From the first to the third Critique. Judgment sensible position and Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigkeit

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Abstract. Starting from Lyotard’s definition of Kantian reflection as “judgment repercussion”, my contribution aims to describe the logical side of this repercussion. To do this, I will focus on Kant’s concept of “judgment”, explaining it as the logical act of constitution of experience. I will then point out how judgment involves sensibility for its self-affection and restriction to sensibility. Finally, I’ll give a nominal explication of Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigkeit, returning to Lyotard’s interpretation. The purpose, in so doing, is to offer to Lyotard’s key concept a logical validation, finding its foundation in the Critique of pure Reason itself. And thus to gain an aesthetical definition of Judgment principle, to read the third Critique.

Keywrods: Kant, Judgment, Aesthetics, Zweckmäßigkeit, Lyotard.

1. JUDGMENT REPERCUSSION

In order to mark the difference between the Transcendental Aesthetics in the Critique of Pure Reason and the aesthetics that Kant discusses in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Lyotard begins his Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime with a very important claim. He starts from Kantian distinction between feeling, Gefühl, and sensation, Empfindung (Kant [1790]: 206), and, once that he has pointed out the cognitive finality of the latter, he uses an unusual image to describe the former. He compares feeling to the «inner repercussion» – in French: «retentissement intérieur» (Lyotard [1991]: 18) – that «affects thought as it thinks something» (ibid.), and by which it is aware of its state, of the Gemütszustand, on the occasion of his own operation. By this, he reaches a double goal. On the one hand, he acknowledges to the feeling an independent status. He thinks of feeling as «the tautego-

1 I will refer to English translations only in case of direct quote. As usual, references to the first Critique refers to original editions page numbering.
of reflexion» (21): as the real αἴσθησις, that is «at once both a “state” of the soul and the “information” collected by the soul relative to its state» (13). On the other hand, he connects feeling to the act of thinking. Inasmuch as the repercussion is always thought repercussion, the reflexion of feeling must be, so to speak, logical operations edge or turn-up. Although by status different from logical judgment, feeling is exclusively in this latter, as «a resonance, almost a return in oneself, internal to feeling» (Desideri [2003]: 106). So that one must say: 1) that this resonance occurs at every act of thought as the judgment and the feeling in which thought itself judges «to be “good” or “bad” given the activity in which it is engaged» (Lyotard [1991]: 18). Judgment (in its aesthetic sense), feeling and reflexion are thus the same (17-32). 2) That, as such, for the difference between the various syntheses, feeling must have different gradations, different levels of proportion, one of which must be felt – a priori – as «the most favourable (die zuträglichste)» (Kant [1790]: 238; 123, transl. modified) for thinking. And 3) (Kant’s real problem) that this resonance can be criticised only insofar as it is ascribable to a special faculty, i.e., only qua produced by an a priori principle on its own, through which thought judges itself and its operation.

What Lyotard achieves in this way is, therefore, the identification of the power of judgment principle, i.e., of thought Zweckmäßigheit, in the pure tautegory of reflexion. Which can be heuristic – both in regard to a priori structures, qua critique, and to the effective, a posteriori synthesis, as teleological comprehension of the empirical – only insofar as it is originally aesthetic (see Lyotard [1991]: 32-40).

We have thus, from a Lyotardian point of view, the possibility to read the third Critique as a unitary movement, which: a) in his two Introduction, identifies the principle of Judgment; b) in the Critique of Aesthetics Judgment, develops the principle itself in the experience of it that we can make; c) in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, shows its applications in theoretical cognition.

Nevertheless, how must be conceived thought itself to assume such a reading key? How the simple repercussion – regardless of the ways it presents itself aesthetically?

The aim of the present paper is to answer to these questions, or rather to clarify the relation between Judgment and the aesthetical moment of experience. For even though Lyotard’s interpretation of the third Critique may represent the basis for reading it as a theory of shapes and meaning of experience as rising from the feeling of the logical institution of existence, to formulate such a theory is first and foremost required to validate that basis. Kant itself seems indeed to presuppose Lyotard’s repercussion in at least two passages of the third Critique. 1. In the Vorrede, where it writes that the critique of aesthetics judgments «is the most important part of a critique of this faculty», the power of judgment in general, for «they belong to the faculty of cognition alone (read: they are a result of the act of thought) and prove an immediate relation of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure» (Kant [1790]: 169; 57). And 2. in the definitive Introduction, § VII, where he speaks about pleasure as something that «cannot become an element of cognition at all» but is «connected with it», maybe as «the effect of some cognition» (189; 75). We know, thus, that Kant itself thought of something like Lyotard’s repercussion. But why and in which sense cognition must have a repercussion as its own effect?

