

Article

Facing diversity and democracy: European neo-nationalism, Canadian multiculturalism and Latin American experiences

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Abstract. The paper tries to demonstrate that the debate about cultural diversity cannot avoid issues concerning the historical nature of the European nation-state, the transformations provoked by the creation of the European Union, and the relationship between the nation state and democracy. The European historical specificities mark the forms multiculturalism can take. The paper tries as well to show how multiculturalism policies vary according to the contexts. In a comparative perspective, the paper considers the development of multiculturalism outside Europe, looking in the first place at the Canadian experience, Canada being a pioneer in making of multiculturalism an official policy; then at the Latin American experiences of multiculturalism and of “multinationalism” (Barabas, 2015). In order to clarify how multiculturalism (and multinationalism) was implemented in Latin America, the paper briefly discusses the historical formation of the Latin American states. It finally considers how a comparative Europe/Latin America perspective can be useful to clarify the European dilemmas.

Keywords. Canada, cultural diversity, democracy, Europe, Latin America, Multiculturalism, Multinationalism, National State.

Abstract. Il saggio cerca di dimostrare che il dibattito sulla diversità culturale non può non affrontare questioni relative la natura storica dello Stato-nazione in Europa, le trasformazioni provocate dalla creazione dell’Unione europea, e il rapporto tra stato-nazione e democrazia. Le specificità storiche europee influenza le forme che il multiculturalismo può assumere. Il saggio cerca di mostrare così come le politiche di multiculturalismo variano a seconda dei contesti. In una prospettiva comparativa, esso considera lo sviluppo del multiculturalismo al di fuori dell’Europa, guardando in primo luogo alla esperienza canadese, essendo il Canada pioniere nel fare del multiculturalismo la politica ufficiale dello stato; esso analizza inoltre le esperienze latino-americane di multiculturalismo e di “multinazionalismo” (Barabas, 2015). Al fine di chiarire come il multiculturalismo (e il multinazionalismo) è stato realizzato in America Latina, il testo analizza brevemente la formazione storica degli stati latino-americani e infine, considera come la prospettiva comparativa tra Europa/America Latina può risultare utile per chiarire i dilemmi europei.

Keywords. America Latina, Canada, democrazia, diversità culturale, Europa, multiculturalismo, multinazionalismo, Stato nazionale.

1. Introduction

Over the last fifteen years, the European political landscape has been characterized by the growth of parties placing themselves outside the two mainstream blocs that have dominated the agenda since World War 2: the conservatives and the social democrats. Following the work of the French scholar Pierre André Taguieff (1984, 2002), political scientists define “new” parties – whose roots can be recent, but also ancient – as “populists” or “national-populists”: the Front National in France, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, abbreviated to FPÖ), the True Finns (Timo Soini), and the UKIP in the UK are classified under this umbrella¹.

Their common features have to do with the governance of cultural diversity (subject of the GOVDIV project’s topic): all these parties are hostile towards immigration; they reject multiculturalism² as a political project; they support assimilation policies for migrants and are in favour of excluding non-nationals from a few some rights and provisions. “Priority to nationals” is one of their slogans (Mény, Surel, 2002). The “Populist” model of the nation-state is a culturally, and possibly ethnically, homogeneous entity (Canovan, 1981, Betz, 1994).

However, if we look in depth at the ways how most European states deal with immigrants’ integration - we realize that the borders between “populists” and mainstream parties may be blurred. Just to give a few examples: in 2007, the conservative French President Sarkozy transformed the Ministry of Immigration into “Ministry of national identity”; in February 2011, UK prime Minister David Cameron strongly attacked “*state multiculturalism*”, accusing it of producing the insularity of Muslim communities that can foster terrorism³; in October 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about the failure of multiculturalism at a meeting of young members of her Christian Democratic Party in Potsdam (“This [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed,”)⁴. The recent massive arrivals of asylum-seekers from a troubled Middle East has shown how European countries have difficulty accepting diverse populations – in spite of an international legislation that should – theoretically – assure protection of victims of wars and violence.

¹ Outside academia, mainstream press and mainstream politicians often use the term “populists” both to define and to insult their adversaries.

² The term multiculturalism has multiple meanings: it is sometimes used just as a synonym of the term “cultural pluralism” of anthropological tradition (Barabas, 2015). In this article the term multiculturalism refers to the political experience of the Canadian state and to the policies that have been introduced in Europe on the basis of the “multiculturalist ideology” – that is, according to the definition of Vertovec (2003) “recognizing the rights of cultural diversity and the formation of new communities, abandoning the principle of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states, and linking these rights with social equality and anti-discrimination.”

