Ireland’s Diplomatic Performance in the Mid and Late-Twentieth Century: A Model for Other Small States?

Hajer Gandouz
University of Sousse (<hajer.gandouz@gmail.com>)

Abstract:
After its intense phase of insularity, Ireland has reached a considerable diplomatic role. The past vulnerability of Ireland due to its subjection to colonialism made its domestic sphere and foreign agenda in the early 1920s insular. However, Ireland started to transcend its isolation as it showed more openness to the world in the mid-twentieth century. More specifically, Dublin, in the post-World War II context, began to exhibit its interest in having a more dynamic role in the international scene. In fact, Ireland displayed its engagement with matters that exceeded its domestic sphere through its membership in the United Nations. Its performance in such an Intergovernmental Organization unveiled the Irish devotion to principles like peace-keeping and collective security. This article aims to assess Ireland’s dynamic role, which started to appear in the mid-twentieth century. Besides, the late-twentieth century was also a significant phase for Dublin and its international presence. This epoch was characterized by Ireland's integration into the European region. Most importantly, the phenomenon of globalization reached its peak at that time, and Ireland witnessed an unprecedented experience of economic opulence known as the Celtic Tiger. Focus should also be laid on Dublin's interesting development in such a globalized climate. Its remarkable evolution, especially in the 1990s, tends to be considered a "model" for other small European and non-European states. Therefore, this paper attempts to scrutinize the extent to which other small states can learn from the example of Ireland.

Keywords: Diplomacy, European Integration, Late-Twentieth Century, Mid-Twentieth Century, Multilateralism

1. Ireland in the Early Years of Independence: An Insular Policy

Since this article deals with Ireland’s move outward and its international involvement, it is crucial to briefly refer back to Dublin’s protectionism as a newly-established Free State. In fact, the period of insularity influenced the country’s character during its early years of independence. The Irish Free State opted for...
protectionism in 1932, and Éamon de Valera’s party, the Fianna Fáil, was one of the prominent framers of this insular approach (Kennedy, Giblin, McHugh 1988, 40). The goals that were set by de Valera and his Fianna Fáil Party sought to emphasize nationalism and traditional values (Puirséil 2017, 6). It is pertinent to mention that the protectionist approach of Ireland entailed a sense of conservatism. Indeed, political conservatism was brought to the fore during the early years of independence and the state-building process, especially with the emergence and rise of de Valera’s Fianna Fáil.

In their scrutiny of Fianna Fáil’s ideological character, experts in Irish Politics, Eoin O’Malley and Sean McGraw (2017) note that the party seemed to have a conservative character. Since it played a crucial role in shaping Ireland’s insular approach, it is notable to highlight the conservative features of Fianna Fáil. In this regard, Olivier Coquelin, a specialist in Irish Studies, maintains that Fianna Fáil was ideologically inspired by certain conservative schools of thought (2005, 34). Coquelin identifies a sort of “reactionary conservatism” in the party’s call for the primacy of “the community” (ibidem). Indeed, Fianna Fáil tended to magnify “[the] mythical and glorious past” of Ireland (ibidem). This conservatism was employed to feature a communal kind of Ireland that highly prioritized tradition and rested upon some fundamental moral bases like family and the Church. Also, “reactionary conservatism” was used to accentuate the importance of the rural aspect of the Irish lifestyle (ibidem). Such a way of life was seen as a means to preserve tradition and morality. Therefore, “reactionary conservatism” was implemented by de Valera’s party to serve the advocated theme of the glorious Irish past. This theme encompassed elements like tradition, morality, and rurality that would eradicate the notion of change. Instead, such a theme would inspire people to maintain the past and rally around continuity.