The answer to this question – that is the validation of Lyotard’s reading – can be found only if we step back from the third to the first Critique and take the reverse path, explaining what is for Kant thinking and why it implies a sensible moment. To do that, we will make three steps. A first one, on Kant’s determination of the act of thought, that is on judgment, in order to give a more precise definition of it, beyond certain prejudices. A second one, dealing with the way this act involves the aesthetic moment. And a third, finally, on Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigheit as corresponding to the inner repercussion.

We will have, by this way, not the aesthetical

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2 Reading, which is not here our point. Here I can only refer to Lyotard’s (1988), (1990) attempts.
development, but the logical side, the theoretical foundation (for future works) of an aesthetical reading of the third Critique.

2. JUDGMENT AS LOGICAL ACT OF CONSTITUTION

In the Critique of Pure Reason, we can find two important definitions of judgment. A first and best known, in the Transcendental Deduction of 1787: the transcendental one (Kant [1787]: 141). And a second, only logical, in the Metaphysical Deduction. This latter is for us of great consequence because the Metaphysical Deduction itself have as its own goal to show that the act of thinking is judgment, and that judgment and the synthesis implied in experience are the same. The definition Kant gives here, in several times: a) starts indeed from the «logische Verstandesgebrauch» (92); b) notices that this logical use of the understanding is possible only through concepts (93); and c) once said that «the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them» (ibid.; 205), states that «judgments are functions of unity among our representations» (94; ibid.). That is: «unit[ies] of the action (Handlung: activity, deed)» (93; ibid.) to give unity to our representations. In § 10, Kant adds to this that, transcendently, this giving unity is nothing more than «the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition» (103; 210), i.e., synthesis. So that we have at least a first identification between the act of thought, judgment, and synthesis.

This is important for it goes against a very widespread idea, in secondary literature, according to which judgment correspond to the proposition, or to the predicative moment of our cognition. Heidegger, for example, thinks of judgment – in Kant and in general – as the statement (Heidegger [1925/1926]: 153-161, 306 ff.): the Aus-sage (etymologically, the e-nunciation) expressing the significance of things, always already given in intuition (on Heidegger’s problematic position see at least Costa [2003]). La Rocca goes so far as to identify it with linguistic acts, and interpret therefore the critique itself as a transcendental grammar (La Rocca [1999]: 33-53, 48-50). And even in Ferrarin, who aims to stress the synthetic, productive capacity of reason (Ferrarin [2015]: 106), Kant’s concept of judgment is not related to synthesis itself, but clearly defined as «propositional expression» (126 ff., 259).

We can find thus in literature a tendency to reduce Kant’s concept of judgment to the propositional moment of our cognition, that seems to have moreover very solid textual bases. La Rocca quotes, for example, a note from the Entdeckung (La Rocca [1999]: 38, 41 ff.; Kant [1790a]: 193 ff.) in which Kant writes that we must use words even in judgment we do not speak (like saying: judgment is linguistical), and a passage of the Enzyklopädie (Kant [1961]: 31) where Kant grounds the possibility of a general grammar of thought on the existence of languages grammars. But from our point of view these passages are not enough. For, if the point is to comprehend the proper activity of reason, the reduction of judgment to Aus-sage entails at least two problems.

First, the problem already pointed out by Ferrarin, on which depends his distinction between judgment and synthesis (Ferrarin [2015]: 107 ff., 126 ff.). If we turn to the problem of synthetic a priori judgments – he claims –, we can focus on judgment qua propositional expression rather than on the a priori synthesis only reducing Kant’s reason «to a fixed mode of apophantic expression» (127) and excluding practical and aesthetical synthesis from the critique. (He concludes that we must focus on the a priori synthesis, for «the expression “a priori synthesis” applies to all instances of a priori extension, while “judgment” does not» (ibid.). Whereas I wonder if the problem is not, rather, the reduction of judgment to propositional expression).

Second: a problem dealing, instead, with our own standpoint. For, if judgment is nothing more than a proposition, in what sense can we speak about a judgment repercussion? True, we can think up an ursprüngliche Lust der Prädikation, an origi-
nal pleasure for predication springing from the correspondence between things and our claims (Hogrebe [1981]). But in this case what about the infinite variety of empirical pleasures? The sense of the inner repercussion is reduced by this way to a minimum: only to the pleasure we feel in claiming, or in knowing. While the transcendental status of feeling, for which it is an independent faculty of mind (see Kant [1790]: 177 ff.), seems to determine it as the principle leading to every feeling.

