1. The end of the 17th Century saw the emergence and diffusion of
a constellation of new academic disciplines at German universities.[1]
Their object of research was the state as a historical-empirical fact
and its practical integration in the societal framework. This helped
to form both interest and methods of cognition and knowledge. This
scholarship summarized (with historical perspective) the contemporary
nature or attributes of the state: Geographical-territorial position,
demography, character of the people, general condition, economic potential,
state finances, military strength, attitudes towards foreign political
interest, etc.
The numerous works on these sciences of state, whose variations included
"Staatenkunde", "Staatenhistorie", "Staatswissenschaft", and "Staatsverfassung",
generally contained two common characteristics: First, a presentation
of the most recent political, economic, and societal developments.
Second, a synoptic presentation of the European political constellation,
made up by varying countries. They, however, did not offer a very
coherent description of the individual European states. What characterizes
all these publications is thus that they all had a spatial-temporal
unity of Europe, which was also a cultural one, as their point of
reference.
Early modern Europe stood at the centre of their interests. The publications
of the sciences of state were in the broadest sense of encyclopaedic
calibre. Universal European and particular European elements are united
in the data that the scholars have collected in their synopses. The
universal European element is especially visible wherever the science
of state literature used the concept of "Europe". Three areas of explicit
reflections about "Europe" can be identified:
First, the recognition of the science of state regarding the scope
of the concept of Europe; in other words, what belonged to Europe
from the political point of view?
Second, the state theorists' considerations about the principles of
the political construction of contemporary Europe.
And third, questions about general European phenomena and about general
European structures, according to which Europe was viewed as a unified
cultural reality.
2. The concept of the political space "Europe" caused the scholars
considerable difficulties. Their synoptically organized descriptions
of European countries took on different forms. Johann Andreas Bose,
professor of history, lectured in 1657/58 at the University of Jena
about France, Turkey, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, the
Holy Roman Empire, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, Lorraine, the United
Provinces of the Netherlands, England, Venice, Rome, Naples, Genoa,
Savoy, Mantua, Modena, Portugal, Barcelona, and Spain. With this,
he presented a historical and political overview of most of the southern
European states of the period.[2]
Hermann Conring's "notitia rerum publicarum", taught around the same
time at the university of Helmstedt, contained the most important
states of the world. His overview, which bracketed out the German
Holy Roman Empire , offered a description of 25 European states.[3]
The Asian and African states, which H. Conring had given quite a bit
of attention, too, were summarized in one chapter in Johann Christoph
Becmann's work, who then was a professor of history at the university
at Frankfurt/O. He concentrated on 12 European states.[4]
Christian Gottfried Hoffmann also, in contrast to Conring, attempted
to narrow the study of the states of Europe. His 1720 "Draft of an
introduction of the knowledge of the present condition of Europe"
defined the sciences of state as an autonomous discipline.[5]
In 1726, Everhard Otto published his influential "Primae lineae notitiae
Europae rerum publicarum", in which he treated Germany, Great Britain,
France, Spain, Portugal and the United Provinces of the Netherlands.[6]
In the sciences of state compendia, the European countries are in
general presented one after the other, closed upon themselves, beginning
from the oldest available information and proceeding up to the present.
The order of the European countries was based upon external geography.
The literature begins with southern Europe and then moves through
western, northern and eastern European states. The early sciences
of state studies limited themselves to the "potiores res publicae"
of Europe,[7] with some
variations. In the mid 18th Century, this was Spain, Portugal, France,
Great Britain, the Italian states, the Netherlands, Russia, Denmark,
Sweden. The limitation to these states, even its order, was canonized
for years in the sciences of state handbooks.
3. The fact that the sciences of state began their studies with Spain
and Portugal points to the significance these two states still had
in the first half of the 18th Century. In the 1730 s, however, the
order is only a matter of tradition. J.P. Zschackwitz expressly refers
to this order as a tradition with his claim that "thus one begins
as consuetudine introducta, with Portugal ..."[8].
The influential Martin Schmeitzel who taught history at the University
of Jena and later of Halle also followed this order in his handbook
on the sciences of state when he discussed the individual states:
Portugal, Spain, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Poland,
Hungary, Transylvania – were Schmeitzel was born –, Italy,
Switzerland, Turkey, Germany.[9]
The influential compendium of the state history that Johann
Jakob Schmauß published in 1741 during his stay in Göttingen
also began in this manner.[10]
His overview of Europe began with Portugal, and then thematicized
Spain, France, Great Britain, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden,
Russia, and Poland. By mid-century, this order had begun to be criticised.
Gottfried Achenwall then played a significant role in the further
methodological development of sciences of state.[11]
In 1749, he published a "Staatenkunde" of the most important individual
European states. It was first entitled "summary of the European empire".