Consequently, it is important to deduce that the approach of insularity was nurtured by political conservatism which was highly advocated by Fianna Fáil and its leader Éamon de Valera. Throughout the early years of independence, Fianna Fáil constantly supported and accentuated the idea of a “self-sufficient Ireland” that would not be susceptible to dependence on other nations (Prager 2009, 205). In fact, the essence of protectionism was not only political and economic; it was also cultural. On the political level, the approach aimed at establishing an Irish Free State autonomous from British “colonialism”. From an economic perspective, protectionism was adopted to catalyze and develop the Irish domestic market. In this context, Kennedy, Giblin, and McHugh allude to different economic reasons behind the principle of insularity, like reducing emigration by creating jobs (1988, 40). On the cultural level, Ireland’s protectionist agendas sought to create and forge a distinct Irish identity. In this regard, R.F. Foster, Professor of Irish History, contends that a new national cultural program to “Gaelicize” the Irish Free State was considered in the 1920s to highlight Ireland’s cultural separation from the United Kingdom (1989, 518).

Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the insular approach adopted in Ireland’s independence years entailed a sort of self-confidence and national pride. Indeed, it diverted attention to the cultural specificities of Irishness after an intense experience of colonization. As a result, Irish insularity helped shape and forge a sense of political and, more importantly, a cultural separation from its past “colonizer”, the UK. Although this insular approach might have nurtured a feeling of national pride, such an ideology was no longer efficient afterwards. Dublin had to change its approach to keep up with the outside world and its developments.

2. The Diplomacy of Ireland in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Changed Approach

It is first essential to precise that in this article, the mid-twentieth century refers to the period from post-World War II to the early-1970s. It is crucial to scrutinize the diplomacy
of Ireland during the post-World War II context, which witnessed the emergence of regional and international organizations. In this regard, Brigid Laffan and Jane O’Mahony, experts in European politics, maintain that Dublin showed a sense of inclination to the “multilateral organizations” that surfaced in Europe at that time (2008, 12).

Before examining the diplomacy of Ireland during the mid-twentieth century, it is pertinent to contextualize and highlight the call for change that characterized that period. The latter eventually resulted in the transcendence of protectionism that Dublin had adopted. In this context, Niamh Puirséil maintains that there was a crisis on the political and economic levels in the 1950s (2017, [60]). The depression that prevailed in Ireland caused the rise of unemployment and emigration (ibidem). Not only did these two interconnected phenomena lead to the insular policy of Dublin, but also raised concerns about the need to change such a protectionist outlook. More importantly, after losing power two times in the Irish general election, Fianna Fáil realized that “it was time for change” (ibidem). Consequently, the critical atmosphere of the 1950s increased the party’s awareness of the necessity to alter its convictions (ibidem). Seán Lemass, de Valera’s successor, explicitly called for more openness to the outside world. He reversed the party’s ideology and aspired to make Ireland more “modern” (61).

Lemass’s idea of Ireland differed from that of de Valera, which made him promote a divergent state-building program that entailed openness and change.

In the same context, Lemass believed that Ireland needed to be more outward-looking to integrate itself into the international arena. His approach, dissimilar from de Valera’s, revolved around trying to make Ireland more “business oriented than ever before” (62). Accordingly, along with his administration, Lemass sought to deviate from “economic nationalism”, which was the fundamental ideology of the ruling party under de Valera (ibidem). Economic growth and adaptation were the key goals of his agenda (Brown 2004). Besides, Lemass’s different vision was not limited to economics; he also called for another cultural outlook. Unlike de Valera’s support for a strong attachment to Gaelicism, Lemass advocated cultural openness. Lemass sought to make Ireland less isolated and more receptive to foreign influences. In fact, Lemass’s administration was characterized by its engagement with openness to foreignness as well as change (Brown 2004). Lemass’s economic and cultural approaches were complementary. More precisely, his economic vision to make the country welcome foreign capital and trade required a new cultural agenda of openness to difference.

The constant call for change after World War II paved the way for the adoption of an outward-looking approach which was initiated by Seán Lemass when he ascended to power. His agenda revolved around change and pushed Ireland closer to the outside world. Consequently, Dublin in the mid-twentieth century started to display its interest to become more involved with the regional and international organizations that emerged. Therefore, it is important to allude to Ireland’s move outward in the mid-twentieth century. More precisely, Dublin’s interest to be more open to the outside world was seen in its involvement in the Council of Europe and the United Nations (UN).