³ “Britain, the prime minister said, has “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives” with the effect of “weakening our collective identity”. This has contributed to a disorientation among young Muslims that makes them susceptible to extremist preachers. The antidote, according to Mr Cameron, is a more consistent, robust promotion of liberal-democratic values – human rights, religious tolerance, gender equality – and a greater emphasis on shared British cultural attributes. He calls it “active, muscular liberalism.” (Editorial The Observer, Sunday 6 February 2011).

⁴ Matthew Weaver, Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has “utterly failed”. The Chancellor’s assertion that onus is on new arrivals to do more to integrate into German society stirs anti-immigration debate, Guardian, 17 October 2010. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>> (09/2016).

The wind of “neo-nationalism” that is blowing over Europe (Petrie, Maryniak, 1997, Chatignoux, 2013, Cerretelli, 2014) targets, first of all, immigrants and, secondly, multiculturalism, as a political approach to deal with societies’ diversity. In the third place, it affects the European Union’s project of a stronger integration among European countries. Today nobody can bet that the fate of European countries will be an irreversible dissolution into the supra-national construction of the European Union, which was presented by the mainstream politicians as one of the few macro-entities (United States, China, European Union) able to face the challenges of an increasingly globalized world⁵.

Since a few years, the dilemmas about giving up more state sovereignty to the EU supranational entity (as it was the case in the construction the monetary Union through the euro) concern both a large number of European political parties (not necessarily “populist”), and the wide range of European public opinions from North to South, from West to East (Lordon, 2014).

The reasons for this trend are not trivial. In the 2008 economic crisis, the EU and especially the Eurozone – as a monetary union deprived of the political institutions that could make it work – have shown numerous dysfunctional aspects⁶: choice of economic austerity policies that produce unemployment; lack of solidarity among states; lack of coordination in international politics and in front of major problems (such as the refugee crisis) – the list could be long... (Lordon, 2014). Consequently, the issue of sovereignty has appeared as a crucial one. Is the EU legitimized to impose economic policies against the vote of the citizens, as it was the case in Greece with the victory of Syriza?

Both issues – migration/integration policies and sovereignty – bring the European nation state and its future to the core of the political debate (Canovan 2000, 2002). The two issues produce, however, different social and political outcomes. Assimilationism and identity policies, defended by national-populists as well as by a part of the mainstream parties, risk fueling xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism among populations that are rendered unsafe by an economic crisis without an end in sight. On the contrary, the issue of sovereignty produces an interesting debate on the conditions allowing democracy to work (and on the risk of entering a “post-democratic phase”) and demands for a democratic regeneration, both at national and European level. A new “left” embraces this position – namely the radical or alternative parties, such as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain, that aim to replace the old social democratic parties of the centre-left. These forces are erroneously called “populists” - just because they refuse the TINA slogan (there is no alternative) of the neo-liberal thought and of the pro-Europeans who deny the failure of the present EU construction. They also look at non-European experiences, namely Latin American ones for a renovation of the relationship between the state, the nation and the “people”.

The paper tries to demonstrate that the debate about cultural diversity cannot avoid issues concerning the historical nature of the European nation-state, the transformations provoked by the creation of the European Union, and the relationship between the nation state and democracy. The European historical specificities mark the forms multicultural-

⁵ See, for example Wolfgang Munchau, Europe’s multiplicity of crises is not accidental – «Financial Times», 4th of January 2016, p. 6.

⁶ “If you create a monetary union without shared economic institutions, fiscal policies and legal systems, you are bound to hit a wall eventually.” (Munchau, 2016, p. 6)

ism can take. The paper tries as well to show how multiculturalism policies vary according to the contexts.

In a comparative perspective, the paper considers the development of multiculturalism outside Europe, looking in the first place at the Canadian experience, Canada being a pioneer in making of multiculturalism an official policy; then at the Latin American experiences of multiculturalism and of “multinationalism” (Barabas, 2015). In order to clarify how multiculturalism (and multinationalism) was implemented in Latin America, the paper briefly discusses the historical formation of the Latin American states. It finally considers how a comparative Europe/Latin America perspective can be useful to clarify the European dilemmas.

2. The historical development of imperialist aggressive nationalism during the Nineteenth century

Without going into details, let's consider some highlights in the history of European nation states and of European nationalism. As Martinelli – among others – points out, the European nation state – *“the main institutional innovation of the modern European society, together with market capitalism and research university”*⁷ – is a relatively recent outcome, following the fall of the “Ancien Régime” and linked to the *“formation of the industrial economy, mass society and expansion of cultural communication”*⁸. (Martinelli, 2013, p. 16)

The ideology that is behind the nation-state is nationalism, a term used for the first time by the French Abbot Barruel in 1798 in a negative way (he criticized the hostility of the Jacobins towards strangers) and, the same year, by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (Nationalismus) in a positive way, with reference to nationality, patriotism and “Volk” – “the people”, defined as an organic homogenous individuality, with its unique specific characteristics. The Herderian concept of the nation, as a classless, but hierarchical national body, requires its members to have a common identity and common standards of conduct, while excluding “outsiders”. (Blokker, 2005, p. 382)

Following the two quoted approaches, the nationalist ideology developed around two different visions of the relationship between the people and the nation: the people, as “demos”, is held together by citizenship, implemented through constitution, political institutions and active participation; the people, as “ethnos”, is identified through culture, language and/or blood. Even if the history of each European nation state presents specific characters, we can argue that during the XIXth century the idea of people as “ethnos” prevailed in most European countries, from Germany (where the Herderian principle was dominant) to Italy, from Poland to Spain. This idea produced a mythological narrative about the original habitants of the territory of the nation states, from whom the present citizens were the descendants.

