1. The studies collected in this volume are the result of extensive research, but hardly deserve the word ‘new’. Three chapters (pp. 71–226) and the first of the two introductions (pp. 17–40) were published two decades earlier in a book with the title Lex regia, diritto, filologia e fides historica nella cultura politico-filosofica dell’Olanda di fine seicento (Studi Vichiani 19), Napoli 1990, a volume which was widely acclaimed by its reviewers. The English version only diminishes the number of footnotes by a fourth and at times reduces considerably the length of the original annotation. The last chapter, on the Groningen professor of law Jean Barbeyrac (pp. 255–270), was in part published before in the 2003 volume The Berlin Refuge 1680–1780. Learning and Science in European Context, edited by S. Pott, M. Mulsow and L. Danneberg. Only the fourth chapter, on the Leiden legal scholar Gerard Noodt (pp. 227–253), and the second introduction (pp. 41–69) seem to appear here for the first time. Consequently, in this volume late twentieth-century studies figure more prominently than secondary literature written in this century.[1]
2. Although a reviewer in the 1992 volume of the Belgian Revue de philologie et d’histoire regretted the absence of an introduction to the Lex regia, ‘since most readers will have only a vague memory of this topic in Roman law’, which the author could easily have provided by combining remarks scattered across the book and observing that ‘this law is on the one hand mentioned in the Digest with the authority of Ulpian, returning in the Codex and Justinian Institutions and on the other hand is mentioned in an inscription justifying the “royal” powers conferred to Vespasian by a decree of the Roman people and the Senate’ (p. 1067), the overall argument of the book is clear and convincing. In the second part of the seventeenth century and in the early years of eighteenth century this obscure topic, apparently of a purely historical nature, was fiercely debated in the Dutch Republic. In 1661 Schoockius was the first to publish a treatise dealing with the matter of the Lex regia and casting doubt on its authentic character. However, whereas Lomonaco deals with this Epistola de figmento legis regiae only in passing, he elaborates on the Oratio de lege regia of Johannes Fredericus Gronovius (1611–1671), the latter’s second address as leaving rector of 8 February 1671, published by one of his sons in 1678. Gronovius was professor of Greek and history in the humanist tradition of Scaliger, Lipsius, Grotius, Vossius and Heinsius and by no means a legal or political scholar. Lomonaco underlines the significance of Gronovius’s Grand Tour (1639–1641), which formed his intellectual outlook and was crucial in the creation of his scholarly network. The author reconstructs the importance of Gronovius’s iter italicum by studying his correspondence. During his stay in Italy and through his close contacts with the scholars of this country he developed his interest in archaeology and antiquity and learned to transform the humanist erudition of his teachers into a critical instrument for assessing the value of historical sources by establishing historical facts and ‘to safeguard the fides historica’ subverted by Cartesianism (p. 85). His attempts to integrate history and philology resulted in a new approach to the Lex regia and a radically new interpretation of it. By dealing with the Lex regia in the light of our historical knowledge about the development of the Roman Empire, he was able to reject earlier humanist interpretations which linked the senatorial decrees to the laws presumably enacted by the ancient kings of Rome. Gronovius pointed out that the Lex regia is a law about sovereign power (‘de regibus’) and not a law by kings (‘a regibus’) (p. 103–104). He also rejected Schoockius’s sceptical view that the Lex regia was merely a political device contrived by the sixth-century jurist Tribonianus in order to justify Justinian’s absolute powers.
3. History itself provides the historian and legal scholar with a proper method to evaluate its meaning. It proves the historical nature of Roman law. Despite the deeply-felt Roman aversion to monarchy Caesar already acquired the traditional republican offices in such a manner that his powers transcended a power delegated by a sovereign people. Although the first emperors retained the semblance of being office holders in a republic, the recorded historical facts and practices show the accumulation of power in the hands of one man. In a Machiavellian manner Gronovius conceived the pretended preservation of the republican forms of power as an instrument for more effectively realising a new political order. Moreover, Gronovius abandoned Livian moralism and with Tacitus impartially acknowledged the inevitable ruthlessness of first-century politics (p. 126). Gronovius’s outline of the agony of the Roman republic provides the context of his interpretation of the Lex regia. Therefore he regarded this law not as a historical fiction like the Salic law, which excluded heiresses from the French crown but reflected the changing field of forces, but as a historical fact.