2.1 Ireland and The Council of Europe: A Closer Move to Europe

To begin with, Ireland opted for neutrality during World War II. This diplomatic approach isolated Ireland from its counterparts in the European region. In the same context, specialists in Irish Studies, Michael Kennedy and Eunan O’Halpin contend that the impractical protectionist approach that characterized Ireland in the early-twentieth century pushed it closer to Europe (2000, 21). More specifically, the failure of insularity, which intensified Ireland’s diplomatic
isolation, paved the way for the country's interest in international involvement. As a result, Dublin's new outward-looking agenda necessitated its need to move closer to the outside world in general and to Europe in particular.

In practical terms, Ireland joined the Council of Europe in 1949. It is crucial to have recourse to the rationale behind establishing the Council. It was noted in the Statute of the Council of Europe that the Council was formed to forge “a closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe” (Council of Europe 1949, 1). In other words, it sought to solidify a Western European bloc in the fragmented international sphere of the Cold War. Accordingly, the Council of Europe rested upon “democratic” and “capitalist” principles as it included Western European nations that supported “individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law” (ibidem). Indeed, the Council sought to harmonize the Western European region. Thus, it called for “discussing” issues that worried the nations involved in the Council to ultimately reach a collective approach and secure their bloc. The scheme determined and adopted by the Council of Europe paved the way for collective and multilateral actions among the countries involved in the Council.

In this context, it is essential to scrutinize Ireland’s involvement in the Council of Europe. Its membership in such a Council, when the international sphere was divided into two, reflected Dublin’s attempt to move beyond its previous diplomatic isolation and protectionist policy. This proved that Ireland was ready to perform actively on the regional and international levels. More importantly, its involvement in the Council of Europe displayed Ireland’s inclination toward Europe, particularly the Western European bloc. As a result, such a propensity mirrored Dublin’s adherence to the capitalist ideology and guidelines supported by the West at that time. Ireland’s inclination also showed its commitment to forge a more dynamic diplomatic identity and to start playing a more active role in the regional arena.

Furthermore, the adoption of the Western and pro-capitalist ideology reflected the desire of Ireland to completely change its inefficient protectionist policy and adapt itself to the guidelines propagated by West. Dublin’s membership in the Council of Europe was probably a pragmatic strategy to move away from its past colonial experience. More remarkably, it is crucial to notice that Ireland joined the Council of Europe to enhance its status in the international arena and move closer to its Western European counterparts. Also, such an involvement unveiled Ireland’s adherence to the key principles of the Council, which included “cooperation” and “collective action” to bring about peace and justice, particularly in the European region. Therefore, Dublin showed its inclination to the principle of “multiculturalism” that this Council seemed to embrace. Accordingly, it is essential to allude to Ireland’s involvement in multilateral organizations like the UN.

2.2 Ireland in the UN: A Multilateral Approach

Dublin displayed another attempt to move beyond its previous isolation on the international and regional levels. Indeed, this initiative consisted of its membership in the UN. To begin with, it is essential to highlight the principles upon which the UN was initially based. The key purposes of this entity were introduced in the Charter of the UN, which included securing “international peace and security” by embracing “the principles of justice and international law” (Department of State 1945, 3). Indeed, The UN aspired to preserve world peace and order through pacific means and collective action among states. Moreover, the UN Charter included multilateral solutions resolving disputes, such as opting for “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice” (UN 1945, 8). Consequently, Dublin's willingness to become part of the UN reflected its adherence to the core multilateral ethos of such an organization.