Moreover, during the Nineteenth century, the ideas supporting the nation as an organic individuality and the people as “ethnos” were reinforced by the broad accept-

⁷ «la principale innovazione istituzionale della società europea moderna, accanto al capitalismo di mercato e all'università di ricerca».

⁸ «alla formazione dell'economia industriale, della società di massa, e all'espansione della comunicazione culturale».

ance of racist theories. According to the historian Eric Hobsbawm (1992), there are obvious links between racism and nationalism: they have reinforced each other in the transition from the “liberal” nationalism – fighting for Constitutionalism and independence of nations as Italy, Poland, Finland in the first half of the century – towards the aggressive and imperialist nationalism, tied to colonial expansionism in the second half of century. Hobsbawm notices that, since 1870, in Europe, ethnicity and language became the central, when not the only, criteria to legitimize a nation and that the nationalism and patriotism slipped politically towards the “right”⁹.

Benedict Anderson (1996) identifies the turning point in the period from 1870 to 1914, which coincides with the phase of imperialism (particularly German imperialism in conflict with the British one): nationalism – combined with imperialist and racist ideas – led to tragedy; World War 1 and 2 were the outcomes. The relationship between nationalism and the structure of the state changed: while in the first half of the Nineteenth century, liberal ideas were dominating the national movements, in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth, nationalism became a component of authoritarian regimes, then of absolutism / dictatorship / totalitarianism. The worst manifestations of “totalitarian” nationalism are fascism and Nazism.

3. Overcoming European nationalism: Altiero Spinelli and Winston Churchill for the United States of Europe

The phases of European nationalism are clearly described by the Italian political thinkers and activists – Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi – in the 1943 “Ventotene Manifesto”, written when they were both interned by fascist regime on the island of Ventotene¹⁰. The manifesto promotes the idea of the United States of Europe as the only possible answer to European nationalism:

The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome narrow-minded parochialism and created a much wider feeling of solidarity against foreign oppression. It eliminated many obstacles hindering the free movement of people and goods. Within the territory of each new State, it brought the institutions and systems of the more advanced societies to more backward ones. But with this ideology came the seeds of capitalist imperialism, which our own generation has seen to flourish to a point where totalitarian States have grown up and world wars have been unleashed. Thus the nation is no longer viewed as the historical product of co-existence between men who, as the result of a lengthy historical process, have acquired greater unity in their customs and aspirations and who see their State as being the most effective means of organizing collective life within the context of all human society. Rather the nation has become a divine entity, an organism that must only consider its own existence, its own development, without the least regard for the damage that others may suffer from this. The absolute sovereignty of national States has led to

⁹ The connection between racism and nationalism is illustrated by the confusion between the notions of nation, race, language and religion: eg anti-Semitism acquires its racial character only in 1880, whereas previously it was mostly of a religious nature; race and nation are used as “almost synonyms”, also in function of a certain idea of inheritance. Hobsbawm (1992) states that the possible reasons for these important changes are manifold; especially the context of wars (colonial, between France and Prussia) and the economic crisis of the second industrialization. The historian does not find surprising that nationalism has “rapidly gained ground between 1870 and 1914.

¹⁰ After being distributed in mimeographed form, a clandestine edition of the Manifesto appeared in Rome in January 1944, a few months before the liberation of the town.

the desire of each of them to dominate, since each feels threatened by the strength of the others, and considers that its “living space” should include increasingly vast territories that give it the right to free movement and provide self-sustenance without needing to rely on others. This desire to dominate cannot be placated except by the hegemony of the strongest State over all the others.¹¹

In response to the tragedy of World War 2, caused by nationalism, Spinelli and Rossi propose to abolish the division of Europe into national, sovereign states and to create a federal Europe. They follow, in this respect, the thought of another Italian, Giuseppe Mazzini¹², who was an early advocate of a “United States of Europe”, and regarded European unification as a logical continuation of the Unification of Italy.

