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## Note & Recensioni

**Marcos Silva (ed.), *How Colours Matter to Philosophy*, Springer, New York 2017, 326 pp.**

«Colours induce us to philosophize». This is how the editor's *Introduction* to this ambitious volume begins. Eighteen papers, divided into three parts, consider the relation between colour and philosophy from different points of view: History of Philosophy (Part I), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Part II) and Philosophy of Language and Logic (Part III). In fact, one of the goals of Silva, who is also the editor of another volume on *Colours in the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), is to broaden the focus of the philosophical debate on colour, centered until now «primarily in the naturalist tradition of analytic philosophy». Silva's reference here is to some classical texts such as *Readings on Color*, edited by Byrne and Hilbert (1996), and *Colors for Philosophers* by C. L. Hardin (1988). These books are quoted and discussed quite often inside the volume, but the connection that they state between the very idea of colour and the enquiries of natural sciences is not the only point of view. In this respect, Silva's work aims at building a bridge between the «analytic and continental philosophical traditions» in relation to the question of colour. This means also that «the extant literature based on the naturalistic tradition» has to be examined «given the grounding of a conscientious historical perspective». It is not by chance that the first two essays of the book are dedicated respectively to Democritus and Plato. Moreover, according to Silva, it is necessary to extend the investigation on colour also to the sphere of language and logic (and this is actually what he does in the third part of the book).

The first part of the volume starts with a paper by B. Maund, editor of the entry "Colour" for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Maund starts from a famous fragment on colour by Democritus, in order to challenge the traditional difference between eliminativism and dispositionalism. In order to be consistent, he argues, dispositionalism – the theory according to which colours are dispositions to look in a certain way to a certain observer – has to admit a component of error or illusion in our experience. Dispositionalism

becomes compatible, this way, with eliminativism: colours don't really exist in the real world or, as Democritus says, they exist only «by convention».

In the second paper E. Txapartegi tries to show, through an analysis of Plato's *Timaeus*, that colour terms in ancient Greece referred to hues (and not brightness or other aspects, as many scholars suggested). This «adds credibility», according to Txapartegi, to the Universal and Evolutionary (UE) model, suggested by Berlin and Kay at the end of the 1960', according to which there are few basic colour categories to which all languages tend to approximate.

The third essay, by K. Walsh, considers Newton's revolutionary discovery about colour: natural light is not homogeneous but composed of different types of rays, which are reflected in different ways and give birth to different colours. Newton indicates 7 main colours and the author tries to investigate the reason of this. Newton is the starting point also of the following paper, by O. L. Müller, who compares Newton's research on colour to Goethe's. Müller's thesis is that, although Newton got the "right" result, Goethe reflected more deeply on the method of scientific investigation.

The last three papers of the section focus on Wittgenstein and Husserl. Concerning the latter, J. da Silva confronts Husserl's perspective, according to which truths about colours are synthetic a priori, with Schlick's objection that this kind of truths actually doesn't exist, because they rely on language. The phenomenological perspective is the object also of K. Mülligan's paper, which examines some important similarities between Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Colour* and David Katz's *Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben* (1911). Yet there is also a fundamental difference: «what Katz and other phenomenologists think of as non-contingent connexions between colour phenomena» for Wittgenstein «are in fact rules for using colour words». The section is closed with a paper by A. Lugg, who aims at defending Wittgenstein from the naturalistic trend in philosophy, according to which colours have to be investigated through natural sciences rather than through an analysis of language (see for that A. Danto, *Preface to*

Hardin, cit.). In order to do that, he takes up the case of the impossible colours (the most famous of which is Wittgenstein's "greenish red") and shows that the problems are not solvable by simply substituting the naturalistic approach to Wittgenstein's logical approach.

The second part of the volume opens with a paper by P. Ross, who defends a physicalist view of colour. According to physicalism, colours have to be identified with certain physical properties of objects. Yet this doesn't imply, according to Ross, to consider colour as a «primary quality». Colour remains a «secondary quality», because the physical properties that constitute colours are filtered by our perception. Yet physicalism undergoes also another kind of problem, which is examined by N. Unwin in the following paper. How can we know that other people see the same colours that we see, rather than, for example, inverted colours? Unwin argues against this famous hypothesis of the «inverted spectrum», showing that there are some important analogies between the phenomenology of colour and its physiological perception.