In order to solve these problems, it is required a wider horizon, in which arousing the interest in consciousness in general. And this through two passages. First, through the determination of the subject of judgment, or of that which judges. And second, explaining the results of the act of judging, and thus its meaning.

The beginning by its “subject” is necessary exactly to get out from judgment reduction to predicative moment. For, in this latter, subject is indeed always empirical. It is the I who speaks, thinks, or knows; as Schelling writes, always a universalization of my I: «ein bloß empirischer, von eines jeden Ich abstrahirter Begriff» (Schelling [1802]: 355). Whereas the subject of the critique, the only transcendental subject, is reason itself in carrying out its tasks. The image of the tribunal of reason, in which reason is, at the same time, judge and defendant, shows enough its subjectivity (Kant [1781]: XI; on this image and likewise on the reason as subject see Ferrarin [2015]: 267 ff.; [2019]: 153). However, one may also quote other passages from the first Preface: «I humbly admit [...] I have to do merely with reason itself and its pure thinking» (Kant [1781]: XIV; 102). Or from the second, for which it is pure reason who «can and should measure its own capacity» (Kant [1787]: 114; 217)⁴, is not the same unity, the unity of consciousness, reason produces. I accept by this way Ferrarin’s overturning of the classical interpretation of the Critique, according to which consciousness is not the container or the owner of reason, but its reflective result (Ferrarin [2015]: 255). But with two clarifications. A first concerning judgment itself, which by this way shows to be twofold – for if we quote, together, Kant’s transcendental definitions of judgment in B Deduction and in Prolegomena, we see that the act «to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception» (Kant [1787]: 141; 251) means the referring given being to reason, while in the «unification of representations in a consciousness» consciousness is the result (Kant [1783]: 304; 98). And a second, dealing instead with the proper sense of consciousness.

If, indeed, we must say that the consciousness reason in general produces is every given consciousness, every single determined event (or being), from a transcendental, a priori point of view, instead, the result of the pure act of thinking must be think of, in a formal, constitutive sense, as thinking. This latter, moreover, has two sides: its sensible one, by which it is «awakened into exercise» (1; 136) and through which it receives its matter, i.e., it is. And the intellectual one, which elaborates the former. As intellectual act of thought (151) giving unity to representations – that is elaborating, determining the existence (748) –, judgment is, therefore, the deed that the whole reason – «inclusive of pure intuition, understanding, and reason proper» (Ferrarin [2015]: 108) – exercises once awakened. Its result is not, merely, a cognition, a theoretical act, but, transcendentally and more deeply, consciousness in general. Which, on the one hand, includes all reason instances, on the other cannot be, for that, the transcendental apperception.

The thesis that I want to support here is that the unity presupposed by reason in its acts, the unity of reason itself (the «qualitative unity»: Kant [1787]: 114; 217)⁴, is not the same unity, the unity of consciousness, reason produces. I accept by this way Ferrarin’s overturning of the classical interpretation of the Critique, according to which consciousness is not the container or the owner of reason, but its reflective result (Ferrarin [2015]: 255). But with two clarifications. A first concerning judgment itself, which by this way shows to be twofold – for if we quote, together, Kant’s transcendental definitions of judgment in B Deduction and in Prolegomena, we see that the act «to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception» (Kant [1787]: 141; 251) means the referring given being to reason, while in the «unification of representations in a consciousness» consciousness is the result (Kant [1783]: 304; 98). And a second, dealing instead with the proper sense of consciousness.

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3 On this claim Vitiello repeatedly insisted (see Vitiello [1984]: 40; [2021]: 253).

a universal consciousness, or as the transcendental form of it, in which, only, the various consciousness may be. This, as Kant claims in Prolegomena, is the form of nature itself: the condition of possibility of every being, or, in this sense, the structure of the universe (294-297, 318-322). In order that, not only the transcendental dimension opened by Kant’s reason is, after all, on the same plane of Fichte’s Light, of Hegel’s Logische, or of Schelling’s Nature and Transcendental Self-consciousness – for all these terms name indeed the room of appearance of being. But, on a proper Kantian side, the fact that the result of judging is this kind of consciousness means that its transcendental function cannot be reduce to a propositional, neither to a gnoseological moment. Even though one may of course concede that every effective judgment is for Kant a propositional expression (or a cognition), between the effective judgments and the transcendental act of judging there is, indeed, the same relation as between the transcendental (describing the constitutive and a priori form of possible experience) and the empirical, situated consciousness. The formers are individuations of the latter, as well as the semantic articulations of the world, in Heidegger’s sense, are instantiation of transcendental logic. Such that, in conclusion, it is possible to reduce judgment to the predicative moment of cognition only if we remain on the effective plane, not on the proper transcendental.