The idea of the United States of Europe, in the frame of the United Nations and under the patronage of Great Britain and the United States, in order to overcome German (and French) nationalism, is expressed by Winston Churchill in a speech given in Zurich in 1946:

I must now sum up the propositions which are before you. Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the strength of the United Nations Organisation. Under and within that world concept, we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe. The first step is to form Council of Europe. If at first all the States of Europe are not willing or able to join the Union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and those who can. The salvation of the common people of every race and of every land from war or servitude must be established on solid foundations and must be guarded by the readiness of all men and women to die rather than submit to tyranny. In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia - for then indeed all would be well - must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.¹³

4. Towards the European Union

In 1950, Robert Schuman, at the time France’s Foreign Minister, launches a European organisation that would be responsible for pooling the French and German production of coal and steel:

¹¹ <<http://www.federalists.eu/uef/library/books/the-ventotene-manifesto/>> (09/2016).

¹² Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was an Italian politician, journalist and activist for the unification of Italy. His efforts helped bring about the independent and unified Italy in place of the several separate states, many dominated by foreign powers that existed until the 19th century. He is considered an early advocate of the “United States of Europe”: “In the Spring of 1834, while at Bern, Mazzini and a dozen refugees from Italy, Poland and Germany founded a new association with the grandiose name of Young Europe. Its basic, and equally grandiose idea, was that, as the French Revolution of 1789 had enlarged the concept of individual liberty, another revolution would now be needed for national liberty; and his vision went further because he hoped that in the no doubt distant future free nations might combine to form a loosely federal Europe with some kind of federal assembly to regulate their common interests. [...] His intention was nothing less than to overturn the European settlement agreed in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, which had reestablished an oppressive hegemony of a few great powers and blocked the emergence of smaller nations. [...] Mazzini hoped, but without much confidence, that his vision of a league or society of independent nations would be realized in his own lifetime. In practice Young Europe lacked the money and popular support for more than a short-term existence. Nevertheless he always remained faithful to the ideal of a united continent for which the creation of individual nations would be an indispensable preliminary” (Mack Smith, 1994, 11-12); Mack Smith, D. (1994), *Mazzini*, Yale University Press, Yale, pp. 11–12.

¹³ <<http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html>> (09/2016).

The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete institutions, which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point:

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.¹⁴

The design of the unification of Europe started by Schuman continues slowly over the following years, focusing mainly on the economic aspects of the partnership. The idea of abandoning political sovereignty for a supra-national entity wasn't acceptable neither by the political parties nor by the peoples – still traumatized by the German occupation of large parts of Europe. It is only thirty-six years later, in 1986, that the Single European Act announced the political aim of a “European Union”; it is only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that concrete steps towards the construction of a supra-national Europe were taken.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was greeted with joy, but was also looked at with fear. Given the past history of Germany, the will of the German government to accomplish the reunification raised worries. We can find interesting information about the reactions of French President François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher in the *Documents on British Foreign Policy: German Unification, 1989-90* (ed. Patrick Salmon et al, 2010)¹⁵. The risk of having again a too powerful Germany in Europe needed to be avoided through a reinforcement of the European institutions. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, with the objective of setting up federal structures, and the introduction of the euro (2001) were the answer to this fear: they still are the highlights of the political project of the European Union.

Done in a hurry, under the pressure of the German will to re-unify the country, the creation of a supra-national federal state lacked political, cultural and even ideological basis: what was Europe going to be? A set of civic values? Or a model analogous to the old nation state, based on homogenous characteristics, such as cultural or even ethnic criteria¹⁶? Nobody knew...

Maastricht Treaty was the expression of a political will that did not take into account the historical, cultural and economic differences existing among the European nation states, in particular their inability – because of a history of nationalism – to deal with cultural diversity, even inside their borders: while the European leaders were signing the Maastricht Treaty, many territorial minorities were still fighting for recognition of their specificities, their language, for gaining more autonomy, etc. – Corsicans in France, Basques and Catalans in Spain, Scots in the UK...

¹⁴ <<http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950>> (09/2016).

¹⁵ <<http://www.margarethatcher.org/document/113883>> (09/2016).

¹⁶ Second, the individual nation states have never accepted to abandon their cultural specificity (educational systems have never depended by the European Union, unlike the currency).

The way in which the European countries were dealing with migration was another indicator of the problems raised by cultural diversity. Each European country followed its own approach for integrating old and new migrants. The French Republican model, theoretically based on universalistic ideals, was de facto assimilation; even worse, it was unable to prevent racism, discrimination and ghettoization, as the movement of the second generation of Maghrebian origin (Les Beurs) denounced in their demonstrations. Germany still refused to be considered an immigration country, after having invented the expression *Gastarbeiter* (guest-workers). Something was, however, changing: Great Britain was open to the novelties coming from the USA and Canada, where the ideology of multiculturalism – a product of an American movement of the Sixties, the “ethnic revival”, was implemented in concrete policies.