This was changed in the second edition of 1752 to "conditions of the
state of European empires and nations"; after the third edition (1756,
1762, 1767) it became "condition of the state of the present most
significant European empires and nations".[12]
Achenwall only discussed the "most important European states" in his
works; this included Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Russia, Denmark, and Sweden. For over the next forty years, Achenwall's
most influential work developed the limiting of these eight states,
including their order, into a tradition. The first part of his work
included an epistemological introduction as well as the description
of the states Spain, Portugal, France, and England. The second part
considered the United Netherlands, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden. Epistemological
as well as disciplinary traditions were responsible for the ignoring
of Austria and Prussia, which as members of the Holy Roman Empire
belonged to the subject of the Imperial state law. Achenwall, however,
had planned to publish a third part on Austria, Prussia, Poland, the
Papal States, Venice, Naples, Sardinia, and Turkey. He was unable
to complete this section.[13]
4. Studies that were published after Achenwall's work generally used
his country selection, but they usually included Germany. Eobald Toze,
for instance, presented the same states in almost the same order as
Achenwall had, but Toze added Poland.[14]
The most widely-read compendia of the period did not deviate methodologically
from Achenwall's work. One can speak of a "text book production",
which was already being criticised by Johann David Michaelis. He called
it the "illness of professors, who want to write compendia in which
one finds what previously had been in earlier works".[15]
The textbook production did finally entirely conquer the previous
exclusion of the Holy Roman Empire and its territories. In 1773, Johann
Christoph Gatterer had observed that the normal column of Austria,
Prussia, and Turkey were missing.[16]
Johann Georg Meusel then professor of history at the university of
Erlangen firmly criticised Achenwall's exclusion of the Empire and
its territories, explicitly including the "Prussian states" alongside
Turkey and Italy.[17]
Here it becomes clear that Prussia had grown beyond the "Empire",
winning independent status in the concert of European states.
If the concept of Europe did describe those states generally as ascribed
to the continent of Europe, at the end of the 17th century it was
still unclear if Russia should be included or not. As late as the
17th century, Moscovian Russia was a peripheral state of Europe.[18]
After the military success of Peter the Great, the empire of the Romanovs
became an integral part of the European state system. Russia became
a major European power that during the course of the 18th century
and gained influence over the history of central Europe. The Peace
of Nystad (1721) documented Russia's rise to supremacy in the eastern
Baltic Sea – as the successor to Sweden. The Peace of Teschen
(1779) also gave Russia the right to intervene in political affairs
of Germany. The entry of Russia into the "European concert" proceeded
relatively quickly and without friction. Sciences of state that had
pretensions of being aware of the most recent political developments
could since the first third of the 18th century at any rate ignore
Portugal or Spain, but never the highly topical Russia.[19]
5. In the sciences of state discourse, Russia was placed in the North.
Catherine II. was generally called "Semirames of the North".[20]
Europe was thus dominated by a north-south tension, and not from an
east-west one. The consciousness that Russia was not an eastern but
a northern power up through the early 19th century must be emphasized.
It has only been since the Congress of Vienna (1815) that Russia and
its neighbouring countries ceased to be considered part of the north.
Between the Congress of Vienna and the Crimean War, Russia became
a country that lay in the east.[21]
Turkey was in no way adequately anchored to the rest of Christian
Europe at the end of the 17th Century.[22]
With the peace of Belgrade (1739), it de facto became a member
of the European community of states. By the middle of the 18th Century
the sciences of state discourse in general recognised Turkey as part
of the European community of states. It could even take on the role
of balancing factor in a European system of powers. This, at any rate,
was the communis opinio in European capital cities, which was then
reflected in the sciences of state discourse. The process of desacralization
is evident in the fact that scholars of the sciences of state automatically
included Turkey in their description of Europe. G. Achenwall and his
Göttingen colleague G. Gebauer were explicitly criticised by
J.G. Meusel for not having included Turkey.[23]
The reason for this omission were inadequate working conditions, such
as lack of sources etc., and not fundamental convictions.
Russia and Turkey could be spatially included as part both of Asia
and Europe.[24] The Ottoman
Empire could even be seen as part of Africa. Although this led to
"divided" opinions in the scholarship of the sciences of state about
the inclusion in the European regions of Russia and Turkey, it did
cause doubt about the fundamental Europeaness of Russians and to a
lesser degree of Turks. This shows that the underlying spatial concept
of Europe was not so much a geographical concept but was at the same
time also vested with socio-cultural categories. At any rate, natural
conditions, landscape and climate did not suffice to clarify and define
the social and legal space of Europe. Thus the European space, as
it was conceptualized in the sciences of state discourse, must be
understood as more than the sum of its topographical elements.
6. The sciences of state discourse was also interested in the political
anatomy of this Corpus Europaeum. The scholars, however, had not yet
begun to think in the categories of a consolidated European state
system, or else had barely started thinking in these terms.[25]
In the argumentation against Louis XIV's threatening French
absolute monarchy, the sciences of state discourse developed very
early the concept of creating and maintaining an ordered system and
balance of power for the European states. The discussion about universal
monarchy[26] and the balance
of power brought about a transformation of political thought about
the form of inter-state relations. The Christian theological concept
of the corporate structure of Europe was increasingly replaced by
the value-neutral mechanical notion of balance. The "ius publicum
Europaeum",[27] which
was concerned with the inter-state legal relations, also did much
to develop a lasting body of mutual convictions, thought patterns
and attitudes in early modern Europe. At the same time, many members
of the European leading élites were convinced of the existence
of a tight network of rights and obligations that connected the European
states with each other.
