Fundamentalists toward democracy? Empirical analysis of fundamentalist attitudes and democratic attitudes in the Middle East

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Huntington asks an important question in The Third Wave: if traditional Islamic values and beliefs have significantly retarded democratic progress in the past, to what extent are they likely to continue to do so in the future? Unlike Huntington's work, this paper is primarily a micro-level analysis. It seeks to show how Muslim people interpret and evaluate Islam and democracy. So we want to attach more data to Huntington's theory and wish to demonstrate that non-democratic political space and authoritarian governments in Muslim countries can't be explained by the features of Islam; there are considerable reasons and facts to convince scholars to look for other factors. The results illustrate nearly all Muslims tend to Islam and democracy at the same time. It seems Large populations of moderate fundamentalists in Muslim countries are appearing who struggle to actualize Islamic teachings in a democratic political model.

Outline of problem

Huntington's *The Third Wave* makes a great contribution to macro-level political sociology. It also includes many implications for scholars who are interested in contemporary religious movements. In chapter six, he argues that there are some cultural obstacles to Democratization as well as economic and political ones.

A less restrictive version of the cultural obstacle argument is not that only one culture is peculiarly to democracy but that one or more cultures are peculiarly hostile to it. The two cultures most often cited are Confucianism and Islam. In this regard, Huntington asks three questions:

1) To what extent are traditional Confucian and Islamic values and beliefs hostile to democracy?

2) If they are, to what extent have these cultures in fact hampered progress toward democracy?

3) If they have significantly retarded democratic progress in the past, to what extent are they likely to continue to do so in the future? (Huntington 1991a: 300).

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In one hand, Huntington argues – based on Ernest Gellner's work – that the high culture form of Islam is endowed with a number of features – unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic – that are congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernization. They are also generally congruent with the requirements of democracy. On the other hand, he believes that fundamentalist Muslims demand a country's sovereignty be in the hands of pious Muslims; that Shari'a be the law; and clergy have a decisive vote in policy-making. Finally, He points to two main solutions to cultural obstacle:

1) Great cultural traditions like Islam and Confucianism are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavior patterns. Any major culture, including Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic.

2) Cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant. The dominant beliefs and attitudes in a society change. While maintaining elements of continuity, the prevailing culture of a society in one generation may differ significantly from what it was one or two generations earlier. (Huntington 1991b: 28, 30).

This paper is focused on the second and the third questions. Unlike Huntington's work, it is primarily a micro-level analysis. It seeks to show how Muslim people interpret and evaluate Islam and democracy. So we want to attach more data to Huntington's theory and wish to take a step further.

What is fundamentalism? Who are fundamentalists? Historically, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855) and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) were the first fundamentalists and today Sunni Muslims consider them as the two prime fundamentalists. Ibn Hanbal, though a renowned scholar and theologian, was mostly famous for his collections of the Traditions and his emphasis upon the Qur'an and the hadith as the primary sources of legal knowledge. Consequently, Hanbali juristic doctrine has a strong traditionalist and conservative character. Inevitably, he was compelled to defend himself against the teachings of the Mu'tazilites during the mihna and he adopted what one would expect on such issues: a Traditionist approach which states that one should look to the primary sources of the Qu'ran and the hadith and accept what is written without interpretation or further discussion. The Hanbali law school currently dominates Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and has a limited following in Syria and Iraq. Among the most prominent adherents of Hanbali doctrine were Ibn Taymiyya and, more recently, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) whose alliance with Ibn Saud, ancestor of the founders of Saudi Arabia, resulted in the Hanbali school becoming the official doctrine in that country (Jackson 2006: 45-47).

There is also Shi'i fundamentalism. Imam Khomeini (1902-1989) and Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr (1935-1980) are the contemporary figures who led Iranians and Iraqis toward Islamic revival.