5. European Democratic Nationalism after World War II

The fact that, in the early Nineties, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, European countries were embedded in great difficulties in dealing with cultural diversity does not mean that they had still something in common with the extreme nationalist, racist and colonialist nation states of the Thirties. World War II had marked the end of the aggressive and imperialist nationalism that had dominated the European nation states between the end of the Nineteenth century and 1945. A new type of nationalism appeared – deeply democratic and moderate.

Differently from fascism, nationalism was not rejected after World War II. The Resistance against Nazism and German occupation was inspired in many countries by nationalist ideals – recovering the liberal nationalism of the early Nineteenth century – the “freedom nationalism”. Only extreme “ethnic” nationalism, as an essential component of fascism and Nazism, was rejected; moderate nationalism was perfectly adapted to liberal democracy and social democracy, in spite of the universalistic approach of the socialist ideology.

Nationalist ideology, even if in a moderate form, continued to be consciously cultivated by the institutions (such as the national army and the school) and rites (national holidays, ceremonies and events)¹⁷, but it was combined with the ideas of democracy and social justice under the pressure of the political forces that had fought against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

After World War II, at least in Western Europe, the forces that had defeated Nazi Germany built democratic governments based on the double principles of freedom and social justice. The principle of freedom is based on sovereignty, which is the foundation of democracy. It is the sovereignty that founds the political community – what is called the “people” and defines a political order in the space of the nation. Until now, no alternative form to give citizens freedom and democracy has been implemented outside the nation: the EU badly lacks democratic legitimation – the institutions that compose it are not elected and not submitted to the control of the people. (Rovira Kaltwasser C. 2012).

¹⁷ Finally, it shouldn't be forgotten that the end of animosity among the European nation states after World War II was also a consequence of the Cold War: the Soviet Union threat pushed all the Western European countries inside the NATO alliance.

As the French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut (2014) reminded in a debate with Daniel Cohn-Bendit:

The nation: the space in which what happens the others happens to you. Despite the 'telepresence' in the world, no one can overthrow the power of the boundaries. It is in this circumscribed space that democracy makes sense.¹⁸

The boundary between nation/sovereignty/democracy was inscribed in the Constitutions that were a product of the Resistance against Nazism and Fascism. The post-World War II European nation state was in its nature democratic – rejecting any form of authoritarian and dictatorial regime.

Besides democracy, the victory on Nazism and Fascism engendered another “child” bound to change deeply the nature of the European nation state, namely the welfare state. In the post-war nation state, the political citizenship – the possibility to elect their representatives and to be elected – was coupled with the social citizenship, through the introduction of the welfare state.

6. A new role for the nation state: the welfare state

The idea of the welfare state was developed by William Beveridge (1942-1945) in the UK during the war and was adopted by most European countries in the post-war period. It represents a new pact between state and citizens; the new post-war national state is at the same time the guarantor of democracy and of the well being of the citizens.

According to William Beveridge, the state must fulfil three specific tasks. The first is to introduce a unified social security system, mandatory for all citizens, able to cover catastrophes or loss of capacity. The second involves the organization of a coherent and articulated system of health services that is free and open to everyone, even designed with a view to monitoring and preventing diseases. The third concerns the basis of the welfare state, namely full employment, understood as an essential requirement to be put in place. Full employment is the alpha and omega of the economic policy of the post-war nation states.

Sandro Mezzadra (2002) recalls how William Beveridge proposed a new social contract between the classes, based on the social rights of citizenship. In the years of War, William Beveridge, presiding at the time the Interministry Committee for Social Insurance, established by the National Government of Winston Churchill, believed that the war could not be won unless millions of ordinary people in Britain would be convinced that we had to offer something better than the enemy, not only during but also after the war. This belief was expressed in a report published by Beveridge in December 1942, entitled *Social Insurances and Allied Services*. This report, considered by many historians close to Roosevelt's New Deal, represents the real birth of a democratic welfare state, marked by a universalist logic and compatible with a market economy. It was explicitly formulated to take advantage of the relative levelling of social conditions, produced by the war (the so-called spirit of Dunkirk¹⁹) to launch a set of social protections.

¹⁸ <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/01/europe-ce-qui-oppose-daniel-cohn-bendit-et-alain-finkelkraut_4358142_3232.html> (09/2016).

¹⁹ The phrase came into use following the evacuation of allied troops across the English Channel by flotillas of

The question of the welfare is extremely important, in order to understand the present rejection of the European Union by large groups of the population: the monetary union – with its rules concerning the limits of government debt - is perceived (and as a matter of fact is) a threat to the welfare system. It is not by chance that the Swedish people, strongly in favour of the welfare state, voted against joining the euro! The perception of the state as protector is in fact a legacy of the post-war nation state. It must also be stressed that the provision of welfare was perceived as bound to the national citizenship, foreigners being excluded²⁰.