Three concepts always surface in the descriptions of the sciences
of state of this European system of power, its destabilizations and
faults, as well as its institutionalizations; namely, "interest",
"system", and "balance".[28]
All three concepts are closely linked in content. They express an
attitude of membership of the individual members to a single theoretical
and practical factual whole. In the political discussions of this
period, these concepts were closely related to the competitive stands
between France and Spain, and France and Austria. The use of these
concepts in the area of political and legal order of the European
states was an expression of the general rationalization in the Enlightenment
period, which also addressed the diverse relationships of the European
states to one another. It was a question of finding a principal of
organization according to which the European states could arrange
their relations to one another. In an analogy to the legal and obligation
relations of individuals to one another, associations and states were
in the discourse of sciences of state put in such a legal relationship.
The professor of jurisprudence Joachim Georg Darjes explained in 1764,
for example: "A state has the same relationship to other states as
a person does to other people. It has obligations to itself. It also
has obligations to others. ... A state can be regarded for itself
as well as in relation to other states". Darjes made these comments
under the indicative title "application of general rules to politics
of the civil society".[29]
7. The concept of "interest" was defined differently in the sciences
of state discourse. Its content, though, was tightly connected to
the "salus publica".[30]
The emerging interest in scholarship in the sciences of state aimed
to explain rationally how the well-being of the state could be best
promoted in respect to its neighbouring states and nations. According
to G. Achenwall, this necessitated "a comparison of one state with
the others and can consequently not be undertaken without previous
knowledge of the other states".[31]
Commonalities and differences in the European state world were listed
in a clearly defined catalogue of criteria in the sciences of state
literature. The corresponding "state interest" could then be deduced
from this, like reading in a recipe. Achenwall called "state maxims"
the rules that "a Volk" was supposed to follow in order to promote
its well-being . The "epitome of all these state maxims of an empire
in its context" was "state interest". "State interest" was in this
sense actually nothing more than "politics that are applied to the
individual state".[32]The
"state interest of European powers" was therefore seen from two viewpoints:
first as the state interest of "every individual empires against every
other one" and second as the "common state interest of many empires
together".[33] The individuality
of the states and their "ultimate aims" were thus seen in the "particular
nature of the individual situation and a connection to other countries",
from which "consequently the (states') own political interest" followed.[34]
When many interests correspond to one another, they can construct
a common European interest. The interest of the individual European
state was in the terms of the sciences of state a product of generalizable
particular interests. The "reason of state" or "ratio status"
was pushed into the background in this discourse which brought the
esteem for state negotiations to the foreground by the assumption
of "interests" being based on natural jurisprudence.[35]
An especially important object of state interests was trade. It was
considered to be the best means of bringing about prosperity. Here,
too, interest was closely linked to the relationships of the European
state among themselves. Interests in trade extended in the natural
right considerations beyond Europe. J. J. Schmauß, for example,
believed "the nature of commerce" in Europe and abroad to be so important,
that "the image of the power of states of Europe is for the most part
dependent upon it, and also often the excuse for war and peace."[36]
8. In the sciences of state the European states could be conceived
of as a system. In this sense M. Schumann described the system in
1745 as "diversarum rerum ordine inter se cohaerentium nexum". [37]And
he emphasized the coherence of the states of Europe through alliances,
peace treaties, or "communis finis", which placed Europe in a condition
of interdependence and mutual influence.[38]
He thereby underlined quite clearly the interactive dependent relationship
of the European states. Marriages, alliances, peace treaties, and
trade relations were the concrete expressions of the complex relationships
of the states to one another.
A coherent treatment of European state relations, as far as the inclusion
of "statistics" of individual states is concerned, took place only
in the institutional context of this discussions at the reform-university
of Göttingen, founded in 1737.[39]
The Handbook of History of the European State System and its Colonies
of its own Creation from the Discovery of the both Indias from
Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, published in 1809, concluding and summarizing
the entire development of the doctrine of the European state system,
marked the height of this discourse.[40]
Heeren viewed the European state system as the epitome of the changing
relations of individual European states "to one another: especially
the capital states".[41]
The general "character of the state system" is "its inner freedom,
which is the autonomy and interactive independence of its members."[42]
The state system is "a whole". Within it, the nations of Christian
Europe "morally constituted a nation, that was only politically divided".
"A Consequence of advancing culture will produce ever more points
of contact."[43] The system
was characterized equally by "uniformity" and "diversity" of the ruling
forms of government.[44]
The "consistence" of the system depended upon the condition of central
Europe, from the "central state" of Germany.[45]
Heeren deduced his concept of the European state system from certain
universalities. He allotted the history of the system to the world
history of enlightened civilization.