Ireland was accepted to join the UN at the end of 1955. Irish Diplomat and former representative of Ireland to the UN from 1998 to 2005, Richard Ryan, argues that Dublin's entry to the UN was a significant move (2003, 13). Its involvement in the UN was a highly important aspect of the Irish foreign agenda in that specific Cold War and post-World War I climate. Although it opted for neutrality during World War II, Dublin showed its propensity for collective action afterwards. Accordingly, former Secretary of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Noel Dorr, maintains that Ireland's willingness to join the UN was catalyzed by its belief in the principle of "collective security" (1996, 41). In the same context, the Political Scientist Hans Kelsen tackles the concept of collective security. According to Kelsen, collective security revolves around finding an agreement on how to curb potential “violations of the law” (1948, 783). Also, it is one of the major purposes of the UN (ibidem). It is possible to note that the neutral diplomatic stance of Ireland did not restrain its commitment to peace and justice through collective and pacific means.

The intense colonial experience undergone by Ireland nurtured its interest in joining an entity like the UN, which would assert collective security. Consequently, as a member of the UN, Dublin did not hesitate to exhibit its active performance. Professor Christophe Gillissen argues that Ireland was prompt to shape its “reputation” as a member of the UN (2008, 153). More precisely, it presented itself as an “independent” and “anti-imperialist” member state right after its membership (ibidem). Therefore, participation in the UN enabled Dublin to take a significant step forward and become more active in the international arena. Indeed, it is crucial to highlight that the Irish involvement in the UN allowed Dublin to simultaneously address world concerns and build diplomatic relations.

In his scrutiny of Ireland's UN performance, Dorr describes the epoch from the late-1950s to the 1960s as “[the] golden age of Irish UN membership” (1996, 43). As a UN member, Dublin sought to become more active and dynamic in the international sphere. Moreover, it is crucial to note that Ireland was asked to “delegate” the UN's General Assembly. The task of the delegation was inevitably a productive and rewarding experience that allowed Ireland to develop on the international level. Thus, it is essential to acknowledge Ireland's management of delegations and its importance for Dublin as well as its foreign agenda. In this regard, Dorr asserts the prominence of the ones conducted by the Minister for External Affairs in 1956, Liam Cosgrave, and, later, by his successor Frank Aiken (44). The first Irish delegation, managed by Cosgrave, accentuated Ireland's basic precepts as a UN member (Murphy 1998, 26). In practical terms, Cosgrave constantly emphasized Dublin's simultaneous commitment to meet the purposes stated in the UN Charter and to secure its independent position (ibidem). Therefore, it is necessary to note that as a UN member, Ireland sought to preserve its independent status, more specifically, its interests. Yet, it still showed an active commitment to world matters and collective action through leading delegations. Most importantly, Ireland's belief in and adherence to multilateralism was crucial in catalyzing its performance as a UN member. Dublin's foreign policy principles were compatible with the aspirations of the UN.

Dublin's diplomatic approach needed to meet the fundamental aims of the UN and to be consistent with these purposes. Accordingly, Ireland continuously expressed its commitment to peacekeeping. In practice, Dublin participated in peace-keeping actions beyond its borders, regardless of its small “size” and lack of “resources” (29). Furthermore, it is crucial to mention Dublin's engagement in making the General Assembly address the South African “apartheid issue” in its scheme (Dorr 1996, 46). Ireland's delegation was, indeed, tainted by an “anti-colonial” stance in 1960 (43). Dublin's previous experience with colonialism influenced such an anti-imperial
position. Also, the intense Irish strife, which included bloodshed, to ultimately gain independence shaped such a diplomatic stance. Moreover, Murphy alludes to Frank Aiken’s proposition of “military disengagement in Central Europe and general disarmament” in the late-1950s (1998, 28). The suggestion to curb the spread of “nuclear weapons” was neither welcomed nor supported by Western nations in that context (Dorr 1996, 46). Yet, this proposition was accepted in 1961 by the General Assembly after several discussions between “major powers” (ibidem). Therefore, Ireland constantly showed its anti-imperialist character and its commitment to peacekeeping. Both principles were inevitably catalyzed by Dublin’s past struggle with colonialism.