In the absence of a European system of social protection, the austerity policies imposed by the EU destroy the welfare system that still depends on states that are forced to cut the provisions in order to follow the budget rules established by the governance of the euro. This means the end of the type of nation state that was built after World War II.

Moreover, the competition for the small bribes of the welfare that are left after the introduction of the austerity policies, is a cause of growing racism and xenophobia against the immigrants by the European populations that have never been prepared to policies of multiculturalism and to the idea of recognition of the others as part of the nation, the welfare being mainly reserved to the nationals.

7. A new model to deal with diversity: multiculturalism as official Canadian policy

During the Sixties, in the USA, the ethnic revival – the request for recognition by the second and third generation of immigrants - produced the ideology of multiculturalism as “recognizing the rights of cultural diversity and the formation of new communities, abandoning the principle of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states, and linking these rights with social equality and anti-discrimination.” Multiculturalism ideology found its most interesting implementation in Canada, becoming the political-cultural project of a country that had been marked by multiple ethnic tensions.

During the Seventies, the conflict between French-speaking and English-speaking people was likely to lead to the independence of Quebec, threatening the unity of the country. American Indians (or better, “first nations”) were in revolt, especially in Quebec. Immigrants no longer accepted to be subordinated to the two “founding peoples”, the French and the English. As a response, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invented a new model for staying together, based on the value of diversity and equal rights. In 1971, Canada was the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy and a new narrative. “By so doing, Canada affirmed the value and dignity of all Canadian citizens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their religious affiliation. The 1971 Canadian policy of multiculturalism also confirmed the rights of aboriginal peoples and the status of Canada’s two official languages.”

pleasure boats, working barges and other civilian craft at the Battle of Dunkirk in 1940. The spirit of Dunkirk is the spirit of the British public pulling together to overcome times of adversity.

²⁰ The crisis of the welfare is, as a matter of fact, a result of neo-liberalism, as Canclini points out: “Es importante nombrar el liberalismo como el modo de organización y desorganización económica que ha favorecido esta precariedad. Pero también hay una desresponsabilización de los Estados en cuanto a seguridades sociales, médicas y otras garantías básicas de la vida.” - Interview with Nestor García Canclini: “El papa es complejo y astuto” - «El País», 31st May 2015, <http://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2015/05/29/actualidad/1432901289_103752.html> (09/2016).

Canada thus offered the world the model of a new type of federal state, praising the value the diversity and refusing to define an official culture. Abandoning the relationship between language and culture, Canada broke with a pillar of the European nationalist ideology (Kymlicka, 1999).

For a short time, during the Nineties, a period when the European Union knew an optimistic expansion (enlargement towards the East and introduction of the euro), some scholars working on multiculturalism and intercultural approaches hoped that the European Union would assume the Canadian model in order to hold together its multiple differences: European nation states, minorities and new immigration. But this perspective failed. Each nation state continued to follow its own politics in the matter of migration and cultural diversity, while problems increased with the settlement and the growing arrival of non-Europeans, especially from Muslim countries.

8. The failure of European cultural diversity and integration policies

In France, multiculturalism was rejected in name of the “republican model” (a form of assimilation): the ghost of “communitarianism” was considered the main enemy of integration. The sad conditions of the immigrant areas in certain suburbs (“*les banlieues*”), ghettos of poverty and unemployment, demonstrate how this approach was wrong.

Germany finally accepted the fact of being an immigration country, but without accepting multiculturalism. The weak equilibrium with respect to immigrants that seems to exist in this country is assured by a good economic situation: but it should not be forgotten that immigrants in Germany have always lived in the midst of racist and even neo-Nazi groups.

Rejected in France and in Germany, a European version of multiculturalism was actually followed by the UK and by Norway and Sweden. In spite of all the difficulties, these are the countries where the integration processes for migrants had the best results.

Other countries, such as Belgium, developed a sort of pretended “multiculturalist” tolerance. The tragic events of the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels show how, in the absence of economic possibilities of building a decent life and of an in-depth change in the narrative of the nation, this pseudo-multiculturalism can only create separate worlds. This superficial idea of multiculturalism, of which Belgium is a tragic example, misses completely two dimensions that have represented the success of the USA and Canadian experiences: some forms of affirmative action to help minorities and avoid ghettoization, and the political, cultural and ideological recognition of minorities and migrants as essential parts of the construction of a new nation (as is the case in Canada and also in the USA as the election of a black American president shows).

It is interesting to note that today, when European countries shut the doors for refugees, Canada has a completely different policy. In an article, titled “*Réfugiés: exception canadienne*” published by *Le Monde*, dated 26.03.2016, Sylvie Kauffmann writes:

The Liberal government of Canada plans on welcoming up to 305,000 new permanent residents this year — the highest projected immigration level in decades, and around a seven per cent increase above the 2015 plan. The government provided details in its 2016 Immigration Levels Plan, which was published on Tuesday, March 8. The increase in immigration numbers will be primarily through

family sponsorship and refugee settlement programs, though more than half of all newcomers will arrive through economic immigration programs.²¹

The numbers of refugees to be accepted in 2016 will be around double the number that was targeted for 2015. Canada's Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (IRCC, formerly known as CIC), John McCallum, has stated that his department aims to speed up processing times for family class immigration, economic immigrants and refugee claimants by applying the lessons it learned from bringing 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada over recent months²².