> Shi'i fundamentalism can be distinguished by following characteristics:
> - Believing in Islam as a total way of life even during the Occultation of the Imam.
> - Paying great attention to Islamic social and political philosophy and jurisprudence.
> - Insisting on the necessity of establishing a religious government in the absence of the Imam.
> - Believing in the unity of state and religion during the Occultation period.
> - Emphasizing on the responsibility of Muslims to take preliminary steps toward the promised global just government of Imam Mahdi (Hashemi-Najafabadi 2010: 193-194).

Savage thinks that

> there is an armored structure to fundamentalisms: they are hierarchical – in regard to gender and religious leaders –, centrally organized – around an authority belief –, clearly demarcated against outsiders, and goal-driven towards a sacred past or future. What can be said of these varied fundamentalisms is that fundamentalism is not one "thing", but rather it is the shape that religion takes when it is under threat (Savage, 2011: 133).

Most of Muslim countries were once the colonies of Western countries. Algeria became independent from France in 1962; Djibouti from France in 1977, Gambia from UK in 1965, Mali from France in 1960, Niger from France in 1960, Senegal from France in 1960, Sierra Leone from UK in 1961, Sudan from Egypt and UK in 1956, and so on. Colonialism threatened both economic and cultural assets. Religion "has been an important source of identity, which has been especially important in the context of the struggle against colonialism" (Fox 2008: 30).

Fundamentalism is rising as an antithesis of globalizing modernity and secularity (Ercins 2009; Vorster 2007). It's growing especially in Muslim countries. 88 percent of people in Saudi Arabia and 71 percent of Algerians agree that only the laws of the Shari'a should be implemented. In Turkey 68 percent believe that religious leaders should influence the government. 95 percent of Pakistanians and 75 percent of Iranians believe that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office. In Iraq 78 percent and in Egypt 60 percent believe that churches give answers to social problems.

In recent decades fundamentalists have been acquiring power in Muslim countries and religious state is the first goal of Islamic fundamentalism (Abukhalil 1997; Esposito 1998).

It is fair to say that Muslims generally believe in the holistic nature of Islam. As an instrument for understanding life, Islam is often considered to be something more than a mere religion. In particular, Islam does not recognize the separation between the spiritual and the temporal – although the two domains can be distinguished –. On the contrary, Islam offers an ethical guide for all aspects of life.

Some view Islamic fundamentalism as a school essentially associated with Radicalism and violence. From a particular approach, every religion relies on some major fundaments which vitalize them through the human history. Consequently, if a certain religion was in a dangerous situation and felt invading external entities, it would defend itself- perhaps in a violent manner – and purify itself – perhaps in an isolation form. Islamic fundamentalists utilizing violence are a small population compared to the large population of Muslim people – not affiliated to radical groups – who have moderate attitude to fundamentalism.

Moghaddam, drawing broadly from a variety of psychological constructs, developed the "staircase to Terrorism" as a metaphor for the process of violent radicalization. The "staircase" narrows as it ascends from the ground floor and through five successive levels. There are six floors:

According to figure 1, people begin with a desire to alleviate adversity and improve their situation. After Unsuccessful attempts and climbing the floors, some of those sympathizers eventually join an extremist group, organization, or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence. At the top or final level among those who have joined are those who overcome any barriers to action and actually commit a terrorist act. Violent radicalization and engagement in terrorism is best viewed as a unique and dynamic psychosocial process in which only a small number of individuals with a special social space would engage (Borum 2011).

Consequently, we study all Muslim people and concentrate on those who are more fundamentalist. From our viewpoint, two major components constitute Islamic fundamentalism: Islamic social system in which Islamic law – based on Quran and Sunnah – is implemented; and Islamic government which is responsible for providing appropriate conditions. Other fundamentalist characteristics – such as different roles of men and women – can be derived from these two elements.

Fundamentalism grew fast at the end of the twentieth century as a response to the crises emerging in Muslim countries. A huge population of Muslims joint Islamic movements. They believed that the solution to our political pro-

Figure 1: *Staircase to Terrorism*



blems today was the return to the social and political values indicated in Islam (Dekmejian, 1985).