9. In exact correlation to this viewpoint, Heeren specified his concept
of the European state system according to the criteria of natural
jurisprudence. He saw the state system analogous to the "civil society",
as a "society of independent persons", as a "society of moral persons",
as an "association", where "necessarily certain general ideas rule
from which on the whole the maxims of negotiations proceed."[46]
He understood the "inner freedom, that is autonomy and reciprocal
independence", in which he understood the "general character" of the
system as a natural right to which every number of the system was
entitled: just every citizen of the state had a natural right to life,
freedom, and property.[47]
To be exact, the system according to Heeren was supported by two pillars:
"As the fruit of advancing culture, a natural right, that is not only
based on explicit treaties, but also on unspoken conventions. The
observation of certain maxims, in peace but also especially in war,
that become a responsibility. Even if these are often damaged, they
are still quite charitable."[48]
Here, Heeren joined other sources and innumerable accounts in the
published literature in pointing out the central importance of the
idea and role of a "European balance", the "balance of power" in the
period of the Ancien Régime.
The idea of balance, oriented on the interests of the individual state,
became a central guiding political and theoretical principle in the
early modern period. Without it, the inter-state politics in Europe
could not be understood or described.[49]The
idea of balance in the sciences of state discourse no longer was based
upon the previously dominated moral-legal categories of judgement
of governments. It referred instead to the well-understood self-interest
of the individual states. Within this interpretation, the security
of the states of Europe depended largely on no one state winning so
much power that it could pose a threat to the other members. The main
objective of foreign policy was thus to ensure a reasonable balance
between the European powers. It had been correctly noted, that the
concept of balance came out of a sense of unity of the European community
of states. This community was no longer understood as a unity within
the framework of the "corpus christianum" organized primarily
by moral and legal principles. Instead it was regarded as the political
community of necessity and of interests.
10. The "balance" or "aequilibrium" – "equilibre des corps politique de l'Europe" – was seen as an inner-European principle of organization that was to make hegemonic demands of European powers impossible, "so that all future wars of Christian powers should be resolved among themselves and a lasting peace can be established in Europe", as J. J. Schmauß stated in 1741.[50] The tight connection of the European states consciously left a place to the danger of being dragged into a war through distant causes. E.Toze explained this respectively:
"A structure of increasing community and coexistence has developed among the European states, so that it is like links in a chain. The smallest movements of one end of our universe would thus soon be sent to the other end. When such a movement occurs, not only the neighbouring states would participate, but also those far-away, in order to attempt to quite the resulting unrest. This is the doubtless effect that the principle of balance has brought about."[51]
All reflections in the sciences of state about balance of powers
initially considered only the "governing part of Europe"; that is,
the west and middle of Europe. Sweden and Russia, Hungary and Turkey
were parts of Europe, but one did not bother with them. After the
balance of the old "praestantiores species Europeae", the state scientist
discovered the "peace of the north". Consequently, a difference was
made between a southern and a northern system of balance of powers.[52]
Scandinavia, Poland and Russia belonged to the northern balance. Prussia
was included from time to time, seen as a member between north and
south and described as holding the scales in balance. In the course
of further sciences of state and historical scholarship, it finally
became possible to combine and fuse both systems. At this point, it
was believed doubly important to idealize the balance. The system
evolved from the sum of a reason of power to a symbol of European
culture of reason. Its amalgamation with the natural jurisprudence
had already started in the early 18th Century. Calling upon its European
higher purpose and justice, one believed to be able to subordinate
the theory to positive law. And the history of the rise and fall of
the concept of "balance of powers" run parallel to the increase and
decrease of the weight of enlightened, liberal thought in European
civilization.
The idea of balance of powers in Europe was constant in the multilateral
state relations of the 18th Century. One of the main reasons for this
was that this European system of balance implicitly propagated the
diversity of states. With this, the existence of numerous smaller
states of Europe was guaranteed. The principle of European balance
of powers therefore tended – at least in its core – towards
maintaining the political status quo.[53]
In the end it could "over decades theoretically almost become a sort
of European constitution."[54]
This changed, however, with the French Revolution and with the consequent
outbreak of wars, which resulted in the collapse of the old European
state and legal order. In exchange for antihegemonial solidarity,
the classic theory of balance of powers forfeited all the basic conditions
of mayor powers to jointly manage a crisis.