Moreover, the new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, son of Pierre Trudeau (of the Liberal Party like his father) breaks the dogma of austerity, is developing a recovery program through public investment in infrastructure and green technology, abolishes the forfeiture of citizenship for bi-national terrorists, and increases the budget of the immigration service.

The Canadian example should be followed by the European states even for dealing with territorial minorities. The continuous tensions between the Spanish government and the autonomous province of Catalonia about the right to hold a referendum on independence show how European countries are unable to follow the model of Canada where two, not just one, referendums for the independence of Québec were organized in a democratic way (and lost by the parties in favour of independence).

To conclude, the democratisation of the European nation states after World War II hasn't solved the difficulties in dealing with internal minorities and with immigrants that nationalism had produced. The creation of the European Union has by no way signified a positive shift towards a different model of dealing with diversity.

On the contrary, the European Union had a negative impact, because, having imposed austerity policies, it has contributed to destroying welfare, that was, with democracy, one of the most important achievements of the post-World War II era, and a re-legitimization of the nation state.

The dismantling of the welfare state is also one of the main causes of the growing xenophobia and racism: when services are scarce, the competition with foreigners becomes stronger. We can see the reasons why many political forces and many citizens claim a return to full sovereignty – modifying the Maastricht Treaty and eventually abandoning the euro. Sovereignty means the possibility to do the policies that have been chosen through democracy. Of course the return to sovereignty is part of the program of the national-populists, but it is also a request of progressive forces worried about the conditions for democracy. These forces – as Podemos in Spain - refer to the “people”, in the sense that the political organization of the “people” is, indeed, democracy.

9. Multiculturalism and multinationalism in Latin America

The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome narrow-minded parochialism and created a much wider feeling of solidarity.

²¹ <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/03/26/l-exception-canadienne_4890452_3232.html#ezhF3ouuXYFwfbMQ.99> (09/2016).

²² Read more at <<http://www.cicnews.com/2016/03/government-canada-plans-admitting-record-numbers-immigrants-2016-037396.html#xO2lmgrLMpf80FOu.99>> (09/2016).

This sentence written by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi in the Ventotene Manifesto is true for many countries not only in Europe, but also in other continents such as Latin America, where the independence from Spain and Portugal was obtained between 1810 and 1830.

However, some specific characteristics show a significant difference in the construction of the nation states of Latin America. Among these differences, we will mention:

- the leadership, namely Simon Bolivar and José de San Martín were inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment more than by those of Romanticism²³;
- the dependence on foreign nations for obtaining capital and for economic investment – putting these countries in a “neo-colonial” dependence – even after the independence²⁴;
- a special role in causing this dependence was played by the “colossus of the North” (the USA);
- the complex relationships with the natives (the Amerindians);
- the importance of the European immigration in the second half of the Nineteenth century for the formation of nations such as Argentina or Brazil.

Differently from Europe, the mythical narrative based on a common “blood” as consequence of a common origin (suggested by the French expression “de souche”) could not exist in countries where the only natives were the indigenous populations that had been subjugated by the Spanish or Portuguese settlers, and where the transnational oligarchy identified with Europe or the USA. Hybridization processes had taken place - between Europeans and natives, and between Europeans and African slaves. Finally, in the XIXth century, massive European immigration transformed thoroughly the demographic patterns of many Latin American countries such as Argentina or Brazil.

In Latin America, the recognition of the mixture of cultures, of the processes of hybridisation, and of the phenomenon of transculturation has a very long history. For example, the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz in his book “*Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar*” published in 1940 first iterated the concept of transculturation, referring to the mixing of cultures that occurs when cultures interact with one another.

Ortiz built his concept in contrast to the North American version of cultural mixing, called “acculturation”, which implies that a subordinate culture adopts the cultural references of a dominant culture, leaving out the kind of two-way interaction that Ortiz describes.

²³ The two leading figures that shaped the Latin American revolutionary movements during the wars of independence, Simon Bolivar and José de San Martín echoed the American and the French Revolution and were inspired by the Enlightenment with its universalistic ideas. They were not influenced by Romanticism that fuelled the independence wars in Europe a few years later (as it was the case for the Italian war of Independence). By the way, Bolivar wanted to forge Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador (Gran Colombia) into a single nation. This project was a failure: by 1830, geographical factors, plus cultural differences defeated Bolivar’s other attempts to create a confederation of the former Spanish colonies failed.