Method

The Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset (1988-2010) includes both individual-level and country-level variables. Data on individual-level variables are drawn from 34 surveys carried out in 12 Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran. Taken together, a total of 54,894 men and women were surveyed. Almost all of the surveys involved face-to-face interviews. Most of the surveys were carried out either as the first wave of the Arab Barometer, the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the World Values Survey, or a project on attitudes related to governance carried out by Mark Tessler with funding from the National Science Foundation. Table 1 shows the details of all surveys.

All of the surveys contain a large number of relevant questions, and the Carnegie Data Set thus includes almost 200 individual level variables pertaining to politically relevant attitudes, values and behavior. There are also many individual-level variables pertaining to the personal attributes of respondents, such as age, sex and educational level.

Table 1: *List of Surveys*

Country	Year	N
Early Surveys		
Egypt	1988	292
Kuwait	1988	300
Palestine	1995	2.368
Palestine	1999	1.200
World Values Survey 3rd Wave		
Egypt	2000	3.000
Iran	2000	2.532
Turkey	2001	4.607
Jordan	2001	1.223
Morocco	2001	2.264
Algeria	2002	1.282
Tessler National Science Foundation		
Jordan	2003	1.000
Palestine	2003	1.320
Algeria	2004	1.446
Morocco	2005	1.083
Kuwait	2005	750
Yemen	2006	1.440

Country	Year	N
Arab Barometer 1st Wave		
Jordan	2006	1.143
Palestine	2006	1.270
Algeria	2006	1.300
Morocco	2006	1.277
Lebanon	2007	1.200
Yemen	2007	717
Jordan	2008	967
Palestine	2008	3.430
Bahrain	2009	500
World Values Survey 4th and 5th Waves		
Saudi Arabia	2003	1.502
Iraq	2004	2.325
Iran	2005	2.667
Iraq	2006	2.701
Jordan	2007	1.200
Morocco	2007	1.200
Egypt	2008	3.051
Turkey	2007	1.346
Qatar	2010	1.060

Source: The Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset (1988-2010), ICPSR 32302.

The inclusion in the Carnegie Data Set of time-specific country-level variables is designed to permit and encourage two-level analyses that investigate relationships between the orientations of ordinary citizens and the characteristics of the countries and time periods in which these men and women are located.

This article analyses three categories: the items which indicate fundamentalism; the items which indicate democratic attitudes; and the indica-

tors which include both fundamentalism and democracy. The indicators are as below:

Fundamentalism

- Government should implement only the laws of the Shari'a.
- Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life.
- It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.

Democracy

- In a democracy, the economy runs badly.
- Democracies are not good at maintaining order.
- Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government.

Fundamentalism and Democracy

- Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam.
- Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people in some areas and implement Shari'a in others.

In the next part, first, all of eight indicators are statistically described; and second, six items constituting two indices – F Index and D Index[1] – make a crosstab which offers an abstract picture. It helps us to sum up all the information; go from specific details to general beings and becomings and make a conclusion.

Results

Table 2 points to the importance of making laws exactly based on the Shari'a from Muslims' view. People of Palestine have been located between "important" and "somewhat important" on the scale with a brief change since 1999. Jordan and Algeria revolve "important" in a slightly wavy manner. Morocco moves from "somewhat important" to "important". Kuwait and Iraq take the inverse direction. Yemen and Egypt move toward "very important". Saudi Arabia is the only one getting "very important" and Lebanon is the only one standing on "not important". Bahrain in 2009 is very similar to Kuwait in 1988 and Jordan in 2003.

Mean of this indicator in the period (1988-2009) is 2.32. Overall, Muslims evaluate this item as "important".

[1] F Index (FI) and D Index (DI) represent Fundamentalist attitudes and Democratic attitudes respectively.

