub-worlds are not the product of a particular tension of subjects' consciousness, but realities existing "out there". The cognitive style that characterizes each sub-world is part of each of them and has to be acquired by the actors. This implies that Berger's analysis is "*empirical factual*" and not "*eidetical*" (Nasu 1999).

[11] Berger begins the essay *Robert Musil and the Salvage of the Self* (1984) by saying that it is necessary to distinguish between the constant, anthropological characteristics of the self and the characteristics produced by specific historical changes in a given period. Unfortunately, he continues, the social sciences have not yet produced an adequate representation of the differences between the constant and variable characteristics. I think it is interesting to note that the consciousness of post-modern man represented in the essay on Musil's novel does not deviate significantly from the anthropological view of consciousness represented in *The Social Construction,* apart from accentuating the negative tendencies that have obviously been present since

lapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Berger's words, «*The Man Without Qualities* contains perspectives of some interest for a phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt* and for the general problem of multiple realities». The imminent war and the end of the Habsburg empire symbolize the catastrophe of the traditional world, its order, its vision. This catastrophe brought about a change in the sense of reality itself. And with it, the disintegration of the subject itself. «What Musil attempted in his gigantic work was nothing less than a solution of the problem of reality from the perspective of modern consciousness» (ibid. 343). «Ulrich, 'the man without qualities', is deliberately presented by Musil as a prototype of modern man […], open to an indeterminate number of reality – and self – transformations» (Berger 1978: 363-364). A man, in short, who tends to replace the sense of reality with a sense of possibility. Musil has Ulrich say that «the sense of possibility could also be defined as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is not» (Musil 1972: 12). The sense of possibility implies not being firmly anchored to deeply rooted beliefs, and also a willingness to take on different points of view and inhabit worlds that are different from what is commonly viewed as the real world.

So Ulrich, with his sister Agate, attempts to build another world, a private world, a different reality ("the other condition"). The world of reality, as it is commonly understood, is devalued, hit by a "negative creed". Let's look at the essential characteristics of the negative creed according to Musil.

- It has to do with the importance of that fundamental trait of the natural attitude that Schutz calls "fundamental anxiety": "the weight of living, that secret melancholy of the knowledge that we all must die, that everything is so difficult and in all likelihood so futile" (Musil 1972: 713).
- The awareness of the relativity of all morals. "There is neither good nor bad, only faith or doubt" (ibid. 738).
- The fragmentation of the self. Any activity one performs relativizes the others.
- The impossibility of having certainties.
- The disenchanted vision of the world that follows the rise of the scientific perspective, the death of the holistic vision.
- The subject's detachment from the world. "There is no kind of mediation between what happens to us and what happens outside of us" (ibid. 719).
- The awareness of the absurdity and artificiality of the world, a world that controls its "normalcy" by sanctioning any other possibility. "Our civi-

time immemorial. In this way the fragility of the consciousness appears endemic. The crisis glimpsed on the horizon has finally come to pass.

lization is a temple of what, if left unchecked, would be called madness"
(ibid. 743).

• The realization that the abandonment of the point of view of the given
social world, the "inessential" world, makes new visions possible.

The crux of the novel, in terms of the theory of provinces of meaning, is the
tendency to look for a new way of being in the other condition. In other words,
the novel does not merely describe the characteristics of the crisis of meaning
affecting the world of everyday life, but also narrates the attempt to replace it
with a different reality, a mystical arena without a religious creed. The other
condition is a world that combines irreconcilable, syncretic positions that, ac-
cording to Musil, would only make sense for a different, more complex self
than that hitherto conceived[12]. A world that defies anthropological logic and
constants, that forges a mystical union between the self and the world[13].

When examining Berger's interpretation, we should bear in mind the dif-
ficulties involved in comparing the world of science with the world of fiction,
two finite provinces of meaning that relate to the world of everyday life in
different ways, and use different modes of expression[14]. Moreover, in addition
to the general problems that this relationship entails, we should also consider
the specific function that metaphor, allegory and simile play in the work of
Musil[15].

[12] Berger asserts that for Musil *The Man Without Qualities* represents an attempt to save the self,
in response to Mach's assertion that the self cannot be saved. This does not contradict the idea
expressed by Harrington, according to which the novel is a critique of the traditional concept
of the self, an expressed by Descartes, Kant and Hegel (Harrington 2002).

[13] In other words, what looks like an incestuous relationship between Ulrich and Agate, as not-
ed by Harrington, symbolizes some higher, ultimate, yet still elusive state of human together-
ness and love, some utopian state of redemption that Musil famously calls 'the other condition'
(*der andere Zustand*) (Harrington 2002: 67).

[14] For an interpretation of Musil's novel from the perspective of the relationship between liter-
ature and sociology, see in particular G. Sebald (2014).

[15] As Gargani claims, Musil intends to reject «any version of the world that claims to be unique,
privileged and inexorable» (Gargani, 1982: 10). And oppose «*Zivilisation* (namely modern civili-
zation based on the automatic causal mechanisms of the technological organisation of society):
rejecting it by presenting an ethical and aesthetic alternative aimed at recovering that sense of
motivation and responsibility that are gradually taken from men of their time» (ibid. 11). In
Musil's work, therefore, metaphor, allegory and simile are not simple "semiotic devices", but
«conceptual links of his literary project intended to provide 'contributions' to enable us to spir-
itually transcend the world» (ibid. 20). Musil believes it is impossible to express indescribable
experiences by means of a direct, denoting language. Metaphor, analogy and simile succeed
in «uniting in a sole meaning things and experiences that the language of one-sided rationality
leaves in a state of scattered fragments» (ibid. 29). It is only through this language that Ulrich
is able to express his idea of another condition, «a human condition where being here would

But in any case, it is only broadly speaking that Ulrich's position appears quixotic in the Schutzian sense. A more careful analysis shows a significant difference. As Endress maintains, "the other condition" does not belong to the Schutzian provinces, the life-world. The other condition is on "the other side of denied reality". «'The other condition' seeks to overcome the human condition or the very idea of existence» (Endress 2014: 170).

Endress shows the need to extend Schutz's framework in order to fully grasp the complexity of the different planes in Musil's novel. He suggests three levels of reflexivity where the theory of finite provinces of meaning can be articulated. Berger stops at the first of these levels, the descriptive level, which is incapable of grasping the wealth of meanings present in Musil's work. But, apart from this aspect, Endress emphasizes the presence of significant problems in Berger's perspective. Let's take the main ones: the concepts of everyday life-world and life-world are used indiscriminately; similarly the concept of multiple realities is used both as a "functional differentiation of society" and as "types of subjective constitution of meaning"; Berger uses the term "abolition of reality" much more frequently than the more Schutzian expression "interruption of reality" (ibid. 163).

To these I would add another critical observation: Berger's interpretation significantly alters the Schutzian model. Let's see some examples. In Musil's novel the other condition is glimpsed through the cracks that open up in the "crumbling structures" in the world of everyday life (Berger 1978: 348). Cracks that are «points at which the 'epoché of the natural attitude' breaks down. These points then become possible transfer stations to the 'other condition', not yet identical with the latter, but potential occasions for its attainment. While differing greatly in their experiential content, all these transition points have in common a violent breakdown of the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life and, *ipso facto*, an intimation of novel and strange modes of being» (ibidem).

Berger recalls Ulrich's experience of being attacked at night, the powerful emotion of falling in love, his sexual experiences with Bonadea, "the violent aesthetic experiences" (music, theatre), religious experiences[16]. These inhabit the world of life as alien intrusions that Berger interprets as islands, enclaves. Alongside these the author recalls the criminal reality of Moosbrugger, «a reality that, unless negated, threatens the suspension of doubt on which all social order rests». «Moosbrugger foreshadows the interruption of everyday

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merely be the image of being there, and even the dream of one person in two bodies would lose its impossibility» (ibid. 28). Language therefore plays a particular "constructive" function.

[16] Berger points out that sexuality and sexual experiences play an important role for Musil «in terms of their efficacy in creating breaches in the structures of everyday reality». Sexuality and sexual experiences are seen as chaotic, Dionysian forces (ibid. 350).

reality by the collective crime of the coming war [...]. Then, replicates on the level of public life the reality-shattering effect of sexual and aesthetic experience in the life of individuals» (ibid. 352-353).

But Berger's interpretation, according to which sexual experiences, musical experiences, experiences of violence can be viewed as enclaves, cracks which cause the abandonment of the epoché of the natural attitude, is debatable.

When it comes to war, violence crime and sex, their potential for destroying *the existing order* is undoubtedly clear. And it is also evident that this order is a constitutive feature of the world of everyday life. But the break with routine, and the existing social order, does not *automatically* mean the dissolution of the nucleus of the natural attitude, the belief in a pre-given reality.

Lastly, however, given the specific nature of the effects generated by the aforementioned experiences, these can be linked to an individual's biography. But how can we view this person as an emblem of modern man? Are these experiences that can be generalized as typical of a specific time in history, from a descriptive, rather than a highly symbolic point of view?

The images provided by Musil are a highly effective hyperbole that stresses the radical nature of the processes taking place; nonetheless these images cannot be acquired by sociology without translating them into its language. In my view Berger has not fulfilled this essential task.

I would like to clarify a key point. I do not mean to argue that the meanings that belong to a finite province of meaning should be viewed as constituted separately from other provinces. What I intend to say is that the meanings imply the relationship between provinces, but the way in which this relationship produces the meanings is a complex problem that we only have an approximate vision of. It seems to me that Berger simplifies the results of these relationships. In other words, an overly literal reading of the events in the novel, together with the idea of using finite provinces of meaning as a framework for interpreting the experiences narrated, leads Berger to formulate two ideas that are slightly forced. The first is an over-elastic use of Schutzian provinces, which are stretched to take in events. The second is that of simplifying the sense of events in a one-sided way.

Underlying the topics covered in this last part, there is a significant problem that has not yet been solved: that of the ways of structuring meaning (considering the classification of experiences into finite provinces of meaning, and assuming that the latter are not static ontological structures). Here we cannot tackle this issue, which is undoubtedly one of the core issues of the basis of Berger's analysis[17].

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[17] I will merely indicate a trace of the process. Schutz envisages a series of readings, from the most simplified image of reality to the that which comes closest to the complexity of reality.

However the concept of reality that emerges from Berger's analysis is not exactly the world of everyday life understood as the world of fundamental reality, as represented by Schutz. There is no doubt that this difference also stems from the fact that Berger uses the concepts of life-world and the world of everyday life interchangeably. But, beyond this inconsistency, the most radical consequence that I would like to focus on is the loss of Schutz's framework. The life-world, not distinguished from the world of everyday life that it is based on, ends up coinciding with a generic "existential" world. And the crisis evoked becomes a "crisis of meaning", variously described in many works, from Beckett to Ionesco's plays to Adamov, Genet[18], works that evoke images of the absurd, the void, the "catastrophe of meaning" (Bodei 1987: 33).

Interestingly, the aforementioned 1995 work by Berger and Luckmann, *Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning: The Orientation of Modern Man,* also formally accomplishes this step. The analysis, from the construction of meaning to its crisis, is no longer carried out using Schutz's framework of the finite provinces of meaning. This structure disappears. The crisis, broadly speaking, becomes a "crisis of meaning"[19]. A crisis that is ever latent in the modern world, ready to emerge if the protective barriers of the intermediate structures of the social world collapse.

Consciousness is seen as consisting of accumulated layers of experience. What is taken-for-granted occupies the bottom layer, the firm foundation that supports the layers in which meaning is less solid, beliefs more uncertain. The top layer is a layer of total uncertainty. The basic assumption of the paper is that in the post-modern world what is taken-for-granted gradually tends to shrink, and this process gradually takes in increasingly broad, decisive areas of life.

The simplest interpretation indicates the formulation of meaning in a single province. Devoting attention to one issue determines the main province where the meaning of that specific experience will be formed, and the articulation of consciousness in terms of the field, topic and horizon (the other provinces are placed on the horizon of the main one). The system of relevance applied is that of the latter province. Schutz renders this basic interpretation progressively more complex. And he does this based on the assumption that we simultaneously inhabit different finite provinces of meaning with different degrees of our personality. It can be seen as a process in which one main theme produces "the apparent unification" of the activities involved (Schutz 1970: 1). Schutz also examines the way in which two themes flow into the consciousness in parallel, and each becomes the horizon of the other, and so on. Even the most comprehensive reading of the author remains unsatisfactory. Natanson's work on the functions of the enclave intended as possible structural arenas for the construction of meaning is of great interest (Natanson, 1986).

[18] Cfr. L. Goldmann 1971.

[19] It is true that Schutz and Husserl share the idea that real units are units of meaning. But that does not mean that the meaning and reality coincide.

In this essay too, Berger and Luckmann do not examine in detail the constitutive structure of the taken-for-granted. The two authors merely observe that taken-for-granted knowledge is non-problematic, obvious, self-evident knowledge. The taken-for-granted sphere is once more accepted without question[20].

M. Rogers claims that Berger and Luckmann are close to formulating an «explicit theory of taken-for-grantedness», which «links habitualization and institutionalization, objectivation and anonymization, and reality maintenance and mundane routines». They link these aspects to the typifications that are constituent elements of common sense knowledge. Nevertheless, «although they repeatedly note the taken-for-granted quality of everyday life, Berger and Luckmann do not thematize that matter for detailed treatment in and of itself. Their construction of what amounts to a sociological theory of taken-for-grantedness leaves unaddressed the one question such a theory must confront: what, precisely, is taken-for-grantedness? And, correspondingly, what is excluded from the taken-for-granted sectors of everyday experience? Sociologically, then, the nature and range of taken-for-grantedness in mundane life remain ambiguous» (ibid. 138).

Part II

1. In Husserl's work, the belief in the world that characterizes the natural attitude is presented as an absolute. «I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as of all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This reality, as the word already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world does not alter the general thesis of the natural attitude. The world as reality is always there; at the most it might be 'different' to what I assumed […] but in the sense of the general thesis, it remains a world that has its being out there» (Husserl 1965: 62). It is a world that is 'present-at-hand' (*vorhanden*) «in part crossed, in part surrounded by an obscurely intended horizon of indeterminate actuality» (ibid. 58).

This world is immediately and intuitively grasped by humans. In other words, the general thesis «does not consist in a particular act, in an explicit,

[20] This critique does not intend to reiterate Bourdieu's point of view, according to which the stances of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology, without distinctions, would be naive: actors' taken-for-granted knowledge would be taken-for-granted. For a critique of Bourdieu see Endress (Endress 2005b).

predicative judgement about existence. Rather, it is something that endures permanently for the duration of the attitude, that is, for all of our natural life in a waking state». If I explicitly address, by means of a judgement, the world as it exists, I am in any case aware «of having predicatively grasped what, […] being 'present-at-hand', is already out there, not thematically or cogitatively or predicatively, in the original experience or what has been experienced» (ibid. 63).

But what do we mean by "real" in the natural attitude? Real, as Natanson underlines, «is 'what is given' [...]. Reality is an added predicate to immediate experience» (Natanson 1973: 22). Reality "is the 'fact-world'". A world that «has not origin or source; it is simply 'there' and always has been 'there' for all of us. 'There' is less a spatial than epistemological term» (ibid. 26).

Accepting the reality of the world, its givenness, is not based on having the opportunity to refer to evidence. Indeed, as pointed out by Natanson, the question of proving one's belief «does not arise in any fundamental way» (ibid. 24). Nevertheless, this belief is a certain belief: in this way it is like faith. Husserl says: «The existence of the world as a whole is that obvious truth that is never challenged [...] and that is the basis of every judgement. Our consciousness of the world is consciousness of the world of certain belief» (Husserl 1960: 25). Husserl refers to that set of «original beliefs that stand before any doubt, which all forms of doubt have to keep faith with in order to exist: we must all necessarily adhere to these, and without them we would not be capable of taking a single step, not only in everyday life but also in logical and scientific investigation. This belief system, that we are unable to genuinely doubt, even if we wanted to, is what we call 'common sense'» (Di Martino 2004: 165).

As Husserl sees it then, there is a foundation layer of pre-given, pre-judged certainties that form the basis of our judgements and make it possible for us to doubt: doubt is only possible within a framework of certainties. But how is this cornerstone of certainties structured: what does the world of original evidence include?

In the first place we need to specify that the world Husserl is talking about is not the exclusive product of that form of intentionality that is "representation", separate from desire, will, affection and various social dimensions; in other words, from the concrete life of the consciousness. According to Lévinas the exclusive emphasis on representation characterized only *Logical Investigations*[21]. Yet in *Ideas* Husserl had already adopted a stance "that would become

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[21] In *Logical Investigations* Husserl argues that «the existing world that is shown to us has the same mode of existence as the object offered to the theoretical gaze. *The real world is the world of knowledge.* The characteristics, such as 'value', 'usual' etc. that are attributed to things are attributed by us, but do not represent the object as it exists» (Lévinas 2002: 76). There is a very clear distinction between the object itself and the attributes that are added to it.

central to phenomenology", and that can be summed up as "being is what we experience". "This idea requires us to include structures pertaining to *non-objectifying acts* in the characteristics of existence and forces us to envisage modes of existence which differ from those of the theoretical object" (Lévinas 2002: 59). As Husserl says in *Ideas*: the world «is before me not only as a world of things, but with the same immediacy, also as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. I find the physical things in front of me furnished with value-characteristics, like physical properties, beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, etc. Things immediately present themselves as objects of use, the 'table' with its 'books', the 'glass', the 'vase', the 'piano', etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the objects as objects […]. And as for mere things, this also naturally applies to the humans and animals that surround me, with regard to their social characteristics. They are my 'friends' or 'enemies', my 'servants' or 'superiors', 'strangers' or 'relatives', etc.» (Husserl 1965: 59).

According to Lévinas the equivalence between objectifying acts and existential modes is sought rather than achieved in Husserl's work. But what is important for us is that the world of life does not stop at representation.

In *The Crisis* this aspect becomes more apparent: «The life-world is the spatio-temporal world of things as we experience them in our pre – and extra-scientific life, and as we know them to be experienceable beyond what is actually experienced. We have a world-horizon as a horizon of possible thing-experience. Things: that is stones, animals, plants, even human beings and human products; but everything here is subjective and relative, even though normally, in our experience and in the social group united with us in the community of life, we arrive at 'secure' facts» (Husserl 1983: 166). Husserl therefore maintains that concrete experience takes place in a historical and cultural world, I would say within one's group, with its own worldview. Nevertheless, even taking this into account, we can arrive at «a truth concerning objects that is unconditionally valid for all subjects, from which, in spite of relativity», everyone agrees («normal Europeans, normal Hindus, normal Chinese people agree, etc.»). «The life-world», Husserl concludes, «despite its relativity, has its own *general structure*. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way that is equally accessible to all» (ibid. 167).

So, to simplify, we can say that in Husserl's work there are two levels of *Lebenswelt*[22]: a changeable historical-cultural level «that embraces the certainties

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[22] Chung-Chi Yu, taking up the work of Waldenfels, sees in the *Krisis* three versions of *Lebenswelt*: «1. the concrete life world; 2. a relative specific world such as a vocational world or a

that apply to me as a man of a certain era and a certain culture», and a basic nucleus, an «invariant structure that is implied not by our way of life but all forms of life in general» (Spinicci 2000: 126).

From this perspective, the problem arises whether there is logical compatibility between these levels or an incurable aporia[23]. Husserl shows great certainty when asserting the existence of an arena of "perceptive immediacy", that is universally and tacitly shared, and on which different worlds are built.

Husserl also believes that the presence of different visions of the world does not affect the degree of belief we have in its existence. He does not explicitly address this issue. But he does not seem to deviate from the idea that belief in the world remains in any case a certain belief.

We can therefore say that for Husserl the "form of belief" changes, but the "certainty of the world" remains (Spinicci: 128).

2. While for Husserl our "first contact" with the world is by means of perception, for Schutz it occurs through *working*[24]. «Basically, the everyday lifeworld, which is based on the *Wirkwelt*, constitutes the core of the Lifeworld, which contains many 'sub-universes' or 'finite provinces of meaning'» (Yu 1999: 163)[25].

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certain cultural world; 3. a world-nucleus of nature to be distilled by abstraction, namely, the world of straightforward intersubjective perception […]. This world is composed of the world of space-time and natural objects, which are not yet culturally interpreted and reconstructed» (Yu 2004: 178). The latter world remains the same for all, above and beyond cultural differences; it remains "the universal ground for all different lifeworlds". A world that, as Waldenfels asserts, is "given first" (ibid. 181). Chung-Chi Yu also recalls that in recent debate on Husserl, the notions of "homeworld" and "alienworld" emerged.

[23] Chung-Chi Yu believes that the attempt to reconcile cultural worlds and the basic perceptual world, based on the idea of foundation, leads Husserl into aporias, and a "confused" theory (Yu 2004).

[24] Natanson underlines the continuity between perception and working. In Husserl's work perception should not be seen as «the *factuality* of vision. If it is at all correct to speak of a 'metaphor' of vision as dominant in phenomenology, the metaphor should be understood as a nuanced indication of intuition, not as feeling but as 'a mental seeing'. Accordingly, action is as central to Husserlian *seeing* as any other aspect of the spectrum of perception. It is the narrowing of perception which Schutz rejects; it is the enlargement of perception which he advances» (Natanson 1986: 17).

[25] Yu's statement sums up the evolution of Schutz's thought and avoids creating misunderstandings. The expressions life-world, world of everyday life, and working world are used interchangeably, as synonyms. It should be recalled that in the 1936 essay that represented the pragmatic shift/turning point, Schutz highlights the basic nature of working (Wirken). And in the 1945 essay on multiple realities, working is defined as the "prevalent form of spontaneity" of the everyday life-world, its distinctive trait. And in the same article the everyday life-world

Moreover in Schutz, "from the beginning" the everyday life-world is an "intersubjective world of culture". Schutz criticises Husserl's view of "pure perception" (letter to Gurwitsch dated 13 October 1954): «traditional phenomenology, including Husserl, is naive in the sense that it analyzes perception as the central paradigm without taking account of the fact that perception is after all a phenomenon of the life-world and thus implicitly presupposes the appresentative structures that lead to the constitution of the life-world» (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 235).