11. The membership of the states to Europe in the sense of a higher unity is observable in 1762 when Jacob Christoff Iselin, in his Geographical Lexicon, qualified the individual state parts of Europe as "provinces". "One includes in it about thirty-one large provinces, first Spain, then France ...". The use of "provinces" did not fundamentally change anything in their character of autonomous states, since the list explicitly used the standard categories of state organisation – i. e. empires, kingdom, free state, republic, or principalities, etc.[55]In 1756, Jean Jacques Rousseau compared the elements of the cultural unity of Europe to other parts of the world. His description met with the wide agreement among the protagonist of the sciences of state and was often cited:
"Europe has certain advantages over other continents: ... All of its countries are connected better. The constant mingling of interests brought about the bonds of blood, of trade obligations, arts, and rulers' settlements ..., the discovery of the printing press – the preference for literature, which offers them a common basis of studies and knowledge; and finally the large number of small size states that ... leaves one always relying upon the others –: in contrast to Asia and Africa, which are a random collection of peoples who have nothing more in common than names, all these reasons together make Europe a real community that has its religion, morals and customs and even its laws, from which none of its nations can free itself without at once causing confusion."[56]
And at the beginning of the 19th century, A. H. L. Heeren pointed
to the "consequences of progressing culture" as the "increasing points
of contacts" among states, which made "the peoples of Christian Europe
as it were morally to one nation" that "was only politically separated."[57]
In this judgement, the absence of European political unity even seems
to be less important than cultural communalities of knowledge and
Christianity.
Other state scientists also had inserted the concept of Europe into
that of Christianity.[58]
G. W. Leibniz for instance identified Christianity as the common European
link: " Habent autem Christiani aliud quoque vinculum commune,
jus scilicet divinum positivum..." [59]Europe
as an association of Christian states stood resolutely in the middle
of many theoretical systems.
12. However, many individual scholars recognized quite early that
the political spatial concept of Europe was not identical with the
Christian occidental concept of culture. Leibniz himself put is thus:
"Tota Europa non est christiana."[60]
It cannot be denied that in the "confessional period", "Christianity"
was disproportionally more often the subject of discussion than "Europe".
But the concept of "Christianity" was subordinated to an increasing
desacralization in the 17th Century, and it was finally logically
consistent to move from "christianitas" to a neutral entirely worldly
"Europe".[61] That meant
that the new Europe prospered best between and outside confessions.
It moved within a unionist tolerating attitude and the enlightened
natural jurisprudence zone. This could be made clearer with the example
of Russia. The Latin Christendom only saw in the Russians the barbaric
schismatics. Only the Enlightenment and the early modern state life
successfully pulled Russia step by step into Europe, both in terms
of a political and a cultural space, a political and a cultural unit.
The traditional equation of Christianity with Europe was particularly
problematic in regards to the Ottoman Empire, which had in terms of
politics always been included into Europe. To put it more precisely:
in the sciences of state discourse, Christianity in its orthodox,
catholic and protestant expressions and the "Mohammedan" religion
were considered to be the two European main religions.[62]
The traditional idea of a European "res publica christiana" was later
fixed at a secular level. "Europe is nothing more than a big nation
made up of many small nations. France and England need the prosperity
of Poland and Russia, just as any of their provinces the others",
as Montesquieu believed.[63]
The image of the "big family" surfaces in the science of state discourse
about Europe again and again. Voltaire's writings were pushing this
idea and August Wilhelm Schlözer, the leading German state scientist
and political journalist at the end of the 18th Century,
also spoke of a "general sympathy of the states" in Europe. But only
since the Thirty Years' War could he imagine Europe as a connected
society of states.[64]
13. The sciences of state discourse saw the unity of Europe as a
common body of "laws" and as the sum of various similar legal elements
and causes. The "ius publicum Europaeum" [65]
encouraged European consciousness through the continued existence
of legal convictions, legal thought, and behavioural norms; that is,
that branch of jurisprudence that attempted to establish itself in
the last quarter of the 17th Century and that attempted to make the
inter-state legal relations of the European states more legally binding.
In domestic relations, the "ius publicum Europeaum" aimed at public
legislation of the different European states. This constituted a sort
of comparative state or government scholarship, or comparative public
law. In external relations, the concept of "ius publicum Europaeum"
was important for the inter-state legal relations. It included what
we term international law, or rather international law of the European
states. In the terminology of the late 18th Century, it could be characterized
as European international law.
In 1672, Samuel Pufendorf still assumed a legally unregulated natural
condition of inter-state relations that granted international law
less validity than inter-state law.[66]
With the beginning of the 18th Century, though, jurisprudence began
more and more to construct legal theory as a network made up by bilateral
treaties that bound all the members together consensually. Some examples
were the inviolability of treaties and diplomats, and certain behavioural
norms in war like the release of prisoners of war and the protection
of civilian population, etc. This was based upon Hugo Grotius' claim
that the state, as bearer of sovereignty, could definitely also enter
into foreign legal obligations.[67]
This did not stop at the level of legal theory, though. It was consciously
made explicit to the European public through a host of volumes and
additions of treaties and diplomatic documents.[68]
At the end of the 18th Century, Europe and its international law even
began to be seen in romantic transfigurations. For the Göttingen
professor of international law G. Fr. von Martens, it was the "innumerable
connection of each of the states with most of the others, the similarity
of mores and of interest" that meant that "Christian Europe should
be viewed not only in geographic, but also in political and legal
considerations as a whole that is different from the other nations
of Europe, as it were a volk comprised of states, that has its own
laws, customs, and beliefs." It was "a connection that Russia entered
into later, and that Turkey would never quite be able to enter."[69]
14. Since the decline of the unity of the Latin church, the preservation
and expansion of European communalities obviously did not lay primarily
in the hand of the confessional patriarchs and heroes. From its humanistic
roots, the rank of the educated classes of Europeans formed itself,
freed to a large extent from the clergy. Initially, this new class
of educated élite was still concerned with theological problems,
but later it became theologically indifferent and even often antitheological,
not antireligious altogether, however.