²⁴ The condition of dependence from foreign powers produced various phenomena that cannot be analysed here: the ruling classes tried to modernize the countries through generous concessions to foreign investors. This contributed to create transnational oligarchies that were deeply divided from the lower classes. The role of the USA in the economic –but sometimes military- domination of the Latin American continent is huge.

In Ortiz's vision, cultural mixing occurs in multiple directions, with all cultures being affected and changed rather than merely the one being oppressed or dominated, generally an indigenous and/or disempowered population. Hybridisation and transculturation were however caused by colonisation and the imposition of European models, the indigenous population being ignored and suppressed during the historical process that led to the formation of the Latin American countries. Without a doubt, its mixture of culture or "metissage" is an expression of Latin American identity, but it should be added that this does not mean that there are no "minority cultures", with individual indigenous identities and minorities within them. These "minority cultures" have been suppressed over the centuries and are the ones that fight today for recognition and a specific form of multiculturalism (Barabas, 2015).

As the book of Alicia Barabas, *Multiculturalismo e interculturalidad en America* (2015), illustrates, things have changed in the last thirty years, with the reclamation of the rights of the Indigenous (or First) people, following the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (Convention No. 169) which entered into force the 5th of September 1991. Since then, multiculturalism²⁵ is present in the reclamation of the rights of the indigenous people to be treated equally and to have the same cultural rights as "the majority", namely the ruling elite²⁶.

The request of recognition of the indigenous people in Latin America represents a specific form of multiculturalism, encompassing not only the notion of recognition of difference, but also that of redistribution of resources. In order to reach these aims, various new political movements and new leaders have appeared – among whom a special place has been taken by Evo Morales, who was elected president of Bolivia in 2006, the first indigenous president of a country where the majority is indigenous.

It must be stressed that each country of Latin America has developed a different form of multiculturalism, with respect to its context of cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity. In the case of Bolivia, after the election of 2006, the new Constitution gave much importance to structuring the new State as multicultural and multinational. The different ethnic and cultural identities have to be given the status of "nation" or "nationalities". That's why Bolivia must be defined as a multinational or plurinational state. Moreover, the plurinational state in Evo Morales' Bolivia has incorporated elements of the indigenous worldview like *sumac causay* (good living) in Latin American political discourse.

10. Conclusions

The paper has shown that forms of nation states vary according to the period and the context; it has also argued that the European nation states are based on a specific ideology embedded in Romanticism that values cultural and ethnic homogeneity as a founding element; this makes it especially difficult for the nation state to deal with cultural diversity – whether territorial minorities or immigrants. This difficulty has deep historical roots.

The construction of the EU has been an attempt to overcome European nationalism, but it has destroyed the democratic basis of the post-war European nation-state, of which

²⁵ Together with its intercultural variant, mainly focusing the exchange between cultures.

²⁶ Chipana C. G (2013), The Prisma: <<http://theprisma.co.uk/2013/04/01/towards-latin-american-multiculturalism/>> (09/2016).

the welfare system was a founding component. Moreover, the relationships between the European citizens and the political institutions continue to develop at the national level. Claiming back national sovereignty in front of the EU makes sense with respect to the exercise of democracy.

The paper has also argued that we cannot talk about a single model of multiculturalism: its specific forms depend on the context. Multiculturalism does not mean the same in Canada, Bolivia, Great Britain, France or Germany.

Multiculturalism develops best in countries where the existing cultural pluralism is accepted and considered as a value – as is the case in Canada. It cannot develop in a satisfactory way if diversity is perceived as a threat.

In their attempt of revitalizing democracy, some new political formations – especially the Spanish Podemos – look at “left-oriented” or progressive Latin American examples: the governments of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner. Various forms of multiculturalism and interculturalism are introduced in these countries combined with a reinforcement of democracy and political participation of the citizens. What is at stake is an idea of “the people” that is not grounded in cultural homogeneity or worse, ethnicity, but that at the same time is not reduced to a set of fragmented communities, as in a certain interpretations of multiculturalism. In the Latin American countries the scope of multiculturalism is not only the notion of recognition of difference, but also of redistribution of resources. In order to reach this aim, multiculturalism matches with an idea of “people” as a political community around a common political culture and a common project. That is what Evo Morales suggests: a multinational state, but a common Bolivian people, conscious of its rights.

At a given moment in history the “people” holds a central position in the public discourse and creates a “political nation” of solidarity and dignity, overcoming the ethnic and cultural differences, bringing together the multitudes against an oligarchical and technocratic power. Looking at the Latin American examples, we can argue that focusing on “the people” is not populism, but an attempt to respond to democratic aspirations²⁷.

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²⁷ We can consider that there is a “positive” populism, as an attempt of building a new “hegemonic” discourse, in the fight for social justice, as the Argentinian scholar Ernesto Laclau (2005) has theorized.

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