4. The second chapter of the New Studies on Lex regia is devoted to Ulrik Huber (1636–1694). This Frisian professor rejected humanist hermeneutics, and attempted to render intelligible ‘those places in the Pandects and the Institutions, which seem to clash with true jurisprudence, moral philosophy, history and the Bible, apparently being false, inequitable, dishonest and absurd’ p. 139). In order to restore the ‘pristine and genuine glory of the legal science’ the moderate Cartesian scholar looked for the immutable principles of jurisprudence, but argued that the unlimited search for mathematical certainty in history—and theology—would result in a complete Pyrrhonism. However, by ascertaining the reliability of historical witnesses and the probability of their reports we arrive at historical facts.[2] Although unlike Gronovius Huber was a legal scholar, he like the Leiden erudite was greatly interested in the Lex regia since the 1660s. According to the Frisian scholar this apparent law mirrors Roman history and the transformation of the Republic into a monarchy (p. 143). Against this context and the ‘agony of the Republic (p. 153) must be read the texts and the famous bronze inscription describing Vespasian’s acquisition of imperial power. Although only at the end of the first century the traditional aversion to the notions of ‘monarchy’ and ‘royal power’ was diminished to such an extent that these words could be used in an official decree, it is beyond doubt that Augustus possessed the sovereign power in the Roman State.
5. According to Lomonaco, Huber with the introduction of the notion of sovereignty transcended the conceptual universe created by Gronovius. In his De iure civitatis of 1672 Huber developed his theory of absolute sovereignty, not restricted by the will of other persons. In the Tacitean-Machiavellian tradition before Huber the notion that the prince was in cases of necessity exempt from the laws was justified by the idea of the ‘reason of state’. Hence, the emperor Claudius married his niece Julia Agrippina, although such a marriage was against civil law (p. 156). The political situation of the Dutch Republic after 1672—a year which saw the abominable murder of Holland’s Grand Pensionary, Johan de Witt, the end of the republican Era of True Freedom and the rise of the royal principle in the Dutch constitution by the appointment of a new stadholder, William III—inspired Huber’s theory. By identifying the will of the prince with the will of the state, Huber argued that the power transferred by the Roman people is not an arbitrary power, but is exercised within a legal—‘constitutional’—order. The sovereign, however, does not respect the fundamental rights of the citizens on account of his supreme virtue, as in the Thomistic tradition, but as Spinoza argued because of the power of the people. The right of the Prince to command is his power to make the people obey him (p. 167) and the notion of ‘reason of state’ is linked to the concept of civil equity. Hence, according to Lomonaco, Huber not only dealt with the Lex regia in the context of Roman history, but also made it immediately relevant to his politica.
6. The third chapter is devoted to another Dutch professor, Jacob Perizonius (1651–1715), who taught history, Greek and eloquence at Leiden. It focuses upon the controversies on methodology in late 17th century historiography. Perizonius attempted to steer a middle course between the scepticism of Bayle and La Mothe le Vayer and Cartesian dogmatism, which both denied all fides historica, that is to say the possibility of arriving at reliable knowledge in history. In his Animadversiones historicae of 1685 and in his famous inaugural address delivered on accepting his office in 1702 he attempted to create a new method of historical research which would establish historical facts and once again would make the discipline relevant to our own age. Whereas historical scepticism maintains that all history is written by the victors, who with mere rhetorical devices attempt to convince posterity of the truth of their story—which implies, according to Bayle, that a historian should not pretend to know the facts, but merely listen to the opposing parties in the courtroom (p. 196)—according to Perizonius the historian should distinguish fables from facts, fiction from truth. By patiently and methodically placing facts in their historical and cultural context we should be able to distinguish between what is plausible and what runs counter to common sense. Moreover, the historian must acknowledge the changing ‘conditions of life’ (p. 202). History shows unambiguously that the customs and traditions of the Ancients are different from ours. With this observation Perizonius anticipated Enlightenment historiography, which made the development of civilisation its main theme (p. 226).