In 1767, Eobald Toze paradigmatically pointed to the communalities
in the discussions of the educated élites held in universities
and academies all over Europe:
"With the exception of the high schools or universities in Europe, excepting Poland, academies and scholarly societies have been founded that have enriched the fields of mathematics, physics, medicine, and other fields of the sciences with new discoveries. In this manner, the space of the republic of letters enlarged, as evidenced from the published works. Some of these institutions, such as the academy of science in Paris or others in France, the academies in St Petersburg and Berlin, the Royal Society in Göttingen, published yearly price essay questions for all scholars in Europe and awarded the best answers with handsome prices."[70]
Wherever the idea of a republic of letters was promoted, if at first intended only to mean academic Germany, one soon spoke in a larger, cultural sense of Europe as a "republic of alliances."[71]
[1] See esp. JUTTA BRÜCKNER,
Staatswissenschaften, Kameralismus und Naturrecht. Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Politischen Wissenschaft im Deutschland des späten
17. und frühen 18. Jahrhunderts, München, 1977; HANS ERICH
BÖDEKER, System und Entwicklung der Staatswissenschaften im 18.
Jahrhundert, in REINHARD MOCEK, ed., Die Wissenschaftskultur der
Aufklärung, Halle, 1990, pp. 88-105, and DAVID F. LINDENFELD,
The Practical Imagination. The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth
Century, Chicago and London, 1997.
[2] See HERMANN KAPPNER, Die
Geschichtswissenschaft an der Universität Jena vom Humanismus bis
zur Aufklärung, Jena,1931, p.112 sq.; ARNO SEIFERT, Staatenkunde.
Eine neue Disziplin und ihr wissenschaftstheoretischer Hintergrund,
in MOHAMMED RASSEM, JUSTIN STAGL, eds., Statistik und Staatsbeschreibung
in der Neuzeit, vornehmlich im 16.- 18. Jahrhundert, Paderborn et
al., 1980, pp. 217-244, p. 218 sq.
[3] See REINHOLD ZEHRFELD, Hermann
Conrings (1606) Staatenkunde. Ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte der
Statistik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Conringschen Bevölkerungslehre,
Berlin und Leipzig, 1926; ARNO SEIFERT, Conring und die Begründung
der Staatenkunde, in MICHAEL STOLLEIS, ed., Hermann Conring (1606
– 1681). Beiträge zu Leben und Werk, Berlin, 1983, pp.
201-214.
[4] See JOHANN CHRISTOPH BECMAN,
Historia orbis terrarum, Frankfurt/O., 1673.
[5] See CHRISTIAN GOTTFRIED
HOFFMANN, Entwurff einer Einleitung zu dem Erkäntniß des
gegenwärtigen Zustands von Europa, worinnen von denen hierzu nöthigen
Wissenschaften überhaupt geurtheilet..., Leipzig, 1720, pp. 6
sq.
[6] See EVERHARD OTTO, Primae
lineae notitiae Europae rerumpublicarum, Utrecht, 1726.
[7] See EVERHARD OTTO, Notitia
praecipuarum Europae rerumpublicarum, editio quinta, Utrecht, 1749,
p. 1 (§1).
[8] See J. P. ZSCHACKWITZ, Allerneueste
Europäische Staats- und Teutsche Reichshistorie, worinnen die Begebenheiten
dieses Welt-Theils, wie solche von den Regierungen des Kaysers Maximilian
I. biß hierher... sich befunden, Zerbst, 1737, p. 24.
[9] See MARTIN SCHMEITZEL, Einleitung
zur Staats–Wissenschaft überhaupt und dann zur Kenntnis derer
europäischen Staaten insonderheit, Halle, 1732.
[10] See J. J. SCHMAUSS, Einleitung
zur Staatswissenschaft, Leipzig, 1741.
[11] See HARM KLUETING, Die
Lehre von der Macht der Staaten. Das außenpolitische Machtsystem
in der "politischen Wissenschaft" und in der praktischen Politik
im 18. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1986, pp. 51-62.
[12] See GOTTFRIED ACHENWALL,
Abriß der neuesten Staatswissenschaften der vornehmsten Europäischen
Reiche und Republicken zum Gebrauch in seinen academischen Vorlesungen,
Göttingen, 1749; Staatsverfassungen der heutigen vornehmsten Europäischen
Reiche und Völker im Grundrisse, Göttingen, 1752.