We find thus the confirmation of the thesis with which we started, i.e., that the literature tends to fall in empirical considerations, whereas it is possible – and required by Kant – to think of judgment as the logical-transcendental act of constitution.

We have, with this, the first element for the validation of Lyotard’s interpretation, that is a definition of Kant’s concept of judgment allowing us to extend the inner repercussion to every consciousness – for judgment qua constitutive act of consciousness, i.e., qua synthesis, is the whole thinking, insofar it com-poses itself into a (theoretical, as well as practical or aesthetical) content, and, in so doing, makes possible experience. We need now to do the second step. For in which ways does judgment, as constitutive act of thought, reflect, echo on itself? How and why must the intellectual act of thinking involves feeling?

3. SELF-AFFECTION AND REFLECTING JUDGMENT

To answer to these questions, we must articulate our second steps in other two. First, we have indeed to return to judgment activity, in order to explain how thinking involves sensibility. And second, we must connect the sensibility account resulting with reflective judgment.

As we saw in the previous paragraph, judgment is indeed the overall activity of the whole reason. It represents not only the intellectual act, but also thought aesthetic moment. Such that the problem we are facing can be solved only developing it in its concrete exercise. This is the object of the second part of the Analytic (see Kant [1787]: 172), that is of that Analytic of Principles Kant himself names in its entirety «transcendental doctrine of power of judgment» (171, 175; 268, 270). Which starts defining the power of judgment as «the faculty to subsume» (171; 268), but – having into itself also schematism – must continue specifying that subsumption itself is possible only for a reverse movement, through which imagination gives concepts their reality.

We have therefore an explication of judging in two moments: a bottom-up movement, that is «subsumption of an object under a concept» (Kant [1787]: 176); and at the same time a top-down effect, i.e., restriction, application of concepts to sensibility (see 179, 186). As La Rocca pointed out from a semantical point of view, both are complementary sides of the same deed (La Rocca [1990]: 33-36, 46 ff.). They are overall the above-

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5 I extend by this to the whole German Idealism Ferrarin’s idea that Kant’s reason is more similar to Hegel’s, as scholars and literature admit (Ferrarin [2019]: 137-194). On Fichte’s and Schelling’s perspectives, see at least Schneck (2009).

6 I interpret in this way the Enzyklopädievorlesung and the other passages on the same topic quoted by La Rocca.
mentioned elaboration of the given by the understanding.

Now, although Kant stress always the former, the first thing we must say is that judgment proper activity is the latter. For, if with judgment we take the constitutive act of experience, what the transcendental doctrine of power of judgment describes through schemata and in *Grundsätze* is the way in which thought makes itself sensible in Nature. Its result is thought act, insofar it is the determination of the ontological framework of space and time. So that, even though thought, logically, a judgment is more subsumption than restriction – because logically, i.e., from the point of view of the *Erkenntnisvermögen*, we consider intuition as already given\(^7\) – transcendental, instead, (like saying: regarding judgment objective realisation) we cannot distinguish subsumption from restriction.

Although transcendental analysis can isolate in thought different forms, that connect back to different sources (faculties), for Kant thought truth or effectiveness consists only in its activity (Ferrarin [2015]: 116 ff.). This truth, as Vitiello showed (Vitiello [1984]: 39-42), is schematism, that gives reality to every concept, especially to categories – «for otherwise they would be without all content, and thus would be mere logical forms, and not pure concepts of the understanding» (Kant [1787]: 175; 270). Such that, even though sensibility must be independent from the understanding; even though its a priori forms cannot be reduced to categories, for the forms with which thinking thinks are not the same through and in which it is – we must say that sensibility, for Kant, can be not yet thought but still given, only if judging constitutes giveness itself.