7. The fourth chapter deals with the Leiden legal scholar Gerard Noodt and the fifth chapter with the Groningen professor of jurisprudence Jean Barbeyrac. Both chapters link the preceding controversies with the notion of natural law. According to Noodt society does not originate in a Grotean social appetite, but in human fear. However, contrary to Hobbes, he rejected the idea that an absolute state is the only guarantee for effective self-preservation, because human passions produce a ‘need for order’. ‘The ordo civilis is not the negation of natural liberties’ such as freedom of conscience and of private opinion (p. 229). Hence, if in the state of nature no man possesses ‘the right to judge God and religion, the individual is unable to transfer his rights to a prince. Natural law both justifies sovereign power and limits its sphere of action’. Although Noodt’s concept of natural law refers to a teleological order in nature created by God, according to Lomonaco it is basically modern, because the divine order in nature is fully transparent and in accordance with human reason (p. 233). This interpretation of natural law forms the context of his view on the lex regia. In 1699 Gerard Noodt resigned the rectorship of Leiden University by delivering an address on sovereignty and the lex regia. This oration caused quite a stir. It was translated into French, with an introduction and commentary by Jean Barbeyrac, into Dutch and even English. Contemporary commentators recognised the author’s originality and courage, observing that such an address doubtlessly would displease the mighty king and stadholder William III. This observation shows the topical relevance of Noodt’s contribution to the lex regia debate. On the basis of his ideas on natural law he considered the ‘history of Roman law’ to be ‘a collection of experiences and facts’, testifying that ‘ancient Rome’ was ‘a state founded on the virtue of laws’ (p. 240). In this manner Noodt was able to link the legal topic of the lex regia with his politica.
8. The Neapolitan scholar Lomonaco is part of a long series of Italian scholars interested in Dutch intellectual history. He himself mentions the example of S. Mastellone, who was interested in republican thought and the development of heterodoxy and the notion of tolerance in the Dutch Republic. Another example is the Milanese scholar G. Gori, who with La fondazione dell’esperienza in ’s Gravesande wrote by far the best intellectual biography of the Leiden philosopher and scientist Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688–1742). However, not only the significance of the intellectual ties between these divergent parts of Europe, but also, and more in particular, the influence on Vico stirred the interest of Italian Vico scholars in Dutch intellectual history. Mazzarino’s studies for example are discussed by Lomonaco, who sought for ‘signs of continuity between phases of Viconian speculation and the work of the Dutch’ (p. 27). Although Dutch legal historians such as Theo Veen and G.C.J.J. van den Bergh have published several studies on Huber and Noodt, the adoption by Lomonaco of Vico’s outlook combining the history of philosophy with cultural and legal history is extremely fruitful.
9. Given the significance of this Italian scholarship it is, therefore, a pity that in general publishers in Northern Europe seem to be rather uninterested in producing translations from the Italian. Although the Swiss publisher Peter Lang’s willingness to release Lomonaco’s studies in English in itself is a welcome exception, the low editorial quality of this particular work will only contribute to the general neglect displayed towards Italian historiography in Transalpine parts of Europe. A proofreader would have prevented a myriad of errors and inconsistencies from spoiling the pleasure of reading. I give only a few examples. The famous Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt is mentioned three times—on pages 30, 159, and 236—but his name is spelled in as many different ways: John de Witt, Jan de Witt and Jon de Witt. The notes to chapter 5 start not with 1 but 367. Moreover, non-English words are often mutilated. On page 272 we find ‘Grozian’ as the adjective of Grotius, the great Dutch humanist, and on page 52 the prince of Orange, who by his office represented the monarchical element in the Dutch constitution, is almost correctly called ‘statholder’ with the original Dutch ‘h’ retained in English but elsewhere in the volume the word is unfortunately spelled without this letter. (The usual spelling is ‘stadtholder’.) Elsewhere Grotius is once more ill-treated by nicknaming him the ‘Cuiacio of Holland’ (p. 240). Apparently this expression compares the Dutch scholar to the famous sixteenth-century French Roman law scholar Jacques Cujas, in Latin Cuiacius and in Italian Cuiacio. In English, however, the original form of the name is the usual one. So, the correct expression would have been ‘the Cujas of Holland’. The publisher would have been wise to call in a native speaker to clear up some ambiguities. It is, for example, quite unclear what on page 147 the phrase ‘the accusations of atheism levelled against Leyden by Stueurt’ means. (Leyden is a Dutch town.) On the same page we read the pseudo-adjective ‘Netherland’ instead of the usual ‘Dutch’, or more officially ‘Netherlandish’. It is a pity that in this manner Lomonaco’s excellent work is not printed in the form it deserves.
[1] It is probable, for example, that after consulting the Dictionary of 17th and 18th Century Dutch Philosophers (Bristol 2003) the author would have reconsidered his view that Steuart [Lomonaco refers to David Steuart (c. 1625–1669), son of Adam Steuart (1591–1654), a contemporary of Voetius (1589–1676), who studied philosophy at Leiden and not at Utrecht where Voetius taught theology since 1636] and Schoockius were pupils of Voetius and that Schoockius’s philosophy was ‘an Aristotelean dogmatism’, see p. 100.
[2] Huber’s interventions in this Frisian debate around Cartesianism are dealt with by Lomonaco’s compatriot R. Bordoli.