In addition, under Cosgrave’s rule, Ireland’s diplomacy was considered “pro-Western” and “anti-Communist” (Murphy 1998, 27). This shows that Ireland sought to preserve friendly relations with the Western bloc, mainly the United States of America (US) and Western Europe. Noel Dorr contends that the diplomatic positions of Dublin in the Cold War atmosphere were cautious (1996, 48). Despite its “courage” and anti-imperial stance, Ireland was still cautious about securing its special relations with the US and Western Europe (ibidem). This was seen in Ireland’s involvement in resolving the Algerian conflict then. Although it lucidly intended to opt for a “pro-Algerian stance”, Ireland considered the need to avoid any potential “upsetting resolution” that would lead to the “radicalisation” of the UN (Gillissen 2008, 166). It is important to note that Dublin explicitly called for the end of imperialism as a UN member. Nevertheless, it considered the significance of securing cordial alliances with Western states, like France in this case. As a result, it is possible to maintain that its “UN policy” witnessed some changes (ibidem). Indeed, these shifts in Dublin’s UN plans were the outcome of its oscillation between anti-imperialism and its special relations with the West.

In his assessment of the Irish UN performance, Murphy deduces that Dublin managed to reach the position of a “middle power” in the UN due to its several peace-keeping operations (1998, 28). The international climate of the Cold War paved the way for Ireland’s “middle power status” (ibidem) in the UN. More precisely, the concepts of multilateralism and “collective security” (29) were accentuated in such a delicate bipolar context. In this regard, Richard Ryan maintains that multilateralism was essential for states like Ireland which had thoroughly struggled with colonialism (2003, 13). As a result, that allowed Ireland to have a “middle power” position in the UN through its contribution to different peace-keeping operations. Murphy contends that Ireland was perceived as a “peacekeeper” or “middle power” policeman at that time (1998, 29). Thus, its participation in the UN enabled Dublin to move beyond its past isolation and assert its position on the international level.

3. The Diplomacy of Ireland in the Late-Twentieth Century: A European Member State

To begin with, to avoid any chronological ambiguities, it is crucial to specify that in this article, the late-twentieth century started when Ireland joined the European Communities (EC) in 1972. The aim is to mainly scrutinize the diplomacy of Ireland starting from that year, as an official member of the EC, then, in the following years as a member of the European Union (EU). In fact, Ireland managed to embrace and, eventually, put into effect its aspiration of moving closer to Europe. In this regard, Laffan and O’Mahony comment that Ireland’s involvement in the institutional bodies of the European region pushed the country closer to Europe (2008, 30). According to them, Ireland’s “success” as an EU member state made it “a model” for other European and even non-European states (219).

First, it is important to contextualize and briefly refer to Ireland’s official involvement in the institutional entities of the European region. Dublin’s attempt to move closer to Europe was
concretized by signing Ireland’s Treaty of Accession to the EC in 1972. Afterwards, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was highly supported in Ireland (The European Union 1992). The document included several ethos according to which the European Union would function. It called for economic balance and development in a harmonious region where internal borders between the involved member states would not exist (The European Union 1992). Consequently, Ireland’s participation in the EU reflected its willingness to become more involved regionally and internationally. This section tackles the cooperative aspect of Ireland as a European member state. It also highlights the Irish presidencies of the Council of Europe.

3.1 A Cooperative Irish Member State in the European Region

It is significant to highlight the Irish-British relations as co-member states in the EC and, later, the EU, after their former conflictual disputes. In this context, Professor of Philosophy Richard Kearney argues that Ireland’s involvement in the EC provided Dublin with a new “self-understanding” and more “international relations” (2010, 41). Therefore, Kearney asserts the British-Irish inclination to “reconciliation” catalysed by the process of integration in the European region (ibidem). In practice, signing the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 reflected the settlement of the Irish-British violent dispute. Indeed, the “peace process”, aimed by both governments, resulted in such a consensus (Ruane, Todd 2003, 121). The document legalized the “union” between Northern Ireland and Britain (ibidem) and enabled Northern Irish citizens to be “British or Irish or both” (Kearney 2010, 41). There was no imposition of one single identity; these citizens were instead allowed to choose. In his scrutiny, Kearney deduces that this Agreement suggested that the British and Irish nations were required to “redefine” themselves in such an integrated European context (49). Moreover, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 proposed forming a British-Irish Council (BIC) to induce “cooperation” between both islands “in a transnational context” (41).