As Kant writes, «the forms of intuition» and not only the formal intuitions of space and time, i.e., space and time themselves, are indeed the first product of imagination, at the moment in which thought is given. They – Kant continues – «can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its [of the activity] representation, thus the way it is affected through itself» (Kant [1787]: 67 ff.; 189; italics mine)\(^8\). In fact, they, space and time, are thinking opening itself into consciousness horizon, or rather the forms of this horizon insofar it happens. Whereas categories are of course forms of the same horizon, but as thought, or as determined. Through the act of judging and its schematisations, space and time are the ways in which reason represents its being: the product of the figurative synthesis of the imagination, which in turn is nothing other than the «synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense» (154; 258). As such, a product of *Urteilskraft* (Kant [1914]: 212). In order that sensibility cannot be separated from thought activity but is involved as its first effect on the subject.

We have with this the answer to the questions posed at the end of the previous paragraph. For, combined with judgment definition in terms of concepts sensible realisation, Kant’s theory of self-affection explains the way in which judgment exercises on itself a repercussion – «that action on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, about which we rightly say that the inner sense is thereby affected» (ibid.) –, thanks to the fact that every time we have a consciousness, this having cannot be only logical, a concept, but is, and is sensibly. To judgment position corresponds a being in space and time, an affectation, through which thought have or is aware of its occurrence. This, in turn, from the point of view of cognition (consciousness objective determination) is a sensation: a modification on the state of consciousness, corresponding to an object. But as simple modification of the state of mind, i.e., subjectively, as we have seen, for Kant it is not sensation: is a feeling. We can therefore conclude that to every act of thought, to every judgment must correspond a modification in consciousness having itself, i.e., a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.

Insofar as judgment is, feeling is the subjective side of this being. It is «that which must always

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\(^7\) This is the reason why Kant defines judgment always in terms of subsumption (see Kant [1787]: 131; [1914]: 201; [1790]: 179).

remain merely subjective» (Kant [1790]: 206; 92), namely the fact that judgment has itself, its judging, merely as judging: as activity, without any regard for the objects this activity produces. Such that thought, reason position, on the one hand, must produce a Sinnlichkeit, an objective sensibility, in which it finds its being as content (Sinn) of its own deed. But, on the other, it implies for thought an only subjective «Vermögen oder Empfänglichkeit» (Kant [1914]: 207), the possibility, the faculty of a self-passivity – we could say: of judgment (or subject) being subjected to itself –, through which this latter feels its own state.

The transcendental power of judgment in general, the logical power of thinking, must from this point of view involve a reflexion not for an additional function, different from the logical determination of its position, but as repercussion of this position itself. Reflecting is in this sense every single judgment, transcendental as well empirical (see contra Guyer [2003]: 29, which claims that determining and reflecting are the same only in empirical judgments), insofar the power of judgment is (and is aware of itself) only in feeling. A judgment is therefore reflecting insofar it is determining, and determining only for reflecting. Both are two sides of the same coin: of the same faculty (activity). Which, as Kant writes, logically is not a proper, independent Vermögen (on Kant [1914]: 202, he claims that is «gar nicht selbständiges», like saying: it is only a moment of whole reason, its power to be effective). But as inner repercussion, as reflecting power of judgment, must be thought of, instead, as a constitutive principle on its own (Kant [1790]: 177), or rather as the transcendental Vermögen of reason for which there can be a feeling of pleasure or displeasure at every thought occurrence.

We gain, thus, the second step of the validation of Lyotard’s concept of retentissement intérieur, that is the demonstration of how and why to every act of thought must relate a sensible position and a feeling. In the guise as introduction of its aesthetical meaning we want to pose only one last question. That is: in which way Kant himself comprehends reflection? Or rather: why he names the (logically) so described reflection Zweckmäßigkeit?

4. IN THE GUISE AS CONCLUSION: THE CONCEPT OF ZWECKMÄSSIGKEIT AND THE FINALISATION OF EXPERIENCE

In the previous paragraphs we followed a precise path. We started from Lyotard’s concept of judgment inner repercussion, taking it as a possible reading key from the third Critique and asking for its validation. To find this latter, we tried to redefine the transcendental meaning of Kant’s judgment as thought constitutive act, producing consciousness. In the second step, we explained then the way in which this act involves sensibility and implies a reflection in a feeling. Now, in conclusion, I want to make a final step, to present a first, temporary clarification of the concept as which Kant labels aesthetical dimension.