Table 2: *Government should implement only the laws of the Shari'a (1= very important, 2= important, 3= somewhat important, 4= not important, 5= not important at all)*

Country	Means on timeline			
Palestine	1999 (2.52)	2003 (2.45)	2006 (2.71)	2008 (2.98)
Jordan	2001 (1.73)	2003 (2.28)	2006 (1.92)	
Algeria	2002 (2.10)	2004 (2.38)	2006 (1.78)	
Morocco	2005 (2.69)	2006 (1.70)		
Kuwait	1988 (2.28)	2005 (3.09)		
Yemen	2006 (2.36)	2007 (1.60)		
Iraq	2004 (2.42)	2006 (2.68)		
Egypt	1988 (2.32)	2000 (1.80)		
Saudi Arabia	2003 (1.49)			
Bahrain	2009 (2.29)			
Lebanon	2007 (3.84)			

Fundamentalists believe that Islam and socio-political life are interlocked and Muslims should actualize Islamic teachings in their society. This item shows a polarized situation in Palestine, Jordan, Algeria (2004), Morocco (2006), Kuwait (2005), Yemen and Bahrain. This situation changes in favor of fundamentalism in Palestine, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco. In Palestine (1995), Morocco (2005) and Lebanon, fundamentalists are absolutely minor leagues.

Egyptians nearly strongly agree with this item. Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon stand on "disagree". Yemen moves toward disagree but there is a 0.75 distance yet. Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine change in favor of fundamentalist attitudes. Iraq takes the way to "neither agree nor disagree". Turkey is located between 2 and 3 with no variation. Overall, 26 percent of Muslims strongly agree and 33 percent agree with the item; Thus, 59 percent think that people with strong religious beliefs should hold public office.

People of Jordan in 2001, 2003 and 2006 disagree and in 2007 strongly disagree with the statement. Morocco goes beyond "disagree" in 2006 and continues in the same way. Algeria is almost constant. Yemen and Palestine change against democracy. On the contrary, Iran, Turkey[2] and Egypt mo-

[2] Yavuz argues that In Turkey, Islamic bourgeois grew fast as a result of evolving public space and making democratic policies in the market in 1980s (Yavuz 2009).

Table 3: *Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life (1= Agree, 2= Neither agree nor disagree, 3= Disagree)*

Country	Modes on timeline				
Palestine	Agree (68%) 1995	Disagree (58%) 1999	Disagree (57%) 2003	Disagree (53%) 2006	Disagree (58%) 2008
Jordan	Agree (52%) 2003	Agree (58%) 2006	Disagree (59%) 2008		
Algeria	Disagree (57%) 2004	Disagree (64%) 2006			
Morocco	Agree (71%) 2005	Agree (51%) 2006			
Kuwait	Neither agree nor disagree (63%) 1988	Agree (56%) 2005			
Yemen	Disagree (58%) 2006	Disagree (52%) 2007			
Egypt	Neither agree nor disagree (47%) 1988				
Bahrain	Agree (57%) 2009				
Lebanon	Agree (78%) 2007				

ves toward "strongly disagree" quickly. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and Bahrain score 3 without exception. Positive attitude to democracy is clear. 43 percent of all Muslims disagree and 32 percent strongly disagree with this item. There is a minority having a negative image of democracy.

Rounded figures point to 3; in other words all Muslims disagree with the item. Morocco (2006), Egypt and Kuwait are the top three. The result is wonderful. In 2000s, Muslims, without exception, believe that democracy as a form of political system manages to maintain social order.

Table 4: *It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree)*

Country	Means on timeline			
Jordan	2001 (2.28)	2003 (2.88)	2006 (2.93)	2007 (2.24)
Algeria	2002 (2.80)	2004 (2.31)	2006 (2.78)	
Morocco	2001 (2.49)	2006 (2.41)	2007 (2.24)	
Palestine	2003 (2.87)	2006 (2.65)		
Yemen	2006 (3.09)	2007 (3.25)		
Iraq	2004 (2.52)	2006 (2.90)		
Turkey	2001 (2.60)	2007 (2.60)		
Egypt	2000 (1.62)			
Iran	2005 (2.15)			
Bahrain	2009 (3.59)			
Kuwait	2005 (3.59)			
Lebanon	2007 (4.04)			

Table 5: *In a democracy, the economy runs badly (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disagree, 4= strongly disagree)*