A BIC was advocated to consolidate as well as shape “harmonious and mutually beneficial” alliances between these islands and their peoples (The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement 1998, 16). A BIC was needed to stimulate “cooperation” and “consensus” on common issues and interests (ibidem). Thus, this BIC was suggested to harmonize and solidify the relations between the Irish and the British. Kearney puts emphasis on the inclusive nature of the proposed Council, indeed, its involved members were from “the British and Irish governments, the devolved assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” (2010, 49). Therefore, it is vital to note that this Council sought to create cohesion between both islands and peoples through inclusion, mutual benefits and exchanges. The rationale behind Richard Kearney’s analysis was to decipher the nature of “Hibernization”, which entails Irish specificities and their potential influence, in dealing with “identity conflicts in Europe” (McCall, Wilson 2010, 34). As a result, Kearney’s (2010) analysis suggests that the Irish strategy of solving such intense conflicts and disputes might be “an inspiration” or a model to other European states. Kearney (2010) contends that Ireland’s way of dealing with its ethno-religious conflicts could embody an “inspiring” model for the Balkans and Cyprus. In this regard, Ireland’s diplomacy as a member state of the European institutional bodies might also be a model. Indeed, its integration in the region entailed a serious sense of cooperation and pacifism.

---

1 Also named the Maastricht Treaty which sought to build a coherent Union that would bring the member states of Europe and their peoples closer.

2 Also known as the Belfast Agreement signed in 1998, after various negotiations and discussions between the governments of Northern Ireland, the UK, and the Republic of Ireland.
3.2 Ireland’s Presidencies of the Council of Europe

Ireland’s involvement and integration in the European region’s institutional entities made Dublin more active in the regional and international spheres. In this context, Laffan and O’Mahony maintain that Irish participation in European matters developed the process of policymaking in Dublin (2008, 177). Ireland, in this international climate, especially during its economic success, known as the Celtic Tiger, was able to look for its interests outward. For instance, Laffan and O’Mahony highlight Ireland’s attempts to establish economic relations with South-East Asia (*ibidem*). The contributions of Dublin as a member of the European institutional entities, particularly the EU, should be assessed.

Laffan and O’Mahony argue that Dublin was given the “opportunity” to preside over the Council of Europe six times (41-42). Indeed, that mission has inevitably impacted and changed the Irish national sphere (61). It is then necessary to precise the functions of the Council of Europe. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the role of the Council of Europe is to direct “the general political directions and priorities” of the Union (Official Journal of the European Union 2012). In practical terms, the Council of Europe has managed the “European integration process” and “crisis” (de Schoutheete 2017, 58). Former Belgian Diplomat Philippe de Schoutheete depicts the Council of Europe as a fundamental “locus of power” (65). Accordingly, it is crucial to tackle the Irish presidency of the Council of Europe, which represents the power of the EU. Laffan and O’Mahony argue that different EU analysts have positively approached most Irish presidencies on the European level (2008, 40). In this regard, they refer to Peter Ludlow’s statement that the Irish managed to handle “successful” presidencies by prioritizing European interests instead of pursuing national ones (*ibidem*). The Fine Gael politician Garret FitzGerald3 also highlights that the Irish presidencies, led by a “small country” and a new member of the EC, enhanced its image in the European region (2002, 131-132). Through presiding the Council of Europe, Dublin showed its commitment and competence to run “successful” presidencies over the European Community and the European Union. More precisely, Garret FitzGerald accentuates the “success” of the Irish presidencies on the European level in solving some challenges (132). For example, he alludes to Dublin’s presidency in 1994, which managed to draft an EU Treaty that was later signed in Amsterdam (*ibidem*).