Following § V of the Erste Einleitung (Kant [1914]: 214-216) and §§ IV, V of the published Introduction (Kant [1790]: 179-186), this «special a priori concept that has its origin strictly in the reflecting power of judgment» (181; 68) is the concept of Zweckmäßigkeit. In order to gain a first comprehension of what Kant means with, it is maybe required to return to Lyotard and his way of thinking about repercussion.

Because of the initial focus of our discussion, Lyotard’s interpretation may offer lots of suggestion, indeed, especially if we abide by the distinction between the tautology of reflection and its heuristic use. For us, this latter is extremely important to centralise Kant’s presentation of the concept. For in the first and definitive Introductions, Kant starts from a too wide perspective. In both, he begins from the problem of empirical laws, moves then on to the experience as system, and finally arrives to transcendental principle (179 ff.; Kant [1914]: 202 ff., 208-211)9. Whereas Lyotard focuses on pure reflection starting directly

9 For a reconstruction of the two Introductions, see at least, respectively, Anceschi (1979) and Garroni (1986): 283-296.
from the feeling as accordance of thought faculties, and only then return to the finality as a correspondent «harmonie qui est toute logique» (Lyotard [1991]: 14). The distinction between tautegorical subjectivity and heuristic use of reflection is the next step (17-23, 32-38), that gives him the possibility to isolate feeling – and allows us to find in this context a more specific way to think of Zweckmäßigkeit.

In order to present the reflective manners in general, Lyotard turns indeed to Kant’s essay on What does it means to orient oneself in thinking? (Kant [1786]), in analogy with which he defines the transcendental situation of thinking as correspondent to that of the I.

As well as to orient oneself empirically is needed «the feeling of a difference in my own subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands» (134; 8), from a transcendental point of view is required for Lyotard a «all subjective non-congruence» (Lyotard [1991]: 42) on thinking, through which this latter is aware of (or feels) its own state. Before the distinction between heuristic and tautegorical, reflection, in general, is this. It is this the mere Zweckmäßigkeit, which for the tautegory becomes heuristic, thus orientational. That is the mere subjectivity, or rather that thinking without thoughts we above defined as Empfänglichkeit.

Confirmations of this may be found, for instances, in Kant’s First Introduction to the Critique of Power of Judgment (Kant [1914]: 207 ff., 232-234), and even more in the semantic shift in Kant’s use of heautonomy, which in the first Introduction is referred only to aesthetic judgments (225), while in the Critique defines the overall being principle of Judgment to itself (Kant [1790]: 185 ff., 288, 385). In this sense, if we want to clarify the sense of Kant’s Zweckmäßigkeit, we can think of it as the purposive assumption of thinking for itself, which can be shown even in a nominal and etymological translation of the term.

Far from saying indeed a mere purposiveness, as it is usually translated in English, the idea Kant underlies in German is that of the mere fact that something is in compliance, gemäß, with the purpose. This something, in the case of a pure and a priori principle, is not a thing but a simple consciousness, a given judgment, insofar it conforms to (sich stimmt... zusammen) the possibility of experience. What in Zweckmäßigkeit complies (or, aesthetically, is in accordance: at once, gemäß and übereinstimmend) with the purpose is, therefore, a thought, of which thinking is aware as corresponding to its forms. Purpose is in this sense the transcendental synthesis of constitution of experience, not for but in which the given synthesis conforms to itself. Such that – as we have seen –, this conforming is not an additional logical moment in the synthesis of the experience but the reflection of this synthesis, in both the genitive senses.

If the logical function of the power of judgment is the act of determining with which thought subsumes under its forms the given and elaborates it objectively, the reflecting judgment must be defined overall, instead, – we can conclude – as the Empfänglichkeit, the repercussion or the inflection of thought position, to which it is subjected. As concept of this transcendental dynamic, Zweckmäßigkeit means this judging movement through and in which it is. That – to return to the sketch of reading of the third Critique given from Lyotard – in its aesthetical case find a completely pure experience, i.e. the pure principle itself. Whereas in the heuristic cases (of teleology, but for Lyotard [1991]: 15 ff., 37 ff. also of the same critique) has its theoretical applications, or its reflection on cognition (see for example Kant [1790]: 194). The difference between the two cases leads on the determination of the purpose, Zweck, that in the second is no more judging itself, the accordance of thought mere faculties (Vermögen, possibilities; see Kant [1790]: 189 ff., 287), but a given and determined thought. I.e., the determination of an object, which possibility (which form) is comprehended as produced in accordance with its concept.

We have by this an overview of the third Critique to develop, grounded on a logical explication of its central concept.
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