Schutz's criticism of the "naivety" of viewing perception as a fundamental paradigm, combined with the idea that the everyday life-world is a world of culture "from the beginning", indicates a position that is clearly different to that of Husserl. Yet Yu believes that there is a well-founded reason to believe that in Schutz the issue of "foundation" leads to an ambiguous vision of the everyday life-world. To sum up Yu's argument in two points.

a) The problem analyzed by Yu emerges, in the first place, from an exchange of letters between Gurwitsch and Schutz (3 September 1954, 13 October 1954). Schutz sets out to indicate the differences between his stance and that of Husserl, with regard to both the existence of a basic level of perception, and in relation to the vision of how culture takes shape in the everyday life-world. He agrees with Gurwitsch on a critical interpretation of Husserl's position regarding the level of perception, but not with the way in which Gurwitsch interprets Schutz's vision of the constitution of culture. Gurwitsch offers the following scheme: if we view an element in the outside world, a material element, in terms of the apperceptive order, we remain on a pre-cultural level (the object is therefore seen in terms of its material characteristics), while if we view a material element in terms of the appresentative order, it becomes a cultural object.

Schutz stresses that Gurwitsch's interpretation lacks the crucial role played by the social context: «The contents of the bag of a primitive witch doctor, or a cyclotron is only considered to be a *cultural object* by the 'expert'». And he adds: «all schemata contained in the appresentative state of affairs are socially conditioned, have to be learned» (ibid. 237).

Yu believes that this view actually brings Schutz closer to Husserl: for Schutz too there appears to be a basic perceptual layer (the pure experience) of the everyday life-world. Because this layer is what remains if the beholder, who does not belong to the culture of the cultural object in question, is not

is taken as the basic province for the finite provinces of meaning, and the life-world. So if the everyday life-world is the paramount reality, working lies at the heart of it. Yet even the author himself does not always respect this distinction.

capable of decoding its meaning. As there is no appresentation, what remains is what emerges from apperception.

b) The second point concerns the possible existence of universal symbolic meanings. This would contradict the existence of worlds that are culturally different "from the beginning". In *Symbol, Reality and Society*, Schutz devotes a few pages, in very general terms, to the issue of the relationship between symbols and the human condition: «there are first sets of appresentational references which are universal and can be used for symbolization because they are rooted in the human condition» (Schutz 1962c: 332). And further on he attempts to show examples of how «universal symbols originate in the general human condition» (ibid. 334).

Chung-Chi Yu asks: «If cultural difference is a consequent interpretation of lifeworld, then how is the universal symbolism integrated into his lifeworld notion? Are they compatible? Does Schutz want to argue that there exists *the* grounding lifeworld, rather than many concrete lifeworlds?» (Yu 1999: 172).

He therefore asserts that Schutz's statements are somewhat ambiguous. I am inclined to think that Schutz did not express himself clearly, rather than that his stance is a contradictory one.

Point one. I think the answer Schutz gives Gurwitsch is markedly incomplete. And it is this incompleteness that produces the ambiguity indicated by Yu. We must remember the basic premise of Schutz's argument: perception is a phenomenon of the world of everyday life, therefore a derivative phenomenon, not an original phenomenon (as Husserl believes). In other words, perception is a phenomenon that implies the prior existence of appresentative relationships, therefore a culture. There is no shadow of a contradiction in this argument. I therefore find it very unlikely that Schutz would immediately reintroduce the idea of a perceptual base layer that precedes culture, and is external to it, just a few lines after denying its existence. When Gurwitsch gives his version of appresentative relationships, Schutz says: «I fear, my friend, that you are here the victim of tracing all experiences back to perception» (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 236). Schutz by no means asserts that the native who does not interpret the cyclotron in line with the meaning "of the expert" uses a universal appercettive scheme. He argues that, in order for an appresentative scheme to exist, it must be interpreted as such by an actor. And also that the appresentative order does is not a private element, belonging to an individual actor. Its existence implies the social dimension[26]. Let's go back

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[26] Not to mention the fact that the idea of "pure experience" would be in stark contrast to the whole of Schutz's methodological and epistemological stance. One thing that springs to mind is his acceptance of Whitehead's critique of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (there is no such thing as simple, pure facts, only interpreted facts). And his acceptance of Scheler's

to the native who cannot interpret the identity of the object as a cyclotron. Schutz argues that this actor can not grasp the presence of the expert's appresentative order. But since the Viennese sociologist does not say anything more about the behaviour of this actor, it seems logical to believe that he thinks the actor perceives the object using the schemes of his *own* culture, probably with its scheme of appercettive order.

Point two. Yu highlights in Schutz's writing the contradiction arising from the existence of culturally different worlds and universal symbols. I think that Schutz means that there exist symbols that can be constituted through appresentative relationships themselves. Which does not mean that they have the same meaning; the latter is always given by the entire cultural model in question. I think we can assume that Schutz, despite the uniqueness of the models (and, more generally, of any meaning), accepts the possibility that different models can be compared. And therefore, despite the diversity of meaning, the possibility to grasp the existence of appresentative relationships that arise from the human condition itself. Thomason believes that Schutz's epistemological stance can be viewed as moderate constructionism ("methodological constructionist"), therefore different from the radical constructionism of Garfinkel, Cicourel, etc.[27]. Schutz's position cannot be reconciled with radical relativism, namely the belief that cultural models are immeasurable, and cannot be compared.

I think we can conclude that the distance between Husserl and Schutz I mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph remains. Which begs the question as to whether this distance also signals different ways of understanding the issue of belief in a pre-given world.

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criticism of the possible existence of a "natural" basis common to all men (which led Scheler to propose the concept of a "relatively natural conception of the world", that Schutz endorses using Scheler's argument).

[27] Garfinkel, when describing the epistemological positions of Parsons and Schutz, sums them up as "correspondence theory" and "congruence theory". With regard to congruence theory, Garfinkel says «Rather than there being a world of concrete objects which a theory cuts this way and that, the (congruence) view holds that the cake is constituted in the very act of cutting. No cutting, no cake». And: «The object is conceived as never appearing except through its schema. *The schema of specifications is precisely the object itself*» (H. Garfinkel, *A comparison of Decisions Made on "Four Pre-Theoretical" Problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz*, quoted in B. C. Thomason 1982: 60). Schutz responds (letter of 19-1-1954): «I am not so sure whether there are really such fundamental differences between our 'decisions' as you assume to prevail […]. I do not fully grasp the basic difference between what you call the correspondence and congruence theory» (Thomason 1982: 63). The entire correspondence between the two authors was most recently revived by Psathas (Psathas 2009).

3. In the first part of the essay I repeatedly criticised Berger and Luckmann for modifying Schutz's theory on the crucial node of belief in the everyday life-world.

Vaitkus believes that this aspect of Schutz's theory is poorly developed. Indeed he asserts that this is the «most important and largely neglected side of Schutz's work». Schutz, «in a number of sketchy remarks never worked out, clearly and indisputably points to the foundational importance of the subjective actor's faith or belief in the world of the natural attitude» (Vaitkus 2005: 112). A faith that can also break down in various circumstances.

In my view this argument is contrived. I think it is more correct to say that Schutz highlights the basic characteristics of the phenomenon, without covering it exhaustively. It is a broad topic that is narrowly analysed by the authors, despite being in great use currently.

Let's take a quick look at the main points dealt with by Schutz.

We said earlier that in Husserl's work the certainty of the world is never questioned, beyond the existence of culture, something which is hinted at, but not analysed. Schutz's work takes a different view: culture is an intrinsic component of the everyday life-world. A world that Schutz's 1945 essay on multiple realities sketches.

The main characteristic of the natural attitude is that of assuming that the everyday life-world is absolutely real – a world that existed before we were born, perceived and interpreted by others, our predecessors. This world is not perceived as a disorganized set of shapes, lights, sounds, etc., but as a structured world. We have a pragmatic interest in it: it is both the arena and object of our actions. *Working* is its characteristic hub. The everyday life-world is structured in terms of space and time, and also according to its social structure. "Fundamental anxiety" has a decisive influence on the lives of actors: on the organization of their plans, and the anxieties and fears deriving from it. Anxieties and fears that «are essential elements of its reality but [they] do not refer to our belief in it. On the contrary, it is characteristic of the natural attitude that it takes the world and its objects for granted until counterproof imposes itself. As long as the once established scheme of reference, the system of our and other people's warranted experiences works, as long as the actions and operations performed under its guidance yield the desired results, we trust these experiences. We are not interested in finding out whether this world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system of consistent appearances. We have no reason to cast any doubt upon our warranted experiences which, so we believe, give us things as they really are. It needs a special motivation, such as the irruption of a 'strange' experience not subsumable under the stock of knowledge at hand or inconsistent with it, to make us revise our former beliefs» (Schutz 1962b: 228).

So in the everyday life-world epistemological problems do not arise. In this world it is not possible to raise the question of the real or apparent nature of the world. Nor is radical, Cartesian doubt conceivable. Doubt may only arise on certain points and moreover there is always a reason for it: there has to be an experience that appears "strange" compared to the knowledge at our disposal.

The 1945 essay on the topic of the natural attitude adds an important concept: «the *epoché* of the natural attitude». Just as phenomenology makes use of a special technique, the phenomenological *epoché*, «a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt», Schutz believes we can assert that man «within the natural attitude also uses a specific *epoché* […]. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence» (Schutz 1962b: 229).

Why this shift of emphasis from the presence of certainty to the absence of doubt? Reeder, commenting on a letter Schutz wrote to Kauffman in the same year (September 1945), on the same subject, argues that the author wants «to provide an account at the level of phenomenological psychology» (Reeder 2009: 105). And from the point of view of phenomenological psychology, experiencing something as real maintains an element of doubt. So Schutz interprets faith in the world as a total suspension of doubt. The work of Spiegelberg quoted in the note regards this issue[28], and Schutz references this to support the plausibility of his argument. Wagner asserts that Schutz «welcomed Spiegelberg's 'analysis of dubitability and dubiousness with respect to reality'. In the context of his own essay he accepted it as an expression of the 'Cartesian method of philosophical doubt' as applied to the 'naïve realism' of man in the natural stance» (Wagner 1983: 176).

While as Schutz recalls, the concept of reality in the world of science, refers «to apophantic judgment, which, through constant critique, is consciously brought to approximation of evident self-givenness», in the natural attitude

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[28] Spiegelberg distinguishes between subjectival reality and non-subjectival reality. The first regards the arena formed by «all phenomena *as such* are presented to us simultaneously and with full adequacy, whether more or less clear in their trans-phenomenal references». This subjectival reality is characterised by three aspects: «our own existence as that of a believing being, our acts of believing and the thing believed in so far as it is believed». This arena is only a «fragment of our supposed total of reality» (Spiegelberg 1968: 89-90). After making this distinction Spiegelberg underlines the dubitable nature of experience: «Certainly everything non-subjectival, including its reality, remains dubitable in principle. Nothing even stands in the way of doubting the whole subjective sphere, though such a doubt would have no reasonable chance of confirmation, and consequently would be essentially unjustified, whereas in non-subjectival reality there always is the theoretical possibility of its proving justified» (ibid. 99).

the concept of reality «is not gained through judgement». What appears is taken as real «in the way in which it appears». It is taken as «something given, taken-for-granted (*Fragloses)*, something beyond doubt. […] This attitude is the limit (*limes*) of all possible attitudes of doubt, which start from here and in different strata progressively constitute the various other spheres of reality» (letter by Schutz 17-9-1945 in Reeder 2009: 104-105). This interpretation of the concept of *epoché*, Schutz adds, is incompatible with Husserl's use of it.

Reeder believes that Schutz wants to highlight the lack of conscious judgement in the acceptance of the reality of the world of everyday life, which is «pre-judgemental (and in fact often pre-linguistic, speaking phenomenologically)». Moreover, Schutz's concept of *epoché*, which differs not only from that of Husserl, but also from the philosophical tradition, aims to emphasize «the very doubtlessness of the naive attitude's acceptance of reality» (ibid. 105).

The essay *Symbol, Reality and Society*, that Schutz views as a sort of completion of his 1945 essay, indicates the nature of signs and symbols, as constituent elements of appresentative relationships. So, while for James the paramount reality is constituted by the "subuniverses of senses" and "of physical things", for Schutz the paramount reality of the world of everyday life «includes not only the physical objects, facts, and events within our actual and potential reach perceived as such in the mere apperceptual scheme, but also appresentational references of a lower order by which the physical objects of nature are transformed into sociocultural objects» (Schutz 1962c: 341).

4. We said earlier that in Schutz the everyday life-world is an intersubjective world of culture. All cultural models include a set of cultural interpretations, systems of relevance, typifications. These include «all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which […] characterize, if not constitute, any social group at a given moment in its history» (Schutz 1976a: 92). This model is the bearer of a vision of the world that is socially shared, socially approved and socially distributed. As Schutz says: «Any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all the situations which normally occur within the social world. The knowledge correlated to the cultural pattern carries its evidence in itself – or, rather, it is taken-for-granted in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is a knowledge of trustworthy *recipes* for interpreting the social world and for handling things […]. The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions and thus serves as a scheme of expression […]. On the other hand, the recipe serves as a scheme of interpretation […]. Thus it is the function of the cultural pattern

to eliminate troublesome inquiries by offering ready-made directions for use, to replace truth hard to attain by comfortable truisms, and substitute the self-explanatory for the questionable. This 'thinking as usual', as we may call it, corresponds to Max Scheler's idea of the 'relatively natural conception of the world' (*relativ natürliche Weltanschauung)*» (ibid. 95).

This is the key point: cultural models are infused with the natural attitude; models that have a pervasive presence in the lives of individuals, in their socialization, and are accepted as if their validity was self-evident. Self-evidence that remains so until proven otherwise.

Scheler argues that it is absolutely wrong to think of the existence of a "natural vision of the world", namely a basic worldview, common to all people in all times and places. A view which would imply the existence of a mythical "natural state" of the human race. «*There is absolutely not one, constant* vision of the natural world 'by man' [...]», says Scheler: «The diversity of the image of the world infuses the categorical structures of the information/data itself». He adds: «O. Spengler rightly […] expresses it in the same terms I used in 1914: 'Kant's table of categories is the table of categories of European thought'». Structural changes naturally take place over very long periods of time (Scheler 1976: 123). The sociology of knowledge must therefore introduce the concept of a "relatively natural conception of the world". This would include everything that in a given group is «generally 'taken-for-granted', every object and idea […] which is generally believed and felt *not to need or call for a justification*» (ibidem).

Schutz takes on Scheler's idea. He underlines that the addition of the term *relative* «should distinguish this concept from the idea of a general State of Nature as assumed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the ancient and modern theoreticians of a Right of Nature» (Schutz 1976b: 228). And thus he likens the relatively natural conception of the world to the ideas of Sumner, Voegelin, MacIver and Lynton. The latter share the idea that each group views its own vision of the world as central (ethnocentrism, founding myth, etc.), right, correct and obvious as the perspective from which to see the world and themselves. While the world view of external groups is seen as foreign, strange, questionable - not "natural".

We can say that the same argument we applied to Husserl also applies to Schutz (and even more so): the difference in the contents of cultural models coexists with the certainty of the world. The "form of belief" changes, but not the "certainty of the world".

5. Schutz provides a very general overview of the phenomenon of taken-for-grantedness, sketching its main structural features. In *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, in the short essay *Relevance: Knowledge on Hand and in Hand*, but

above all in *The Structures of the Life-World* he develops the distinction between on hand knowledge, in hand knowledge, and at hand knowledge[29]. In hand knowledge can be viewed as an intermediate form between the other two[30]. Let's take a look at on hand knowledge and at hand knowledge.

On hand knowledge

This form of "knowledge" regards the universal characteristics of experience, the basic, «fundamental structures of experience of the life-world. […] These fundamental structures do not enter into the grip of consciousness in the natural attitude, as a core of experience. But they are a condition of every experience of the life-world and enter into the horizon of experience» (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 104). These structures are not perceived as real «on the basis of social interaction and internalization», but «on the basis of universal idealizations» (Rogers 1981: 134). This "knowledge" can never become problematic or the focus of attention in the world of everyday life. Or be articulated as a specific form of knowledge. Its characteristics are therefore invariant and always present in every relatively natural vision of the world. Mary Rogers believes that, phenomenologically speaking, this "knowledge" should be understood as "what is given", and distinguished from "what is taken" (ibidem).

Elements that belong to on hand knowledge include epistemic constants, metaphysical constants and situational constants.

a) Epistemic constants. To recall the general thesis of the existence of the alter ego, the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives (idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints, idealization of the congruency of the system of relevances) the thesis of the world (general thesis of the natural attitude), the idealizations connected to the pre-given nature of existence and persistence of the world, and the repeatability of actions, "and so on and so forth", and "I can do it again", etc.[31]

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[29] «Not only does Schutz delineate what is '*on* hand' (Heidegger's *Vorhandenheit*) and what is '*at* hand' (*Zuhandenheit*), – says Zaner – but his analysis shows the necessity for a further sphere-viz. '*in* hand' (which is of several kinds)» (Zaner, note 12, in Schutz 1970: 145).

[30] As Schutz says: «Among the habitual knowledge stored away some elements are merely at hand […]. Others, […], are more permanently present, are more frequently used: the business of living does not permit us to let them entirely out of grip, and to keep them neutralized and dormant. We may say that these elements of our knowledge are not only *at* hand but *in* hand» (Schutz 1996: 69).

[31] There are other idealizations beyond those mentioned. Cicourel's interpretative procedures, for example, can be viewed as idealizations (Cicourel 1974).

b) Metaphysical constants. These relate to the "knowledge" that we are born from parents, «that the world into which we are born has a history, that the world has already been interpreted by others, that communication with other human beings is possible, etc.» (Rogers 1981: 145).

c) Situational constants. Each person, at each moment in his or her life, lives in a given situation, to which his or her stock of knowledge is related genetically, structurally and functionally. The situation is necessarily limited, by the ontological structure of the world, as well as by the transcendence of time and the physicality of subjects. This limitation gives rise to the spatial, temporal and social organization of experience. These therefore represent the limits of the human condition and also «the conditions of possibility of all human experience in the world - their necessary horizon» (Zaccaï-Reyners 1996: 42).

- Spatial arrangement. Among the various objects present in the world there is a privileged object: my body. This is the "vehicle" for my movements in the outside world. It is not a «fragment of space; on the contrary, space would not exist for me at all if I had no body» (Schutz 1970: 173). The body can therefore be seen as the zero point: a system of spatial (and temporal) coordinates, according to which I organise the space into left and right, above and below, etc. I divide the world into the world currently within my range, the world within a reachable range and the world where my reach can be restored. It should be added that «I *am* my body and sense perceptions, I *am* my hand grasping this or that object. My body is the form in which my self manifests itself in the outer world» (ibid. 172).
- Temporal arrangement. The transcendence of the time of the world "has various subjective correlates". I experience the necessary, imposed nature of time in my expectations. The passing of my inner time, as I get older, and in the irreversibility of events. In *working*, my inner time intersects with cosmic time and social time. And in *working*, present, past and future come together. In the passage of time I also experience my finitude.
- Social arrangement. "All experiences have a social dimension". In this way «the Other is given to me immediately as a fellow-man in the we-relation, while the mediate experiences of the social world are graduated according to degrees of anonymity and are arranged in experiences of the contemporary world, the world of predecessors, and the world of successors» (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 104).

At hand knowledge

This type of knowledge regards culturally variable aspects of experience; aspects that occupy the field and issue of consciousness and do not remain on

the horizon, in the shadows of consciousness. It is a form of knowledge acquired through actions, interactions, processes of socialization. It especially concerns the contents of the cultural model of one's social group. It settles in the stock of available knowledge in varying degrees of clarity, depth, familiarity, habitualization and belief. It is structured into typifications with various degrees of generality and anonymity. It is the basic "raw material" that makes up the relatively natural conception of the world. It is a form of knowledge that is no longer problematic and that requires no further investigation. It is "neutralized", but can be reactivated if «typically the same or like experiences turn up in the future» (Schutz 1996: 68). So, while it is taken-for-granted, it can always be critiqued: it is always possible to doubt it.

At hand knowledge requires on hand knowledge. The latter, as we have seen, determines the scope of the former[32].

Concluding remarks

In the first part of the paper we pointed out the discrepancies between Berger and Luckmann's analysis and Schutz's ideas. *The Social Construction of Reality*, while explicitly referencing the theoretical model of the Viennese sociologist, markedly departs from it, especially in the way it interprets the natural attitude. This divergence is accentuated in various essays by Berger. Belief in the reality of the world of everyday life appears to be tinged by uncertainties and fears; cracks caused by looming negative forces, "night-time forces" that threaten to destroy it.

The second part of the essay examined the main characteristics of the natural attitude, in particular the issue of belief in the reality of the world of everyday life in the work of Husserl and Schutz. The aim was to capture traces in the works of the two authors that might have led to the image of reality described by Berger and Luckmann as characterised by an endemic fragility. And to highlight, in a more analytically complete fashion, the vision of the natural attitude from which they depart.

In Husserl's work, belief in the *Lebenswelt* is a sure belief. The presence of culture gives rise to the issue of the co-existence of differentiated basic worlds

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[32] It should be added that there is actually no gap between the two forms of knowledge. There is an intermediate level, a form of habitual knowledge, routine knowledge that, as it were, is grounded in on hand knowledge, while part of it moves gradually (from skills to knowledge of recipes) towards at hand knowledge. There is no clear dividing line between «certain fundamental elements of the stock of knowledge and certain provinces of habitual knowledge» (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 105-106).

and a common level of "pure perception". In any case, from Husserl's point of view, there is no doubt about the persistence of the general thesis of the natural attitude. The contents of this belief in the world can differ, but not the certainty, the faith in its pre-givenness.

Schutz shifts the focus of attention from transcendental phenomenology to the phenomenology of the natural attitude. This shift in focus enables us to concentrate our analysis of the world of everyday life on the social and cultural aspects, from its basic level, that of *working*. These analyses yield the fundamental traits of the natural attitude. Traits that make up the general structure of a theory of what is taken-for-granted.

Schutz by no means exhausted the analysis of the huge field that emerged from his reflections. The author provided a basic framework, the structural characteristics of the forms of knowledge of common sense.

He highlighted three ideal types of knowledge: on hand knowledge, in hand knowledge, and at hand knowledge. The latter basically represents the specific contents of cultural models. It is the result of interactions and is acquired in processes of socialization. This kind of knowledge can be questioned in problematic situations. We can also add that it is subject to constant change. So in this sphere processes of crisis are always latent. But this is not the only form of knowledge that characterizes the world of everyday life. There is the point of reference represented by on hand knowledge. This kind of knowledge is not learned "directly" in processes of socialization, but formed through idealizations. It is, so to speak, "given". It is the bedrock that supports everything else. It represents an unshakeable certainty, a belief which cannot be questioned in the world of everyday life. This is an essential point. It cannot be disregarded without an argument that shows the way in which it can be neutralised, its theoretical irrelevance.