Moreover, Ireland showed its involvement in the European institutional bodies through joining the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Laffan and O’Mahony maintain that the EPC entailed more “coordination” between the member states’ foreign policies (2008, 175). Dublin’s involvement in the EPC necessitated a divergent approach to “international politics” (41). Ireland’s integration into the EPC required less focus on national interests and more concentration on European ones. Nevertheless, participation in the EPC has impacted the Irish policymaking process and benefited the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (183). The need to collectively work with other member states has inevitably influenced and enriched Irish foreign policymaking. As a result, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs was required to deal with European and Irish matters. Laffan and O’Mahony emphasize the development of this Department to fulfill its new tasks that were demanded by its European membership (*ibidem*). More precisely, Irish policymakers needed to cooperate with Diplomats from other member states as they became more engaged in European international missions. Later, a more “ambitious” foreign policy suggestion called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was discussed at Maastricht (175). The European Union’s “three pillars” encompassed this political proposition (Watts 2008a, 235), which

---

3 He ran the Irish government twice from 1981 to 1982 and from 1982 to 1987.
mirrored the evolved political ambition of this European apparatus. This political development enabled Dublin to act in a “multilateral” way. It is important to note that Ireland’s participation in this diplomatic cooperation implied enhancing its status in the international sphere.

4. The Diplomacy of Ireland from the Mid to the Late-Twentieth Century: A Model for Other Small States?

As mentioned above, in the mid-twentieth century, Ireland moved beyond its past protectionist policy that isolated it regionally and globally. The change of approach that characterized Ireland in the mid-twentieth century pushed the country to concretize its aspiration to become more open. Indeed, the fact that Dublin managed to put its ambition into effect reflected its determination to move forward and keep up with the rest of the world. The outcomes of its changed international diplomacy became evident in the mid-twentieth century. In that context, characterized by post-World War II and the emergence of the Cold War, Ireland was willing to become more integrated into the European region and move closer to its Western European neighbours. Consequently, it joined the Council of Europe and adhered to its fundamental precepts. Besides the regional level, Dublin sought to further integrate itself into the international arena by participating in the UN. In both entities, the Council of Europe and the United Nations, Ireland exhibited the belief in and adherence to the principle of “multiculturalism”. The Political Scientist Antonio Franceschet (2016) maintains that “multilateralism” is a strategy that seeks to settle the issue of coercion. Indeed, Franceschet contends that the guidelines of multiculturalism have been shaped and further promoted by organizations such as the UN.

Accordingly, Ireland can possibly be considered a “model” for other small states due to its commitment to be an active member on the regional and international levels. Dublin's decision to transcend its protectionism, a significant feature of its independence, was a positive initiative. Although insularity was a policy that reinforced the independent nature of the state, Irish policymakers were prompt to call for the need to change it. Despite its importance, protectionism’s lacunae blocked Ireland from moving forward. Indeed, that policy was not as rewarding as it used to be. More precisely, it made Ireland more isolated and alienated on different levels. Accordingly, insularity was no longer as adequate and efficient as before. It is possible to note that the inclination to change such a significant approach that helped normalize and assert the independent status of Ireland was a pragmatic move. It was necessary to leave protectionism behind for Ireland to keep up with the rest of the world. Consequently, the idea that Ireland did not radically hold onto its insularity can be a model for other small states. More specifically, it is essential to acknowledge the need for change to keep up with the new trends.

In the late-twentieth century, as an official member of the European region’s institutional bodies, Dublin displayed its possession of an active diplomatic role and position. According to Barrett, Laffan, Thom et al., in the early years of membership in the EC, Ireland aimed to economically “catch-up” with the other member states (2008, 5). On the economic level, participation in the EC pushed Dublin to opt for more openness and interdependence with its co-members. It is crucial to mention that Ireland managed to move from poverty to affluence as a member state of the EC and later the EU. After experiencing economic malaise in the 1980s, Ireland witnessed an unprecedented economic opulence, known as the Celtic Tiger, in the 1990s. The origins of this economic affluence were open to many interpretations, both internal and external factors were highlighted. For instance, former Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald argues that participating in the EC was economically rewarding for Ireland (2002, 125). Indeed, it provided Dublin with access to a wider “continental market” (ibidem). Besides,
it is essential to have recourse to the European Structural Funds given to Ireland, among the other peripheral member states, to help it economically “catch-up” with the others.