In the third paper, B. Ainbinder asks himself why Heidegger never wrote about colour. According to Ainbinder, far from being a problem for Heidegger's thought (as many scholars state), colours can be considered from an Heideggerian perspective in a way that permits to solve many problems. The following contribution, by Stekeler-Weithofer, goes back to Wittgenstein. Like A. Lugg, Stekeler-Weithofer starts from the privileged position that physical sciences have acquired in the present philosophy of colour. His suggestion, against this physicalist approach, is to understand colour sensations as a limit-concept and colours as general distinctions that we *make*. A guide to this task, according to the author, is not only Wittgenstein, but also Hegel (whose thoughts on colour, however, are not mentioned).

The last paper of this section, by O. Bueno, is dedicated to the question of colour in the arts. Bueno's thesis is that whether colour's phenomenology is quite «constant», its meaning in the arts can «vary» considerably.

The last section starts with an essay by G. Priest, who addresses from a logical point of view an intriguing question: can we see contradictory colours (like red and green) at the same time? Priest's answer is yes. In order to demonstrate this, he shows a continuous progression (a «sorite progression») from red to green, in which the transition-states are at the same time red and green. Colour predicates are «vague», then. This is also the thesis of the following contribution, by D. Raffman. Raffman as well starts from a sorites series of colors, processing from blue to green. She refers to some experiments that have been done, in which the application of colour predicates (blue or green) by the same subject varies according to the two phases – from right to left and vice versa – in which the series is seen. The following two papers are dedicated to the «homology of relations» between natural logic and the logic of colours. Both structures are represented by D. Jaspers through an hexagon of oppositions, while J. Y. Beziau picks up Jaspers' hexagon in order to suggest a combination of colours and «psychic dispositions». The last two contributions are dedicated to some mathematical problems that have to do with colours: the Four Color Theorem, analysed by G. D. Secco and L. C. Pereira in the light of Wittgenstein's idea of a surveyability of mathematical rules, and Ramsey's theory of finite combinatorics, through which W. Carnielli and C. di Prisco investigate «why colors matter for mathematics».

This volume offers a great overview of how broad the question of colour can be. Even more importantly, it shows how colour requires from us a very philosophical task: that of crossing borders. Of course some fields remain barely sketched, for example the problem of colour in art (addressed only in one paper). A deeper investigation of this question may have contributed to shed light on another more general issue. In fact, the volume considers attentively the tension between natural sciences and logic. Yet there is another border that seems to be less considered in this text: the «borderline between logic and the empirical» (Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*, III.19), or between abstract colours and colours in our everyday expe-

rience. If we focus on this sphere – on our normal experience of colour – another question arises. Can the perception of colour really be separated from its meaning? In other words, is it really correct to consider subjectivity – as Stekelr-Weithofer states – as a limit-concept, in order to focus either on colour terms (linguistic approach) or on colour perception (naturalistic approach)? This is a puzzling question indeed and certainly this book increases our will to puzzle.

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(di Alice Barale)

**Menninghaus, W., Wagner, V., Hanich, J., Wasiłiwizky, E., Jacobsen, T., and Koelsch, S.,** *The distancing-embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception*, "Behavioral and Brain Science", 40, 2017, 1-58.

The article of Menninghaus and colleagues focuses on the well-known (and apparent) paradox concerning the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception. On the basis of recent psychological data, the article proposes a model centered on two kinds of mechanisms. The first group of mechanisms (art, representation, and fiction schemata) represents distancing processes that allow the personal safety of the recipients, thereby preventing negative emotions from becoming incompatible with enjoyment and pleasure. The second group of mechanisms (compositional interplays of positive and negative emotions, aesthetic virtues of the representations, and meaning-making efforts) allows recipients to positively embrace the experiencing of negative emotions.

The model represents an interesting proposal, even if at present the hypotheses are too speculative and rest on scarce evidence. Above all, in the present version the model has two relevant theoretical limitations, the first one concerning the distancing factors (1), the second one concerning the embracing factors (2).