What remains poorly investigated is the relationship between the two forms of knowledge. The separation between them is an analytical one. The world of everyday life is an interweaving of the two forms of knowledge. This aspect is what Schutz fails to cover adequately.

Many writers, while dealing with the world of everyday life (in various interpretations), do not accept the division of forms of knowledge present in Schutz's work. Nor do they develop their own complete theory of the phenomenon of taken-for-grantedness. These include authors such as Mead and Goffman and some closer to Schutz's thinking, like Garfinkel[33], Cicourel, and, as we have seen, Berger and Luckmann. In the work of the latter, the fact that

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[33] M. Rogers shows how in Garfinkel «the unquestioned and the unquestionable are […] aggregated in an implicit characterization of taken-for-grantedness» (Rogers 1981: 137).

their theoretical framework lacks an analysis of taken-for-grantedness is what then leads to their excessive emphasis on the fragility of the world of everyday life. The resulting picture oversimplifies the complexity of the phenomenon.

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The Novelty of Phenomenological Sociology and Its Interdisciplinarity.
An interview to professor Carlos Belvedere

Edited by Michela Beatrice Ferri

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Dear professor Carlos Belvedere, which is the place that Sociology covers in the Phenomenological Background in North America?

From the outset, Phenomenology aimed to produce a renewal of the sciences, not just of Philosophy. It was Husserl's commitment to refuse positivism in order to start a new conception of the sciences. Many of Husserl's students continued with this aim and contributed to refurbish different fields of research. Psychology, for instance, benefited from the contributions of existential analysis.

Nowadays, Phenomenology's invigorating spirit remains the same although the scientific context has somehow changed. Phenomenology found

new disciplines to interpellate, such as the Neurosciences and the Cognitive Sciences. It also found new fields of research for practitioners of phenomenology which in recent years have had a prolific expansion such as Environmental Phenomenology (just to mention one of many examples).

The widespread reach of Phenomenology in contemporary context discloses its interdisciplinary aim. This is no news since, as I said before, that was the aim of Phenomenology from its very beginning. That's why some phenomenologists prefer to speak of "multifarious Phenomenology" as regards the perennial spirit of its endeavor. This idea, in fact, is part of the title of a collaborative volume published by the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations, probably the main global institution of current Multidisciplinary Phenomenology.

What to say, then, about Sociology, a discipline oriented science? Is it possible to save such a perspective in the context of Multidisciplinary Phenomenology? Indeed it is not only possible but it actually happened that Phenomenology conceived Sociology in such a way that it became a multidisciplinary field of research in itself. For instance, that's what Alfred Schutz did: he considered sociology as a place of encounter with many and diverse disciplines, such as Anthropology, Linguistics, Historiography, Cultural Studies, Psychiatry, etc.

Due to the work of Schutz and others, Sociology turned out to be one of the scientific fields of empirical research in which Phenomenology has been most influential and productive during the 20th Century. In this matter, Phenomenology's contributions were groundbreaking all over the world. But when it comes to North America in particular, it should be added that Phenomenology has blossomed in Sociology as in no other science (letting aside Philosophy, which has also an inspiring development in the United States). What I mean is that something happened in American Sociology which captured the attention of sociologists abroad and scientists not specifically related to Phenomenology.

In my opinion, the novelty that Phenomenological Sociology brought in was to question the dogmatism proper to both, the naïve perspective of common sense and the unexamined assumptions of positivism. Phenomenology provided a new, insightful alternate to mainstream Sociology that could deal with fundamental issues that were put aside by a narrow minded positivism, such as the problem of meaning, subjectivity and everyday life. It provided not only a new perspective but also an alternative method and a new ontological region to explore.

Could you explain if it is correct to say that a Phenomenological Sociology exists, or if it is correct to state that a Sociological Phenomenology exists?
As a matter of fact, the most frequent wording is "Phenomenological Sociology"; although, this expression has at least two different, contrasting meanings.

On one hand, some refer to "Phenomenological Sociology" implying that Phenomenology is one of many perspectives in Sociology, i.e. that it is a part of Sociology. They think that Phenomenology makes valuable but partial contributions which need to be complemented with other perspectives. Accordingly, Phenomenology on its own would only produce a one-sided Sociology. Also this perspective takes it for granted that the problem is Phenomenology, not Sociology. I mean, that the bias and flaws come from Phenomenology. Therefore, we can take Sociology as it is (with its positivist assumptions, methodologies and techniques) and then adapt Phenomenology to this unquestioned paradigm. By doing this, what we get is the disarmament of Phenomenology, which must surrender to Science and set aside all critical and innovative pretensions. Once this is done, Phenomenology becomes a kind of Sociology among others, not a perspective in its full extent. As you can imagine, this is not the view I support.

On the other hand, some refer to "Phenomenological Sociology" as a new paradigm that offers an alternative to positivist perspectives and avoids preconceived sociological notions, established recipes and formulas of research procedures. In other words, they believe that Phenomenological Sociology leads to a paradigm switch, promoting a deep renewal of Sociology as a science through the critique of unexamined assumptions. It also questions old-fashioned positivist divisions of scientific labor, counter to what the perspective which I criticized before implies (that Phenomenology can be integrated into mainstream sociology with no need to question any of its assumptions). This is the perspective that I like to call my own.

Alfred Schutz, a phenomenologist more than a sociologist, or vice-versa?

It's not easy to talk about proportions, but my answer is that he was both, a Phenomenologist and a Sociologist. Although, the first part of my answer has been contested in the past.

Indeed, some scholars over the years have argued that uis not a phenomenologist because he refuses to complete the transcendental reduction and, consequently, he sticks to a descriptive, mundane stance which is deemed as naturalistic and dogmatic. In my opinion, these kind of objections come from orthodox, conservative perspectives which won't accept any innovative position. Briefly, they are static, non-historical conceptions of Phenomenology condemned to scholarship and recite of already established positions. Phenomenology would have been lost for good if Phenomenologists had lost the ability to go back to things themselves over and over again and come up with better and better descriptions.

In this view, Schutz can be depicted as a genuine Phenomenologist, not only interested in Husserl's writings but mostly in pushing forward Phenom-

enology in new directions. Not all disagreements with Husserl have to be interpreted as a "loss of Phenomenology". In Schutz's case, at least, it can be viewed as a contribution to Phenomenology. Whether or not Schutz is a phenomenologist should not be decided based on his proximity to Husserl (which, by the way, was very close and closer than what some of his critics think) but on an examination of his own perspective.

The main reason why I think that Schutz was, in fact, a Phenomenologist is that he actually had in mind a programmatic view of Phenomenology. He conceived of Phenomenology as a scientific, "technical device" (not as a "mystical gift") which implied a switch of the natural attitude in order to clarify the complete system of intentionality within the frame of Phenomenological Psychology, both at the eidetic and the empirical level. Within this framework, Schutz pursues a "Constitutive Phenomenology of the natural attitude" as an "eidetic mundane science".

The second reason why I think that Schutz's stance must be accepted as phenomenological is that those "orthodox" critiques are now obsolete since there is a new consensus as regards naturalistic positions. They are now accepted by some of the most respected Phenomenologists of our times as valuable readings of Husserl's latest writings. For instance, some Husserlians nowadays agree that much of what has been contested in the past about Merleau-Ponty's positions are inspired in Husserl's papers that were not published back then and now make them at least plausible. Well, I think Schutz has not yet been absolved by some enthusiastic Husserlians as Merleau-Ponty was absolved, and neither his contributions to the "naturalization" of Phenomenology have been fully appreciated. Whether he was or was not a Phenomenologist mainly depends on that.

About Schutz as a Sociologist, fortunately we can tell a very different story. Schutz's work was adopted by mainstream Sociology as a contribution worthy to be counted as a part of its own legacy. Schutz himself presented main aspects of his work as Sociological. In his early years, he introduced his first book as a critique and foundation of Comprehensive Sociology. In his later years, he taught a seminar on the Sociology of Language. He had students, supporters and even detractors in Sociology. So, he felt like, and he was seen by others, as an important Sociologist.

Schutz's idea of his own Sociology is closer to the first meaning of Phenomenological Sociology discussed before. His contributions are meant to be a part of Sociology and not to produce a paradigm switch. Instead, his idea of Phenomenology is closer to the second conception of Phenomenological Sociology that I mentioned –the one that I support. It works with different assumptions than mainstream philosophies and it's not meant to take part in a broader framework but to endorse a holistic view in its own right. So, even

if I think that Schutz was both, a Philosopher and a Sociologist, I will have to admit that he was a Philosopher in a broader, deeper sense.

Although, regardless to what Schutz might think about his own Sociology, it actually is an alternative paradigm to mainstream Sociology. It was Schutz's students who realized that, and started the work of a new conception of Sociology. That's the reason why George Psathas, in his marvelous introduction to *Phenomenological Sociology*, could establish that, as a matter of fact, it exists in the many diverse enterprises and writings carried out in its name.

Which is the focus – "Lebenswelt", "Everyday Life-World" – of the sociological theory of Alfred Schutz?

In Sociology, Schutz is known as a Sociologist of Everyday Life. This is true although in some ways inaccurate. His contributions on this matter are in fact outstanding, but there is more to it than just another Sociological theory of Everyday Life. What makes the difference is that it belongs to a larger framework which enhances it since, for Schutz, Everyday Life is not a realm in its own but the core of the Life-World. In this broader view, Everyday Life is not just an ideology, an ensemble of "social representations" or a mere "cultural construction" but the heart of the paramount reality. Accordingly, the proper way to understand Schutz's Sociology of Everyday Life is to situate it at the center of the *Lebenswelt*.

In this regard, there is no dichotomy between both concepts in Schutz: one leads to the other. You can focus on Everyday Life or on the *Lebenswelt,* as you wish, but one thing will take you to the other. Anyway, the broader scope is the latest's, which includes and completes the former.

Although, it is true that Schutz became increasingly involved in developing his own theory of the *Lebenswelt*. Sure he was inspired by Husserl but his reflections on the subject start very early, way before Husserl's specific writings about it reached widespread diffusion. He also kept making progress until his late manuscripts, where we find his most extensive and sophisticated Philosophy of the *Lebenswelt.*

In Schutz's view, the *Lebenswelt* is the Alpha and the Omega of our reflections, as much in the Sciences as in Philosophy. This is one of the reasons why he rejects Husserl's transcendental reduction, which he considers impossible, unnecessary and redundant. Schutz even thinks that some aspects of the *Lebenswelt* such as the universal structures of the *humana conditio* can only be established by a philosophical Anthropology whose reach could surpass Phenomenology.

Every time I mention Alfred Schutz in the field of the studies of Phenomenological Sociology, I need to talk about Aron Gurwitsch, too. Why our philosopher Aron Gurwitsch is a considerable voice in sociological theory ?

There are a number of reasons why the name of Schutz evokes Gurwitsch's. In the first place, they had a long lasting friendship, which endured even through exile, and then starting a new life in the States -where Schutz felt at home. It was also a philosophical friendship since over the years they had shared their ideas with each other, agreed and disagreed on many subjects, and above all appreciated their friend's advice no matter how critical they might have been. Also, they were both "critical Phenomenologists" (as Helmut Wagner puts it), since each of them had a creative understanding of Phenomenology and pursued the dream of developing their own personal oeuvre.

Of the many subjects that overcame their differences and served as a common ground for mutual understanding, I would like to recall two of them which are in turn closely related to one another, the problem of relevance and the question of the constitution. They are at once a Philosophical and a Sociological issue. As a Philosophical matter, Schutz dealt with the problem of relevance as the constitution of the thematic field of consciousness; as a sociological matter, he based those reflections on his theory of power as imposed relevances. He discussed these ideas broadly with his friend Gurwitsch on a common ground, which is the rejection of Transcendental Phenomenology, on Gurwitsch's side, by getting rid of the ego, on Schutz's side, by getting rid of the transcendental.

How can be defined the relationship between the position of Alfred Schutz and the theory of the sociologist Talcott Parsons?

The relationship between Schutz and Parsons could be told from two different points of view. By reading their correspondence, you can tell that, in Parsons' perspective, a discussion with Schutz was meaningless. Parsons faced his exchange with Schutz as a Kantian discussion over the possibility of a valid knowledge in the Social Sciences. He also thought that their dialogue did not arrive at any interesting conclusion. Eventually, this is the interpretation that prevailed about the Parsons – Schutz affair. In Schutz's perspective, a whole different interpretation can be established. His expectations prior to their letters exchange was that a dialogue with Parsons was possible because they were both concerned with the theory of social action. In particular, Schutz was interested in the question of the rationality of social actions. He did have some objections to the way that Parsons understood this, partially because he misread Weber's idea of rationality. However, he felt that they shared a common ground in the field of sociological theory. And he regretted that they could not pursue a dialogue through their differences.

You might think of this as the opposite to Schutz's correspondence with Gurwitsch: they did have some serious differences, however they respected

each other and believed that the criticisms they were given actually represented the most qualified and precious contribution. If only Parsons would have been open to an honest debate, Sociological Theory could have profited so much from the sincere exposition of their differences and hopefully from a higher synthesis of what unhappily remains as one of the core dissents in 20th Century Sociology.

Because this consensus was never achieved, all that remains is Schutz's well known criticisms of Parsons as a Sociologist with serious problems of adequacy since he replaces the man on the street by a kind of puppet made up in accordance with his own theoretical expectations, not with the reality of the social world, which is not produced by Sociological Theory but by the ordinary man who lives and acts in the Everyday Lifeworld.

Could you explain us which is the relation between Phenomenology and the Ethnomethodology founded by Harold Garfinkel?

Even though Ethnomethodology is a fresh perspective, you could say that it has Phenomenological roots. If you consider what Garfinkel read during his college years, you will realize that he had a solid Phenomenological base. For instance, he was familiar with the writings of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Marvin Farber, and others. Also his best known papers include many quotations from other Phenomenologists, mainly from Maurice Merleau-Ponty but also Martin Heidegger, among them. However, Garfinkel's concern with Phenomenology was not philosophical and neither theoretical. He was focused on descriptions, not ideas.

Probably, the most important description that Garfinkel borrowed from Husserl is that of the "occasional expressions", which in Ethnomethodology gave rise to the concept of "indexical expressions". That which for Husserl is a particular kind of expression (terms such as "I", "you", "here", "there", and the like), whose meaning changes according to the peculiarities of who is speaking, for Garfinkel it was an instantiation of a feature common to all expressions, which is, that its meaning is irremediably contextual. Briefly, for Garfinkel any meaning is contextual.

In turn, the most important claim that Garfinkel borrows from Schutz is that Phenomenology must be pursued as a description of the natural attitude (which Husserl, as well as Schutz, named Phenomenological Psychology). According to George Psathas, in his PhD dissertation Garfinkel came up with the idea of turning Phenomenological Psychology into an empirical research program. He realized that the natural attitude had systemic properties, which means that an alteration of one of their features would have holistic consequences. Therefore, if you alter any particular feature, you get a shocking experience that strikes the natural attitude as a whole. Years later, this idea in-

spired his "breaching experiments" and the experimental alteration of "trust" and Everyday Life "assumptions".

The position of professor George Psathas comes from the tradition that began with Alfred Schutz. But we have also Berger and Luckmann. Could you explain which are the right places that these scholars covered and cover now in the history of Phenomenological Sociology?

George Psathas played a main role in the institutionalization of Phenomenological Sociology. He realized that this perspective existed as a matter of fact since there were a number of researches carried out in its name. So he organized a session on Phenomenological Sociology at the meeting of the American Sociological Association in 1971. Then he edited a book with prestigious contributors whose "Introduction" is, to me, a whole manifesto, since it depicts Phenomenological Sociology as "a paradigm". He also makes a "historical overview" and lists a number of "issues and problems" to be addressed, among them, the Life-world, the subjective dimension, the assumptions of Everyday Life, and intersubjectivity. He also founded the journal *Human Studies*, which gave voice to what had been so far more of a movement than an established perspective. He also had the clear minded idea that Ethnomethodology was a way of *doing* Phenomenological Sociology and made evident some important relations and affinities (a few of which I commented on in my previous answer). Those who practice Phenomenological Sociology are indebted to him for his kind work and his mindful observations.

Berger and Luckmann wrote the most influential book in Phenomenological Sociology, *The Social Construction of Reality*. It opened new paths for this perspective and got many Sociologists who don't necessarily consider themselves Phenomenologists interested. Of course, there are good reasons for the huge success that it achieved. One of them is the systematic aim of the book which, among other things, led the authors to take into consideration not only the "subjective reality" of society (which is what many would expect from an average Phenomenologist) but also its "objective reality", including among others the dimensions of the institutionalization, sedimentation, tradition, and social organization.

Now, if you allow me, I would like to say a few words about Luckmann's personal contributions to this perspective. He edited Schutz's manuscripts on the structures of the Life-world —in my opinion, one of the most outstanding works by Schutz. Even though some scholars consider it a "secondary bibliography," I think that —with the exception of one chapter- it gathers and systematizes fundamental writings of the late Schutz in a way that makes them available for discussion and enhances the understanding of his oeuvre. Also

he developed, in his own perspective, the theory of social action and contributed to an update of the problem of intersubjectivity in contemporary context.

Which themes, nowadays, are at the center of the debate of Phenomenological Sociology?

It's my belief that nowadays consensus prevails over debate in Social Phenomenology. Ideas such as the importance of subjectivity, the constitution of meaning and the social construction of reality are widely accepted. In recent years, they gave rise to a number of insightful investigations on matters such as power, social management of time, social aspects of trauma and memory, social withdrawal, institutional crisis, politics and the Life-world, and so on. These issues drew the attention of many colleagues in the United States, Germany, Japan and South America.

However, over the years, a few debates have taken place. I will mention one of them in particular, with regards to the very existence of Phenomenological Sociology. The question was: Is Phenomenological Sociology possible?

Basically, the issue was if Phenomenology is solely a Philosophy or if it can also be a Science. Here we have two different stances, each one of them with its own "geographical disseminations" and "prominent representative" (according to Thomas Eberle). The German tradition, led by Thomas Luckmann, considers Phenomenology as mere Protosociology. On the contrary, the American tradition, led by George Psathas, considers that many important contributions of Phenomenology take part of Sociology as a Science.

In Luckmann's view, since Phenomenology is a Philosophy, it can only be Pre-sociological or Proto-sociological because Sociology is an Empirical Science. As they proceed through completely different methods, a Phenomenological Sociology is a misnomer because Phenomenology is not a Science but a Philosophy dealing with phenomena of subjective consciousness from an egological perspective. Alternatively, as a Science, Sociology deals with phenomena of the social world from a cosmological perspective. Accordingly, even if Phenomenology can ground Sociology, it cannot be a part of it.

In Psathas's view, Phenomenology is at once a Philosophy, a method, and an approach for Social Sciences. Thus, it can also be an empirical endeavor dealing with the Life-world as experienced by ordinary human beings living in it. Consequently, there is a Phenomenological way of doing Sociology (for instance, as I said before, Ethnometodology is one of them).

In my opinion, the terms of this debate should be updated since a lot has being going on in the Sciences during at least the last two decades. One of the main changes, which had a huge impact in Phenomenology (particularly in North American Phenomenologists) is the rise of inter- and cross-disciplinarity. This makes it impossible (or at least much more difficult) to sustain such a clear distinction such as that upheld by Luckmann between Philosophy and

the Sciences, which, of course, makes Psathas's position stronger: not everything that has some philosophy in it is external to Sociology. We should reconsider matters like this if we aim at taking Phenomenology as a new paradigm.

Personally, I have been dealing with these issues from the perspective that I like to call "Social Phenomenology". It includes, of course, Phenomenological Sociology but it does not exclude Philosophical subjects and it also involves all Social and Cultural Sciences. Briefly said, Social Phenomenology is the regional ontology of the social realm at all levels, empirical, eidetic and transcendental (if you accept Transcendental Phenomenology). For instance, the problem of intersubjectivity would not be seen as a Philosophical problem but as one of the core issues of Social Phenomenology. You could even say that it's both Sociological and Philosophical, and even that it involves all the other Social and Human Sciences.

This makes Social Phenomenology a multidisciplinary paradigm, with a wider aim and scope than Phenomenological Sociology and Phenomenological Philosophy on their own. At the same time, it allows us to leave behind the sterile discussions about boundaries in order to focus on enhancing Phenomenology as a whole. It is my hope that if we, Phenomenologists, accomplish this switch in attitude, it will make a brighter day.

A well-informed 'model of administration' for agrarian states. Or: how not to fall into the trap of 'nostrification' when comparing colonial West African States with 18th century Prussia

Hubert Treiber

In a noteworthy essay entitled "The Operation Called Vergleichen (Comparison)" Joachim Matthes has drawn attention to the fact that studies which claim to compare particular phenomena from one's own culture (such as law or administration, for example) with those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, perform a real comparison. Instead, what takes place is (in his words) a "nostrification", that is, "an appropriation of the other in one's own terms" or conceptual assimilation. Even the ideal-type constructions of Max Weber seem largely to confirm this proposition. In principle, then, it ought to be quite hard to find studies which are not exposed to the charge of nostrification. In what follows works by Gerd Spittler are examined in some detail from this particular perspective. In the first instance Spittler investigated the specific problems encountered by the colonial administration in West African peasant states (1919-39), before examining if this problematic could be applied to the peasant state of Prussia in the 18th century. So, for example, he asked himself how a bureaucratic administration reliant on written documents resolved the problem of raising taxes on a body of untruly peasants who to a large extent communicated orally amongst themselves. Since in both cases Spittler relates the typical structures of an agrarian society to typical administrative structures, he attains a level of reflection where the "'One' can be translated into the "Other" and vice versa' (Matthes), and in this way he escapes the particular danger of nostrification.

1. Introduction

In his noteworthy essay "The Operation Called Vergleichen" Joachim Matthes (1992) has suggested that as a rule the procedures aimed at comparing particular phenomena of one's own culture (administration, for example) with those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, make a comparison. Instead, this involves "a 'nostrification', an appropriation of the other in one's own terms" (Matthes 1992: 84). Elsewhere in his essay he elaborates on this:

> The aporia of such a 'comparative' practice consists firstly in the fact that its *tertium* is not constructed as a meta-reflection, but forms it as a cultural projection. The other aspect of this aporia is *that a tertium gained through a cultural projection provides at the same time the standard for the search, for the identification of comparative phenomenon elsewhere*. The *there* for the substance (Sachverhalt) of this

'comparison' is detected with the aid of this projected *tertium* using the concept that the *here* of the content to be 'compared' has of itself – transposed into an abstraction unlimited with respect to time and space. What is presented as 'comparison' is performed, first, as an identification of what is 'like' (or on a 'par') according to its own standard, before com-parison (Ver-gleichen) as an explicit operation begins. (Matthes 1992: 83).