Among the endogenous factors that stimulated the Irish economic boom in the 1990s, it is necessary to note the domestic use of the European Funds. Laffan and O’Mahony contend that these Funds were spent to evolve the “physical infrastructure” (2008, 233). For example, they highlight the investment in “roads, telecommunications, public transport and ports” (ibidem). John Bradley and Eithne Murphy maintain that nearly 60 percent were dedicated to the implementation of infrastructural plans (1989, 282). The commitment to improving the state’s infrastructure was a pragmatic strategy that helped facilitate foreign investment afterwards. Also, Laffan and O’Mahony allude to the Irish investment to develop human capital with these Funds, like education (2008, 233). They argue that Dublin sought to improve education and professional training, particularly in electronics and software, due to their growing importance at that time (226). Investment in human capital was a pragmatic future-oriented strategy that would produce a well-prepared and skilled labor force in emerging fields like software. Thus, human investment was a strategic move that could lead to efficient economic results. Indeed, Laffan and O’Mahony argue that the existence of “skilled workers” in Ireland further encouraged foreign direct investment (232). In this context, John D. Fitz Gerald suggests that “lessons” could be extracted from the Irish use of these Funds (1998, 689). For instance, the Irish experience displayed the importance of developing human capital (ibidem). Such an investment helped Ireland reach the economic convergence that the EC required.

Moreover, in the late-twentieth century, Ireland was able to attract non-European investors by entering the EC (Buckley, Ruane 2006, 1614). Accordingly, the realization of a Single European Market further increased Dublin’s reception of inward investment. In this regard, Fagan contends that Ireland was seen as a convenient place in the European region where multinational American corporations could invest (2002, 138). As a result, various multilateral American firms among which Laffan and O’Mahony (2008) mention “Intel, Dell [and] Microsoft” opened in Ireland (232). The fact that such corporations chose to expand in Ireland showed the suitable and advantageous aspects of its domestic environment. Indeed, some endogenous motives had emerged in Ireland before its participation in the EC like the amendment of the Control of Manufactures Act in 1958 whose aim was to promote foreign investment. This measure reduced taxes and, ultimately, made Ireland a favorable place for investment. Laffan and O’Mahony refer to the use of English as an official spoken language (2008, 226).

Therefore, it is possible to maintain that Ireland’s diplomatic performance in the late-twentieth century can be seen as a model for other small states. Its closer move to Europe and the world helped develop the position of Ireland in the international arena. More importantly, such an integration allowed Ireland to witness an unprecedented economic opulence. However, it is crucial to contend that Dublin seized the different international opportunities and simultaneously worked on improving its domestic sphere. Consequently, it managed to create success and transcend the peripheral position. It is essential to acknowledge the importance of openness to the world. However, it is also necessary to carefully manage the domestic sphere and keep it in touch with the outer world.

To conclude, Ireland made an impressive move from insularity to openness. An amalgamation of domestic and external factors facilitated that shift. Most importantly, Dublin carefully seized the different opportunities and ensured a well-equipped domestic sphere compatible with the new international changes. Ireland can thus be a model for other small states. More specifically, its prompt acknowledgement of moving beyond its protectionism and international isolation to keep up with the world can be an example. Indeed, small states that radically hold
onto insularity can easily succumb to failure on various levels, especially if they have a shortage of material resources. Besides, one should acknowledge the need for domestic change. That was seen in the case of Ireland when it used European Funds to invest in its domestic arena to become an attractive locus for huge corporations later. More generally, Ireland’s move from insularity to openness and from poverty to opulence, can make it a “model” for other small states.

Works Cited


Miscellanea