(1) The authors correctly stress that negative ordinary emotions have three key properties: they are particularly powerful in securing attentional resources, intense emotional involvement, and privileged storage in memory. According to many strands of evidence, the underlying rationale is that negative ordinary emotions have a strong personal relevance. This is precisely the meaning of the formula quoted by the authors: «bad is stronger than good». Obviously, in virtue of their personal relevance and negative valence, negative ordinary emotions are generally not associated with pleasure and enjoyment. In contrast, negative aesthetic emotions, that is emotions in response to art, are often integrated in pleasurable experiences. According to the model, the precondition of this phenomenon is constituted by the cognitive mech-

anism that keeps negative aesthetic emotions at some psychological distance. As a consequence of the so-called "art, representation, and fiction schemata" (p. 4), subjects are aware that during aesthetic experience there is a condition of personal safety and they are in control of the situation.

So, in line with a widespread agreement among experts, the model posits that negative aesthetic emotions, although genuine and authentic emotional episodes, are not activated by ordinary, immediate, instrumental, and practical personal goals. However, if by definition negative aesthetic emotions entail «little direct personal goal relevance» (p. 13), how can they engage the same three properties of negative ordinary emotions? The authors explicitly argue that the distancing effect «does not convert, let alone erase, negative emotional responses, and need not even reduce the felt intensity of these responses in order to make them (more) compatible with positive enjoyment» (p. 15). However, the distancing mechanism inhibits the strong real-world personal relevance and therefore it does not explain how negative aesthetic emotions can activate a powerful grip on attention, emotional involvement, and high memorability. Moreover, this difficulty cannot be solved by the intervention of the embracing factors. By definition they «allow art recipients to positively embrace the experience of negative emotions» (p. 1): they link a negative experience with a positive one, but they do not endow this negative experience with strong personal relevance. So, this is the first missing point of the model: it does not explain the personal relevance of negative aesthetic emotions and how they can have the same three key properties of negative ordinary emotions.

(2) The pleasurable experience allowed by the embracing factors is denoted by different terms: "enjoyment", ("hedonic") "reward", "rewarding quality", "liking", ("intellectual/emotional") "pleasure", ("pleasurable/positive") "affect", "aesthetic appeal, appraisal, appreciation". However, these terms evidently refer to a heterogeneous set of very different affective and emotional phenomena that ranges from elementary and immediate reac-

tions to elaborated and sophisticated processes of appraisal. So the model does not afford an accurate typology of the pleasurable experiences associated with negative aesthetic emotions.

In particular, the model does not distinguish between first-order pleasurable experiences and higher-order ones. From this point of view, «interplays of positive and negative emotions» (p. 17) and «concomitant mixed emotions as bipolar mediators» (p. 20) are clearly first-order emotional reactions directly experienced in response to the representational properties – such as setting, characters, and events in narrative. In the case of sadness, Menninghaus and colleagues explicitly reject the hypothesis about compassion/empathy as a self-gratifying response involving a meta-emotional (re)appraisal. Accordingly, «aesthetic virtues» factors are largely first-order emotional reactions directly experienced in response to aesthetic properties inherent to the representation itself – such as coloring, execution, poetic style, and so on. On the contrary, there is a widespread agreement among experts that aesthetic pleasure is a higher-order experience accompanying elaboration, grounded in and function of first-order processing experience of artworks. Precisely, it is usually defined as a higher-order phenomenal signals provoked by constant self-monitoring of ongoing cognitive processing, automatically elicited by internal and experiential cues associated with fluency – or dis-fluency, that is insightfully predictive error reduction.

This is another very relevant missing point for the model. Because aesthetic pleasure is a higher-order phenomenon, it is largely irrespective of the artwork's intrinsic affective and emotional contents as such. Even if the first-order experience provided by the artwork is strongly negative, this experience may result pleasurable and appreciated at the higher-level because it allows a relevant dynamic of fluent/dis-fluent understanding. So, for instance, in the case of horror films there is no need of additional explanatory mechanisms like the «benign-masochism hypothesis» (p. 35).