Country	Means on timeline			
Jordan	2001 (2.88)	2003 (2.85)	2006 (2.65)	2007 (3.66)
Morocco	2001 (2.71)	2005 (2.74)	2006 (3.29)	2007 (3.35)
Algeria	2002 (2.74)	2004 (2.75)	2006 (2.66)	
Yemen	2006 (2.71)	2007 (2.57)		
Iran	2000 (2.85)	2005 (3.34)		
Turkey	2001 (2.77)	2007 (3.48)		
Egypt	2000 (3.03)	2006 (3.63)		
Palestine	2003 (2.87)	2006 (2.63)		
Iraq	2004 (2.88)			
Saudi Arabia	2003 (2.73)			
Kuwait	2005 (2.87)			
Lebanon	2007 (2.88)			
Bahrain	2009 (2.81)			

Table 6: *Democracies are not good at maintaining order (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disagree, 4= strongly disagree)*

Country	Means on timeline		
Jordan	2001 (2.89)	2003 (2.77)	2006 (2.68)
Algeria	2002 (2.74)	2004 (2.70)	2006 (2.59)
Morocco	2001 (2.60)	2005 (2.71)	2006 (3.27)
Yemen	2006 (2.86)	2007 (2.72)	
Palestine	2003 (2.78)	2006 (2.58)	
Iraq	2004 (2.72)		
Egypt	2000 (3.01)		
Saudi Arabia	2003 (2.64)		
Iran	2000 (2.83)		
Turkey	2001 (2.71)		
Bahrain	2009 (2.80)		
Kuwait	2005 (2.91)		
Lebanon	2007 (2.84)		

This item best represents democratic attitudes. Similarly, rounded figures point to 1 or 2. People of Morocco (2001) and Egypt strongly agree and others agree with the statement. Tables 5, 6 and 7 confirm one another. They carry a clear message: Muslims tend to democracy as a form of government and there is a consensus among them.

Table 8 and 9 are different from the previous ones. In table 8, there is an item defining democracy as a system opposing Islam. On the contrary, the next item brings Islam and democracy together.

Jordan, Palestine, Algeria and Morocco move toward "disagree". People of Kuwait, Lebanon and Bahrain disagree with the item. Yemen is located near 3 on the scale. Lebanon, Morocco (2006) and Bahrain express the most disagreement. More than 65 percent of all Muslims strongly agree or agree with the statement. There is also 7 percent whose opinion is neutral. The "clash" thesis claims that there are sharp cultural differences between the core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage – particularly those concerning representative democracy – and the beliefs common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies. Huntington believes that the main elements of Western civilization include the separation

Table 7: *Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= disagree, 4= strongly disagree)*

Country	Means on timeline		
Jordan	2001 (1.72)	2003 (1.82)	2006 (1.87)
Palestine	2003 (1.94)	2006 (1.97)	2008 (1.99)
Algeria	2002 (1.67)	2004 (1.93)	2006 (1.91)
Morocco	2001 (1.29)	2005 (1.74)	2006 (1.55)
Yemen	2006 (1.77)	2007 (1.94)	
Iraq	2004 (1.69)	2006 (1.67)	
Egypt	2000 (1.39)		
Saudi Arabia	2003 (2.01)		
Iran	2000 (2.12)		
Turkey	2001 (1.72)		
Bahrain	2009 (1.81)		
Kuwait	2005 (1.73)		
Lebanon	2007 (1.69)		

of sacred and secular authority, the rule of law and pluralism, the democratic structures of representative government and the protection of individual rights and liberties as the buffer between people and the state (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 135). It seems Muslims can get along with democracy just to the extent where sacred authority still remains. If democracy can survive without secularization, it will become Muslims' favorite political form.

Palestine and Yemen moves from "important" to "somewhat important". Algeria, Morocco and Jordan revolve 2. Kuwait and Bahrain are the same; both of them evaluate the item as "important". Lebanon score 3; it is somewhat important to make laws according to the wishes of the people in some areas and based on Shari'a in others. Total mean of this indicator is 2.22; in other words, Muslims tend to such a political combination.