[13] See VINZENZ JOHN, Geschichte
der Statistik. Ein quellenmäßiges Handbuch für den akademischen
Gebrauch wie für den Selbstunterricht, Tl. 1, Von dem Ursprung
der Statistik bis auf Quetelet (1835), Stuttgart, 1884, p. 78.
[14] See EOBALD TOZE, Der
gegenwärtige Zustand von Europa, worin die natürliche und politische
Beschaffenheit der Europäischen Reiche und Staaten aus bewährten
Nachrichten beschrieben wird, 2 vols., Bützow and Wismar, 1767
(an English translation was published in three vols. in London in 1770).
[15] See JOHANN DAVID MICHAELIS,
Räsonnement über die protestantischen Universitäten
in Deutschland, vol. I, Göttingen, 1768, p. 18.
[16] See JOHANN CHRISTOPH
GATTERER, Ideal einer allgemeinen Weltstatistik, Göttingen,
1773.
[17] See JOHANN GEORG MEUSEL,
Lehrbuch der Statistik, Leipzig, 1792.
[18] See MANFRED HELLMANN,
"Die Friedensschlüsse von Nystad (1721) und Teschen (1779) als
Etappen des Vordringens Russlands nach Europa", Historisches Jahrbuch,
1978, n.97/98, pp. 270-288 and MARTIN SCHULZE-WESSEL, "Systembegriff
und Europapolitik der russischen Diplomatie im 18, Jahrhundert",
Historische Zeitschrift, 1998, n.266, pp. 649-669.
[19] See HEINZ GOLLWITZER,
Europabild und Europagedanken: Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte
des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, München, 1964 (2nd edition),
pp. 65 sq.
[20] See INA ULRIKE PAUL,
Stichwort "Europa". Enzyklopädien und Konversationslexika
beschreiben den Kontinent (1700 – 1850), in DIETER ALBRECHT,
KARL OTMAR FREIHERR VON ARETIN, WINFRIED SCHULZE, eds., Europa im Umbruch
1750 – 1850, München, 1995, pp. 29-50, p. 41.
[21] See HANS LEMBERG, "Zur
Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert. Vom Norden"
zum „Osten" Europas", Jahrbücher für Geschichte
Osteuropas, 1985, n.33, pp. 48-91; in contrast see also LARRY WOLFF,
Inventing Eastern Europe: the Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment, Stanford (CA), 1994.
[22] See HEINZ DUCHHARDT,
"Friedenswahrung im 18. Jahrhundert", Historische Zeitschrift,
1985, n.240, pp. 265-282, p. 275.
[23] See JOHANN GEORG MEUSEL,
Anleitung zur Kenntnis der Europäischen Staatenhistorie nach Gebauerscher
Lehrart, Leipzig, 1788 ( 3rd edition), p. xiii.
[24] For details see INA ULRIKE
PAUL, Stichwort "Europa" cit.
[25] For the emergence of
Europe as a community of states in the 17th Century see WOFGANG
SCHMALE, "Das 17. Jahrhundert und die neuere Europäische Geschichte",
Historische Zeitschrift, 1997, n.264, pp. 587-611, WINFRIED SCHULZE,
"Von den großen Anfängen des neuen Welttheaters. Entwicklung,
neueste Ansätze und Aufgaben in der Frühen Neuzeit Forschung",
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 1993, n.44, pp. 3-18,
and KLAUS MALETTKE, "Europabewußtsein und europäische
Friedenspläne im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", Francia, 1994,
n. 21, 2, pp. 63-93.
[26] See esp FRANZ BOSBACH,
Monarchia universalis. Ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen
Neuzeit, Göttingen, 1988.
[27] See ERNST REIBSTEIN,
"Das „Europäische Öffentliche Recht" 1648-1815.
Ein institutionengeschichtlicher Überblick", Archiv des Völkerrechts,
1959/60, n.8, pp. 385-420.
[28] See MANFRED RIEDEL, System,
Struktur, in OTTO BRUNNER, WERNER CONZE, REINHART KOSELLECK, eds.,
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 6, Stuttgart, 1985, pp. 285-322;
HANS FENSKE, Gleichgewicht, Balance, in OTTO BRUNNER, WERNER CONZE,
REINHART KOSELLECK, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 2,
Stuttgart, 1975, pp. 959-996.
[29] See JOHANN GEORG DARJES,
Einleitung in des Freyherrn von Bielefeld Lehrbegriff der Staatklugheit
zum Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer verfertigt, Jena, 1764, pp. 304 sq.
[30] See EVERHARD OTTO, Notitia
praecipuarum Europae rerumpublicarum, editio quinta, Jena, 1749, p.
6 (§XI), 33 sq.
[31] See GOTTFRIED ACHENWALL,
Staatsverfassung der heutigen vornehmsten Europäischen Reiche
und Völker im Grundriße, Göttingen,1752, p. 35.