In my view, both the theoretical limitations of the model can be quite easily overcome. The

main step is to consider aesthetic experience as an experience of knowledge: it is a function of previous knowledge and already acquired skills and at the same time a powerful means of improving advancement of understanding and enabling further skills acquisition. Obviously, the basic goal of knowledge can be instantiated in two opposite ways that correspond to two fixed and constantly active sub-goals of the brain: confirmation and preservation, exploration and growth of knowledge. The basic goal of knowledge enables the real-world personal goal relevance of negative aesthetic emotions. Immersed in intense negative feelings, subjects can re-enact emotional schemata previously entrenched in memory and/or discover new emotional features that defy habitual expectations. Accordingly, negative aesthetic emotions can be associated with a pleasurable experience as a consequence of two different forms of aesthetic pleasure, the first one as a fluency-based higher-order experience monitoring the goal of confirmation, the second one as a disfluency-based higher-order experience monitoring the goal of exploration.

In sum, the theoretical limitations of the model directly derive from the mistaken methodological choice of considering the «functional benefits» of art irrelevant for «the immediate experiential correlate of exposure to artworks» (p. 7). On the contrary knowledge plays a pivotal role in determining the experience of art and its personal relevance.

(di Gianluca Consoli)

**François Jullien, *Si près, tout autre. De l'écart et de la rencontre*, Grasset, Paris 2018, pp. 234.**

Con il suo volume *Si près, tout autre. De l'écart et de la rencontre* (Grasset, Paris 2018), François Jullien – filosofo, ellenista e sinologo da molti anni impegnato nell'esplorazione dei rapporti tra pensiero europeo e pensiero cinese – offre al dibattito internazionale un ulteriore, importante momento

di elaborazione della sua riflessione, per molti versi incardinata sulla ricomprensione di quel nodo filosoficamente cruciale che è il tema dell'alterità. In *Si près, tout autre* il punto di partenza dell'indagine sviluppata, con la consueta finezza, dall'autore è costituito dalla consapevolezza che, se «*penser autrement*» è la “parola d'ordine tradizionale” della filosofia, o piuttosto – precisa Jullien – il suo «*vieux rêve*» –, è precisamente la possibilità di accostarsi a qualcosa che sia veramente “altro” a dover essere interrogata e ripensata radicalmente. Cosa significa, insomma, “accedere all'altro”? È possibile farlo? E come?

Secondo l'originale taglio prospettico offerto qui da Jullien, indugiare nella perlustrazione di questi interrogativi significa innanzitutto rilanciare la possibilità di un pensiero che, ponendosi all'altezza di questa sfida teoretica tutt'altro che ovvia, sappia rimettere in discussione abiti di pensiero e pratiche di sapere, “atavicamente” incorporati nella cultura occidentale, che si qualificano invece per la loro tendenza a procedere per opposizioni e distinzioni, per delimitazioni e definizioni. Il che, sempre secondo Jullien, presuppone un'idea del pensiero come strategia demarcante-differenziante che “lavora” con (e a partire da) termini *già* concepiti nella forma di “enti” o di “stati di cose”: termini, cioè, ripiegati sulla loro identità con sé stessi e rigidamente chiusi nel loro isolamento. È quanto la tradizione metafisica occidentale, in modi diversi, ha ratificato e consacrato, eleggendo perentoriamente ad assioma fondativo della propria strategia epistemica l'aristotelico principio di non-contraddizione. Di qui, allora, il prevalere di quella logica disgiuntiva e definitoria (classificatoria e categorizzante) che trasforma le *antonimie* linguistiche, vale a dire le opposizioni e le differenze istituite all'interno del nostro linguaggio comune, in vere e proprie *antinomie* ontologiche ed epistemologiche.

Ebbene, è precisamente a questo livello che, secondo Jullien, occorre *aprire uno scarto* (un «*écart*»), valorizzando e *facendo lavorare* le linee di separazione e di divaricazione, le distanze e le fratture: quelle emergenti innanzitutto tra termini o nozioni che, nella frequentazione ordinaria del

nostro linguaggio quotidiano, tendono a essere assunti semplicemente come “simili”, come “sinonimi” o come “omologhi”. Si tratta allora di introdurre nella fissità dell'ordine logico-linguistico storicamente vigente, nella pretesa trasparenza e nella quiete rassicurante delle sue differenziazioni demarcanti-delimitanti, quell'istanza euristicamente sempre attiva di dissenso e di disturbo, di deregolamentazione e di decategorizzazione, che dissocia il pensiero dalla fissità del “noto”: dall'inerzia del già-conosciuto e del già-pensato. È quanto Jullien traduce, a livelli diversi, attraverso la messa in campo di una vasta costellazione di nozioni-chiave, tra loro strettamente interrelate, che ruotano tutte intorno all'idea dell'effrazione e della trasgressione, del turbamento e della dissidenza: *débordement* e *dérangement*, *décalage* e *clivage*, *embranchement* e *béance*, *dérèglement* e *désarroi*, *défaillance* e *fêlure*.