Once this illuminating observation is taken into account, we realise that there are very many instances of this.[1] Some of Max Weber's ideal-typical constructions take this form, and seem to provide confirmation for Matthes' claim. On the other hand, it appears much more difficult to show how one might avoid this trap of "nostrification". However, it seems to me that the studies of Gerd Spittler do offer a demonstration of this kind.

Gerd Spittler, a sociologist by training, but one whose first-rate credentials as an ethnologist are displayed in his field research (Spittler 1978: 140ff.), had a fascinating idea. Having investigated the manner in which (colonial) West African peasant states were administered during the period 1919-1939, he devised a 'model of administration in peasant states' (Spittler 1976; 1978; 1981), applying this model to agrarian 18th century Prussia (Spittler 1980), framing it as an *intercultural comparison* in which he first examined the interaction between administration and peasant culture in Prussia.[2] Spittler demonstrates typical patterns of domination in the agrarian Prussia of the 18th century, but also administrative problems of the type that regularly tend to crop up in the day-to-day practice of administration. By linking the structures of an agrarian society (a peasant state) to typical administrative structures and problems (Spittler 1981: 9), he is able to construct a well-informed 'model of administration' for agrarian states, avoiding the danger of nostrification, the "appropriation of the other in one's own terms" (Matthes), especially since he begins his intercultural comparison with the analysis of a twentieth-century African agrarian society, then shifting his perspective to eighteenth-century Prussian agrarian society, a society which we today perceive as remote.

Drawing upon Spittler's work on colonial West Africa (1919-1939) and on the agrarian society of Prussia in the 18th century, the following paper sketches in outline a 'model of administration' in peasant states. In doing so, I draw upon more recent studies than were available to Spittler at the time when he constructed and tested his model (Eifert 2003; Wagner 2005).

[1] Treiber 2012: 28f.
[2] Spittler's "model of interaction between agrarian peasant societies and (bureaucratic) administration" can in part be "applied to the Prussian bureaucracy as it existed from the turn of the century to the 1860s" (Wagner 2005: 63).

2. The development of a 'model of administration' in agrarian states

2.1 Typical characteristics of agrarian states or peasant societies

First of all, some terms need to be explained. Spittler, drawing upon Max Weber, defines a 'state' as a 'territorial political association with a central authority and bureaucracy', which claims 'to exert direct domination' over its members (Spittler 1981: 13). A state can be described as an 'agrarian state' if farmers make up the majority of the population and if the burdens of taxation and other obligations fall first and foremost on them, and they can also be conscripted when military forces have to be raised (Spittler 1981: 13). Agrarian or peasant states can also be defined in terms of the degree to which a monetary and market economy has developed. For the present purpose, the following will suffice: where there is widespread subsistence agriculture and self-sufficiency (i.e. a low level of market integration), the administration will find itself confronted with substantial problems, for example in the fields of information gathering and surveillance. The agrarian states investigated by Spittler in colonial West Africa (1919-1939) are characterized by an oral culture, i.e. 'communication and intellectual abilities are predominantly governed (by the oral mode)', though this is by no means intended to imply that peasant farmers lack talents or are ignorant. Where Prussia is concerned, Spittler can draw on an outstanding authority, in the person of Christian Garve, to demonstrate the contrary, namely that a specific type of intelligence is to be found amongst the peasant population that can be ascribed to their methods of production and their subjection (Spittler 1981: 18f.; Garve 1796). Even if it is accepted that the ability both to read and to write is to be found among peasant farmers to a certain degree (Quéniart 1981), it may nevertheless be assumed that the description of rural areas in the 18th century as a 'world of semi-oral culture' is an apt one. For this characterization we are indebted to the highly illuminating study by Quéniart (1981: 133). Much light is also shed by his remarks and suggestions on the 'delimitation of partial literacy', in the course of which he states that 'partial literacy that is limited to the ability to read does little to change the nature of a person's cultural dependency. In oral culture the memory continues to be the only means of accumulating and transmitting knowledge: such partial literacy "does not change the individual's relationship to this culture, but reinforces it." Only when the ability to write has been acquired may we assume that such a change occurs (...)' (Quéniart 1981: 117). The picture painted by von Ungern-Sternberg (1987: 386f.) for some 18th century German states either supports Quéniart's or at the very least does not contradict it:

Thus while many people who were described as illiterate could not, or could hardly, write, they were nevertheless, at least to a certain degree, able to read. (...). Around 1800, Württemberg, Saxony and the Thuringian states, above all Gotha, were considered to be exemplary regions, thanks above all to their relatively well-developed school systems, whereas the Palatinate, for example, was judged to be distinctly backward. (...). Even if elementary reading abilities were more widespread in Germany than has been assumed up to now, for most peasants, as for the lower social classes and the lower middle class, reading was a "surplus activity", at least to the extent that it went beyond the needs of religious observance and the modest amount of leisure time available (see Friederich 1987: 126ff.).

All this means that 'information was [predominantly] not laid down in writing, but was stored in the memory' (Spittler 1981: 19) and handed down orally. To this extent, the 'elders' occupy a special position as reliable sources of information. Thus 'the retrieval of information (...) is much more strongly dependent on people than it is in a written culture which accumulates its knowledge in books and documents' (Spittler 1981: 19). Wagner (2005: 106f.) finds a particular impressive example that may stand for many others as late as the year 1871 (!) in Prussia:

When there were conflicts about the boundaries between the areas of land assigned to private and to communal use, those concerned found themselves on shifting sands as far as the legal basis was concerned, since the stock of information that the authorities could draw upon in order to mediate in conflicts was diffusely distributed in the village. Mostly it was a case of memory versus memory, while the few written or cartographical documents (…) were all too often imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations.' The procedure used to resolve such conflicts tells its own tale: the *Dorfschulze*, the village mayor or reeve, who represented 'the very lowest level of the state administrative apparatus' (Wagner 2005: 112), was permitted, as a person acting in an official capacity, to draw upon his 'personal memory' if 'there were no documents available and people's recollections diverged (Wagner 2005: 107).

However, the implications of a written culture are more far-reaching: 'Definitions of terms, abstraction from concrete situations and individual cases, thinking in lists and tables, all these features that constitute the way a bureaucracy operates, cannot be dissociated from written culture' (Spittler 1981: 19). This can be seen above all if, as was the case in Prussia, there are particular regions where particular dialects (e.g. Low German) or other languages (e.g. Polish) were spoken. Those who are at home in such a dialect or language,

those whose whole manner of speaking and thinking is shaped by it, do not (in the 18th century) necessarily feel the need to learn the dominant written language which is at the same time the language of the administration. Rather, for groups of the population who have no need to master the written language, bilingualism is more of a hindrance, especially to learning to write (Quéniart 1981: 125). Moreover, written information can easily be passed on orally by a small number of persons, e.g. by the village clergymen, so that it is not essential to be able either to read or to write (Quéniart 1981: 133).

Characteristic features of agrarian states, especially those with a low level of market integration, are on the one hand the high degree of inaccessibility of the peasants living in remote villages, scattered hamlets or isolated farms, and on the other hand the regional and local heterogeneity, which makes it extremely difficult to obtain a clear picture: 'Where every village has its own customs, where there are sharp distinctions in language and dialect from region to region or even from village to village, where a word may mean different things in different villages, and the same thing be designated by different words, where every little town has differing units of length, area, capacity and weight, but all use the same words for them' (Spittler 1980: 578), any administrative apparatus will find it difficult to collect reliable information and evaluate it, and to enforce compliance with its general (and increasingly abstract) rules. The multiplicity and diversity of local and regional harvest customs is well documented for as late as 1865 (!) by a survey, carried out by Wilhelm Mannhardt, of the names given to particular harvest customs and their dissemination in Germany and some adjoining countries, because he was seeking to demonstrate – being in this respect a true disciple of Tylor's – that these were 'remnants of a Teutonic religious cult' (Kippenberg 1997: 125; Mannhardt 1868; Tylor 1873).

It is necessary to consider briefly the extent to which 18th century Prussia was an agrarian or peasant state. Spittler (1980: 584ff.) states that it was. In terms of the features set out at the beginning of this paper, Prussia was not only an agrarian state, but was characterized by a degree of heterogeneity that was inescapable to any observer and confronted the bureaucratic administration with substantial challenges: 'Prussia was heterogeneous not only with regard to its weights and measures, but also in language, religion and ethnic composition, in manners, customs and law' (Spittler 1980: 585). Prussia as a military and agrarian state was particularly dependent upon its peasants as recruits and as taxpayers. They were the ones that bore the burden of the *Kontribution* (see below) that was regularly levied, and which represented a more important source of income for the state than the municipal excise duties; and in addition, the peasants made an essential contribution to the incomes of the landed estates (Büsch 1962: 5f., 16f., 21f.; Braun 1975). As explained above,

the assumption that rural areas were a 'world of semi-oral culture' may also be taken to apply to 18th century Prussia. Wagner (2005: 111) gives a vivid example of this from as late as 1850 (!) in relation to a village in West Prussia. Of the 113 people who took part in a parish meeting in that year, 43 (48.6%), i.e. almost half, did not sign the record but placed their marks under it in the form of three crosses. But illiteracy is likely to have been widespread even among the holders of positions in the lowest ranks of the administration, the village reeves (Dorfschulzen) and the *Kreisreiter*, the officials who toured the district on behalf of the *Landrat* (Wagner (2005: 122f.).

2.2 Three types of administration in agrarian societies: bureaucratic, intermediary and arbitrary administration

In considering the workings of the administration in colonially governed agrarian societies with a view to gaining insights that are susceptible to comparison with agrarian Prussia, Spittler constructs three ideal-types of administration (Spittler 1981: 21ff.): bureaucratic, intermediary and arbitrary (extending as far as despotic), each of which is distinguished by quite definite advantages and disadvantages. *Bureaucratic administration* rests, according to Max Weber's ideal type (Treiber 2007), on abstract, universally applicable rules or on abstract knowledge that is collected and recorded in documents or in lists and tables.[3] The features characterizing the manner in which such a bureaucracy functions are inseparable from the existence of a written culture, but this is something remote from the population of an agrarian state: 'The bureaucratic way of thinking is foreign to peasants who have grown up in an oral culture' (Spittler 1981: 22). Where there is a low level of market integration, local and regional 'heterogeneity in economics, society and culture' (Spittler 1981: 22) and an underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. inadequate road networks), the fundamental problems for any bureaucratic administration that stem from the incongruence of written and oral culture are intensi-

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[3] In the period following the royal Instruction of 19 January 1723, by which the General War Commissariat and the General Finance Directory were amalgamated to form a single General Directory, serious efforts in the direction of rationalization and enhanced effectiveness can be seen to have been undertaken within the central administration (Kohnke 1996; Mainka 1998; Schellakowsky 1998). It is therefore not surprising that the administrative reform of 1723 also involved the creation of a special statistical office within the General Directory. The Commissariat had played a decisive role in the process of building up a modern administration and smashing the old Estate-based system in the course of the previous two centuries (Hintze 1981). But despite this, in regard to the peasants, the lowest hierarchical level at which the state made demands upon its subjects, the central bureaucracy was long dependent upon intermediary administration.

fied. These are on the one hand the problem of collecting and processing information, and on the other hand that of being able to exercise domination (i.e. to enforce compliance with laws and regulations). The peasants to whom such (abstract) regulations are addressed very rarely display open resistance to compliance, however; rather, they generally react to the demands of the administration with 'defensive strategies' (Spittler) such as avoidance (by hiding), ignoring them, bending them through wayward interpretation or concealed non-compliance (Treiber 1995: 71ff.; Garve 1796). All these 'defensive reactions' and the associated communicative behaviour are characterized by the fact that they are not 'sophisticated strategies for exercising influence', but are rather quite simply intended to withhold important information from the administration, especially since this is the most important resource for bureaucratic administration.

These two fundamental problems of bureaucratic domination do not apply if arbitrary rule is exercised by government and administration: the type of *arbitrary administration*. This form of administration may appear advantageous because it does not 'require any written documentation or (…) storage of information' (Spittler 1981: 23). It is precisely in situations in which obtaining and storing information proves to be extremely difficult, that an arbitrary style of administration may come to prevail. Arbitrary rule can however only be used selectively and in particular places; it therefore has a very limited reach, in both time and space. So it is no surprise that arbitrary domination is always accompanied by a *'laissez faire'* attitude, i.e. by largely abandoning the attempt to enforce compliance with the regulations.[4] This paradoxical coexistence of the use of force at one point and *laissez faire* at another is by the way thoroughly characteristic of the early modern state in the Occident (Tilly 1989). The transition to despotic rule, in which arbitrariness is accompanied by the threat or use of force, something to which even the lowest administrative level commonly resorts (v. Trotha 1995: 136ff.), is fluid: 'Bureaucratic taxation turns into something close to looting, and organized conscription for military service becomes more like a hunt after people' (Spittler 1981: 23).

One rational solution to these two fundamental problems of bureaucratic administration is to be found in Spittler's third type, *intermediary administration*, or more precisely the combination of bureaucratic and intermediary administration. The function of such 'intermediary systems' is to enforce compli-

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[4] „The economy of the use of violence explains the apparent paradox in the co-existence of violence and toleration that so astonished a European observer. He experienced on the one hand a high level of violence focussed on the imposition of a few demands, and on the other an equally unfamiliar level of disobedience to many demands made by the state." (Spittler 1978: 69).

ance with the universal requirements of the central administration and to collect basic information on the country and its population. Intermediary administration relies on middlemen who are recruited locally and are well rooted in the community. These people are no strangers to the written culture of the administrative bureaucracy, but nor are they excluded from access to the (semi-)oral culture of the peasants. Thanks to the way these middlemen are anchored in local or regional society, intermediary administration is also more readily able to deal with the heterogeneity described above. The middlemen fulfil both the expectations of the bureaucratic system and those of the (semi-)oral culture, even though, depending on their social origin and the prevailing constellation of power factors, they may see themselves as owing loyalty more to the one side or to the other. The combination described offers substantial advantages both in obtaining information and in collecting taxes. To obtain information, the middlemen predominantly communicate with the peasants orally, whereas for tax collection the invention of the 'repartition' or tax-farming system shows itself to be advantageous. In this system (here in relation to the tax known as the '*Kontribution*') a quota is laid down in advance for a group of the population, which the middleman is then responsible for collecting and handing over to the authorities; but it is left to him to determine how the quota is allocated within the group concerned (Spittler 1981: 24).

Spittler's brief history of tax collection, taking the *Kontribution* as its example, tells of comparable technical difficulties, but also of the extent to which the data collected was dependent on those who furnished it (which also included the gentry-dominated district assemblies). This is not least because the *Kontribution*, a land tax, was calculated on the basis of a fictitious or virtual unit of measurement. This unit was the hide (*Hufe*) (HRG, vol. 2: col. 248ff.; Ersch/Gruber 1980: 369), which was actually a measurement of area, although the areas under agricultural use had not yet been comprehensively surveyed and recorded. According to Meitzen (2007: 13), triangulation did not begin in Prussia until 1750. For example, when the "Generalhufenschoss' (a levy on real estate) was introduced in East Prussia (1715-1719), the necessary survey of arable land was prevented by the resistance of the aristocracy (Spittler 1980: 591). In Prussia, cadastres or land registries as a basis for land tax assessment were first introduced in 1822, initially in the Rhineland and Westphalia, 'and by the the Act of 21.5.1861 for the entire state' (HRG, vol. 2: col. 661f.). According to Wagner (2005: 58), it was 'ultimately (…) not until the land tax reform [of 21 May 1861] and the associated creation of new land registries in the course of the 1860s that the foundations were laid for the collection of more and more accurate data on the situation in the countryside. It was the Land Register Ordinance of 5 May 1872 that finally created an information system relating

to parcels of real estate, their ownership and the obligations attached to them that was both geographically comprehensive and also constantly kept up to date.' In view of the situation described, the yield of arable land in Prussia was calculated in accordance with the '*beschworene Aussaat*' or 'sworn seedcast', a form of affidavit in which the peasants were required to declare how much seed they had sown. This 'was assessed in bushels for every place in the monarchy, and the *Kontribution* levied in accordance with the number of bushels sown.' The *Kontribution* was used to finance the army. As it was levied regularly and represented a more or less constant amount (Büsch 1962: 22), it enabled the King to make himself independent of the Estates. In practical terms, the *Kontribution* was treated like a tribute, i.e. 'each district was assigned a certain quota, which it had to raise.'

From the point of view of the central authority and its bureaucracy,   the obvious advantages of *intermediary administration* are accompanied by one considerable disadvantage: these relatively autonomous middlemen not only make it more difficult for the central bureaucracy to exercise surveillance, but also tend 'to mediatize the relationship between the subject and the state bureaucracy' (Spittler 1980: 582). In respect of the two principal features that characterize agrarian states – that it is peasants who bear the burden of taxation, and also form the pool from which the (standing) army is recruited – Spittler describes typical distinctions between the three types of administration: 'As taxation is a function of bureaucracy and tribute of intermediary domination, so looting is a feature of despotic rule. A similar distinction can also be made with regard to military recruiting: bureaucratic recruiting is based on muster lists, intermediary recruiting on quotas; but despotic recruiting relies on hunting for people – the press gang.' (Spittler 1980: 580).

3. The interaction of peasant agrarian society and bureaucratic administration in Prussia: Landrat and village clergyman as typical representatives of 'intermediary administration'

In the 18th century, the *Landrat*, the chief administrative officer at district level, may be regarded as a typical example of intermediary administration, as can be seen *inter alia* from the fact that he was recruited from amongst the land-owning gentry of his district, who also had the right to propose new personnel in the case of vacancies (Spittler 1980: 586; Büsch 1962: 77f.; Gelpke 1902). In the 18th century all *Landräte* were drawn from the aristocracy; they were proposed by the *Kreisstände*, the district assemblies dominated by the aristocratic landowners, and appointed by the Crown. In 1713 the King had restricted

this right of proposal, but from 1756 onwards the *Kreisstände* were once again able to exercise it without restriction in all provinces of Prussia, though untitled landowners were excluded (Eifert 2003: 45).

Indeed, 'the status of the *Landräte* as representatives of the landowning interest was in line with the concept of their office that had prevailed since the 18th century' (Wagner 2005: 67). The repercussions of this view that the *Landrat* represented the landed interests can still be seen as late as the end of the 19th century in the tax evasion practiced by large landowners and the derelictions of duty committed by *Landräte*. Both these types of offence were 'so widespread that those who committed them no longer even subjectively felt them to be such, but rather regarded them as representing the correct interpretation of the law's intentions, though the application of this interpretation was of course to be limited to a certain social class' (Witt 1973: 217). At the same time, this provides a vivid example of shortcomings in enforcement in the classic field of fiscal administration just at a time when the Prussian administration appeared to be in the process of coming much closer to Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, and as late as 1911 well-regarded scholars, such as Otto Hintze (1981a: 27), extolled the generally admired virtues that were taken to characterize the Prussian civil service, namely its honesty, devotion to duty, professional competence, observance of the law and personal integrity.

In the 18th century the office of *Landrat* appeared as an 'extended squire-archy' (Wagner), as can be seen, in an external view, from the fact that up until 1861 the *Landrat*'s office was located on his estate. So the paternalistic attitudes that were cultivated by the squire and which consequently helped to shape the way in which he saw himself (Wagner 2005: 158f.) were customarily reflected in the way he carried out his duties as *Landrat*, and were considered to be legitimate, or appropriate to his status (Wagner 2005: 159). These paternalistic attitudes are attributable amongst other things to the fact that the 'manorial estate (was) not only a large agricultural operation, but also had far-reaching rights of rule [*Herrschaft*] attached to it outside the economic field. Purely by virtue of his ownership of the estate, the great landowner exercised law and order functions and jurisdiction over his tenants. In 1837, around one-third of all Prussian subjects in the areas east of the Rhine were subject to this patrimonial exercise of law and order and of judicial functions' (Jessen 1995: 142, referring to Koselleck 1967: 674f.; Lüdtke 1982: 196-227). Only after the promulgation of the Decree of 16.12.1861 was a *Landrat* obliged to reside in the town that was the administrative centre of his district and also to exercise his official duties from there (Wagner 2005: 74f.). The *Landrat* had to meet both the costs of keeping up his public position and also the costs of administration largely out of his own pocket. The latter were a major factor especially from the 1840s onwards, when written correspondence increased

in volume to such an extent that it was necessary to employ a number – varying from district to district – of clerical staff to cope with it (Wagner 2005: 76).

Even though the *Landräte* had officially been required to take an examination before the Higher Examinations Commission since 1770, most of them appear to have managed to avoid it, so that the level of (formal) qualification required for the office would not appear to have been particularly demanding at first. The same may also be deduced from the fact that the office of *Landrat* was an honorary one performed by its holder on the side (Eifert 2003: 46f.). It is also demonstrated by the basic level of manpower available to the *Landrat*, which up to the end of 18th century consisted of ancillary staff with low qualifications, a clerk and a *Kreisreiter*, whose job it was to tour the district and keep in contact with the village reeves; from 1815/16 onwards every *Landrat* then became entitled to have a district secretary to manage his office (Spittler 1980: 586; Wagner 2005: 76; Eifert 2003: 78ff., 85). Eifert characterizes the tasks of a *Landrat* in the 18th century as being 'an accumulation of supervisory duties', and yet if the office was exercised in the manner outlined above, then these supervisory duties must have been undertaken for the most part through non-bureaucratic methods, i.e. less by the making and keeping of documents than by the kind of oral communication that typified the tours of inspection – modelled on the monarch's 'royal progress' ('koenigliche Revuereisen') (Eifert 2003: 78ff.) – which according to an Instruction issued in 1766 were to take place 'twice a year, in the spring and in the autumn' (Eifert 2003: 43). The colonial civil service was also well acquainted with this method of obtaining information and exercising surveillance (Spittler 1981: 105ff.) – in this case it was the colonial District Commissioner who was required to go 'on tour' or 'on safari'. With regard to this 'non-bureaucratic method' of exercising surveillance, Spittler (1981: 107f.) remarks:

> The type of contact and conversation propagated in this way may allow the District Commissioner to penetrate the reality of a village. But it is very difficult for him to standardize the results and manage them in a bureaucratic manner. The form of communication is more appropriate to an oral culture than to a bureaucracy based on abstract written documentation. To this extent, it is no mere accident that the District Commissioner spends most of his time in his office and has no time to go on tour. Producing written documents in an office accords with the bureaucratic way of doing things, and creates a familiar reality, even if it is a fictitious one. (…) The system of gathering information called "going on tour" requires a physical presence and therefore takes up a lot of time. Thus it must of necessity be restricted to small numbers and is unable to cope with any mass phenomenon (large numbers of peasants and villages) such as bureaucracy typically attempts to deal with.