[32] See GOTTFRIED ACHENWALL,
Vorbereitung zur Staatswissenschaft der heutigen führnehmsten
europäischen Reiche und Staaten, worinnen derselben eigentlichen
Begriff und Umfang einer bequemen Ordnung entwirft und seine Vorlesungen
darüber ankündigt, Göttingen, 1748, p. 41; similar
EOBALD TOZE, Der gegenwärtige Zustand von Europa, worin die natürliche
Beschaffenheit der Europäischen Reiche und Staaten aus bewährten
Nachrichten beschrieben wird, 2 vols, Bützow und Wismar, 1767,
p. 63.
[33] See J. H. EBERHARD, Abhandlungen
von dem Begriffe und der Bearbeitung der Deutschen Staatsklugheit nebst
einer Nachricht von seinen Vorlesungen, Hüttenberg und Zerbst,
1768, p. 6.
[34] See GOTTFRIED ACHENWALL,
Die Staatverfassung der heutigen vornehmsten Europäischen Reiche
und Völker cit., p. 35.
[35] See FRIEDRICH MEINECKE,
Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte, ed. by
Walter Hofer, 2nd edition, München, 1960, pp. 283 sq. and MICHAEL
STOLLEIS, Arcana imperii und Ratio status. Bemerkungen zur politischen
Theorie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen, 1980, pp.
31 sq.
[36] J. J. SCHMAUSS, Einleitung
zu der Staatswissenschaft..., I. Vol., Die Historie der Balance
von Europa..., Leipzig, 1741, "Vorrede".
[37] See M. SCHUMANN, De
systemate, 1755, p. 8.
[38] Ibid., p. 10.
[39] See LUIGI MARINO, Praeceptores
Germaniae. Göttingen 1770-1820, Göttingen, 1995.
[40] ARNOLD HERMANN LUDWIG
HEEREN, Handbuch der Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems
und seiner Colonien, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1809.
[41] Ibid. vol 1, p.
6.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., p. 9.
[44] Ibid., p. 10.
[45] Ibid., p. 11.
[46] Ibid., p. VI sq.
[47] Ibid., pp. 7 sq.
[48] Ibid., p. 11.
[49] See esp. ARNO STROHMEYER,
Theorie der Interaktion. Das europäische Gleichgeicht der Kräfte
in der frühen Neuzeit, Wien et al., 1994, and HEINZ DUCHHARDT,
Balance of Power und Pentarchie. Internationale Beziehungen 1700 -1785,
Paderborn et al., 1997.
[50] See J. J. SCHMAUSS, Einleitung
zu der Staats-Wissenschaft...., I vol., Die Historie der Balance
von Europa...., Leipzig, 1741, p. 55.
[51] EOBALD TOZE, Der gegenwärtiger
Zustand von Europa cit., p. 145.
[52] See ARNO STROHMEYER,
Theorie der Interaktion. Das europäische Gleichgewicht der Kräfte
in der frühen Neuzeit, Wien et al., 1994, passim, and
HEINZ DUCHHARDT, Balance of Power und Pentarchie. Internationale Beziehungen
1700-1785, Paderborn et al., 1997, passim.
[53] See ibid.
[54] See ibid.
[55] JACOB CHRISTOFF ISELIN,
Neu-vermehrtes Historisch- und Geographisches Allgemeines Lexikon...,
2 vols., Basel, 1726, vol. 1, p. 247.
[56] JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
Auszug aus dem Plan des Ewigen Friedens des Herrn Abbé de Saint
Pierre (1756/61), cited from KURT VON RAUMER, ed., Ewiger Friede.
Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance, Freiburg
und München, 1953, p. 347.
[57] ARNOLD HERMANN LUDWIG
HEEREN, Handbuch der Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems
und seiner Colonien..., Neueste Ausgabe, Wien, 1817, pp. 7 sq.
[58] See esp. W. FRITZMEYER,
Christenheit und Europa. Zur Geschichte der europäischen Gemeinschaftsgefühls
von Dante bis Leibniz, München and Berlin, 1931.
[59] See GOTTFRIED WILHELM
LEIBNIZ, ed., Codex juris gentium diplomaticus, Guelferbyti, 1747,
"ad lectorem" (p. ix).
[60] See W. FRITZMEYER, Christenheit
und Europa cit., pp. 164 sq.
[61] See ibid., passim.
[62] See HEINZ GOLLWITZER,
Europabild und Europagedanken cit., pp. 44 sq.
[63] Ibid., p. 38.
[64] Ibid., p. 42.
[65] See DIETER WYDUCKEL,
Recht, Staat und Frieden im Jus Publicum Europeum, in Heinz Duchhardt,
ed., Friedenswahrung im Mittelater und Früher Neuzeit, Köln,
1991, pp. 185-204.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] See HEINZ DUCHHARDT,
Balance of Power und Pentarchie cit., passim.
[69] See G. FR. VON MARTENS
cited from ERNST REIBSTEIN, "Das „Europäische Öffentliche
Recht" cit., p. 388.
[70] EOBALD TOZE, Der gegenwärtige
Zustand von Europa cit., p. 124.
[71] See HANS BOTS, FRANÇOISE
WAQUET, eds., La république des lettres, Paris, 1997.