In questa prospettiva, “pensare altrimenti” significa essere in grado di *fessurare* il dato: significa far esplodere la coerenza semantica, e insieme la coesione sintattica, di quella trama di relazioni attraverso la quale il linguaggio e il pensiero articolano il mondo, e il nostro farne esperienza, in sinonimie e similitudini, in equivalenze e omologie, in rapporti di contrarietà e-o di complementarietà. Ma il punto è che, una volta riassorbito all'interno di quella trama logico-categoriale che il pensiero costruisce per dare ordine e stabilità al caos dell'esperienza, *dell'altro non ne è più nulla*: la riduzione dell'“altro” al rango di “opposto”, infatti, è già il risultato della messa in opera di una strategia di inquadramento che, nel porre *analiticamente* il diverso “di fronte” all'identico – nell'assegnargli, cioè, un ruolo e una funzione all'interno della relazione differenziale-oppositiva (come esemplarmente avviene nel caso della *diairesis* platonica) –, finisce per collocare e per allineare quella stessa presunta alterità nella griglia di un ordine già da sempre governato dalla non-contraddittorietà dell'identico. Includere l'altro nella tessitura di un ordine semantico-concettuale già fondato sul primato preventivamente accordato alla datità dell'identico significa, allora, “perdere” l'altro: significa negarlo, appunto, *in quanto* altro.

Da questo punto di vista, il compito al quale il pensiero deve essere in grado di assolvere si rivela fondamentalmente duplice: si tratta infatti, per un verso, di dare corso a una pratica di *dis-assimilazione del simile* (per scongiurare il rischio omogeneizzante-uniformante di una prospettiva francamente “monistica”) e, per altro verso, di procedere alla messa in atto di un lavoro di *dis-esclusione degli opposti*, intendendo con ciò la capacità che il pensiero deve avere di portare a manifestazione la loro interdipendenza e la loro indisciungibilità (il che, invece, permette di evitare quella scissione della vita, quella lacerazione cioè della sua unità, che è invece l'esito al quale conduce ogni possibile prospettiva di tipo “dualistico”). Di contro a ogni possibile dualismo, dunque, ecco riaffiorare potentemente l'idea eraclitea della *palintropos harmonie*, l'idea cioè di una permanente “cooperazione degli opposti”, da intendersi come un *antixòin* paradossalmente coincidente con la dimensione del *symphèron*.

“Dis-assimilare il simile”, quindi, e *insieme* “dis-escludere gli opposti”: a questo deve mirare un pensiero autenticamente capace di porsi all'altezza di quella sua irrinunciabile sfida teoretica, e insieme etica, che è la ricerca dell'*altro in quanto altro*. È quanto Jullien appunto ci propone nella densa trama argomentativa del suo *Si près, tout autre*. Qui, infatti, quale che sia la coppia di termini apparentemente simili/affini di volta in volta presa in esame (scarto-differenza, senso-coerenza, incontro-relazione, godimento-piacere, ripresa-ripetizione, differire-rinviare, equivocità-ambiguità, altro-opposto, esplorare-spiegare), la messa in atto dell'originale strategia critico-decostruttiva suggerita da Jullien si traduce operativamente nell'*iscrizione* di una distanza, nell'introduzione cioè di una incrinatura (una *fêlure*) e di una divaricazione (un *embranchement*), capace di mantenere produttivamente in *tensione reciproca* i due termini appartenenti a quella medesima coppia concettuale.