As late as 1816 – not long after which those areas of activity had begun to expand which 'required a greater degree of written and less personal activity' (Wagner 2005: 72) from the *Landrat* – Wagner observes that the *Landrat*'s task was 'to govern not from his office, but from the saddle, to take decisions on the spot, in direct contact with those involved' (Wagner 2005: 68), and draws attention to the draft of an Instruction which itself dates from the year 1816 (!) in which it is stated that the official business of the *Landrat* should 'as far as possible be exercised orally and should not give rise to unprofitable masses of paperwork' (Wagner 2005: 68). In this Instruction it seems very clear that the bureaucracy was prepared to renounce a major tool which would have allowed it to keep the *Landrat* under more effective surveillance. On the other hand, it did appear to be interested in having such a tool available, since at the same time it raised demands for the *Landrat* to have prior qualifications and practical administrative experience, which would further his integration into the bureaucratic hierarchy (Wagner 2005: 73). This was also connected to the interest of the bureaucracy in detaching the *Landrat* from his relationship of loyalty to the local (landowning) elite. However, it remains, the case that with regard to the requirement for prior qualifications, which was understood to mean that the *Landrat* should have already taken or be in the process of taking the 'higher administrative or legal examination', there were substantial shortcomings in implementation (Eifert 2003: 120ff.). As the most important representative, together with the village clergyman, of 'intermediary administration', the *Landrat* was not only at the interface between the bureaucratic administration and its peasant subjects; he also had to act in a field of opposing forces, exerted mainly by the central government bureaucracy on the one hand and his fellow members of the local (landowning) elite on the other, which (furthermore) were constantly shifting through the impact of socioeconomic developments (Wagner 2005: 39ff.).

As a further representative of 'intermediary administration' in 18th century Prussia, the village clergyman must be mentioned, not least because it was he who supplied the data on which all important lists and tables drawn up by the bureaucracy were based. To Spittler he was 'the Trojan horse which enabled state bureaucracy to penetrate the rural areas, bypassing the mediatizing aristocracy' (Spittler 1980: 597). Even though he was subject to the patronage of the squire and to this extent was in a relationship of dependency, he nevertheless formed an integral part of the bureaucracy: 'The clergy were more and more regarded and treated as state officials. They were required to keep lists of the population, plant mulberry trees and proclaim new government regulations from the pulpit' (Hintze 1967: 81f., after Spittler 1980: 597). As local representatives of the state church they were subject to regular visitations, i.e. a type of bureaucratic surveillance. Since the village clergy were on the one

hand able to read and write, but on the other hand also thoroughly well acquainted with the 'semi-oral culture' of the peasants, they were highly suitable to fulfil the role assigned to them by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy realized that the church registers kept by the clergy, in which all important basic demographic data was recorded with the names of the persons concerned, constituted a most important and reliable source of information, so that both the population lists and the lists of those liable to military service were based on them (Spittler 1980: 597).[5] There may have been some deficits in its implementation – as a result, for example, of there being an insufficient number of clergymen in relation to the population, or of their being unsuitable or lacking in commitment (Spittler 1980: 597f.) – but the fact that the data contained in the church registers was collected 'for religious reasons, and not (primarily) in the interests of the state' (Spittler 1980: 597) vouches for their reliability.

It has however become customary to query the extent to which the church registers are reliable sources of valid information. In this regard it may suffice to recall the suggestion made by the Strasbourg City Councillor Georg Obrecht. In his treatises on public order, published posthumously in 1644 under the title 'Fünff Unterschiedlichen Secreta Politica', he presented 'the first comprehensive concept of a modern administrative organization in German political literature'. On the basis of comprehensive registers that were to be kept by persons designated as 'Deputaten' ('commissioners'), general population statistics were to be compiled, while on the other hand 'effective surveillance of moral behaviour' was also to be facilitated (Maier 1980: 122-131; Meitzen 2007: 11). At the same time, Obrecht goes into the question as to 'whether the church registers might not also be able to fulfil the purpose of the registers to be kept by the commissioners' (Maier 1980: 129). It is true that he declared in favour of his 'Institute of Commissioners', mainly because of the objection that the church registers would not afford 'any overview of the total state of the community', since they would remain in the individual

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[5] From 1719 onwards there were 'population lists' in Prussia, in which the turnover of the population (baptisms, marriages, deaths) was recorded and these were gradually extended by the addition of further headings and categories and increasingly kept in tabular form (Meitzen 2007: 12ff.; Schaab 1967: 1). It was also on the basis of the data obtainable from the church registers that the *Kantonslisten* were drawn up, the lists of young men subject to military service kept by the *Landräte* (Behre 1905: 145). The population lists and historical tables were also the basis for the 'population policy', which was a classic instrument of mercantilist economic policy in the 17th and 18th centuries (Blaich 1973: 1-31; 170-178), a type of economic policy that in its turn demanded more comprehensive and more precise information; so that in the end the central administration, which initially had done no more than collect the numerical material and publish it (Behre 1905: 136), began to present it in tabular form in order to analyse it and draw conclusions.

parishes and would thus not be known in their entirety to the authorities. All the same, it remains the case that through this administrative concept 'the individual, detached from his or her position within a social class, the abstract "population", was for the first time discovered as the object of administration' (Maier 1980: 130).

4. How does Spittler avoid the trap of nostrification?

Spittler avoids the trap of nostrification in a remarkably simple way. By asking the question "how does state administration work in agrarian societies?" he systematically links the structure of (bureaucratic, document-based) administration with the structure of an agrarian society (Spittler 1981: 9). A rural peasant economy moulded by market integration not only determines the strategies of bureaucratic, document-based administration and the character of the peasants inhabiting a semi-oral culture; it also presents administration with a number of problems that it must solve, and to which it responds with quite specific actions. These problems primarily arise from the fact that (on the one hand) dues and taxes have to be collected from peasants, who (on the other hand) represent the pool for military levies, for which every time serious informational problems emerge. The various approaches selected by the administration can be reduced to ideal-typical structural types: to bureaucratic, document-based administration; to arbitrary and despotic rule; and intermedial administration,[6] which in practice can be observed operating in typical combinations, in particular that between bureaucratic, document-based and intermedial administration.

The *comparison* between West African colonial administration in the period 1919-1939 and eighteenth century Prussian administration is made by first considering the structure of West African agrarian society (or societies). These typically have "imposts" (tax payments and military service, together with their associated informational problems) which for their realisation have to be related to a suitable administrative structure, characterised in particular by a combination of bureaucratic, document-based administration with that of intermediaries (canton chiefs). Separately from this eighteenth century Prussian agrarian society is approached in a similar manner, linking imposts with an administrative structure appropriate for their realisation. Here again,

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[6] The relationship between bureaucratic, document-based administration and its various intermediaries is as a rule based upon personal rule of a clientilist nature – the village priest is an exception.

the combination between bureaucratic, document-based administration, and that based upon intermediaries (village priest, councillor) proves especially robust. Even if the analysis in this contribution is concentrated upon the Prussian case, it could benefit from the analysis conducted for the West African case, together with the insights gained thereby; and it does not presume the "projection of *one* comparative measure derived from one's own society." (Matthes 1992: 81). Instead, this approach opens up the space for reflection that Matthes demands (1992: 96), and which in the reciprocity of the analyses made reveals a remarkably high level of common features, as well as characteristic (often culturally determined) differences, as happens for example in the involvement of suitable intermediaries.

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Cultura politica di partito e cultura politica nazionale: il caso del Pci nella Prima Repubblica

Andrea Millefiorini

In the paper we are explaining those aspects of the Italian Communist Party, that, thanks to the particular organized structure, contributed, in a meaningful way, to outline some characteristic features of the Italian political culture. There are four aspects of them: the first one was represented by a strong level of ideologism that for reaction and contamination passed from its main centre of diffusion (which was just the P.C.I) to the other actors of the Italian party system, whose high level of ideologization produced models of interpretation of problems and of decisions, elaboration and planning, about not so much pragmatic plans; on the contrary, concerning rhetoric or propagandistic approaches. A second, relevant effect to which contributed in this case not only the political communist culture, we are analyzing above all from this point of view: it was constituted by the leadership exerced by the political parties that acquired in the symbolic values of the Italians universe as regards the other components of the Political system; the consequences of this situation we are going to analyze in the paper. A third element was the strong statalism which constituted the political culture of the country at least till the end of seventies. The fourth factor spread by the political communist culture was given by the egualitarianism. It assumed a relevant role at the organizing and structural level concerning the burocratic machinery; the values connected to it not always produced good results in efficiency, in resources optimization and productivity.

Gli studi e le ricerche sulla cultura politica italiana iniziarono dal Secondo Dopoguerra inoltrato, e diedero vita ad un intenso filone che conobbe interventi importanti, a cominciare, inizialmente, dalla politologia statunitense, dotata allora di mezzi e risorse facili da reperire oltreoceano, molto più difficili in un Paese in ricostruzione come il nostro. L'Italia suscitava l'interesse di molti addetti ai lavori americani, sia perché alcuni di loro erano già stati una quindicina d'anni prima nel nostro paese, in quell'occasione con elmetto e fucile, ed avevano avuto modo di scoprire un popolo che aveva certamente destato la loro curiosità di futuri scienziati sociali, sia in quanto era una nazione che stava vivendo un processo di (ri)democratizzazione dopo un periodo contrassegnato dall'oscuramento dei diritti politici e di alcuni importanti diritti civili.

È per questo che le misure alla nostra cultura politica vennero prese con un metro che se si era dimostrato adatto al sistema politico americano, mal

si attagliava ad una tradizione politica come la nostra, che infatti Almond e Verba non esitarono a definire "suddita", almeno in ampie sue parti (Almond e Verba 1963). Già ben prima di loro, del resto, un altro statunitense, Edward Banfield (Banfield 1958), aveva, come noto, parlato di familismo amorale per descrivere la cultura politica del Mezzogiorno d'Italia.

Quelle analisi ebbero, certo, il merito di aver messo bene in luce quanti e quali aspetti della cultura politica italiana risentissero di arretratezze, di scarsi valori civici, oltre che del retaggio del fascismo, con la sua concezione della partecipazione intesa come mobilitazione dall'alto, piuttosto che come impegno spontaneo dei cittadini. Tuttavia, esse non presero nella giusta considerazione il fatto che in Italia la cultura politica e la partecipazione, sebbene si attestassero su livelli che, se comparati ai parametri statunitensi, erano in effetti più bassi (nei cosiddetti "repertori" della partecipazione politica, come prender parte ad una manifestazione, apporre la propria firma per una petizione, etc., eravamo in effetti agli ultimi posti nelle nazioni prese in considerazione dalla ricerca di Almond e Verba), sebbene ciò, dicevamo, gli italiani non potevano affatto essere definiti un popolo che non partecipasse politicamente, tutt'altro.

Perché dunque emerse questa sfasatura tra la "fotografia" scattata dagli americani e una realtà ben più complessa e articolata? In cosa quelle ricerche erano state lacunose? Ciò avvenne in quanto, mentre negli USA lo spazio dedicato all'analisi della partecipazione nei partiti politici era piuttosto circoscritto (e ciò non a caso: è ben noto quanto in quella tradizione politica i partiti assumano un ruolo defilato rispetto ad altre agenzie e istituzioni, e rispetto alla stessa cultura civica diffusa nella popolazione americana), in Italia, pensare di affrontare ricerche sistematiche sulla partecipazione senza porre al centro dell'analisi i partiti, specie in quel periodo, significava omettere dai risultati un aspetto fondamentale del fenomeno nel nostro paese.

I partiti italiani, e ancor più i partiti di massa, come meglio si vedrà nel corso del presente saggio, costituivano l'alfa e l'omega del processo politico, a qualunque livello esso venisse considerato: dalla formazione dei governi sino all'organizzazione della raccolta di firme nel più piccolo e sperduto dei paesi.

Tali aspetti vennero invece colti e messi in evidenza nelle ricerche di studiosi italiani quali Alessandro Pizzorno, Vincenzo Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Francesco Alberoni, Giacomo Sani, Giorgio Galli, alcuni di loro raccolti intorno alle collane editoriali di ricerche sulla cultura politica italiana che la casa editrice il Mulino editava in collaborazione con l'Istituto Carlo Cattaneo.

Proprio in quanto attorno ai partiti ruotavano gran parte delle dinamiche legate alla partecipazione politica e della stessa cultura politica del paese, potrà essere utile precisare che alla definizione di cultura politica a suo tem-

po data da Almond e Verba («L'insieme degli atteggiamenti e orientamenti cognitivi, affettivi e valutativi dei membri di un sistema politico nei confronti della politica») (Almond e Verba 1963), per il caso in specie, quello italiano, occorre aggiungere che tali orientamenti e atteggiamenti risentivano ampiamente e in maniera determinante delle culture politiche dei partiti. Queste ultime, come noto, discendevano a loro volta, in modo più o meno aperto e marcato, da ideologie politiche. Questo, almeno, valeva certamente per i partiti della sinistra, e dunque anche per il Pci.

In particolare, scorrendo i tanti testi, documenti, ricerche storiche e sociologiche prodotti in Italia nel periodo che va dal Secondo Dopoguerra agli anni Settanta, si incontrano spesso, nella denominazione della cultura politica della sinistra italiana, le espressioni "cultura o subcultura politica rossa", o "socialista", o "social-comunista", o, infine, "comunista" *tout-court*.

Ciascuna di esse ha un suo specifico significato, dal valore anche politico e non solo puramente sociologico, e non può essere confusa o sovrapposta con le altre. Non è compito in questa sede dare conto delle diverse accezioni dei termini. Dobbiamo soltanto precisare che intenderemo qui con l'espressione "cultura politica comunista" riferirci a quella particolare esperienza politica che raccolse milioni di iscritti intorno al Partito comunista italiano nel periodo che va dal 25 luglio 1943, data della caduta del regime fascista in Italia, al febbraio 1991, quando nel suo XX congresso il Pci fu sciolto per dare vita al Partito democratico della sinistra.

Ebbene, avendo il Partito comunista esercitato, a partire dal 18 aprile 1948 – data delle prime elezioni politiche nella storia repubblicana, nelle quali esso superò in consensi l'altro grande partito di massa della sinistra, il Psi – una indubbia e riconosciuta egemonia politica e culturale su tutta la sinistra, almeno sino alla fine degli anni Ottanta, l'analisi e lo studio della cultura politica comunista in Italia diventano decisivi per comprendere parte importante e significativa non solo della cultura politica di sinistra in Italia, ma anche, vista l'influenza politica del Pci sulle dinamiche di funzionamento dell'intero sistema politico, su quella che si sarebbe nel tempo configurata come la cultura politica della Prima Repubblica. Con ciò intendendo non solo la cultura delle classi politiche, ma, estensivamente, e secondo la definizione classica datane da Gabriel Almond e Sidney Verba (Almond, Verba 1963), quella di una parte significativa della cittadinanza italiana.

Procederemo, a tal fine, seguendo un percorso esplicativo che sarà suddiviso in due parti: nella prima cercheremo di tratteggiare i "caratteri originari" della cultura politica comunista in Italia a partire dal Dopoguerra sino alla fine degli anni Ottanta; nella seconda parte andremo ad evidenziare le ricadute e gli effetti più visibili e profondi che tale cultura sortì nel più ampio panorama della cultura politica italiana.

1. La cultura politica comunista in Italia

Con la creazione del "Partito nuovo", dopo la prima esperienza del Partito Comunista di Gramsci e Bordiga fondato a Livorno nel 1921, terminata con lo scioglimento del partito per mezzo delle leggi "fascistissime" del 1926, Palmiro Togliatti riuscì, in poco tempo dopo la caduta del regime fascista nel 1943 e dopo l'uscita dalla clandestinità del partito, a ricostruire una forza politica in grado di arrivare a competere in poco tempo con i principali partiti di massa organizzati territorialmente in Italia, e di porsi addirittura l'obiettivo di governare il Paese (Spriano 1978).

Questa operazione, di cui Togliatti e il gruppo dirigente attorno a lui furono gli artefici, fu l' esito di una visione e di una strategia politica poggianti su un retroterra politico-culturale che il leader comunista seppe sapientemente utilizzare, ottimizzare e coniugare con le mutate condizioni del dopoguerra, sì da farne un *unicum*, sotto il profilo organizzativo e culturale, nel panorama dei partiti comunisti occidentali. Il risultato fu la creazione del più grande e politicamente forte partito comunista presente nel panorama delle democrazie europee.

In cosa consistette, dunque, il valore aggiunto che il leader del Pci seppe conferire alla rinata organizzazione? Possiamo sinteticamente riassumere la valenza di tale operazione nell'aver impiantato, su di una piattaforma politica di stampo marxista-leninista, il portato della teoria gramsciana sia sotto il profilo organizzativo che sotto quello politico-culturale.

Così, sulla tradizione marxista-leninista, che concepiva il partito ideologicamente proiettato verso la dittatura del proletariato (Marx) e organizzato secondo criteri di tipo quasi militare (Lenin), tradizione che fu comunque ben presente per tutto il corso dell'esistenza del Pci (Fisichella 1979: 44) – ancora nel 1979, gioverà ricordarlo, Enrico Berlinguer rivendicava il legame del partito con le sue radici leniniste (Salvadori 1999: 176; Aa. Vv. 1985: 7) –, venne innestato quel formidabile strumento di controllo, di direzione politica e di conquista di una società già industrializzata, che fu il concetto gramsciano di "egemonia", sul quale torneremo più approfonditamente a breve.

Il fine ultimo della lotta politica dei comunisti non può non essere quello di costruire una società dalla quale il male sia finalmente e definitivamente estirpato. Se in Marx questo concetto, pur presente, faceva però quasi da sfondo al ben più centrale elemento della violenza levatrice della storia, e dunque della lotta per la conquista del potere, in Gramsci si direbbe che i due elementi sono quasi ribaltati in ordine di importanza: l'obiettivo della costruzione dell'Uomo Nuovo e della Società perfetta è talmente importante da imporre strategie di conquista politica della società che non necessariamente devono seguire i dettami dell'ortodossia marxista.

Siamo in presenza, come osserva Luciano Pellicani, di un impianto ide-

ologico-dottrinario che altro non è che «uno spiritualismo mascherato, più precisamente una versione secolarizzata del messianismo giudaico-cristiano» (Pellicani 1990: 24). Da qui una concezione del mondo che, ponendosi in totale antitesi con la realtà esistente, assumeva inevitabilmente tratti di intolleranza. E l'intolleranza nei confronti di qualunque altra forza politica che non fosse il proprio partito fu infatti uno dei tratti più tipici del militante comunista italiano. Basti solo ricordare che i pur alleati e compagni di strada socialisti venivano non raramente apostrofati con l'appellativo di "social-fascisti", a volerne stigmatizzare la non integrale, piena e incondizionata adesione fideistica al *credo* dell'obiettivo finale della Rivoluzione e al modello sovietico come riferimento imprescindibile per qualunque progetto politico almeno di medio-lungo periodo.

Per raggiungere l'obiettivo della edificazione della società perfetta, essenziale è poter assurgere, da parte della classe proletaria, al rango di classe dirigente (Gramsci aveva certamente letto e studiato i classici italiani della teoria delle élites: Mosca, Pareto, Michels). Tale ascesa

> non è concepita come una affermazione meramente economica – come avviene nel materialismo storico – bensì come una espansione etico-politica di un gruppo sociale che, grazie alla sua superiorità intellettuale e morale, sente di avere il diritto e le energie per dirigere tutta quanta la società. Il potere di una classe dominante, pertanto, più che derivare dal controllo degli apparati coercitivi – controllo che presuppone sempre un minimo di consenso: almeno quello degli armati – e dal possesso dei mezzi di produzione, deriva dalle sue capacità dirigenti, quindi dalle élites creative che è in grado di produrre nel suo seno (Pellicani 1990: 38).

L'originalità del concetto di egemonia in Gramsci consiste quindi nell'aver concepito una strategia che non contempla più la violenza come «centro di gravità» della propria azione, e che esalta invece tutto ciò che è legato, direttamente o indirettamente, all'aspetto etico-culturale della conquista del potere. Dalla «guerra di movimento» si passa quindi alla guerra di posizione» finalizzata alla conquista non violenta delle strutture sociali, culturali, educative, comunicative, con le quali si procederà successivamente all'opera di indottrinamento di settori sempre più vasti della popolazione, sino alla loro totale egemonizzazione.

1.2 La "doppiezza" comunista

Come detto, il fine ultimo della lotta politica dei comunisti è quello di costruire una società liberata dalle impurità storicamente affermatesi con la civiltà,

e imputabili in massima parte all'avvento della proprietà privata, del mercato e, in ultima, del modo di produzione capitalistico.

L'apporto originale del leninismo, rispetto al tradizionale lascito politico di Marx, è stato quello di aver concepito l'organizzazione del partito comunista esattamente in funzione del raggiungimento di questo obiettivo, che, come si è visto sopra, aveva in sé un chiaro contenuto messianico. Il partito doveva quindi strutturarsi sulla base di veri e propri principi militari (non si dimentichi che, nel Partito bolscevico durante la Rivoluzione d'Ottobre, i più importanti leader politici ricoprivano spesso anche ruoli militari strategici), ovviamente non per l'offesa fisica (sebbene tale eventualità non fosse del tutto esclusa, in caso di momenti rivoluzionari o di guerra civile), ma politica.

Un «partito-caserma», dunque (Zaslavsky 2004: 47 ss.), ma anche un «partito-chiesa» (Pellicani 1990: 138-141). Così aveva insegnato Vladimir Il'ič Ul'janov, al secolo Lenin. Caserma, per essere sempre e in ogni istante nelle condizioni di applicare con la massima efficacia e rapidità gli ordini provenienti dall'élite degli intellettuali illuminati dalla vera scienza, ovvero il socialismo (scientifico, appunto). Chiesa, innanzitutto per l'aspirazione internazionalistica o, meglio ancora, universalistica del messaggio di cui erano portatori i comunisti; in secondo luogo in quanto il messianismo di cui tale messaggio era impregnato non poteva non tradursi in un *credo*, che come tutti i *credo* necessitava di un preciso luogo di culto, il partito per l'appunto.