In Diagram 1, proportional frequency of each cell is presented. More than 30% of all Muslims have moderately fundamentalist and democratic attitudes. There is 17% whose FI and DI are 2 and 1 respectively and there is 14% whose FI and DI are 1 and 2 respectively. Only 3% are pure fundamenta-

Table 8: *Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree)*

Country	Means on timeline		
Jordan	2003 (3.23)	2006 (3.52)	2008 (3.48)
Palestine	2003 (3.11)	2006 (3.42)	2008 (3.58)
Algeria	2002 (3.22)	2004 (3.14)	2006 (3.49)
Morocco	2005 (3.64)	2006 (3.75)	
Kuwait	2005 (3.64)		
Lebanon	2007 (3.83)		
Yemen	2007 (3.49)		
Bahrain	2009 (3.72)		

Table 9: *Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people in some areas and implement shari'a in others (1= very important, 2= important, 3= somewhat important, 4= not important, 5= not important at all)*

Country	Means on timeline		
Palestine	2003 (1.97)	2006 (2.54)	2008 (2.52)
Algeria	2004 (1.93)	2006 (2.28)	
Morocco	2005 (2.08)	2006 (1.75)	
Yemen	2006 (2.10)	2007 (2.63)	
Jordan	2003 (1.93)	2006 (2.18)	
Kuwait	2005 (2.02)		
Lebanon	2007 (3.06)		
Bahrain	2009 (2.03)		

lists and only 8% represent purely democratic attitudes. Pure fundamentalists and democrats are shifting to the central cell. Radical fundamentalist movements do not represent the majority of Muslims or Islamic movements; they include a few small groups. Unlike radical fundamentalists who reject dialogue, conciliation and cooperation, moderate fundamentalists participate in legal political processes and protect tolerance, freedom, civil society and democratic values (Moussalli, 1995). Ahmad Moussali redefines the bases and scope of modern Islamic thought, suggesting that Islamic fundamenta-

Diagram 1: *Fundamentalism and Democracy Crosstabulation*



lism might prove to be a liberating theology for the modern Islamic world. Basing his argument largely on Arabic documents, he analyzes the basic concerns of fundamentalism. He examines the ideas of major Muslim thinkers who have affected the contemporary Islamic revival – especially Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Hasan al-Turabi – showing the range of Islamic fundamentalist views from liberal democracy to authoritarianism. He then discusses how their thinking could affect an Islamic state, from political repression at one extreme to political representation at the other. Going to the core of issues raised by fundamentalists, he maintains that Islamic fundamentalism is a modern development that will have a lasting impact on the history of Islam – one comparable to the impact of Protestantism on the history of Christianity (Moussalli 1999) –. Thus, fundamentalism should be viewed as a dynamic doctrine which is engaged in political debates. It is performing the role of providing an ideology explaining political and social reality to individual Muslims.

Conclusion

More than a year after 2010, there continues to be a strong desire for democracy in Arab and other predominantly Muslim nations. Indeed, these publics do not just support the general notion of democracy – they also embrace spe-

cific features of a democratic system, such as competitive elections and free speech –. On the other hand, a substantial number in key Muslim countries want a large role for Islam in political life; however, there are significant differences over the degree to which the legal system should be based on Islam.

In presentations of democracy within a broad conceptual framework, much attention is given to some specific aspects of social and political operation. In particular, Islamic democracy is seen as affirming longstanding Islamic concepts of consultation (shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad). Like many concepts in western political tradition, these terms have not always been identified with democratic institutions and have a variety of usages in contemporary Muslim discourse. However, regardless of other contexts and usages, these terms are central to the debates and discussions regarding democratizations in Muslim societies (Esposito 1996: 27). Large populations of moderate fundamentalists in Muslim countries are emerging who seek to actualize Islamic teachings in a modern form which adopts and raises some of the western concepts such as democracy. It seems Muslims will create a new religious political system absorbing some democratic values and norms.

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