In questo modo, ad affiorare con la massima flagranza è la virtù tipicamente *esplorativa* ascrivibile alla nozione di “scarto”: la sua capacità di promuovere il dispiegamento attivo del pensiero

proprio attraverso il riconoscimento di quella inesauribile fecondità di *risorse* semantico-concettuali – risorse da sondare e da difendere, da scrutare e da valorizzare – che è implicita nello spazio *intensivo* del “tra-due” e che, sola, è in grado di aprire il pensiero alla possibilità del “nuovo”. «C'est en percevant de l'écart entre les semblables, à proximité, comme en percevant du commun entre les termes opposés – ci ricorda infatti Jullien – que pense la pensée». A delinarsi così è un quadro interpretativo all'interno del quale è precisamente l'incontro con l'inassimilabile eccedenza di senso incarnata dal “*così accanto-tutt'altro*” a costituire la risorsa essenziale della vita: il vettore capace di favorire e di sollecitare quell'inquieto «*déploiement de la vie en ex-existence*» che, in quanto espressione di una sua «*dé-coïncidence*» rispetto alla positività del già-noto e alla fissità del già-compreso, ha la virtù di rigenerare l'orizzonte del senso.

Procedendo dunque per scarti e “smarcandosi” così dal già-pensato, il pensiero ha la forza di *liberare l'altro*: ha l'abilità di farlo “sgorgare” («*jaillir*») e “risaltare” («*saillir*») come pura *esteriorità* non-sussumibile nell'ordine astratto del concetto: come espressione di un “fuori” che non si lascia integrare funzionalmente nello spazio del “proprio”. Liberare l'altro significa allora liberare la possibilità di fare esperienza, nel finito, dall'interno stesso cioè di quel che *di più vicino vi è nel vicino* – dall'interno stesso, insomma, di quel che *di più sensibile vi è nel sensibile* («*au plus près, au plus sensible du sensible*») –, di qualcosa che eccede il finito stesso. È quello che Jullien non esita a definire come lo spazio *del* “metafisico” (ma con la consapevolezza che “il” metafisico non coincide affatto con “la” metafisica, tradizionalmente intesa). Con questa espressione, infatti, Jullien allude a quella possibilità di trascendere l'immanenza *dall'interno stesso* dell'immanenza della quale la nozione irriducibilmente paradossale di “*jouissance*”, opportunamente “smarcata” dalla nozione solo apparentemente simile di “piacere” (e ricompresa, dunque, proprio attraverso lo “scarto” che la separa da essa), costituisce una delle espressioni esemplari.

Di qui, più in generale, l'emergere del tenore propriamente *etico* ascrivibile alla nozione di “si

*près-tout autre*” tematizzata da Jullien: «L'inouï est [...] une catégorie foncière, à défaut d'être fondatrice, puisque se défiant de l'ontologie. En disant l'Autre si proche, mais ne s'assimilant pas, l'inouï définit de façon rigoureuse ce qui fait la tension propre à l'*ex-istence*. Par suite, en disant cet Autre inaccessible, mais dont on se laisse heurter, l'inouï est une catégorie éthique. Car on accepte, ou non [...] de *rencontrer* cet inouï de l'Autre. “Il faut l'oser”». L'incontro con l'assolutamente Altro richiede, dunque, coraggio e impegno: esige un passaggio dalla logica identitaria del concetto alla logica paradossale dell'esistenza, imperniata innanzitutto sulla densità insieme emotiva e cognitiva del nostro *sentirci in situazione*. In questo senso, l'incontro con l'Altro presuppone la nostra *disponibilità a credere* nella possibilità del suo effettivo dispiegamento: la disponibilità, in termini eraclitei, a “sperare nell'insperabile”. Si tratta dunque di una dimensione che, potendo essere solo *scelta*, fa appello innanzitutto alla nostra libertà. «Croyance *hardie* – scrive, a questo riguardo, Jullien – croire, non pas à ce qui est ou n'est pas, mais bien “que ce qui est est”. *Que ce qui est est*: autrement dit, c'est l'effectif, à portée, mais inaccessible comme il est, ou le “réel”, comme on dit, mais non pas à séparer comme “en soi”, qui est l'inouï; et c'est à cet inouï qu'il faut “croire” pour le rencontrer».

Indice: Avertissements; I. Sous la proximité, la béance (*Ou du plaisir à la jouissance*); II. L'opposé n'est plus autre (*Ou comment les contraires s'entendent entre eux*); III. Il faut fracturer le semblable (*Ou les vrais embranchements n'apparaissent pas*); IV. L'écart qui s'ouvre fait découvrir (*Ou de la jouissance à l'existence*); V. Si près surgit l'Autre (*Ou qu'est-ce que rencontrer?*); *De l'inconscient à l'inouï*.

(di Antonio Valentini)