Essendo l'obiettivo finale quello più sopra ricordato, esso non poteva non essere proiettato in avanti, e i tempi per la sua realizzazione non si potevano in alcun modo prevedere con esattezza né tantomeno fissare preventivamente. Si trattava quindi di mantenere viva la tensione messianica tra i militanti, e in effetti è probabilmente proprio grazie alla traduzione in termini messianici del messaggio comunista che si riuscì a radicare quest'ultimo così stabilmente nell'animo delle masse proletarie malgrado la sua non immediata possibilità di realizzazione.

E tuttavia, il partito non poteva sottrarsi all'esigenza di adeguare alla contingenza della quotidianità la propria condotta politica, fatta di inevitabili valutazioni di opportunità, di analisi costi-benefici, di accordi e patteggiamenti con possibili alleati e "compagni di strada", come allora li si chiamava; in una parola, di ricorrere al compromesso e dunque alla tattica politica, mentre la strategia di lungo periodo, come detto, restava fissata indefinitamente.

Ciò imponeva ai gruppi dirigenti di saper costantemente mantenere la capacità di non perdere di vista l'obiettivo finale, per lo meno in termini ideologici, e di impostare tattiche politiche che, nel breve o medio periodo, non necessariamente potevano o dovevano coincidere con tale obiettivo (Fisichella 1979).

Oltre a ciò, nel caso del Partito comunista italiano il concetto di egemonia gramscianamente inteso significò, per i motivi che abbiamo visto, una ben

maggiore disinvoltura da parte dei gruppi dirigenti. Ciò anche in conseguenza dello scenario politico completamente diverso, rispetto a quello sovietico, nel quale i comunisti italiani si trovavano ad agire, essendo esso collocato nell'ambito di un regime democratico, e dunque avendo il partito come scopo primario la ricerca del consenso elettorale. Ciò portò il «nobile destriero», come Togliatti ebbe a definire la creatura da lui rifondata dopo il crollo del fascismo, ad adottare stili e condotte politiche che certo non si sarebbero a prima vista immediatamente attribuite ad una dottrina politica di tradizione marxista-leninista. Si era portati cioè a recepire tatticamente elementi valoriali tipici di altre classi sociali, per inglobare anche il loro elettorato tra le proprie schiere.

Ecco dunque che, alla fine, quasi tutto si riduceva a tattica, senza però abiurare i principi di fondo del proprio *credo*, ai quali anzi il gruppo dirigente manteneva saldamente ancorato il partito proprio per garantire compattezza ad un'organizzazione di militanti che altrimenti si sarebbe trovata in una condizione di disorientamento.

Il "*contrordine compagni*" si spiegava quindi sia nel quadro di un'azione politica che poteva di volta in volta rivedere e aggiornare le proprie tattiche di lotta e di competizione, sia, non secondariamente, anche perché si trattava di giustificare una continua re-interpretazione (senza tuttavia metterla mai in discussione dalle fondamenta, ma anzi continuando a legittimarla) della dottrina originaria alla luce delle nuove esigenze politiche di breve e medio periodo.

Last but not least, la condizione di oggettiva "doppiezza" dei comunisti italiani era dovuta al rapporto tra il Pci e la lealtà alla democrazia e alle sue istituzioni in Italia, da una parte, e dall'altra alla lealtà nei confronti dell'Unione Sovietica e al suo modello di organizzazione politica, economica e sociale.

1.3 La visione polemica della storia e la sfiducia nelle istituzioni liberaldemocratiche

Sotto qualunque lente, sotto qualunque prospettiva lo si voglia considerare, tale tipo di organizzazione aveva come conseguenza un fatto certo: la completa e totale subordinazione al partito da parte del militante comunista. Il partito, per l'appunto, esercitava su di lui la stessa influenza che una chiesa ha sui suoi fedeli, e poteva far valere i propri ordini con la prontezza e la velocità con cui un soldato esegue quelli di un superiore. Sicché, il partito, guida politica e morale delle masse, non poteva che assumere una conformazione di tipo centralistico, monolitica diremmo. Anche perché, ci ricorda sempre Pellicani, «il partito non aveva solo una funzione meramente politica, ma, in base a quanto teorizzato da Gramsci circa il concetto di egemonia, anche un

ruolo etico-pedagogico sulle masse: egli affermava infatti che "ogni rapporto egemonico è necessariamente un rapporto pedagogico"» (Pellicani 1990: 30).

Una simile impostazione era anche conseguenza della cosiddetta "visione polemica della storia". L'atteggiamento del militante comunista verso il mondo che lo circonda è come verso una realtà che dovrà essere e sarà necessariamente superata da una nuova realtà, più giusta e più umana. Come dire: "siamo in questo mondo, ma non siamo di questo mondo". Anche qui, come si vede, una chiara attinenza con una dimensione sacro-religiosa.

Si aveva cioè una considerazione dell'organizzazione sociale in cui si viveva ed operava, sotto un profilo economico, politico e culturale, che era comunque quella di una cultura "altra". Se ne potevano esaltare o sminuire questa o quella dimensione, a seconda della maggiore o minore attinenza di quest'ultima con la gerarchia di valori tipica della cultura politica comunista. Ad esempio, tutto ciò che atteneva all'eguaglianza, nell'organizzazione sociale, veniva ovviamente tenuto in gran conto, e difeso con grande tenacia e passione. Sorte non altrettanto simile toccava a quegli elementi, valoriali o direttamente organizzativi, orientati alla differenziazione, alla selezione, alla scelta di taluni rispetto ad altri secondo criteri non ritenuti consoni al principio del "da ciascuno secondo le proprie capacità a ciascuno secondo i propri bisogni", come recitava il principio marxista.

Una delle conseguenze più significative di tutto ciò era che mentre il concetto e il principio di "democrazia", genericamente inteso, raccoglieva consensi generosi e convinti, diverso si faceva il discorso qualora si scendesse un po' più nel dettaglio e nello specifico, cioè nella democrazia come "concetto" più che come "principio". E nel dettaglio era impossibile non scendere qualora si trattasse di dare delle valutazioni non sulla "democrazia" in senso lato, ma sulle istituzioni democratiche e, ancor più, sulle istituzioni liberaldemocratiche alle quali, sebbene in forme ancora "primitive" rispetto alle più avanzate democrazie anglosassoni, la Costituzione del '46 aveva comunque dato vita. Ciò, beninteso, non significava una aperta critica al sistema politico come fu concepito dai costituenti (tra i quali un ruolo decisivo ebbero, come si sa, gli stessi comunisti), quanto una sostanziale, di fatto anche se non dichiarata, subordinazione, in ordine di importanza e di priorità, delle istituzioni liberaldemocratiche al partito.

Nel concreto, da ciò discendeva: a) scarsa fiducia o apatia verso i valori e la cultura politica liberaldemocratica; b) scarsa fiducia o apatia verso le istituzioni liberaldemocratiche; c) poca (anche se non necessariamente in contrapposizione) identificazione con la storia politica nazionale.

In merito al punto b), va comunque precisato che, dopo l' 89, il lento ma costante percorso di adeguamento del neonato Pds al nuovo contesto politico-culturale venutosi a formare con la Seconda Repubblica, ha fatto sì che la

nuova dirigenza del Partito, a cominciare dal Segretario succeduto a Occhetto, Massimo D'Alema, si avvicinasse con sempre maggiore convinzione ai principi fondamentali che sottostanno alle moderne liberaldemocrazie.

Le istituzioni democratiche non venivano quindi considerate come un valore in sé stesse, in quanto tali, ma solo come strumenti utili al raggiungimento dell'«egemonia». Esse erano considerate utili e degne di rispetto se permettevano di realizzare attraverso di esse gli obiettivi politici che il partito si dava. Erano invece "fasciste", "borghesi", "antidemocratiche" se ciò non garantivano.

Come meglio vedremo più avanti, in ciò risiede uno dei principali fattori che hanno contribuito a conferire alla Prima Repubblica e alla sua cultura politica quella tipica condizione per la quale i partiti hanno sempre assunto una indiscussa posizione di primato politico rispetto alle istituzioni (Millefiorini 1996: 82). Ma su questo nodo problematico torneremo anche successivamente.

Stessa e identica sorte, del resto, toccava all'insieme dei valori laici e borghesi, da sempre considerati e trattati con sufficienza dalla cultura politica comunista. Non si spiegherebbe diversamente, altrimenti, la disinvoltura con la quale Togliatti liquidò, nell'Assemblea Costituente, le proposte provenienti dai partiti laici di superare i Patti Lateranensi, richiamati nell'articolo 7 della Costituzione, votato per l'appunto da Dc e Pci. Né si spiegherebbe come mai, durante la fase in cui negli anni Settanta i partiti laici conducevano storiche battaglie per la conquista di diritti civili elementari, come il divorzio o l'aborto, i comunisti abbiano sempre mostrato una certa neghittosità a mobilitarsi convintamente e tantomeno a prenderne in prima persona l'iniziativa politica. Ma anche su questo torneremo meglio più avanti.

1.4 *Cultura politica comunista e sentimento patriottico*

Un'ulteriore e più approfondita considerazione da farsi riguarda il punto c), indicato poco sopra nel precedente paragrafo. Su questo aspetto vi è da dire che la cultura politica comunista, per lo meno quella rintracciabile nelle dichiarazioni e nelle condotte adottate *dopo* il periodo della Resistenza, a partire dall'insediamento nelle istituzioni repubblicane, è sempre stata caratterizzata da un patriottismo che, a prima vista, poteva sembrare piuttosto tiepido nel suo lessico, e ridotto a spazi angusti nel suo universo valoriale. Si è a volte parlato di spirito "a-patriottico" presente in quella cultura politica.

Tuttavia, le cose non stanno esattamente in questo modo e meritano una più approfondita analisi. In realtà, sebbene già durante la Resistenza i comunisti si ponessero su posizioni di netta e marcata differenza, rispetto a tutte le altre forze politiche che insieme a loro combatterono la Guerra di Libe-

razione, quanto all'idea e alla visione futura che essi avevano del Paese che avrebbero voluto edificare una volta avuto ragione dell'occupante e delle forze fasciste che ancora combattevano per la "loro" idea di Patria (Galli della Loggia 1996), sebbene ciò, dicevamo, questo non significa che anche i comunisti non avessero, appunto, una loro idea di Patria, e che per tale idea non abbiano combattuto talvolta anche eroicamente nella Guerra di Liberazione. Fu lo stesso Togliatti, del resto, che si fece carico dopo la fine della Guerra di fare da intermediario con Mosca per risolvere la questione di Trieste, e, va detto, a lui molto si deve se la questione fu infine risolta a vantaggio dell'Italia.

Il punto non è questo. Da nessuna ricerca effettuata nel nostro Paese negli anni del Dopoguerra, né da quelle dell'Istituto Cattaneo, né dai tanti studi effettuati in quel periodo da ricercatori americani è mai risultato che al militante comunista difettassero sentimenti di attaccamento al proprio Paese.

Ciò che invece va specificato è un altro aspetto. Come abbiamo spiegato, nella concezione che i comunisti avevano delle istituzioni democratiche, tutto ciò che in qualche modo potesse ostacolare, rallentare o deviare dalle proprie prospettive politiche di breve o lungo periodo, veniva molto semplicemente liquidato come "fascista". Così, fascisti erano quei socialisti che si definivano "riformisti", fascisti erano i socialdemocratici, fascisti tutti i partiti di centro-destra, non soltanto ovviamente i missini (i quali non disdegnavano affatto l'epiteto), ma anche i liberali, i monarchici, gli elettori dell'*Uomo qualunque*. Fascisti i prefetti che opponessero dinieghi a richieste di sorta, fascisti gli intellettuali che si permettessero di muovere critiche alla visione ed alla concezione comunista della società, fascisti i presidi che non dessero il benestare a iniziative di assemblee promosse in orari o luoghi non consentiti, fascisti gli ispettori del lavoro che non si limitassero a far osservare agli imprenditori i (sacrosanti) diritti dei lavoratori, ma che adissero altresì elevare sanzioni a lavoratori non in regola con mansioni o tempi di lavoro, fasciste le forze dell'ordine che impedissero occupazioni contadine di terre avallate e spalleggiate dal Pci.

Oltre a ciò, nella mentalità comunista tutto ciò che direttamente o indirettamente fosse riconducibile al lascito e all'eredità storica e politica del Ventennio veniva immediatamente bollato come retaggio fascista, e dunque espunto senza appello da qualunque possibilità di considerazione sotto un'altra luce, sotto una diversa prospettiva. Ciò è per l'appunto quanto toccò in sorte al concetto di patriottismo[1], associato e confuso con quello, in realtà completamente diverso, di nazionalismo, uscito, quest'ultimo sì, con le ossa definitivamente rotte dall'esperienza dell'avventura bellica mussoliniana (Rosati 2000).

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[1] Sul concetto di patriottismo si veda M. Rosati, *Il patriottismo degli italiani. Culture politiche e identità nazionali*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2000.

C'era infine, cosa non da poco, la questione del legame con l'altra Patria, quella del comunismo, cioè l'Unione Sovietica. I sentimenti di ammirazione verso il modello sovietico erano forse ancor più forti tra i militanti che non tra i dirigenti del partito. Questi ultimi, recandosi spesso in quel Paese, avevano sin dagli anni Cinquanta preso l'abitudine, una volta rientrati in Italia, di elogiarne pubblicamente le virtù e di lamentarne privatamente le storture e le inadeguatezze. Sino ai primi anni Ottanta, dalle ricerche effettuate sugli iscritti al Pci emergeva che più del 50% di essi riteneva il modello sovietico superiore, per efficienza produttiva e per capacità di erogare diritti, alle democrazie occidentali.

Stando così le cose, non può sorprendere che, ad esempio in materia di deterrenti missilistici, il Pci e i suoi aderenti abbiano sempre contestato apertamente, e con grandi manifestazioni, le testate Nato sistemate in Italia (allo scopo di difendere il nostro Paese e l'Europa), mentre nulla era dato sapere circa i giudizi politici di quel partito sui missili sovietici puntati anche sull'Italia.

In realtà, simili atteggiamenti si spiegano, più che attraverso il (supposto, ma, come abbiamo visto, del tutto assente) sentimento a-patriottico, grazie ad un altro elemento, questo sì tipico e fortemente caratterizzante la cultura politica comunista durante tutta la Prima Repubblica, che è stato il forte e marcato antiamericanismo (Teodori 2002). L'antiamericanismo veniva declinato e manifestato in diversi modi, quasi tutti aventi precisi obiettivi politici e propagandistici, si trattasse dell'intervento in Vietnam piuttosto che la questione della cortina di ferro, o delle testate nucleari. Anche qui emerge quella "doppiezza" spesso ravvisabile nelle condotte dei comunisti italiani, nel senso che se da un lato si denunciava il modello istituzionale ed economico americano, dall'altro non si rinunciava, da parte di militanti, iscritti o simpatizzanti, a seguirne stili di vita e di consumo, nonché alcuni precisi valori culturali, spesso rappresentati nel cinema americano, del quale i comunisti italiani sono stati probabilmente tra i più voraci consumatori ed estimatori, per non parlare dei tanti riferimenti agli autori della letteratura americana amati da Cesare Pavese, Italo Calvino e diversi altri intellettuali più o meno vicini all'area comunista.

1.5 La "diversità" comunista e le sue conseguenze

Se consideriamo l'insieme degli elementi evidenziati sino a questo punto della nostra analisi, non sarà difficile comprendere perché si sia parlato di "diversità" comunista, e come mai fossero gli stessi comunisti a ricorrere spesso all'espressione "siamo uguali ma siamo diversi", espressione che rimase cara ai militanti e iscritti al partito sino ad almeno tutti gli anni Ottanta: talmente cara da essere stata immortalata nella scena del noto film "Palombella Rossa" del regista Nanni Moretti.

La diversità comunista aveva un doppio risvolto: da un lato essa traeva la sua ragion d'essere dalla effettiva distanza che separava la cultura politica comunista da quella del resto di coloro che erano direttamente o indirettamente coinvolti in processi di partecipazione politica. Dall'altro, come già abbiamo avuto modo di sottolineare, essa aveva bisogno però di essere continuamente rimarcata dall'organizzazione e dai vertici del partito, pena il suo progressivo affievolimento e la sua inevitabile diluizione nel corpo di una società che deteneva ben altra capacità di forgiare e plasmare i valori e i modelli d'azione e di comportamento di chiunque avesse un minimo di familiarità con i beni, materiali e immateriali, che essa dispensava copiosamente per tutti i suoi membri.

È per questo motivo che il Pci si premurò di innalzare dei robusti steccati intorno al terreno politico solcato dai suoi appartenenti. Lo fece attraverso quello che Giovanni Sartori ha chiamato l' «incapsulamento organizzativo» di iscritti e militanti (Sartori 1982). Trattandosi di un partito anti-sistema, altra nota espressione e definizione di Sartori (Sartori 1976), esso ricorreva, a tal fine, a strumenti ideologico-propagandistici come l'auto-attribuzione di una sorta di superiorità morale rispetto agli avversari politici, o il loro screditamento, oppure il voluto innalzamento del livello dello scontro, laddove la tattica politica lo rendesse opportuno o necessario. Era, questa, una prassi del resto tipica di tutto il movimento comunista, a qualunque latitudine e in qualunque periodo. Nel caso italiano, si pensi, per non fare che un esempio, a come il partito giunse alla decisione di promuovere il referendum per l'abolizione del Decreto del governo Craxi che aboliva la scala mobile, nel 1985: in quel caso, sebbene molti dirigenti del partito, e della stessa Cgil, fossero sinceramente convinti della non utilità del ritorno alla scala mobile per le tasche degli operai, si decise comunque per il referendum in quanto occorreva rimarcare la propria differenza e quindi la propria posizione conflittuale nei confronti di un Governo, e soprattutto del suo leader, socialista, che stava rapidamente cambiando la "grammatica politica" della sinistra italiana.

Questa caratteristica così marcata della cultura politica comunista creò le condizioni affinché quello che più sopra abbiamo indicato come l'eccesso di "tatticismo" del Pci – ossia la continua rincorsa rispetto ai cambiamenti che avvenivano nella società, per non perdere il contatto con un elettorato sempre più di ceto medio, ritenuto giustamente strategico per il rafforzamento delle proprie posizioni – si dispiegasse dovendo però fare i conti con un fardello piuttosto pesante, costituito appunto dalla "diversità" comunista.

Quando Togliatti affermava che, per conquistare i nuovi ceti, il Pci doveva «aderire a tutte le pieghe» della società, in fondo non faceva altro che ribadire, in forma di dettato ufficiale, quella politica che, lo abbiamo visto, era diretta conseguenza dell'impianto ideologico gramsciano, legato al concetto di egemonia e di conquista culturale della società, prima ancora che politica.

Ma «aderire a tutte le pieghe della società» imponeva al partito una sorta di rincorsa ai cambiamenti sociali e culturali in atto, che arrivava però sempre in ritardo rispetto alle svolte chiare, in termini politici e culturali, che si rendevano necessarie da parte del partito. E ciò proprio a causa della posizione di partenza che era, per l'appunto, di "diversità" rispetto alla cultura prevalente. Ciò imponeva quindi tempi, energie e risorse aggiuntive al partito per adeguarsi e per metabolizzare i cambiamenti; tempi e risorse aggiuntive rispetto a quanto non occorresse invece ad altri partiti, a cominciare dal Psi, più flessibili e aperti, in quanto non gravati dal retroterra ideologico della "diversità".

Sicché, la storia del Pci può essere anche definita come una storia di ritardi e di appuntamenti mancati. Il Pci si è sempre trovato in ritardo, quando cioè i tempi politici erano ormai proiettati su altre priorità, su nuove agende politiche. Bastino qui, per tutti, gli esempi della tardiva presa d'atto dell'errore dell'invasione sovietica dell'Ungheria, o dell'accodarsi del Pci all'iniziativa politica dei partiti laici in materia di diritti civili come il divorzio e l'aborto, o, infine, il cambio del nome del Partito avvenuto dopo il crollo del Muro di Berlino.

Infine, «aderire a tutte le pieghe» significava anche assecondare, cercando di controllarli dall'esterno, tutti quei movimenti che nascevano da forme di lotta, di contestazione, di dissenso (Della Porta 1996; Della Porta e Rucht 1992). Ciò lo si vide chiaramente durante la stagione politica iniziata con il Sessantotto, e proseguita poi lungo tutto il corso degli anni Settanta. In questo caso, inoltre, si trattava altresì di mettere in pratica un antico insegnamento della dottrina politica leninista, per il quale i comunisti non dovevano avere "*Nessun nemico a sinistra*". Qual era la *ratio* che animava tale prassi? Si trattava di evitare di avere rivali sul fianco sinistro per soddisfare due necessità: la prima, di carattere organizzativo, era quella, già vista, di avere un controllo ferreo sui militanti, evitando "concorrenti" che rendessero più appetibile per gli stessi militanti, in un'epoca di forte ideologizzazione, la propria offerta politica rispetto a quella del Partito; la seconda ragione, di carattere elettorale, era diretta conseguenza della prima: non scoprirsi sul fianco sinistro, ma anzi presidiare stabilmente *tutto* il campo alla propria sinistra, rendeva più semplice il lavoro di conquista elettorale del centro politico, cosa che, anche questo lo si è visto, era essenziale per un partito che oltretutto operava e agiva in un contesto democratico (Tarrow 1976). Diversamente, le energie e le risorse disponibili si sarebbe dovuto mobilitarle per contendere ad altri quegli spazi, e la possibilità di espansione al centro sarebbe notevolmente diminuita. Si spiega così, ad esempio, la colpevolizzazione del gruppo dei dissidenti da sinistra (Natoli, Rossanda, Pintor, Parlato, Castellina, Magri e altri) rispetto alla democrazia interna del Partito e rispetto alla linea ufficiale inizialmente

tenuta sull'invasione sovietica della Cecoslovacchia (alcuni di loro, espulsi dal partito, diedero vita nel 1969 alla rivista e poi al quotidiano *il manifesto*), nonché l'accusa, rivolta loro dalla dirigenza del Pci, di tradimento e frazionismo.

2. Gli effetti sul sistema politico e sulla cultura politica del Paese

2.1 L'ideologizzazione dell'arena politica

Se quelli che abbiamo qui elencato costituiscono dunque i tratti più tipici della cultura politica comunista nel corso di quella che va comunemente sotto il nome di "Prima Repubblica", dobbiamo ora cercare di chiarire in che modo essa contribuì, insieme ovviamente alle altre principali culture politiche, a cominciare da quella cattolica rappresentata dalla Democrazia Cristiana, a delineare i caratteri di quella che è stata, complessivamente, la cultura politica del Paese (Pellicani 1979).

Abbiamo visto che uno degli aspetti più caratterizzanti il Pci fu la forte ideologizzazione sia del suo linguaggio politico che delle sue condotte.

Ciò ebbe l'effetto di far ricadere sulla stessa Dc, per conseguenza, la necessità di difendersi dall'offensiva ideologica dell'avversario utilizzando anch'essa un armamentario e un lessico che rispondessero colpo su colpo alla strategia comunista, impostata, come sappiamo, sul concetto di egemonia culturale.

Lo si riscontrò del resto sin da subito, sin dalla campagna elettorale per le prime libere elezioni politiche dopo il Ventennio, quelle del 18 aprile 1948, quando la martellante azione dei comitati civici di Luigi Gedda, unita all'azione capillare svolta dalla Chiesa, soprattutto nei confronti delle donne, portò alla schiacciante e storica vittoria della Dc nei confronti del Fronte popolare.

Dopo quell'evento, tuttavia, inizialmente il linguaggio politico democristiano mantenne, secondo l'insegnamento degasperiano, un tono improntato all'*understatement* (Scoppola 1977), se si eccettua il caso di padre Lombardi (Ginsborg 1989) soprannominato all'epoca "il microfono di Dio", e il ruolo che questi ebbe in quella che va sotto il nome di "operazione Sturzo".

Dopo l'uscita di scena di De Gasperi – che non a caso avvenne in conseguenza di un altro, essenziale momento politico caratterizzato da forte ideologizzazione, ossia il dibattito sulla legge elettorale, ribattezzata dai comunisti "legge truffa" –, fu con l'ascesa ai vertici della Dc dei nuovi dirigenti, a cominciare da Amintore Fanfani, che il clima politico-culturale anche all'interno di quel partito virò decisamente verso l'utilizzo dello strumento ideologico.

Del resto, a partire dagli anni Sessanta, a Dc e Pci giovava premere sul tasto ideologico ai fini della polarizzazione del consenso. La forte ideologizzazione del sistema politico italiano fu quindi il risultato di un gioco di tipo

"*win-win*": vinci tu e vinco io se entrambi innalziamo il livello dello scontro politico. In ogni caso, non va dimenticato il fatto che a questo risultato si giunse in quanto la fonte principale di tale immissione di "residui" ideologici era appunto il Pci, che in qualche modo influenzava e condizionava, o nella stessa prospettiva ideologica (Psi), o in quella opposta (Dc, Pri, Pli, Msi) l'intero sistema partitico italiano.

Quest'ultimo, dunque, si connotò sin da subito per un elevatissimo livello di ideologizzazione. Ciò significò, come ben si può comprendere, che l'intero discorso pubblico italiano, non solo quello nei e tra partiti, ma, per inevitabile conseguenza, quello nelle istituzioni rappresentative, quello tra i principali protagonisti per la negoziazione dell'agenda politica, quello sugli organi di stampa e in parti consistenti dell'intera opinione pubblica, si caratterizzasse per modalità di confronto, di discussione, di approccio ai problemi che poco si premuravano di andare al nocciolo delle questioni concrete, e molto invece di amplificare messaggi politicamente utili per rimarcare e definire confini, per inviare messaggi "in codice" all'avversario e, in generale, per catturare consensi.

Tutto questo ebbe conseguenze rilevantissime sulla capacità del sistema politico di saper approcciare, affrontare e gestire le diverse criticità e richieste di output, sotto forma di politiche pubbliche, che una società in rapida trasformazione continuamente poneva di fronte alla classe politica. Quella capacità si dimostrò infatti sempre al di sotto delle reali necessità del Paese.

2.2 Il primato dei partiti e lo svuotamento del valore e del significato delle istituzioni liberaldemocratiche

Durante tutto il periodo che va dal 25 luglio 1943 (caduta del fascismo) al 1 gennaio 1948 (entrata in vigore della Costituzione), i partiti di massa occuparono quegli spazi politici che in un regime già consolidato e legittimato detengono le istituzioni. Il Pci svolse addirittura un ruolo di pacificatore sociale e di controllo dell'ordine pubblico, se pensiamo, ad esempio, a come esso gestì e governò il difficile, e pieno di tensioni, momento durante il quale in Sicilia e in altre zone del Paese i contadini presero ad occupare le terre dei grandi proprietari terrieri assenteisti. Esso aveva del resto già conquistato nel Paese una indiscussa e riconosciuta autorità grazie al suo impegno come attore di primo piano nella Guerra di Liberazione dal nazifascismo.

Sicché, dopo la caduta del regime mussoliniano, e con la nascita della Repubblica, «le masse – scrive Giordano Sivini – furono integrate nei partiti prima ancora che nel nuovo Stato» (Sivini 1971: 102). Organizzatisi legalmente subito dopo il 25 luglio, i partiti italiani si trovarono immediatamente di fronte al problema della conquista del consenso di massa. Il suffragio uni-

versale a uomini e donne spalancava nuovi ed enormi spazi politici. Spazi che in qualche modo dovevano essere riempiti. Pci e Dc non trovarono, in questo cammino di conquista della società italiana, molti e irti ostacoli. Istituzioni ancora in fasce, e una cultura politica nel Paese scarsamente avvezza alla ginnastica civica e democratica, facilitarono ancor più questo percorso. Se cioè i partiti riuscirono a porsi come architrave indispensabile per il nuovo sistema politico, lo dovettero al fatto che furono essi stessi gli architetti, i costruttori e i manutentori di quel sistema. Dopo il crollo del regime, infatti, i partiti di massa, a cominciare dal Pci, organizzatisi su tutto il territorio nazionale (Manoukian 1968; Bartolini 1976), furono le prime, e per un certo periodo le uniche, agenzie politiche dotate di una qualche legittimazione democratica.

Sin da subito fu quindi molto chiara, nel Paese, la percezione del ruolo primario dei partiti politici, e forte risultava altresì l'identificazione con essi e con la cultura politica di cui erano portatori. Nettissima, lo si è visto, era la contrapposizione tra le due principali sub-culture politiche, cattolica e comunista. Alberto Spreafico e Joseph La Palombara parlavano in quegli anni di «cristallizzazione delle scelte», emergendo dalle loro ricerche che ben il 78% degli elettori aveva già deciso per chi votare alle successive consultazioni politiche (Spreafico e La Palombara 1963: 690).

Va ribadito che una delle motivazioni principali di un così forte contrasto risiedeva nella forte ideologizzazione del dibattito politico. Fino agli anni Sessanta e Settanta le ideologie tennero saldamente il campo nel sistema partitico italiano. Sicché, se Daniel Bell, sin dagli anni Sessanta, iniziava ad intravedere il declino delle ideologie in occidente (Bell 1962), nel 1969 Joseph La Palombara ammoniva che «la teoria del declino delle ideologie è semplicemente non valida per il caso italiano» (La Palombara1965: 71 ss.).

A ciò va aggiunto che uno dei due principali attori della contesa politico-ideologica era apertamente sostenitore di un sistema politico-economico alternativo a quello allora presente. La caratterizzazione anti-sistema del Pci (Cafagna 1991: 108) contribuiva quindi ad alimentare una certa alienazione dal sistema politico stesso e creava, in molti cittadini-elettori, una concezione dei partiti intesi più come partiti-chiesa che non come soggetti politici di un sistema più ampio e complesso, sistema nel quale la competizione politica può dunque essere guardata come elemento positivo, piuttosto che come lotta drammatica tra due contendenti che si affrontano per la conquista finale del potere (Salvadori 2011: 65).

Ora, se i partiti svolsero un ruolo di supplenza delle istituzioni democratiche nel periodo di transizione che abbiamo sopra ricordato, c'è però anche da aggiungere che essi, si è sottolineato anche questo, fecero in modo di prolungare indefinitamente tale stato, o meglio di assicurarsi una posizione di primato sulle istituzioni anche dopo la fine del periodo di transi-

zione, una volta entrata in vigore la Costituzione. Ciò avvenne, per quanto riguarda in particolare il Pci, cercando, da un lato, di farsi interprete privilegiato di tutto quell'insieme di istanze sociali provenienti dalla lunga stagione politica contrassegnata nel nostro Paese dai movimenti collettivi degli anni Sessanta e Settanta e, dall'altro, rassicurato dal crescente consenso elettorale alla sua politica, portando avanti una linea impostata sul controllo e sull'indirizzo dei mutamenti a livello di massa che stavano avvenendo in quegli anni: politica salariale, assistenzialismo indifferenziato, garanzie e privilegi a settori del mondo del lavoro considerati prima di tutto come aree da proteggere, più che come categorie che rispondessero anch'esse a logiche di mercato del lavoro.

Questi processi vennero portati avanti seguendo un approccio ed un'impostazione che ricalcavano i tradizionali schemi, come lo stretto controllo del partito e la tendenza all'ideologizzazione. Tali elementi contribuirono ad ingenerare confusione, e a presentare i problemi secondo un approccio che non aiutava a porre tali tematiche, certamente importanti, entro un confronto politico improntato ad un'analisi pragmatica delle questioni.

Va infine aggiunto, cosa che vedremo meglio nel prossimo paragrafo, che "primato dei partiti" significò altresì occupazione dello Stato da parte di questi ultimi. Le risorse pubbliche, prima di trovare la loro naturale destinazione nell'utilizzo da parte della cittadinanza, venivano forzosamente fatte passare da una stazione intermedia, quella cioè occupata dai partiti politici, i quali dunque, oltre ad essere considerati i reali protagonisti e decisori circa l'allocazione e la distribuzione delle risorse pubbliche, traevano inevitabilmente da questa posizione anche indubbi vantaggi "logistici", nel senso cioè che, in diversi modi e sotto le forme più creative ed "estrose", anch'essi incameravano parte di quelle risorse, a mo' di dazio che andava pagato a coloro che garantivano a ciascuno la propria fetta di torta. E non ci riferiamo qui solo e non tanto a risorse di tipo finanziario, ma anche alla possibilità di definire, allocare e destinare risorse umane in ambiti della pubblica amministrazione, a livello nazionale e locale, nei quali poter esercitare influenza, capacità di decisione e di condizionamento nelle fasi di implementazione, monitoraggio e valutazione delle politiche pubbliche. Ci riferiamo, in altre parole, a quella "partitocrazia" di cui il grande costituzionalista Giuseppe Maranini aveva chiaramente individuato la presenza nel nostro sistema politico sin dal 1949 (Maranini 1949). Egli fu, tra l'altro, l'inventore di questa espressione, così efficace per descrivere la posizione che i partiti politici hanno, da sempre, occupato nella "Costituzione materiale" (come avrebbe detto un altro grande costituzionalista, Costantino Mortati) della Repubblica.

2.3 Lo statalismo

I partiti dunque, nei confronti delle istituzioni, se per un verso si interponevano nel rapporto individuo-Stato, per un altro erano di fatto i garanti della fruizione di servizi di interesse pubblico.

Se consideriamo inoltre che ai due maggiori partiti facevano riferimento la maggior parte delle strutture subculturali territoriali (Trigilia 1980; Manoukian 1968), non si farà fatica a comprendere come il processo di progressiva espansione della pubblica amministrazione abbia contribuito ad ingenerare un assistenzialismo tutto imperniato sul controllo, da parte delle strutture partitiche, delle rispettive aree di influenza. Solo in questo modo infatti, solo, cioè, attraverso l'utilizzo di un modello democratico giustamente definito "consociativo", al Pci era possibile fare in modo che la sua esclusione di fatto *sine die* dal governo (la cosiddetta "*conventio ad excludendum*") fosse almeno compensata da una qualche forma di compartecipazione alla funzione di aggregazione e di articolazione degli interessi, funzione essenziale e indispensabile in qualunque sistema politico (Almond e Powell 1988).

Non, dunque, competizione per il governo del Paese, ma per il controllo di rispettive aree di interessi nel più ampio (e dunque molto meno rispondente a criteri di *accountability*) panorama dello Stato.

Una cultura politica statalista, già del resto sviluppatasi in modo abnorme a seguito dell'indottrinamento delle masse perseguito per vent'anni dal fascismo, non solo non trovò, con la Repubblica, ostacoli di sorta al suo rifiorire, per i motivi appena visti, ma venne favorita anche da tutta un'altra serie di ragioni che a ciò contribuirono. Non è, in questa sede, possibile soffermarsi dettagliatamente e specificamente su ciascuna di esse. Per ciò che tuttavia attiene all'oggetto del presente lavoro, cercheremo di dare ragione delle cause che vanno associate più chiaramente e direttamente a quello che è stato il ruolo del Pci sotto questo profilo.

Ebbene, non sarà impresa difficile evidenziare come lo statalismo che si affermò nella cultura politica del Paese riflettesse in misura assai significativa molti dei valori che connotavano la cultura politica comunista.

Vi era innanzitutto, per quanto concerne la sfera produttiva e del lavoro, un chiaro giudizio di valore positivo verso tutto ciò che fosse pubblico (Accornero, Mannheimer, Sebastiani 1983) e, specularmente, negativo per quanto riguardava il settore privato.

La cultura politica comunista non può in alcun modo essere tacciata di "anti-industrialismo", vista la valenza positiva che nella teoria marxista hanno sempre detenuto i concetti di produzione, tecnologia, lavoro, e lo stesso concetto di capitale, per lo meno in prospettiva storica. Tuttavia, il settore privato del sistema industriale, per lo meno rispetto a quello pubblico, era

soggetto in qualche modo a giudizi non esattamente positivi, che riflettevano quelli, altrettanto poco entusiasti, sul concetto più generale di iniziativa imprenditoriale privata. Si spiega dunque, con molta probabilità, anche grazie a ciò il fatto che, come bene emerge dalle ricerche di Gabriele Calvi svolte in Italia negli anni Settanta e Ottanta (Calvi 1973; Id. 1980; Id. 1987), l'item "anti-industrialismo" raccogliesse nel Paese consensi sorprendenti, e ciò anche dopo il periodo del "miracolo economico" grazie al quale il nostro Paese divenne un Paese industrialmente avanzato e si lasciò alle spalle secoli di povertà e miseria.

Ulteriore conseguenza del modello improntato all'insieme di valori di cui stiamo parlando si ebbe nella grande considerazione con cui venne tenuto il ruolo dello Stato interventista in economia. Anche in questo caso, non va certamente sottovalutata l'esperienza pregressa durante il Ventennio, e tuttavia, ancora una volta, quell'esperienza trovava dei continuatori in coloro che il fascismo avevano contribuito a sconfiggere.

Dopo la lunga fase delle politiche di nazionalizzazione attuata dal centrosinistra (Tamburrano 1990), e dunque, va detto, con il concorso decisivo anche dell'altra importante cultura politica della sinistra italiana, quella socialista, il sistema produttivo del Paese divenne, agli inizi degli anni Settanta, un sistema ad economia mista, non definibile cioè "di mercato", visto che quasi il 50% del Pil proveniva dal settore statale, fosse esso imputabile alla pubblica amministrazione o all'impresa di Stato.

Lo Stato, nel quadro di una siffatta cultura politica, non doveva limitarsi ovviamente ad essere un mero produttore, ma, più in generale, era considerato come una sorta di entità superiore, quasi metafisica, alla quale demandare, e dalla quale farsi liberare da ogni tipo di richiesta o problema. Lo Stato diventava quindi la camera di compensazione di differenti e in alcuni casi contrastanti visioni e culture della cosa pubblica, che trovavano però nel "grande protettore" il modo di scaricare contraddizioni e mancati punti di incontro su criteri e modalità di organizzazione e gestione delle risorse e degli interessi, privati o pubblici, oltre che dei pubblici dipendenti. Si spiega anche in questo modo il fatto che i sindacati riuscirono ad ottenere condizioni contrattuali nella pubblica amministrazione che in altri paesi, anche quelli che posero le basi storiche del Welfare State, risultavano del tutto sconosciute. Non solo, ma, esattamente per questo stato di cose, gli stessi sindacati occuparono progressivamente ogni spazio nella pubblica amministrazione, sino a diventare indispensabili per la nomina dei dirigenti. Del tutto disattesa, ancora oggi, è infatti la norma che impedirebbe ai dirigenti della P.A. di essere iscritti a sindacati, mentre di fatto, nella sanità, nella scuola, persino in alcuni settori delle forze dell'ordine i sindacati sono decisivi per la nomina addirittura di dirigenti apicali (Caruso 2012).

2.4 L'egualitarismo acritico

Che il valore dell'eguaglianza abbia costituito uno degli architravi dell'intero modello della cultura politica comunista è concetto finanche ovvio. Esso ha dato slancio ad una delle motivazioni più forti che hanno animato la passione politica e civile di milioni di uomini e donne, iscritti, simpatizzanti o semplici elettori che si sono riconosciuti nel messaggio di liberazione e di emancipazione di cui quel valore era ed è ancora oggi portatore.

Gran parte delle lotte politiche e delle battaglie che hanno accompagnato la storia politica del Pci sono state caratterizzate da quel forte anelito, e alcuni dei traguardi più significativi raggiunti in materia di diritti dei lavoratori, di garanzie alle fasce più deboli della popolazione, di emancipazione delle donne, di diritto allo studio sono anche il risultato dell'impegno politico dei comunisti italiani e portano spesso la firma di suoi dirigenti e parlamentari.

Tutto ciò non è qui in discussione. Ciò che merita in questa sede approfondire riguarda quella particolare declinazione del concetto, del valore e del "senso" di eguaglianza che andò a caratterizzare una parte rilevante della vita pubblica italiana, e che, come abbiamo avuto modo di anticipare già nel precedente paragrafo, produsse le sue conseguenze meno "virtuose" proprio nel settore della pubblica amministrazione e, in generale, nella conduzione dello Stato a livello centrale, periferico e delle organizzazioni ad esso contigue (il cosiddetto settore "para-statale").

Va detto, innanzitutto, che la lunga stagione che in Italia accompagnò la progressiva affermazione dei diritti civili, negli anni Settanta, vide come protagonisti diversi attori, presenti sia nel sistema partitico (Partito socialista, Partito radicale, Partito repubblicano, Partito socialdemocratico, Partito liberale, oltre naturalmente al Pci), sia in quello dei movimenti (la galassia dei movimenti della sinistra operaia, quella dei movimenti studenteschi, il movimento femminista). Ognuno di questi attori prediligeva ovviamente alcune prospettive politiche e non altre del grande processo di allargamento e rafforzamento della cittadinanza che in quel periodo si compì nel nostro Paese. I partiti di tradizione politica liberale (Partito radicale, Partito liberale) si focalizzavano sui diritti individuali, intesi cioè come i diritti di libertà della persona, accomunati in questo anche dai due partiti della sinistra riformista, Psi e Psdi, i quali però coprivano anche l'altro grande filone delle battaglie per la cittadinanza, tipico della cultura politica di sinistra, dato appunto dai diritti di eguaglianza (Breschi 2008). Eguaglianza sul lavoro, nella famiglia, tra uomo e donna, di fronte alla legge e nelle istituzioni dello Stato.

Mentre, come detto, nel campo della sinistra Psi e Psdi si posizionavano su entrambi i due filoni sopra richiamati, e cioè diritti della persona e diritti di eguaglianza, il Pci presidiava politicamente solo il secondo dei due, ritenendo

il primo non strategico per la sua politica. I comunisti guardavano da sempre con sufficienza alle battaglie per i diritti individuali, sin dai tempi di Gramsci liquidate come "borghesi" (Togliatti non risparmiò parole aspre verso l'esperienza antifascista di "Giustizia e libertà" e la sua rivista *Non mollare*, e addirittura di disprezzo verso il suo fondatore, Carlo Rosselli, quando fu pubblicato il suo *Socialismo liberale*).

Nel multiforme e articolato universo della politica per i diritti che contrassegnò la lunga fase tra il 1968 e i primi anni Ottanta, il Partito comunista si fece dunque interprete privilegiato di tutta quell'area politico-elettorale che rivendicava una maggiore giustizia sociale nel Paese.

Se questa fu quindi la chiara linea portata avanti dal partito, è da dire che essa produsse effetti non solo sul piano "manifesto" e dichiaratamente perseguito, quello cioè dell'approvazione di misure legislative che andassero in questa precisa direzione, ma anche su di un piano più in ombra rispetto al precedente, e con effetti forse indesiderati ma pur sempre significativi. Stiamo parlando dell'introduzione di tutto quell'insieme di misure, provvedimenti, accordi partiti-sindacati-governo (Baglioni 1978: 123), i quali, con lo scopo di tutelare e garantire i dipendenti della pubblica amministrazione e di mettere tutti i lavoratori su di un piano di parità, ebbero inevitabili effetti distorsivi sull'efficienza, sulla capacità di ottimizzazione e, in ultima analisi, sulla produttività complessiva di tutto il settore della pubblica amministrazione.

Ciò avvenne essenzialmente attraverso due dinamiche fondamentali: una di tipo prevalentemente culturale, l'altra dai connotati strutturali e sistemici. Con la prima, vi era la tendenza a mettere il pubblico dipendente in una posizione di scarso controllo da parte dei suoi superiori. Ciò in quanto ci si richiamava a principi di non intrusione da parte di gerarchie che in quel periodo scontavano la fase della contestazione verso il principio dell'autorità in quanto tale, fase tipica del Sessantotto e di tutti gli anni Settanta. Su ciò, e veniamo così alla seconda dinamica, fecero leva abbondantemente i sindacati i quali, confortati dal clima culturale presente nel Paese e dalle politiche egualitarie portate avanti dal Pci e dalle "sinistre" (come si diceva allora, cioè includendo anche Psi, Psdi e tutte le altre formazioni che nelle diverse legislature di allora occuparono i banchi di destra[2] del Parlamento), non trovarono impedimenti nel reclamare a sé stessi sempre maggiore voce in capitolo in quelle che erano le impostazioni e le strategie organizzative della pubblica amministrazione.

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[2] Ricordiamo che in Aula i partiti di destra siedono a sinistra, e viceversa; ciò è dovuto alla prospettiva, opposta, che li fa invece vedere a destra e sinistra se ci si siede di fronte, sul banco del Governo.

Il principio dell'egualitarismo, in questa temperie, conobbe quindi una chiara torsione nel senso di una deriva di indifferenziazione all'interno dei contesti organizzativi del lavoro. Ciò fu a sua volta causa di deresponsabilizzazione, di totale assenza di *accountability* nell'amministrazione dello Stato e, in ultima, di completa scomparsa di principi di avanzamento e di remunerazione del lavoro che tenessero almeno parzialmente conto anche del merito.

Uno dei settori nei quali questo fenomeno assunse i tratti e le conseguenze più visibili fu quello della scuola. In questo caso, più fattori conversero a far sì che l'istituzione scolastica in Italia conoscesse, soprattutto a partire dalla Legge delega del 1973, con i successivi Decreti delegati del 1974, una progressiva dequalificazione di alcune delle sue più tradizionali e tipiche vocazioni (Scotto di Luzio 2007: 361). Ciò accadde specialmente nella scuola media, anello debole della catena formativa ma decisivo per la preparazione ai livelli superiori dell'istruzione scolastica. Se è incontestabile il fatto che i ministri della Pubblica istruzione, dal 1947 al 2001, siano stati praticamente tutti appartenenti alla Democrazia Cristiana, è pur vero che il Pci, sulla scia della dottrina dell'egemonia, ha sempre considerato la scuola come una delle "casematte", come le definì Gramsci, strategiche da controllare, se non attraverso strumenti istituzionali diretti, come appunto un ministero, sicuramente attraverso la sistematica mobilitazione di docenti e studenti per impedire ogni qualsivoglia tentativo di riforma nel senso contrario al modello di scuola che venne progressivamente imponendosi nel Paese.

Quel modello, dunque, fu anche il risultato del consociativismo tacito o esplicito tra i due principali partiti, e va dunque ascritto alla responsabilità non solo del Pci ma anche della stessa Dc. A te (Pci) il controllo e la mobilitazione delle "masse di manovra", a me (Dc) il controllo sui programmi e sui contenuti didattici, ovviamente in linea con un'impostazione che non arrecasse eccessivo disagio alle gerarchie ed alla tradizione cattolica, diffusa e radicata nel Paese.

In questo quadro, il primo aspetto che ne risultò fu quello per il quale i sindacati ottennero che il principio dell'autonomia di insegnamento, aspetto certamente fondamentale e irrinunciabile per una scuola moderna, si tramutasse, travalicando le intenzioni iniziali del legislatore, in facoltà di totale autoreferenzialità anche per aspetti della professione di insegnante che nulla avevano a che vedere con quello della didattica. Ci riferiamo qui, ad esempio, al tacito ma ferreo e mai messo in discussione principio della mancanza di controllo sulle assenze degli insegnanti da parte dei presidi, o alla completa e definitiva rinuncia allo strumento del controllo ispettivo del ministero sulle attività e sull'operato dei presidi, degli istituti e dei docenti. Come già detto, questi aspetti (assenteismo, assenza di controlli, etc.) non sono imputabili direttamente alla mera cultura politica del Pci. Tuttavia, essi furono conseguen-

za del fatto che quel partito, con l'intento di tenere sotto la propria ala protettrice attori e soggetti che operavano all'interno del mondo scolastico, non oppose particolari resistenze alla progressiva sindacalizzazione della scuola, la accompagnò anzi con uno sguardo compiacente, essendo i principali sindacati ivi presenti, in termini di iscritti, quelli comunque più vicini, se non a quel partito, di certo all'area della sinistra.

Un secondo elemento concerne il fatto che il principio dell'egualitarismo, sommato a quello dell'autonomia, produsse un clima di totale preclusione verso qualunque forma di valutazione dei risultati della didattica e, più in generale, dell'attività degli istituti. E ne vediamo le conseguenze ancora oggi, con centinaia di istituti nei quali la maggioranza dei docenti si rifiuta di somministrare i test Invalsi ai propri studenti.

Infine, e in conseguenza dei primi due fattori esposti, anche gli studenti non poterono che risentire e dunque riprodurre, nella loro subcultura giovanile, modelli valoriali e comportamentali che provenivano anche dalla classe insegnante. Come potevano dei giovani che si trovavano nell'età in cui ci si forma, con fatica e difficoltà di ogni tipo, una qualche opinione su ciò che ci circonda, sviluppare uno spirito ed un senso critico verso modelli organizzativi deresponsabilizzanti e nei quali il riconoscimento e la gratificazione del merito era merce praticamente bandita dal consesso di chi operava nell'istituzione scolastica?

Sicché, gli obiettivi verso cui gli studenti rivolgevano (e rivolgono ancora oggi) i loro attacchi non erano e non sono di certo le criticità e i limiti che abbiamo cercato di esporre, ma riguardano, al contrario, ogni pur timido tentativo dei governi che si sono succeduti dagli anni Ottanta ad oggi di riformare la scuola secondo criteri più meritocratici, produttivi e qualificanti.

I risultati non tardarono del resto ad arrivare. Il Mezzogiorno, che almeno nei livelli di istruzione aveva, dall'Unità d'Italia, faticosamente recuperato il suo gap rispetto al resto del Paese (Felice 2013: 117-125), conobbe un tendenziale riallargamento del divario rispetto al Centro-Nord. I dati complessivi sulla preparazione scolastica degli studenti italiani iniziarono a mostrare crescenti distanze rispetto a quelli dei loro omologhi di altri paesi occidentali e persino rispetto ad alcuni paesi non ancora industrializzati.

3. Conclusioni

Con questo saggio si è voluto mettere in evidenza quanto e in che modo la cultura politica di un partito di massa, *in specie* il Pci in Italia, possa avere influito nel contribuire a delineare i tratti complessivi della cultura politica del paese nel quale il partito in questione ha esercitato la propria azione politica,

nel nostro caso per più di quattro decenni.

Ciò che dunque, oltre alle evidenze che il saggio ha cercato di descrivere, i risultati di questo lavoro vogliono seppure implicitamente sottolineare, sta nel fatto che, più in generale, *qualunque* partito di massa che abbia occupato stabilmente la scena in un determinato sistema politico, può aver impresso alcuni significativi e duraturi connotati alla cultura politica del popolo che da quel sistema politico è stato governato. Nel caso della Prima Repubblica in Italia, oltre al Pci, la presenza e l'influenza dell'altro grande partito di massa, ancorché non definibile come "ideologico", la Dc, ha indubbiamente sortito effetti che, sebbene in direzioni e contenuti diversi (per quanto, in alcuni ambiti, paradossalmente simili e sovrapponibili) potrebbero essere facilmente evidenziati da studi e ricerche analoghe a quella qui presentata.

Oggi, nel 2015, i partiti ideologici di massa europei sono definitivamente usciti di scena. Anche quei partiti che hanno avuto come progenitori partiti ideologici di massa, come i molti partiti socialisti europei che ancora occupano spazi importanti nelle rispettive assemblee rappresentative, non possono certamente più essere considerati tali, ma, al massimo, come partiti elettorali di massa (si pensi ad esempio alla Spd, al Psf, al Pd, al New Labour) (Panebianco 1982). Come tali, essi non detengono certamente più né la forza ideologica né la progettualità politica, né, conseguentemente, la cultura politica per riuscire in ciò che ai loro predecessori, come abbiamo visto nel caso del Pci, riuscì invece in modo più che evidente: contribuire a forgiare alcuni aspetti della cultura politica di un popolo, sia nei suoi aspetti virtuosi sia in quelli che tali, almeno nel lungo periodo, non si sono rivelati.

Quanto abbiamo descritto in relazione alla storia del Pci, dunque, sarebbe oggi del tutto impensabile possa vedere protagonisti gli attuali partiti presenti non solo nel sistema politico italiano, ma, in generale, in tutto il panorama europeo, per non citare quello americano, nel quale partiti ideologici non sono mai stati presenti. Questo ci permette di introdurre anche un'altra considerazione. Con il presente lavoro non abbiamo inteso solamente proporre una ricostruzione storico-sociologica relativa al periodo e al tema che si è visto. O meglio, tale ricostruzione ha voluto proporsi di mostrare come i limiti, le inadeguatezze, le problematicità che *tutt'oggi* connotano il nostro sistema politico e sociale siano per molti aspetti riconducibili a quel periodo, ancor più che a quello della Seconda Repubblica (1993-2015). Quest'ultima – intesa come l'assetto politico-istituzionale venutosi a formare in Italia dopo il crollo del muro di Berlino, dopo la crisi di Tangentopoli e dopo la importante riforma elettorale seguita ai due referendum del 1991 e del 1993, e intesa altresì, naturalmente, attraverso i protagonisti e le classi politiche che ne hanno segnato la storia – viene spesso additata come causa del degrado politico e della "palude" nella quale il Paese si è trovato alla fine impantanato, durante una

delle crisi più gravi della sua storia, quella del 2011-2014. Se tuttavia si cerca di risalire, come abbiamo cercato qui di fare, alle ragioni che sottostanno a certi atteggiamenti diffusi (e non solo nelle classi politiche), a certe abitudini, a taluni "tic" presenti nelle diverse categorie di soggetti che, chi per un motivo, chi per un altro, calcano l'arena politica del nostro paese, si giunge spesso a concludere che, per molte fattispecie, le cause vanno collocate cronologicamente ben prima dell'avvento della Seconda Repubblica, e trovano invece nella cultura politica dei partiti di massa alcune delle ragioni che hanno contribuito a forgiare la cultura politica complessiva del Paese.

Qui dunque possiamo concludere con un'ultima, forse scontata ma, a nostro avviso, non del tutto insignificante notazione. Lo studio della cultura politica delle principali organizzazioni e istituzioni di un paese può rivelarsi uno strumento efficace quando, per diversi motivi, un passato denso di implicazioni e di stratificazioni tra fatti, istituzioni, protagonisti, classi politiche, non permette facilmente di districare e di separare cause e conseguenze di determinati fenomeni politici o sociali.

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In ricordo di Luciano Gallino

Con Luciano Gallino scompare un grande sociologo, padre fondatore di una disciplina che è sempre riuscito a nobilitare anche nei momenti più difficili segnati da tante improvvisazioni e sbandate ideologiche. È stato il più grande dei nostri maestri consegnandoci ben più di un metodo rigoroso ed analisi ancora oggi insuperate della società italiana e dei suoi squilibri. Ha insegnato ad almeno tre generazioni di studiosi come sia indispensabile coniugare ricerca scientifica ed impegno civile senza che, come è spesso avvenuto nel nostro paese, scelte politiche o pulsioni ideologiche inquinino analisi e proposte. Rigore metodologico ed etica scientifica sono state le stelle polari che ha sempre voluto mostrare sia agli studenti che a noi più giovani colleghi.

I suoi libri sono stati tanti e tutti rilevanti non solo per la nostra formazione quanto per quello che hanno significato per la cultura collettiva dell'Italia. Preziose restano le sue analisi dei molti mondi della fabbrica, da quelli della solidarietà olivettiana a quelli duri ed impersonali segnati dallo sfruttamento e dal precariato. Ed ancora fondamentali sono gli insegnamenti teorici dei suoi rigorosi trattati e le limpide ricerche sul capitalismo finanziario e sul nuovo feroce mercato del lavoro.

Fedele al suo impegno civile, presente sin dalle sue prime ricerche ad Ivrea, Luciano Gallino ha mantenuto al centro del proprio costante lavoro di studioso il nodo delle diseguaglianze che crescenti violano nei fatti i principi delle costituzioni che enfaticamente proclamano sin dai primi articoli l'uguaglianza dei cittadini.

Luciano Gallino è stato raro esempio del Berüf weberiano, della professione che è anche vocazione. È stato ed è esempio prezioso di una pratica di ricerca che acquista senso quando è arricchita dall'impegno civile, di una docenza esemplare fatta di conoscenza e di etica, di una scelta politica rinnovata e mantenuta con rara coerenza.

Agli amici ha dato anche il suo affetto sorridente e schivo.

Ci mancherà.

Giandomenico Amendola

A Brief Intellectual Biography of Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz was born in Vienna April 13, 1899. After graduation, he participated in the First World War as a cadet officer in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He fought on the Italian front on the Piave river, near Conegliano. After the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, the young Schutz found himself before the crisis that hit Austrian society: he wanted to pursue his medical studies or follow an academic career, in addition to being a musician. All three possibilities seemed implausible, due to the lengthy insecurity he would likely encounter (Wagner 1983: 8). As a result, he chose to study law, following courses of international law at the University of Vienna and international trade at the Viennese Academy. Over the course of his university studies, Schutz came into contact with lawyers like Kelsen, economists like von Wieser, von Mises and Machlup, political scientists like Voegelin. Perhaps the key figure for the young Schutz was the mathematician and philosopher Felix Kaufmann, who not only directed him towards a more rigorous methodology, but above all, introduced him to phenomenology and Edmund Husserl.

In the first semester of 1918, Max Weber gave a course at the University of Vienna that had a wide resonance. Schutz was unable to attend because he was still at the front, but he was in contact with students who were struck by that lesson. The influence of Weber had a fundamental impact on the thought of the Austrian sociologist, who studied his work in depth after he finished university. The Weberian theme of the subjectivity of the understanding of meaning constituted a bridge to fill the gap between the technicality of economic theory and the social world (Wagner 1983: 13).

Schutz graduated in law in December, 1921, and began working as managing secretary of the Association of Austrian Bankers. In 1926 he married Ilse Heim, who gave birth to him two children, Evelyn in 1933, and Georg in 1938. In 1929, he began working as an expert in law and banking with Reitler & Co., a private bank that operated in Central and Eastern Europe. It was also for his intense interpersonal relationships due to his work, that Schutz de-

veloped the theme of comprehension of the social world, posing the problem of intersubjectivity at the heart of this analysis.

In the twenties Schutz worked on *Theorie der Lebensformen* and *Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur* (the latter unfinished), two texts in which the influence of Bergson's thought emerges. Voegelin was the friend who introduced him to reading the works of the French philosopher. Bergson's idea of the temporality of consciousness was the theme used to develop the Weberian principle of selectivity of meaning. Schutz, "starting from Weber's theory of action, accepted and recast the phenomenological analysis but, 'rethinking' Max Weber, changed it in the Bergsonian sense" (Protti 1995: 18). Nevertheless the voluntary category of intuition of Bergson did not allow him to address the problem of meaning in a radical way. The Bergsonian impass of the twenties is the result of the realization that ideal-typical access to the social world is methodologically inconsistent with the intuition of Bergson, that this last category is unverifiable and thus basically metaphorical.

The approach to phenomenology in his late twenties, under the guidance of his friend Kaufmann, was motivated by the need to resolve the differences between Bergson's idea of stream of consciousness and the method of Weber which were anything but marginal. This is how Schutz "through the port of phenomenology can tap into the 'data' of consciousness through a methodologically controller procedure" (Muzzetto 2006: 319), based on a rigorous theoretical frame. Kaufmann introduced Husserl to Schutz in 1932, the same year of the publication of the book *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*. In Freiburg, where Husserl lived, Schutz met those who would become the main exponents of phenomenology: Dorion Cairns, Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe. Schutz met Husserl several times, who considered him a strict phenomenologist: "one of the few people who managed to penetrate the deeper meaning of his work" (Wagner 1983: 46). Husserl proposed that he become his assistant but Schutz refused because of his work commitments. The influence of Husserl was indelible, even if the relationship with phenomenology was never uncritical: Schutz immediately had doubts about the possibility of developing a sociological program structured on the idea of a transcendental ego.

In 1938 Schutz was in Paris on business, when Austria was occupied by Nazi Germany. After a year's exile in France, in 1939 he emigrated permanently to the United States, where Reitler had planned the transfer a few years before. In 1943, thanks to contacts with the American phenomenological movement, he became part-time lecturer of sociology at the *New School for Social Research*. In 1952, he obtained the post of full professor, which allowed him to leave Reitler to devote himself full time to research and teaching.

The American period is characterized by the influence of pragmatism and Schutz's interest in language as a vehicle typifying the constitution of

meaning. The articulation of the theme of *Verstehen* in a key of mundane understanding led the sociologist to finally abandon the transcendental ego of Husserl and replace it with the Mead's theory of the Self. The path to a phenomenology of natural attitude was complete. Two basic points: certainty is not to be found on a transcendental level but in the world of everyday life (certainty "mundane"). The basis of the phenomenology of natural attitude is socio-centric. The subject is "from the beginning" social; the "We-relation" is understood as the basic category of the social world, as Natanson explained it is "the epistemic root of the shared world" (Natanson, 1977).

Reworking, among others, the ideas of James, Mead and Cassirer, he developed the theory of finite provinces of meaning, creating a powerful theoretical and methodological system, in some ways still unsurpassed, which continues to draw sociologists and philosophers alike. The publications of Schutz in the US, from 1940 to 1959, mostly in the form of journal articles have been published in various volumes of the *Collected Papers*. Alfred Schutz died May 20, 1959 of severe heart disease.

The first influences of Schutz's thought

The "phenomenologically oriented" sociology of Schutz has influenced sociological thought to varying degrees. The first vein is that which builds on work done by Schutz's best known pupil Thomas Luckmann. He not only wrote the two volumes of *The Structure of Social World* with Schutz, (more precisely the drafting of the two volumes is due to Luckmann, who reworked Schutz's notes which contained the general structure of the work), but has also published, together with Berger, what is commonly interpreted as a manifesto of phenomenological sociology: *The Social Construction of Reality*, a volume that contributed to making Schutz known worldwide.

The second and more heterodox vein of successors of Schutz is that of Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel. Independent from the current developments of ethnomethodology, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* of Garfinkel is one of the most audacious attempts to develop the thinking of Schutz, and the phenomenological in general, in a radically empirical key. *Method and Measurement* and *Cognitive Sociology* of Aaron Cicourel, however, are two texts in which the thought of Schutz is used, respectively, to develop a critical discourse on the methods of conventional empirical social research and to explain the empirical modes of the use of language in situated contexts.

Maurice Natanson and Helmut Wagner are some of the last students of Schutz who have developed a third approach, the more philosophical social, linked to themes of the Self, to intersubjectivity, to categorizations, finite provinces of meaning and to phenomenological methodology.

Currently, an international circle has been constituted, the *Schutz Circle*, that has given a new boost to the line of study opened by Schutz, extending his key of understanding to the whole body of human and social sciences.

In this special issue of SMP, some of the authors that have contributed are members of the Schutz Circle, namely Michael D. Barber, Carlos Belvedere, Jochen Dreher, Mototaka Mori, Daniela Lopez, George Sebald, and Chung-Chi Yu.

Riccardo Venturini

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Michael Barber, Ph.D., completed his doctoral work at Yale University in 1985 and is currently Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. He works in the area of the phenomenology of the social world. He is the author of over 60 articles and 6 books, including: *Social Typifications and the Elusive Other: The Place of Sociology of Knowledge in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology* (1988); *Guardian of Dialogue: Max Scheler's Phenomenology, Sociology of Knowledge, and Philosophy of Love* (1993); *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation* (1998); *Equality and Diversity: Phenomenological Investigations of Prejudice and Discrimination* (2001); *The Participating Citizen: A Biography of Alfred Schutz* (2004, winner of the 2007 Ballard Prize); *The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology and the Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians* (2011). He is currently the President elect of the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North-American Phenomenologists, and is working on a book on finite provinces of meaning.

Carlos Belvedere is an Argentinian philosopher and sociologist. His PhD dissertation, held at the University of Buenos Aires, poses a critique to the reception of Alfred Schutz in contemporary social theory. He has authored several books and articles on Social Phenomenology. Currently, he is an Associate Professor at the University of Buenos Aires and at the University of General Sarmiento, in Argentina. He is also a researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET). He co-chairs the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.

Denisa Butnaru studied English and Japanese literature, sociology and philosophy (having specialized in phenomenological philosophy). She holds a doctor title from the University of Strasbourg, France obtained in 2009 with a thesis in social phenomenology. The main topic of the dis-

sertation was the concept of signification understood mainly as a result of typifying language processes. Since 2010 she has been constantly working on the topic of the body and disability in a socio-phenomenological context. She edited with David Le Breton the collective volume "Corps abîmés", published in 2013. At present she holds a post-doctoral position in the graduate school "Factual and fictional Narration" GRK 1767, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany with a project on the narrative constitution of the body in life story interviews in the case of persons who suffer of cerebral palsy and spinal cord injury. The analysis of these lived experiences is realized in a phenomenological context. The main orientations which are used for such a purpose are those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, Dan Zahavi, Robert Gugutzer but also recent paradigms in the phenomenology of the body, such as the enactive approach. Recently she has broadened her research focusing on philosophical and social-theoretical developments related to the field of bionics.

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Michela Beatrice Ferri (1983) ha conseguito nel febbraio del 2012 il titolo di dottore di ricerca in Filosofia presso l'Università degli Studi di Milano ed è adjunct professor presso lo Holy Apostles College and Seminary (Connecticut, U.S.A.). Le sue ricerche sono rivolte allo studio della ricezione della fenomenologia in Italia e negli Stati Uniti d'America, allo studio delle connessioni tra la fenomenologia e la sociologia e tra la fenomenologia e l'antropologia, all'estetica moderna e contemporanea e all'estetica fenomenologica. La sua tesi di dottorato, intitolata *La prima ricezione della fenomenologia negli Stati Uniti d'America*, è dedicata a un tema pionieristico ed è frutto delle sue ricerche condotte presso la New School for Social Research di New York nel 2010, presso gli Husserl-Archives di Leuven nel 2011, e presso la University of California Berkeley presso la quale è stata Visiting Researcher durante l'autunno del 2014. Ha partecipato a numerosi convegni nazionali e internazionali.

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Mototaka Mori (PhD, Waseda University, 1995) is Professor of Sociology and Social Sciences at Waseda University (Tokyo, Japan). He is author of numerous articles and books in Japanese: *Alfred Schutz in Vienna* (1995), *Alfred Schutz* (2000), *Friedrich von Hayek in Vienna* (2006), *Sociology of Money* (2007), and *Theoretical Sociology* (2014). His recent main works: *Musical Foundation of Interaction –Music as Intermediary Medium*, in: Michael Barber, Jochen Dreher (eds.), *The Interrelation of Phenomenology, Social Sciences and the Arts*, Springer (2014), and *Person als Medium –Eine pragmatisch-phänomenologische Alternative zur Systemtheorie*, in Joachim Renn, Gerd Sebald, Jan Weyand, *Lebenswelt und Lebensform –Zum Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Pragmatismus*, Velbrück Wissenschaft (2012).

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